1 October 1998
The military intervention of South African troops into Lesotho, in the context of a SADC initiative, on Tuesday 22 September has provoked an outcry in our own country. There has been widespread condemnation, ranging from the South African Council of Churches, through the PAC, to right-wing parties. Newspapers have described it as a "bungle", and the Mail and Guardian in its editorial of Friday 25th September apologised "on behalf of South Africans" to the people of Lesotho.
Insofar as all of this reflects a healthy and broad based South African distaste for military actions beyond our borders, it is, in principle, to be welcomed. Indeed, since 1994 our democratic South African government has been extremely reluctant to deploy troops externally. We need, as a nation, to think three and four times before we take military actions, and whatever is done needs to be subjected to close scrutiny and public debate. The SACP welcomes all of this.
But the condemnation of the SADC initiative in Lesotho has generally been grossly unbalanced and unfair. With the blame being thrown at the SANDF and SA government, the main culprits for the crisis in Lesotho have been getting off all too lightly.
In the judgement of the SACP the burden of culpability must lie, in the first instance, with the Lesotho political elite. The key Lesotho political actors, drawn from all the main parties and institutions, emerge from this episode in a very poor light.
The ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) party was the obvious beneficiary of an extremely flawed election in May. Those elections were characterised by widespread and apparently systematic irregularities. The Langa Commission, which produced (perhaps appropriately) a very legalistic document, found that it was not able to prove fraud, but it highlighted serious irregularities in at least 41 of the 80 constituencies.
In a court of law it may be difficult to prove guilt, but since the LCD was entirely the beneficiary of the irregularities, it does not take a rocket scientist to figure things out. The irony is that the LCD would almost certainly have won the elections in any case. The LCD has not helped its own case, since, by being extremely arrogant about the elections and about its own right to rule.
The opposition parties clearly had a case when calling into doubt the fairness of the May elections. But the opposition parties, and King Letsie, were prepared to play a highly reckless game in pursuit of their various objectives. The call for fresh elections, or at the very least by-elections in many constituencies, was absolutely legitimate, as was mass mobilisation around such demands. But the fostering of a creeping coup, the use of the junior ranks of the LDF (historically a problematically partisan army with allegiances to the BNP) to undermine the unity of the army, and to terrorise the police, went way beyond the legitimate. In the days before the SADC intervention, the national radio station had been closed down, some 50 senior officers in the LDF had fled into South Africa and the police were paralysed.
None of the major Lesotho political parties or institutions emerge with shining colours from this episode. There is some evidence that all were involved in acquiring weaponry and setting up militias. In the week before the SADC intervention, the LDC government had become invisible, and failed to appeal to its mass base. The Prime Minister wrote two letters to SADC requesting a military intervention, but was reportedly furious that the letters were made public by the South African government after the SADC intervention had begun. He had wanted to benefit from SADC troops, but he did not want to carry any responsibility for their presence!
When the looting in Maseru spread to other towns (where the security situation had not broken down), the LCD government failed to actively deploy the Lesotho police, and begged, instead for SADC troops to move into other towns as well.
The opposition parties were speculating on the break down of law and order in Lesotho, and failed to condemn what was happening in the LDF. But they have now also failed to assume any responsibility for the destruction of Maseru. The connections that many of these parties have to right-wing and other dubious forces in our country have also become more apparent in the last weeks, as they make all kinds of naïve and ill-judged appeals to the likes of Tony Leon and Roelf Meyer.
As for King Letsie, we should remember that he was active in attempting to dissolve the 1994 elected government (the first democratically elected government in 20 years). This time around he has played a similar game, hoping that a melt-down in the multi-party electoral system would promote the political role of the monarchy.
SADC dynamics have been another factor complicating attempts to ensure democracy and stability in Lesotho. Many of the more conservative SADC heads of state see mass protests in neighbouring states as a "bad example" that needs to be suppressed robustly - before the habit catches on at home. This often impedes a flexible and humane approach, so necessary to the resolution of complex problems. There were, for instance, many disapproving raised eyebrows in SADC circles when our Minister of Defence, comrade Joe Modise, was prepared to engage junior officers in the Lesotho Defence Force, to ascertain the nature of their grievances.
The tardiness of the Botswana Defence Force in making its way (at a speed of 40 km per hour!) to Lesotho is another reality that has received little public attention. According to some reports, it was the BDF that was meant to secure the safety of the city while the SANDF focused on the tougher military objectives. The fact that the BDF arrived a day late, after most of the shooting was over, contributed to the failure to protect the commercial centre of Maseru, while military battles were raging at the LDF bases and the Katse dam complex..
All of this is not to say that there was not some serious clumsiness in the SANDF side of the operation in Lesotho. The SADC troops are now a factor for stability, and their continued presence in Lesotho for the present must be supported. The courageous and generally humane and restrained way in which most SANDF troops conducted themselves must also be acknowledged. There are still questions about the timing and even advisability of the intervention in the first place, but that is now water under the bridge. King Letsie (whatever his own role and agenda) seems to have been side-lined in the period immediately preceding the intervention. The SACP is sure that the events will be analysed and debated in a balanced (and not point-scoring way) in the coming months by our own relevant military, intelligence and political structures in government.
Clearly the operation, in its first days, was also a communications flop. While the South African and the world's media portrayed the intervention as an aggressive invasion, the real story was not emerging with any clarity, and the ANC and its alliance partners were left with a sense of disempowerment in the first days of the intervention. There are clearly lessons to be drawn from this experience.
What is the way forward? The SACP agrees with its alliance partners and with the SA government, that the way forward in Lesotho is essentially in the hands of the people of Lesotho themselves. It is our view, however, that the following elements are essential for any enduring democratic outcome:
New elections must be held in Lesotho, preferably general elections, but at the very least by-elections in all constituencies in which there were demonstrable and serious irregularities. Clearly, the existing Electoral Commission cannot be entrusted with new elections, and a much more effective and reliable electoral management and oversight mechanism is essential;
There needs to be a wide-ranging discussion within Lesotho on the most appropriate electoral dispensation. It seems to us that the present, Westminster electoral system, of constituency based elections in which the winner takes all, is a source of some instability. Consideration should be given to building in some element of proportional representation, fostering greater political inclusiveness.
Punitive measures against rebel soldiers will only promote the possibilities of a lingering guerrilla war in Lesotho. The grievances of soldiers and the general restructuring and depoliticisation of the LDF must be handled sensitively in the context of an overall political settlement;
The restoration of infrastructure and of humanitarian and welfare into Lesotho itself must be a priority of the Lesotho government, of SADC, and of all progressive civil society formations in Lesotho and in our region;
While the King has a symbolic and nation building role, any attempts to politicise the monarchy further must be resisted. While it may be tempting to call for the immediate withdrawal of the SADC armed forces in Lesotho, we believe that this would be a serious mistake at this point.
Issued by SACP HQ