Raising the Red Flag

The International Socialist League and the Communist Party of South Africa, 1914 - 1932

AFTU	African Federation of Trade Unions
ANC	African National Congress
APO	Afriacan People's Organisation
Cl	Communist International
CPGB	Communist Party of Great Britain
CPSA	South Afriacan Communist Party
CPUSA	Communsit Party of the United States of America
ECCI	Execcutive Committee of the Commusit International
ICU	Industrial and Commercial Union
IFTU	International Federation of Trade Unions
ISL	International Socialist League
ITUCNW	International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers
ILP	Independent Labour Party
IWA	Industrial Workers of Africa
IWW	Industrial Workers of the World
RILU	Red International of Labour Unions
SMEO	South African Association of Employees, Organisation
SAIF	South African Industrial Federation
SALP	South African Labour Party
SATLC	South African Trades and Labour Council
SATUC	South African Trade Union Congress
SDF	Social Democratic Federation
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SLP	Socialist Labor Party
UNIA	United Negro Improvement Association
YCI	Young Communist International
YCL	Young Communist League

It is appropriate here to express my appreciation not only to individuals and organizations who have in the 1990s facilitated the publication of this volume, but also to those who in the 1960s facilitated the research and writing of the doctoral dissertation which is this volume. l also should explain to readers several stylistic decisions which have been taken regarding the publication in South Africa in 1993 of a manuscript originally completed in the United States in 1965.

Most recently I am particularly indebted to the International Political Economy Program of Duke University and its erstwhile director, Professor Robert Bates, and the Center for International Studies of Duke University' presently headed by Professor Peter Lange, Special Assistant to the Provost for International Affairs, for generous subventions which have enabled the Mayibuye Centre for History and Culture in South Africa of the University of the Western Cape to underwrite the publication of such a lengthy book. I am most appreciative for the patience of the Centre's director, Dr. Andre Odendaal, during the longer than anticipated time that the manuscript was prepared for publication. Ms llyana van Tonder and Dr. Donald Pinnock of Rhodes University, the technical consultants of the Mayibuye Centre, have been unceasingly helpful in assuring that the manuscript was put into proper form for typesetting. My most heartfelt thanks go to Mary Frances Davis for her herculean labors in word processing the entire dissertation manuscript onto the diskettes from which the book was typeset. Finally, my wife, Christa, should be recognized for her forebearance and steady support, both in urging me forward and in taking on tasks alone while I was making editorial revisions and proofreading.

It is impossible to name all the individuals and organizations from whom I received assistance during the early 1960s when I conducted research for the dissertation in the United States, South Africa' and Great Britain. But I must express explicit gratitude to the many persons and institutions in South Africa who aided me in innumerable ways in 1962-1963 at a time when the government was dramatically increasing its harassment of all its opponents. Without their assistance I could not have obtained the sometimes priceless and often banned materials which permitted me to fill in numerous crucial pieces of the puzzle which otherwise would have been missing. I remain appreciative of the financial support which I received at various times from the United States Educational Commission in the United Kingdom, the Ford Foundation, and the Russian Research Center of Harvard University. I am equally grateful for the hospitality of St. Antony's College of Oxford University and the Russian Research Center in the conducive surroundings of which much of my research and writing were done.

My dissertation supervisor, the late Professor Rupert Emerson' was endlessly supportive of an enterprise centering upon a country which was outside his prime area of interest but about which he, too' was anxious to learn.
Rather than attempting to change spelling in this volume from accepted American usage to accepted South African usage in a manuscript of hundreds of pages, Dr. Odendaal kindly agreed that American spelling could be used. Similarly we agreed that I would not change the terminology which I used in 1965 to that which would be appropriate today. Thus, the term "non-white" appears regularly along with the term "Coloured"; neither of these historical and legislative racial categorizations are readily accepted today by those to whom they have been applied. There are undoubtedly other usages which I would change were I to write the manuscript anew in the 1990s.

In 1965 I made every effort to present a balanced scholarly study to advance understanding of the emergence and development of the Communist Party of South Africa through its first decade. What follows is that study' unchanged except for very minor editorial revisions' primarily to consolidate footnotes. The original language in which it was written has been maintained. It is language which I believed at the time eschewed the vocabulary of the cold war and anti-communism. Some readers might not agree that I was fully successful. In the hindsight of the 1990s I might possibly accept that this was sometimes the case. Rather than attempting to rephrase myself in each instance where I might now consider it desirable I have chosen to keep the original phrasing throughout. No matter how individual readers react to my language in particular instances I trust that they will regard it as a feature of a historical document which reflects the times in which it was written. I continue to believe that this is a balanced scholarly study and I present it as such.

Communism in South Africa has been regularly near the center of South African political discourse ever since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Its major proponents have been the Communist Party of South Africa (founded in 1921 and dissolved in 1950 in the face of banning by the Nationalist Party government under the Suppression of Communism Act), its immediate predecessor, the International Socialist League (founded in 1915), and more recently, its sucessor, the South African Communist Party, (established underground in 1953 by members of the dissolved party and legalized in 1990 after decades of clandestine and exile existence despite ruthless government efforts to destroy it). Its major opponents have been, most notably, successive South African governments and their business allies, but also various African political leaders and white liberals opposed to the government. Both its proponents and opponents have claimed that communism was in the forefront of militant opposition to the existing white-dominated political and economic order. Locked in bitter antagonism, both fervent communists and vehement anti-communists nevertheless have agreed that the party was one of the leading organizations challenging the racial and economic status quo.

Intrigued by the claims made about the significance of communism in South Africa, and fascinated to learn how a Marxist-Leninist party had addressed the racial problems of South Africa I started research in 1961 upon a doctoral dissertation on the Communist Party of South Africa during its early years. It is this dissertation, submitted in 1965 to the Department of Government at Harvard University under the title, Marxism-Leninism in a Multi-Racial Environment: The Origins and Early History of the Communist Party of South Africa, 1914-1932", which comprises this book. What follows is the dissertation as it was submitted, unchanged except for minor editing, primarily of footnotes.

Although the bulk of chapters six and eleven have been published as journal articles,1 the full detailed history never found a publisher. I was unwilling to condense the manuscript and not even an academic press was willing to publish such a lengthy dissertation. Nevertheless, in the 28 years since it was completed the dissertation has been frequently consulted by scholars and others from all over the world who have borrowed it from the Harvard University Library. With the unbanning of the South African Communist Party in February, 1990, it became possible to consider its publication in South Africa to address the thirst of South Africans for easily accessible accurate and full information about a vital aspect of their past to which they had been denied access. Thus, I am particularly pleased that the Mayibuye Center has agreed to publish the dissertation as a historical document.

At the time that the dissertation was completed in 1965 there was no single comprehensive study of the origins and early history of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) and its predecessor, the International Socialist League (ISL). It was a topic, however, which had been written about in some detail by several South Africans who had either participated in the CPSA and ISL, or were close to individuals who were members. Edward Roux, a CPSA member from the party's inception until the mid-1930s, had written two detailed books drawing upon his own experiences, documented further from unpublished party documents and personal letters and from published sources.2 Both books were pioneering accounts of the CPSA, the ISL and the broader black struggle against white domination in which many of the important events, particularly those concerning the policy and activities of the CPSA pertaining to black politics and social movements, are described and analyzed. In both books, but particularly in the biography of S. P. Bunting, major attention was given to S. P. Bunting's (and Roux's) response to the controversial slogan, an independent native South African republic, which was proposed and imposed upon the CPSA by the Communist International in 1928. R. K. Cope, a South African writer, had published in the mid-1940s a semi-official biography of W.H. Andrews, the most prominent white communist trade unionist who had been active in labor and socialist politics since the turn of the century.3 The book, based in part upon Andrews' personal papers, is an invaluable source for the early history of left-wing socialism. A less useful, but still relevant published source, was the meandering memoirs of the Cape Town socialist and sometime communist, Wilfrid Harrison.4

The books of Roux, Cope, and Harrison provided essential information for the dissertation, but the bulk of my data came from a broad range of published and unpublished sources which are described and listed in the concluding bibliographical section of this volume. From these diverse sources, written or published not only in South Africa and the Soviet Union, but also in western Europe and the United States, I drew the bulk of the information which enabled me to describe the step-by-step process by which the left-wing internationalist socialist groups which formed at the start of the First World War coalesced into the CPSA in 1921, how the CPSA moved in the 1920s to shift its focus from white labor to the emerging black working class, and the fashion by which the CPSA ultimately accepted the authority of the Communist International in Moscow by 1932.

In the intervening 28 years since the completion of the dissertation there have been a number of publications, both scholarly and non-scholarly, which have dealt directly with the ISL and the CPSA in the 1914-1932 period covered by the dissertation. They have included additional accounts by participants, official histories published through the press of the South African Communist Party in London, studies by South African scholars, studies by a Russian historian, a lengthy anti-communist polemic, and an analysis co-authored by a South African activist and an English observer of African affairs.

Of the post-1965 published works by participants in the CPSA or organizations close to it, two are by South Africans (Edward Roux and Clements Kadalie) and one is by an American black (Harry Haywood). Edward Roux supplemented the accounts and analyses of his earlier books in memoirs, completed posthumously by his wife, Winifred, also a former member of the CPSA.5 The Roux memoirs, published in 1970, focused upon his own personal experiences and added hitherto unpublished details about his activities in the Young Communist League (and to a lesser extent, subsequently, in the CPSA). In the same year Clement Kadalie's autobiography, a typescript copy of which I had read and used, was also published.6 With an interpretative introduction by Stanley Trapido, this work represented not an additional source for Kadalie's views upon his relationship with the CPSA, and that of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU) which he headed, but merely the publication of a source which I had already consulted. In 1978 Harry Haywood, who had served on the Negro Commission of the Communist International in 1928 and was an early supporter of the slogan of an independent native South African republic, published his autobiography.7 In a lengthy volume which focused upon his American experiences, but also included a number of chapters on his four and a half years in the Soviet Union, Haywood provided information beyond that which he had shared with me in a 1961 letter, particularly about his experiences with James La Guma and James Gumede when the two South Africans visited Moscow in 1927 and 1928.

South African communists in exile, publishing through the party press in London, also contributed three books to the list of post-1965 publications about the CPSA and the ISL. Each of the books covered not only the 1914-1932 period, but also the post-1932 period, including the history of the successor South African Communist Party, constituted in 1953. In the first volume to appear, Michael Harmel, writing under the pseudonym of A. Lerumo, published a short history of the party upon the 50th anniversary of its founding.8 Based upon a series of articles published in the party's journal, The African Communist, the book contained a general historical introduction followed by a condensed history of the party (of which approximately one-half was devoted to the period 1914-1932). In addition, in appendices which were as lengthy as the text, the book contained 15 party documents (some of them excerpts), including the 1928 draft resolution of the Communist International proclaiming the slogan of an independent native South African republic. Without footnotes and detail, Harmel designed the volume as a popular history which he explicitly hoped would spur further research and discussion. In his discussion of the slogan of an independent native South African republic and the aftermath of its introduction he strongly endorsed the general analysis made by the Communist International when it put forth the slogan. He was equally as forthright in his condemnation of what he characterized as a dogmatic, sectarian tendency which manifested itself at the time in the Communist International and was transmitted to South Africa, subsequently leading to a harshly intolerant, ultra-left period...which cost the Party untold damage in membership and influence.9 In 1975 Brian Bunting, editor of the party-oriented Guardian and its subsequent reincarnations until the final successor newspaper was banned in 1963, produced a biography of Moses Kotane, longtime general secretary of the party, in celebration of his 70th birthday.10 Incorporating material from the party archives (much of which was not, however, carefully footnoted), as well as information gathered through correspondence and conversation with Kotane, Bunting's book offered its readers a sympathetic analysis of Kotane's participation in the party during the late 1920s and 1930s, revealing important details which had not been previously published. In more detail than Harmel's book (and explicitly critical of Roux's analysis) it discussed the introduction of the slogan of an independent native South African republic within the accepted position of the South African Communist Party, but it did not offer any new information about the debates of 1928-1930. In 1981, on the occasion of its 60th anniversary, the South African Communist Party published a book of selected party statements, making them easily accessible in one volume.11 Apparently designed as a non-scholarly reference work, the volume was comprised of documents drawn overwhelmingly from the party press and other publications, rather than from unpublished archival sources. There were only very short introductions and connecting notes to explicate the documents. Of the 136 documents, divided into four sections, 53 of the selections were from the period 1914-1932, including more documents from the 1928-1932 period than appeared in the Harmel volume. Yet there were only extremely brief excerpts from significant Communist International and CPSA documents of 1930 and 1931 when S. P. Bunting and others who had originally opposed the slogan of an independent native South African republic were purged from the party and there were no previously unpublished documents from this period which could have provided invaluable new information.

The most recent semi-official party publication dealing with its history was a short popular history, published in 1990 in South Africa without any explicit publisher or date.12 Reflecting the changing climate in South Africa in the wake of the unbanning of the party on February 11, 1990, the 64-page illustrated pamphlet-like volume, for which Brian Bunting was acknowledged as assisting in the research, presented a capsule history of the party in lively straight-forward language. Almost half of the pamphlet was devoted to the period 1914-1932. Aside from a brief anecdote about the expulsion of a party member in the early 1930s it offered no new information. More than likely it was the harbinger of more extensive histories to be published in the 1990s under party auspices.

Unquestionably the most significant work focusing substantially upon the party and its predecessors published since 1965 was the massively detailed study of H.J. and R.E. Simons.13 In their book the Simons, a husband and wife team (he was an academic who had taught for decades at the University of Cape Town and she was a longtime trade union leader in the western Cape), chronicled and analyzed in detail the intertwined development of South African socialism and black resistance to white hegemony. Central in their account were the CPSA and the ISL. The book was based upon exhaustive research, particularly in contemporary newspapers, which had been completed before the authors, both deeply engaged members of the party since the 1930s, were forced into exile in the early 1960s. The Simons explictly called the book an exercise in political sociology rather than a history. They forthrightly stated that their narrative was interspersed with comments and value judgements.14 In scope their work was analogous to Roux's Time Longer Than Rope which they utilized as a source and with which they often disagreed in interpretation. They also drew from Roux's first book, S. P. Bunting: A Political Biography, with which they also disagreed, particularly about the significance of the CPSA's relationship with Moscow in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In their coverage of the period 1914-1932 they utilized many of the same English-language South African printed sources which I did. In addition, they were able to draw upon unpublished documents (including letters written in the late 1920s) of James La Guma, the first CPSA member to discuss the slogan of an independent native South African republic with the Communist International in Moscow and subsequently one of the first South Africans to support the slogan, as well as correspondence and conversations with his party ally of the time, Douglas Wolton. They also had access to the papers of Andrews whom they had known well during the latter part of his life when he rejoined the party and lived in Cape Town. Their study is as detailed as the dissertation which follows. It agrees with it in outline and most details. It disagrees with it in some interpretations and value judgements, particularly in assessment of the role of the Communist International in the formulation of the slogan of an independent native South African republic and its aftermath within the CPSA.

Another younger exiled South African, Martin Legassick, published in 1973 the only analysis which focused upon the slogan of an independent native South African republic.15 Exclusively utilizing published secondary sources, notably the Simons' book, Legassick did not provide any new information about how the slogan originated or its impact within the CPSA during the period which he covered. He did, however, offer a Marxist-based critique of the slogan and its consequences for the CPSA in which, like the Simons, he considered the relevance of the slogan's emphasis upon African nationalism and colonialism for the contemporary period.

More recently younger South African scholars conducting research within the country have published studies which have given new information about specific individuals or aspects of the 1914-1932 period. In 1989 Doreen Musson, a Cape Town-based researcher, published a biographical study of Johnny Gomas.16 Gomas, a close associate of La Guma, and like him a Coloured, was a key party member in Cape Town from 1925 onward. Benefitting from access to Gomas' correspondence and writings, as well as Benefitting from access to Gomas' correspondence and writings, as well as interviews with family and friends, Musson used the means of a book which she characterized as a political biography to add new details to the published record about the CPSA in Cape Town in the latter years of the 1914-1932 period. Two other researchers, in articles published in scholarly collections and journals, have thrown new light upon the role of Jewish radicals and Marxists during crucial periods in the history of the ISL and the CPSA respectively. In a carefully focused study published in 1987, Evangelos Mantzaris analyzed the nature of the Yiddish-speaking branch of the ISL which was active from 1917-1920.17 Utilizing police reports from the archives and drawing pertinently from specialized scholarship about the South African Jewish community, Mantzaris provided new information about the Johannesburg Jewish supporters of the ISL in the period immediately following the Bolshevik revolution. In an earlier 1981 article, also fruitfully utilizing police and judicial archives, Mantzaris examined not only the significance of Jewish participation in the Industrial Socialist League of Cape Town during the same period, but more broadly the general nature of militant socialism in Cape Town prior to the formation of the CPSA.18 Taffy Adler provided analogous supplementary information, obtained primarily through interviews, in his sharply concentrated study of the Jewish Workers' Club, a vital source for party support and recruits in the late 1920s and early 1930s.19

The only other large-scale study matching that of the Simons in its exhaustive coverage was that of the Russian historian, Apollon Davidson. In 1969 he first published an article focusing directly on the founding of the CPSA which subsequently, in slightly revised form, became a chapter of a much larger book which appeared in 1972. Davidson, A. B., Komintern i Rozhdenie Pervoi Kompartii v Afrika (The Comintern and the Birth of the First Communist Party in Africa) in Deliusin, L. P.; Persits, M. A.; Reznikov, A. B. and Ul'ianovskii, P. A. (eds.), Komintern i Vostok (The Comintern and the East) (Moscow: Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi Literaturi, 1969), pp. 448-507; Davidson, A. B., Iuzhnaia Afrika: Stanovlenie Sil Protesta 1870-1924 (South Africa: Growth of the Power of Protest 1870-1924) (Moscow: Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi Literaturi, 1972). Focusing upon a period of 54 years in his book, in contrast to the 100 year period of the Simons, Davidson similarly examined the emergence of both socialist and black opposition groups. Davidson was thoroughly familiar with English-language secondary sources, including the Simons' book and this dissertation. (Of the other authors of post-1965 publications only Musson and Mantzaris appear also to have consulted either this dissertation or either of the published articles drawn from it). Yet the major part of Davidson's research drew upon English-language primary sources, most notably the publications of the ISL and the early publications of the CPSA, but also upon unpublished material from Soviet archives pertaining to South Africa and the Communist International. Davidson provided a meticulously researched, step-by-step authoritative narrative which concurred generally with that of this dissertation for the 1914-1924 period in which the two overlapped. The book differed from this dissertation in the new details which it offered based upon the scattered contemporary sources available in Soviet archives. There were also differences in interpretation.

In stark contrast to the systematic and scholarly approaches of Davidson, the younger South African scholars, and the Simons was the polemical approach taken by Henry Pike in his 1985 volume, the lone full-length history of communism in South Africa published within the tradition of rabid anti-communism.20 The author, an American clergyman and a self-professed born-again, conservative Christian,21 was primarily concerned with the more recent period, but one-third of his book was devoted to the period through 1932. Utilizing materials from a vast range of published sources, both primary and secondary, as well as from interviews with Gerhard Ludi (a government spy who successfully penetrated the underground and exiled South African Communist Party in the 1960s) and Hendrik van den Bergh (the former head of the disbanded BOSS, the Bureau of State Security), Pike dramatized through an unending stream of facts and commentary what he believed to be the machinations and dangers of marxism and communism in South Africa, commencing with the arrival of Karl Marx's sister in Cape Town in 1853 and the subsequent publication (anonymously) of articles by Marx in the contemporary South African press and continuing through to alleged anti-Western American collaboration (including that of the CIA) with the Soviet Union in an international conspiracy against the Republic of South Africa. His methods were completely unscholarly, his data was chosen selectively to conform to his anti-communist advocacy, and in his preface he unabashedly stated that the book does not purport to be a definitive, scientific analysis, but rather was intended primarily for purposes of instruction and education regarding the subject of communism in South Africa.22 It contained a few new factual trivia items for the period through 1932, and numerous previously unpublished photo-graphs gleaned from South African archives, but there was no additional hitherto unavailable information to be culled from this anti-communist diatribe.

The most recent publication focusing upon the South African party was a closely argued collaboration between a black party member, writing under the pen name of Tsepo Sechaba, and Stephen Ellis, a white British journalist/academic.23 As the title of the book suggested it was overwhelmingly concerned with the post-1960 period, but it did include a brief opening chapter upon the CPSA. Its sources were published secondary sources; it contained no new information for the 1914-1932 period.

In addition to the post-1965 publications discussed above which have focused directly upon the CPSA or ISL (with the exception of the Kadalie autobiograpy which focuses upon the ICU), there have also been other publications, both books and articles, which have considered the CPSA in relation to other organizations, mostly the ICU or the African National Congress (ANC), or in the context of particular local struggles.

Two earlier political histories, institutional studies of the ANC and the ICU, by Peter Walshe (an American-based academic) and P. L. Wickins (a South African academic) respectively, both discussed the nature of relationships with the CPSA.24 Both books were based upon systematic examination of available archival material and periodicals, but neither volume offered any new information about the CPSA.

More recent publications from a younger generation of social historians, drawing effectively from diligent archival sleuthing in South Africa of police files, judicial and municipal records, supplemented by interviews with participants, have given new insight upon several dimensions of party activities. F. A. Johnstone has amplified understanding of the fashion in which the ISL immediately after the First World War sought to engage African workers on the Witwatersrand in trade union activity.25 In analogous fashion Philip Bonner has elucidated the nature of the relationship of the ISL with the Transvaal Native Congress in the same period.26 In her pathbreaking volume on rural mobilization by the ICU in the 1920s Helen Bradford also has suggestively offered new ways of thinking about the relationship between the ICU and the CPSA.27 New information about the fashion in which the CPSA established itself in the Potchefstroom location at the end of the 1920s was contained in Julia Wells' study of locally-based women's activism.28

Outside of the stream of South African-oriented research published since 1965 there has been one important general study of Russian and Soviet links with Africa including the 1914-1932 period, a book published in 1974 by the American scholar, Edward Wilson, which included material relevant to a deeper appreciation of developments within the CPSA.29 Wilson's study, based upon a comprehensive examination of Russian-language primary sources of the Communist International and other Soviet organizations, as well as English-language and French-language sources, devoted little specific attention to South Africa, but it did present additional details about heightened Soviet attention to black Africa from 1928 onward, particularly through the International Trade Union Committee for Negro Workers which included South Africa within its mandate.

Unlike all of the post-1965 publications this dissertation remains the only scholarly work which exclusively focuses upon the history of the ISL and that of the CPSA during the first decade of its existence. None of the published scholarly work, neither major studies which covered all or significant parts of the 1914-1932 period in detail (Simons, Davidson) nor the more narrowly focused studies which considered only aspects of ISL or CPSA history (Musson, Adler, Mantzaris) factually contradicted the narrative of this dissertation. Similarly, neither the publications of the South African Communist Party (Lerumo, Bunting, South African Communists Speak) nor the accounts of participants (Roux, Haywood) offered major new factual information. From most of these sources came new details which add to overall knowledge of the period, yet this dissertation is still the single source which has both the fullest narrative and the most information about the early history of the CPSA and its immediate predecessor, the ISL. Significant information, especially concerning the birth of the CPSA and developments surrounding the slogan of an independent native South African republic, is only available in this dissertation. Although I published some of this material in the journal articles cited above, the articles, like this dissertation, are not easily available, particularly in South Africa. On these grounds alone there is great utility in having this dissertation published.

If I were to rewrite this dissertation today I would not only incorporate the new factual details which have become available through the scholarship which has been done since 1965. but I would also undoubtedly weigh and interpret the evidence differently. My views and perceptions in the 1990s are different from those I held in the early 1960s. My analytical approach today would almost certainly be different in light of both very specific post-1965 scholarship on South Africa as well as important new approaches which have shifted away from the institutional study which this dissertation represents. I would also wish to take into account criticisms made by such scholars as Davidson who have directly engaged with this dissertation. To make these changes, however, would require much more research and time. Furthermore, because of the lack of new evidence on the major issues, I am convinced that the essential narrative of the development of the CPSA would not be changed. Thus, I believe that it is more important to make this dissertation available immediately for the historical record in the form in which it was written in 1965. As a published source it will be readily available to the many who are now engaged, and the many more in the future who will become engaged, in the reexamination not only of the history of the ISL and the CPSA, but also more generally of South African history during the period covered by this dissertation. It is my intention to engage in this reexamination during the 1990s and to use this publication as a resource. I hope that many others will also do so. It is in this spirit that this hitherto difficult to obtain dissertation is published.

Issues of color and questions of the Afrikaner-British relationship dominated politics in South Africa in the first years of the twentieth century immediately after the end of the Anglo-Boer War. Yet the problems arising from the rapid economic development of South Africa were also becoming significant. In particular, the lusty growth of the gold mining industry brought class-based problems of capital and labor to South Africa in a distinctive form. Among immigrant white workers socialism was vigorously debated.

With the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in the southern Transvaal in 1886 large amounts of capital were demanded in order to finance the expensive and complex machinery necessary for the extraction of the gold from the rich ores; simultaneously a demand was created for a small, but expanding number of skilled artisans, and a large number of unskilled workers. The capital for the gold mining industry was supplied by syndicates which had successfully concentrated control over the South African diamond fields as well as by other large financial syndicates; in both cases the overwhelming percentage of the capital came from overseas investors. The skilled artisans also came from overseas, predominantly from Great Britain, but also in smaller numbers from the European continent, Australia, and the United States. Only the unskilled workers were recruited primarily in South Africa. Africans, and to a much lesser extent, Coloureds, both of whom had initially supplied the unskilled and semi-skilled labor for the diamond mines in the 1870s and 1880s, provided the unskilled labor for the expanding gold mining industry of the Witwatersrand.

The resulting mixture of concentrated overseas capital, white skilled workers from overseas, and non-white unskilled and semi-skilled workers created an economic structure in the mining industry which was almost a caricature of Lenin's image of capitalism in the highest stage of finance capitalism, imperialism. At the top of the structure a small number of firms, controlled by overseas capital (primarily British) and coordinated closely inthe Chamber of Mines, dominated the gold mining industry and thus the South African economy which was increasingly dependent upon the gold mining industry. The role of the labor aristocracy, allied with the capitalists through relatively high wages, was played by the white skilled artisans who, in keeping with what had become standard practice in the diamond fields of Kimberley, monopolized the higher paid skilled artisan jobs for themselves. At the bottom of the structure were the masses of low-paid non-white semi-skilled and unskilled workers who represented within South Africa the colonial proletariat of Lenin's schema. In particular, the Africans, controlled by a network of pass laws which restricted their movement at the will of the white authorities, represented a great pool of potential cheap labor. The original reliance upon both skilled white workers and initially unskilled non-white workers, the necessity for minimizing costs and maximizing profits to maintain the attractiveness of the gold mines financially, and the firmly established color prejudice of South Africa, buttressed by the laws of the Transvaal, combined to create a system in the gold mines of the Witwatersrand in which the distinctions between white skilled workers of the metropole and the unskilled non-white proletariat of the colonies were sharply visible within the confines of a single country. Class lines and color lines coincided.

In the early years of the twentieth century, however, a number of factors threatened an erosion of the coinciding divisions within the gold mining industry. Parallel developments within the Afrikaner and African sectors of the agricultural economy resulted in new additions to the potential labor force for the gold mines. At the same time the continuing desire of the mining companies to find the cheapest source of labor tempted them to upset the racial patterns which had emerged at the mines.

Within the inefficient and patriarchal rural society of the Afrikaners a gradual process of differentiation among the Afrikaner farmers was occurring. Under the twin pressures of increased Afrikaner population in the face of a dwindling supply of new land and demands for more efficient farming to supply the needs of the growing gold mining industry the poorer, inefficient Afrikaner subsistence farmers began to lose their land in increasing numbers. The class of poor white farmers and bywoners (share-croppers) which emerged was gradually extruded off the land into the cities. On the fringes of the urban areas of the Witwatersrand clusters of poor whites introduced a new factor into the labor market the unskilled white workers who were unequipped, linguistically or technically, to do the skilled work expected from whites and yet at the same time expected the higher pay which had come to be regarded as the prerogative of white workers.

Simultaneously, the continuing population pressures in the shrinking tribal reserves allotted to Africans, the need to amass money to pay taxes imposed by the white government, and the rising demands of Africans for certain consumer goods speeded the movement of the Africans to the cities to seek work in the gold mines or the new industries supporting the goldmines. In the period immediately following the Anglo-Boer War a temporary shortage of African labor was solved by the importation of Chinese workers, but the flow of Africans to the cities quickly resumed before 1910. The majority of the workers on the mines remained migrant workers who returned to their tribal areas, at least temporarily, after fulfillment of their contracts, but an increasing number of the Africans remained in the cities and settled as part of a growing work force of unskilled laborers. The longer the Africans remained regular workers the more skilled many of them became.

The influx of non-whites who were becoming more skilled and who were willing to work at lower wages undermined the previously strong monopolistic position of the white skilled workers and created new bonds of potential common interest between the Chamber of Mines and the non-white workers. Increasingly the mine owners began to discuss the possibility of replacing highly-paid white workers in certain areas with lower-paid skilled or semi-skilled non-white workers. At the same time the emergence of a significant number of Afrikaner poor whites created another threat to the previously protected position of the white English-speaking workers. The bases of the previous alliance between the 'labor aristocracy' and the Chamber of Mines were further weakened. On the other hand, the white Afrikaners, overwhelmingly unskilled workers, also represented the potential for an alliance between the predominantly English-speaking skilled workers and the Afrikaners in defense of a 'civilized' wage for all whites, regardless of skill, and against the Chamber of Mines which the English-speaking white skilled workers distrusted as a symbol of capitalism and which the Afrikaners distrusted as a symbol of British control. The nature of the Afrikaner-British conflict and the terms of the color question were clearly altered by the developments on the key gold mines of the Witwatersrand.

Although the growth of the gold mines on the Witwatersrand cast an increasingly long shadow over the rest of South Africa, the most immediate impact of the rapid economic developments on the Witwatersrand was restricted to the Witwatersrand. It is true that the coastal provinces became increasingly dependent upon the trade generated by the gold mines, yet there was no substantial mining or industrial development to rival the developments on the Witwatersrand. Durban and Cape Town remained primarily commercial and distributive centers and agriculture in the coastal colonies and the Orange Free State continued to be the base of the economies of these provinces. In the African areas of South Africa increasing numbers were involved with the gold mines as migrant laborers, yet the majority of the Africans still primarily remained within the tribal economy or at work as farm laborers on white farms. Among the Coloureds the direct impact of the development of the gold mines was very limited. A small number of Coloureds did migrate to the Transvaal to work on the mines as semi-skilled and unskilled labor, but the overwhelming majority of the Coloureds remained in Cape Province. Similarly, the Indians remained overwhelmingly concentrated in Natal, and those who were in the Transvaal generally were not working on the mines.

The extremely uneven impact of the development of the gold mines was reflected in the uneven political effects induced by it. The new economic developments brought in their wake many of the problems which characterized the industrialized states of Europe. Yet the concentration of these problems in the urban areas of the Witwatersrand meant that they affected directly only a minority of the South African population. Questions of capital and labor did become important politically for this section of the population, but in most of South Africa the older issues of the Afrikaner-British conflict and the color problem in their more traditional forms still determined the terms of political activity, especially in the negotiations among English-speaking South Africans and Afrikaners which led to the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910.

In the Cape Province prior to 1910 there had been some degree of self-government for over a half century within the British colonial system. The Afrikaner majority of the white population (the descendants of those Afrikaners who had not joined the Great Trek) had generally been willing to accept the fact of British hegemony and to work within it for greater autonomy for the Afrikaners. Under the leadership of the Afrikaner Bond, the leading Afrikaner party, an alliance had generally been arranged between Afrikaner politicians and some English-speaking politicians to govern the Cape Colony. It continued through and after the Anglo-Boer War.

With the advent of Union the governing party in the Cape Province, the Afrikaner Bond, joined with the other Afrikaner-dominated parties of the two former Afrikaner republics to form the South African Party, a coalition dedicated to constructive, but critical, cooperation within the British Empire in order to build one white South African nation.

The political atmosphere in the former republic of the Orange Free State (known as the Orange River Colony from 1902 to 1910) with its overwhelming Afrikaner majority in the white population was radically different. With the grant of responsible government after the Anglo-Boer War the dominant party of Afrikanerdom in the Orange River Colony, the Orangia Unie, showed little inclination to conciliation with the British in the interests of building a new white South African nation. The 'nationalist' attitude of the Free State Afrikaners was expressed in the Education Act of the colony under which Dutch and English were given complete equality in the schools, whereas in the other colonies of South Africa it was presumed that English would become the dominant language. Under the leadership of the Afrikaner leaders of the Orange Free State, Marthinus Steyn and James Barry Hertzog, the Orangia Unie became the center for Afrikaner nationalist hopes. Nevertheless, at the time of the first Union elections in 1910 the Orangia Unie joined with the Afrikaner Bond of the Cape Province and Het Volk of the Transvaal to form the South African Party. But by 1912 the differences over the attitude toward cooperation with the English-speaking South Africans were so great that Hertzog led the 'nationalists' out of the South African Party to form their own distinctive, exclusive Nationalist Party dedicated solely to the advancement of Afrikaner interests with the ultimate aim of a return to the independent republics.

In the crucial Transvaal the white population was almost equally divided among the Afrikaners and the English-speaking South Africans. The divisions between the two groups were heightened by the fact that most of the Afrikaners lived in the rural areas, while the English-speaking South Africans were concentrated in the urban areas along the Witwatersrand, the rich gold deposits of which had originally drawn them to the Transvaal. Nevertheless, the leading Afrikaner party in the Transvaal, Het Volk, led by the ex-Boer generals, Louis Botha and Jan Smuts, pursued a policy of conciliation towards Britain and the English-speaking South Africans. The cost of the policy was bitter antagonism from those Afrikaners who sympathized with the position adopted by Hertzog in the Orange Free State as well as those who still rejected the Treaty of Voreeniging which had brought an end to the Anglo-Boer War in 1902. Yet the returns from the Botha-Smuts policy of conciliation seemed high in terms of support from many Afrikaners and some English-speaking South Africans for the idea of a single white South African nation incorporated within the British Empire. At the time of the Union elections in 1910 it was Het Volk under Botha and Smuts which took the lead in the formation of the South Afrian Party. The success of the South African Party in the first Union elections made Botha the first premier of the Union of South Africa and the moderate South African Party the leading party in South Africa. Only after 1912, with the formation of the Nationalist Party led by Hertzog, did the South African Party face an Afrikaner-based opposition party.

In the three provinces of Transvaal, Orange Free State, and Cape, the English-speaking parties which had refused to follow the Afrikaner-dominated parties, even if they were conciliationist, as in Cape Province and in the Transvaal, banded together upon the calling of the Union elections in 1910 into the Unionist Party. Although the program of the Unionist Party differed little from that of the South African Party it was clear that its appeal was primarily to English-speaking South Africans. Its support remained confined to urban areas and to the English-speaking rural constituencies of the Eastern Cape Province and Natal. The South African Party captured all the rural areas inhabited by Afrikaners and even several urban constituencies in the Transvaal where Afrikaners had begun to concentrate in their accelerating urban migration. The politics of Natal remained distinct and relatively free from the struggle between Afrikaners and English-speaking South Africans in the colonial period. With the exception of small areas in northern Natal inhabited by Afrikaner farmers, the white population of Natal was almost completely of British origin and anxious to further the British nature of Natal. Political divisions in Natal were thus not drawn over the proper attitude to be pursued toward the British imperial connection, but rather over local issues with regard to the proper administration of the colony. Even after the formation of the English-speaking Unionist Party in the other three provinces many of the English-speaking politicians of Natal initially retained their position as independents.

Although the divisions between the South African Party and the Unionist Party (and after 1912 the Nationalist Party) kept the questions of the Afrikaner-British relationship to the forefront of South African politics, the potentially more intractable questions of the place of the non-white in South Africa also profoundly influenced the terms of South African politics. In each of the four provinces the Africans, the indigenous inhabitants of South Africa who had been fought and pacified by the whites, particularly the Afrikaners, comprised an overwhelming majority of the total population of the province. Everywhere African tribal society was disintegrating under the impact of traders, missionaries, government officials, and above all, the initial pressures of an industrializing economy. Yet the Africans, who now appeared as a black semi-proletariat at the edge of the white cities or as farm laborers on white farms, as well as inhabitants of the African tribal reserves, still had to be placed within the larger white-dominated South African society. The problem of the place of the African was further confused and complicated by the presence of two other sizeable non-white groups in the Union of South Africa the Coloureds, a group of mixed Malay, Khoi, San, African, and white descent whose home language was generally Afrikaans, and the Indians, a group which had immigrated to South Africa in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. Throughout South Africa there were varying patterns of discrimination against the non-whites who made up over three-fourths of the total population of the Union of South Africa. In fact, the differing racial patterns in each of the four provinces provided the bases of controversy in the attempts of the white South Africans to approach the questions of color.

In Cape Province the direct confrontation of the African and the white was muted by the presence of 450,000 of the 525,000 Coloureds in South Africa. Concentrated in the southwestern districts of the province around Cape Town, where there were few Africans, the Coloureds were the non-white 'problem' in the most politically active area of Cape Province. Lacking even the disintegrating tribal base of the Africans, the Coloureds were economically a poor appendage of the white community. The majority of the Coloureds served as farm laborers or unskilled workers, positions filled elsewhere in South Africa by Africans (or Indians). A significant minority of the Coloureds, however, served as artisans in spheres elsewhere monopolized by whites. Yet Coloureds were barred from full economic and social participation in white society by color bars. Nevertheless, the Coloureds had greater economic opportunities in South Africa than either the Africans or most Indians.

The situation of the African population in Cape Province was also distinctive. The overwhelming majority of the Africans (who comprised 60% of the total population of Cape Province) were concentrated in the African reserves in the eastern part of the province. Although memories of the bitter wars in the nineteenth century between the white settlers and the African societies were still strong, the African areas had been pacified for decades. The Africans concentrated in the rural African reserves did not present a direct economic or political threat to the white areas, and the extremely moderate accomodationist attitude of the small number of educated Africans gave little immediate cause for alarm to the whites.

Perhaps the most crucial feature of the racial situation in Cape Province was the presence of a liberal tradition which had become established in the nineteenth century under the influence of English missionaries. The liberal tradition of the Cape Colony allowed the creation of a non-racial franchise with qualifications based exclusively upon economic position and education. Under the operation of the non-racial franchise Coloureds comprised 10% of the voters roll and Africans comprised 5% of the voters roll. The small numbers of non-whites who did participate in political life adopted moderate positions so that the whites, who made up the remaining 85% of the voters roll, did not seem to be threatened in their domination of politics in the Cape Province. Nevertheless, the non-whites were a factor which influenced the action of the Cape politicians, particularly in the few constituencies where there were large concentrations of non-white voters, and the problems of the non-white received greater sympathetic attention in the legislature of the Cape Colony than in any other legislature in South Africa.

The position in Natal, the other province which had been a long-time British colony, contrasted sharply with that of the Cape Province. The differing percentage of the white population, the nature of the non-white population, and the situation of the African population combined to create the bases for a strong segregationist and protectionist attitude on the part of the white English-speaking settlers of Natal.

In contrast to the Cape Province, where the whites represented almost 23% of the population, whites in Natal were only slightly more than 8% of the total population of the province. The non-African non-whites in Natal were not the Coloureds of mixed white and non-white descent, but Indians who had a distinct non-Western culture and retained strong links with India. The first Indians, mostly Hindus, had been imported as indentured laborers to Natal in the latter decades of the nineteenth century primarily for the labor-thirsty sugar plantations. Later groups of 'free' Indians, among whom were many Moslems, followed the indentured laborers to Natal where many established small trading and business establishments dealing with the trade of the Indian and African sectors of the population. In 1911 the Indians represented over 11% of the population of Natal; 133,000 of the 152,000 Indians of South Africa lived in Natal.

In terms of sheer proportion of the population the Africans seemed to present a greater threat to the whites in Natal. In contrast to the Cape Province the Africans represented almost 80% of the total population of Natal. The Africans of Natal, like those of the Cape Province, were also primarily concentrated in the tribal reserves. Yet under the earlier 'Native' policy of the Natal Colony the tribal reserves were widely scattered through the Colony and many of the tribal reserves were broken up by a grid of white-owned farmlands in contrast to the more compact African reserves in the Cape Province. Any unrest among the Africans in the reserves was more quickly taken as a threat by the significant white farming elements of Natal.

The English-speaking settlers of Natal originally regarded the vigorous Indian community as the greatest threat to the hegemony. The Indians, particularly the 'free' immigrants, rapidly established themselves as a significant commercial community, and the Indians also represented a potential economic threat in terms of skilled and semi-skilled labor in competition with the British artisans. In the first decade of the twentieth century, however, the African problem took prominence. In 1906 unrest among the Zulus flared into an open rebellion which was quickly quelled; nevertheless, the fears of the whites were heightened. In this atmosphere there was broad unity among the whites of Natal that the Union government should act vigorously to maintain the racial status quo. That the ostensibly non-racial franchise of Natal was, in fact, administered to exclude all but a tiny member of Indians and Africans was the logical consequence of the fears of the whites of Natal.

In the formerly independent Afrikaner republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal the non-white 'problem' was primarily the Africans against whom the Afrikaners had fought in the Great Trek north from the Cape Colony. In the Orange Free State the African tribal structure was largely broken and the Africans were distributed throughout the province, primarily as farm laborers. In the Transvaal many Africans were also resident on white-owned farms as tenants or farm laborers, but a considerable number of Africans were also scattered in tribal reserves into which the Afrikaners had driven them in the economically less attractive northwestern and northern areas of the province. The 'threat' of the rural Afrikans in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State was not immediate or concentrated particularly in the Orange Free State, where the white population was 33% of the total (the highest of any South African province). Furthermore, any possible challenge by the non-whites was rendered difficult by the firm entrenchment of the traditional segregationist attitude of the Afrikaners in the laws of the two former republics which were carried over substantially unchanged when the Orange Free State and the Transvaal became provinces of the new Union of South Africa. All non-whites were specifically excluded from the franchise and discriminatory practices were sanctioned by law to a greater degree than in the other two provinces, particularly the Cape.

Despite the entrenchment of segregation in practice and law the 'problem' of the non-white in the Transvaal was becoming acute for the whites. Indians, who comprised slightly over 2% of the total population of the Transvaal, were concentrated in small trading and truck farming. Although they were seen by marginal white commercial interests as dangerous rivals, they were not considered by most whites as the primary non-white problem. It was the rapidly growing African population around the white cities of the Witwatersrand which posed the problem of the non-white. The presence of the urban Africans on the Witwatersrand signified the emergence of the Africans as a source of cheap labor which could undercut the position of the white workers. The segregationist fears of both the Afrikaners and the English-speaking South Africans in the Transvaal were heightened.

In questions of color the traditional lines of antagonism between Afrikaner and English-speaking South Africans were broken. The Afrikaners from the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, the English-speaking South Africans of the same two provinces, and the most British of the English-speaking South Africans from Natal found themselves united against the white liberals of the Cape Province on questions of color. The differing approaches of the provinces were uneasily accommodated in the compromise solution regarding franchise qualifications in the Act of Union, the 'constitution' of the new unified South African state. The three Northern provinces were permitted to keep their existing exclusive all-white franchises despite the pressure of the white liberals of the Cape for the extension of a non-racial franchise throughout South Africa; on the other hand, despite the desires of the politicians of the Northern provinces, the non-racial franchise of the Cape was entrenched in the new constitution by a provision which guaranteed its maintenance until overturned by a two-thirds vote at a joint sitting of both houses of parliament. Support for the non-racial franchise on the part of some of the liberal white politicians of the Cape, mostly English-speaking, did not mean, however, that any white South Africans were ready to extend the full franchise to all non-whites. Throughout white South Africa, if allowed at all, the franchise should be limited to the few 'civilized' non-whites.

The reaction of the various non-white groups to their exclusion from full participation in South African electoral politics varied according to the situation of each racial group. The Coloureds of 'liberal' Cape Province, relatively compactly located, attempted to use their limited franchise rights as a device to gain concessions from the whites. A British-trained Coloured doctor, Abdullah Abdurahman, founded a political organization in 1905 for the Coloureds, confusingly named the African People's Organization (APO). Under the leadership of Dr. Abdurahman the Coloureds used the APO to bargain their votes with the established white parties in return for promises of favors or concessions. The Indians, concentrated in Natal, but with a small but significant minority in the Transvaal where their rights were even further restricted, devised new political techniques in keeping with the fact that they were excluded from the franchise. Under the leadership of a young lawyer, Mohandas Gandhi, the Indian National Congress waged a series of passive resistance campaigns in the early years of the twentieth century in order to gain limited concessions for freedom of movement in South Africa and qualified guarantees of civil rights in all provinces. The Africans, the overwhelming majority of the non-white population, who were hampered by tribal differences, by differing degrees of detribalization, and by diffusion of their population throughout most of South Africa, responded politically in two ways to the greater restrictions on their position. The small number of Africans in the Cape Province who possessed the franchise participated actively as voters in order to represent African interests, but divisions among them precluded the organization of a single effective group such as the APO which the Coloureds used with some success. Outside electoral politics ad hoc organizations of Africans arose in response to specific threats with petitions and representations to the responsible authorities; they were particularly active immediately prior to Union in an unsuccessful attempt to extend the Cape non-racial franchise throughout South Africa. Finally in 1912, under the threat of the Natives Land Act which was to restrict the African right for land ownership to 8% of the country, the areas of the existing tribal reserves, African leaders from all over South Africa, spurred by Dr. I. Pixley Seme, came together to form the South African Native National Congress. The new organization, a loose pressure group, dedicated itself to obtain further political rights for Africans and to represent the interests of the Africans through petitions and representation. Like the Indians and the Coloureds, the Africans were forced to rely upon political pressure groups rather than political parties for representation of their interests. The effective electoral channels were restricted almost exclusively to white South Africans.

It is against this political backdrop, in which Afrikaner-English issues and the maintenance of white dominance were highlighted, that the development of socialist and labor politics must be viewed.

The first hints of socialist and labor organizations in South Africa became visible in the Transvaal in the last decade of the nineteenth century before the Anglo-Boer War. Many of the five thousand white artisans working on the Witwatersrand in the 1890s, most of whom had recently emigrated from Britain, organized branches of the British craft unions to which they had belonged before coming to South Africa. Attempts were made to coordinate the trade unions in a Trades and Labour Council, but rivalries between craft unions, as in Britain, hindered the effectiveness of the Council which was finally organized in 1895.1 A more consciously political labor organization, known initially as the Witwatersrand Mine Employees' and Mechanics' Union, and quickly shortened to the Labour Union, blended the ideas of the American Knights of Labor with those of the socialist-tinged 'new unionism' of England which called the workers to unite against capitalism by joining one big union. The Labour Union, never large, merely led a shadowy existence before disintegrating in 1897 or 1898. Individuals also propagandized a variety of the socialist philosophies then current in Britain, almost none of which were specifically Marxist. The most prominent propagandist was J. T. Bain, a Scot by origin, a fitter by trade, and one of the founders of the Labour Union. Bain was a follower of Robert Blatchford, the English socialist and publicist, whose newspaper, Clarion, Bain sold along with other labor literature of the non-Marxist, militant left wing of the English socialist movement. The fruits of the agitation of Bain (and other propagandists) in the ferment of the white labor community of the Transvaal became evident in 1899 when the first political party of socialists and trade unionists, the Independent Labour Party (modelled after the Independent Labour Party of Great Britain, founded in 1893) was formed.2 The infant Independent Labour Party, along with many of the craft union organizations, perished at the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War in 1899.

With the return of peace in South Africa in 1902, the gold mines assumed even greater importance under the reconstruction policies of Lord Milner. Relatively few Afrikaners were in the white industrial work force. Instead, the prewar white predominantly English-speaking, labor force was augmented by demobilized soldiers from the British armies who had been drawn not only from Britain but also from Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The infusion of the demobilized soldiers into the labor force carried with it new ideas of labor and socialist organization from not only Britain but also Australia where trade unions and labor politics were much further advanced than in Britain. A section of the workers, particularly miners, also came from America, or had worked there at one time or another; they introduced the American variety of industrial unionism and syndicalism. Thus, most of the strands of socialist thought and labor politics in the English-speaking world were represented among the white South African work force.

Although the bulk of the immigration to South Africa did come from the English-speaking world, news of the supposed easy riches for the Witwatersrand also brought immigrants from the continent of Europe. Italians, Germans, and Jews were among those who arrived on the Witwatersrand, and whose ranks included socialists who brought their own particular organizational models to South Africa. The Italian socialists formed an Italian Socialist Group, probably Marxist or syndicalist in orientation, while the Germans organized a Vorwärts Club, a socialist organization after the practice of the Marxist Social Democratic Party. Among the Jewish immigrants branches of the Marxist Jewish Bund were organized.3 Although the orientation of these organizations was to the problems of European countries and groups, they did play a role in South African labor politics as their membership became integrated with the predominantly English-speaking South African labor force. Through them some of the issues and struggles of the continental socialist movements, particularly Marxism, were introduced to South Africa. Nevertheless, the location of these groups on the periphery of the South African labor movement greatly diluted the impact of their Marxism.

The first sign of renewed organizational activity among the white English-speaking workers after the Anglo-Boer War was the formation shortly after the end of the war in 1902 of another Trades and Labour Council. It was strengthened by the adhesion of the growing number of craft unions. Yet fear among the leaders of the member unions of a strong authority over them prevented the Trades and Labour Council from assuming an independent role. In addition, many of the conservative craft unions were opposed to political activity beyond the representation of specific, limited concerns. Consequently, the Trades and Labour Council remained a conservative organization which generally restricted itself to representation upon specific issues related to the position of white skilled workers.

The conservatism of the Trades and Labour Council was challenged within its ranks by a small group of enthusiasts for industrial unionism, the organization of workers by industry, rather than by craft. Led by Tom Matthews, the leader of the Transvaal Miners' Association who spent a number of years in Montana as an officer of the militant Western Federation of Miners there, and W. H. Bill Andrews, a prominent member of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, the dissident trade unionists advocated the transformation of craft unions into industrial unions within the existing organization of the Trades and Labour Council. Other advocates of industrial unionism went further. They refused to accept the 'Trades Hall bureaucrats' and demanded the destruction of all existing craft unions prior to the establishment of industrial unions. The militant trade unionists were split before any effective campaign could be undertaken.

Elements from the trade union ranks also attempted to break from mere reliance upon trade unions, craft or industrial. Aware of the attempts of labor groups to organize overseas, either for limited gains or for all-encompassing socialist goals, various labor leaders in South Africa imitated overseas political organizations particularly as the possibilities for electoral activity increased with the extension of limited representative government under the Milner administration. In 1905, Peter Whiteside, an engine driver recently returned from a visit to his native Australia, sparked the organization of a Political Labor League in Johannesburg after the model of the organizations in New South Wales. Animosities and jealousies disrupted the organization which quickly collapsed in the wake of its first unsuccessful electoral effort.4 More militant workers turned to Britain for another model with the result that another Independent Labour Party (ILP) was organized in the Transvaal in 1905 or 1906.5 The ILP, too, was shaken by a series of ideological and personal quarrels, from which left-wing elements emerged victorious.6 Yet the most extreme left-wing elements who opposed participation in elections, led by Archie Crawford, broke away to form a Socialist Society dedicated to the unsullied propagation of true 'red-hot socialism' outside the regular electoral process. Nevertheless, the ILP did remain in existence as a focal point for militant socialist elements who argued that socialization of the means of production was necessary.

The most important political organization for white labor, however, was the Labour Representation Committee, another institution taken from British practice. Like the British model, the Transvaal Labour Representation Committee was a federal body which included delegates from many organizations the Trades and Labour Council, individual trade unions, the ILP, the Italian Socialist Group, the Vorwärts Club, the Bund, and other groups. Unlike the ILP, which endorsed only candidates who supported its principles, the Labour Representation Committee merely functioned to coordinate the efforts of candidates endorsed by various member organizations. Its weakness was indicated by the fact that the three members of the Transvaal legislature who were elected under its endorsement were neither responsible to it nor to any other labor caucus. Yet its existence did signify the readiness of white labor, despite its diversity, to organize politically in defense of its interests.7

The disagreements between the labor and socialist groups of the white workers in the Transvaal over ideology and tactics were offset by their near unanimity on the question of non-white labor. From the beginning the organizations of white workers fought to preserve the established customary and legal position by which relatively well-paid skilled work was reserved for whites exclusively. The fact that the mine owners, organized together in the powerful Chamber of Mines, continually hinted that they were sympathetic to the advancement of non-white workers to semi-skilled and skilled work lent an added dimension to the antagonism of the white workers to organized capital. The success of the Chamber of Mines in securing the importation of Chinese labor briefly after the Anglo-Boer War further vivified the threat of non-white competition. In the Transvaal militant labor agitation against capitalism became closely intertwined with militant agitation for the protection of the privileged position of the white worker. In the first decade of the twentieth century only a few lone militant socialists in the Transvaal opposed the majority view to preach the extension of industrial unionism to all workers, regardless of race.8

The segregationist and protectionist patterns established in labor politics in the Transvaal were repeated in Natal (where trade unions and a labor party were active in Durban, Pietermaritzburg and Ladysmith) and in the agricultural Orange Free State (where the tiny uninfluential labor organizations of Bloemfontein were wracked with dissension between Afrikaner workers and English-speaking workers). Only in Cape Colony were there small, but significant, modifications. In Cape Town, the center of commerce and industry in the Cape Colony, Coloured artisans had always been a significant part of the work force. They were allowed membership in the craft unions.9 Yet occasionally the local Trades and Labour Council in Cape Town opposed appeals to non-whites.10 In contrast, the tiny local Social Democratic Federation (SDF), a loose propaganda organization inspired by the group of the same name in Britain, regularly conducted propaganda and organizational work among the Coloureds.11

With the approach of a Union government the protectionist white labor groups in the four colonies coalesced into a country-wide South African Labour Party (SALP). In the process middle-class reformers who favored a 'white South Africa' (such as the mining engineer, F. H. P. Creswell, and his colleagues) were included in the new organization. At a series of stormy meetings held over a two-year period the conservative trade unionists and their middle class supporters battled the more ideologically minded socialists and industrial unionists. The resulting compromise revealed a considerable victory for the moderates and the strong segregationists. Although the ILP had successfully included a socialist objective in the SALP constitution, the socialization of the means of production, distribution, and exchange to be controlled by a democratic State in the interest of the whole community, there was no mention of the class struggle. The party platform in the subsequent 1910 Union election dropped the socialist objective for a long list of welfare measures to be enacted by the government for the benefit of the white workers. Further Indian immigration was to be excluded, and, in a preview of the later Bantustan policy of the Nationalist government, a variety of proposals were made to 7encourage Africans to remain in their supposed tribal areas where limited self-government, agricultural training, and 'proper' educational facilities would be made available. It was clear that the new SALP saw its first task as the protection of the white workers.12

At the time of the formation of the Union of South Africa labor and socialist politics in South Africa already displayed three distinct characteristics. With few exceptions the labor and socialist groups in South Africa limited themselves to whites only and, in fact, they were in the forefront of those seeking to strengthen the existing racial structure in the South African economy. Labor and socialist politics were almost exclusively the concern of the English-speaking white skilled workers, and a small number of white workers who originated from continental Europe; the Afrikaners, who began to enter the work force in significant numbers only after 1907, remained outside the consideration of labor and socialist groups.13 Furthermore, the labor and socialist organizations in South Africa were split among themselves into opposing camps, reflecting many of the divisions of the socialist and labor movement of Britain and to a lesser extent, of Continental Europe. Prospects for a strong united labor and socialist movement firmly based within all South African groups and extended throughout South Africa were not bright.

The weakness of the SALP nationally was shown in the first Union election and subsequent by-elections when only six SALP members were elected to the parliament of 121 members. All of the SALP members were from the few urban areas where the English-speaking white artisans (and their continental European allies) were concentrated.

The six SALP members put up a strong fight for measures to protect the white workers (such as the Mines and Works Act, which restricted certain jobs to whites, and the Phthisis Act, which granted compensation to miners suffering from the often fatal disease which gave the act its name). Merely slight concessions were made to non-white workers by the SALP. Under pressure from the Cape section, which was faced with a considerable number of Coloured workers and voters, the SALP did agree to admit Coloureds to membership, but only if they gave evidence of supporting 'white' standards.14

In the more general questions on the means to achieve socialism and the attitude of the party in the event of a 'capitalist' war, the right wing and left wing of the SALP continued to compromise uneasily. The left wing (whose ranks had been depleted by the ejection of 'ultra-left' militants of the Socialist Society before the formation of the SALP and by the defection of a section of the ILP upon the nomination of Creswell for a parliamentary seat) carried its viewpoint in 1912 with a resolution to call a general strike in the event of the outbreak of war.15 In 1913 the SALP endorsed affiliation of the SALP to the International Socialist Bureau on the basis of its Stuttgart anti-war resolution. Yet at the same time the right wing succeeded in amending the socialist objective of the constitution with the qualification that it was to be achieved only by means of a continued agitation for the demands from time to time contained in the Platform of the Party.16 In terms of the world socialist movement the SALP faced moderately left internationally and moderately right domestically.

The most interesting developments of consequence for the future of left-wing socialism in South Africa occurred outside the framework of the SALP in the trade union movement and in the splinter socialist groups which refused to join the SALP. In both cases the vocabulary of segments of the militant socialist left overseas was imported directly into South Africa, often with little change for the South African environment.

In Durban and Cape Town, branches of the SDF preached weekly Sunday socialist sermons according to the Marxist gospel of Hyndman, the leader of the SDF in Britain, and other overseas left-wing socialists. The South African branches of the SDF, unlike those in Britain, included anarchists, reform socialists, and guild socialists in their ranks as well as followers of Hyndman's Marxism.17

On the Witwatersrand there were also splinter socialist groups. The Socialist Society, led by Archie Crawford, successfully convened a national conference in 1912 for adherents of the Socialist Society, the Pretoria Socialist Society, the Socialist Labour Party, and representatives from Durban and the Cape in order to form the United Socialist Party. The Socialist Labour Party (SLP), a small group of propagandists on the Witwatersrand who followed Marxism as preached by Daniel De Leon of the SLP of the United States, refused to join the new United Socialist Party. The SLP continued independently with its propaganda for a socialist revolution through industrial unionism coordinated by a Marxist political party. The other groups represented at the conference, an unstable mixture of Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) enthusiasts, Marxists, anarchists, and other socialists, assured the ineffectuality of the new United Socialist Party.18 Nevertheless, loose links were established between the 'ultra-left' socialists of South Africa.

For most of the splinter socialist societies the question of color does not seem to have been a central concern. As has been noted, groups such as the SDF in Cape Town and possibly the SLP in the Transvaal made special appeals to the non-whites, but the other groups tended to assume that the problem of the non-white workers would be solved automatically within the millennium of the imminent socialist revolution. The small and diverse, but articulate, groups of left-wing socialists functioned more particularly as the self-appointed ideological consciences of the predominantly non-ideological South African white labor movement.

The organizational thrust of the left-wing socialists was centered within the trade union movement. The visit of Tom Mann, the famous British advocate of industrial unionism, to South Africa in 1910 sparked new interest int he question of industrial unionism.19 The Industrial Workers' Union which Mann persuaded the Trades and Labour Council to establish was quickly taken over by the more militant advocates of industrial unionism, supporters of the IWW of the United States. Copying the platform of the more anarcho-syndicalist Chicago branch of the IWW, the South Africans placed sole reliance on the device of industrial unions to realize the socialist revolution (in contrast to Mann and also the SLP in South Africa, which adhered to the Detroit branch of the IWW which advocated political action by industrial unions under the leadership of socialist political parties). The South African IWW achieved a brief but spectacular success when its supporters led a tramway strike in Johannesburg in 1911, but it did not take root in South Africa.20 The less syndicalist industrial unionism advocated by Tom Mann and the left wing of the non-Marxist British labor movement did, however, find support among the English-speaking trade unionists of the Transvaal. The strength of its appeal was reflected in the organization in 1911 of the more inclusive Transvaal Federation of Labour to replace the conservative Trades and Labour Council. More particularly, many of the leaders of the new Federation were strong advocates of industrial unionism and used the militant language of the left wing of the British labor movement.

The strength of the industrial unionists, as well as the depth of the antagonism to the Chamber of Mines among the white workers of the Witwatersrand, was dramatically revealed in mid-1913. A dispute over work rules at one gold mine snowballed into a general strike on the gold mines led by the Transvaal Federation of Labour. The young Federation enforced its writ on the Witwatersrand in the face of the hostility of the Chamber of Mines and of the government. Fatal clashes between the strikers and police threatened to escalate the general strike into a bloody conflict. Finally Smuts and Botha, the leaders of the Union government, were forced to intervene to negotiate a settlement which promised reinstatement of the strikers, a judicial commission to investigate grievances, and recognition of trade unions. Some of the militant 'ultra-left' socialists argued for a continuation of the strike until even greater concessions could be obtained, but the trade union leadership obtained ratification for the negotiated settlement by a three to one vote.21

In the remaining months of 1913 labor unrest continued to simmer. Flushed with success, the leaders of the Transvaal Federation of Labour threatened another general strike if the terms of the agreement forced upon Smuts and Botha were not forthcoming. The left and right wings of the SALP united in their common antagonism to the government and the Chamber of Mines. Distrustful of exclusive reliance upon industrial unions, the leadership of the SALP persuaded the leadership of the Federation to cancel its strike threat and embarked upon a Union-wide membership drive. Led by Creswell for the right wing and Andrews for the left wing, the SALP was successful in increasing its membership sharply. At the same time the membership of trade unions throughout South Africa grew and moves were made to establish national trade union organizations.

In January 1914, the uneasy truce between labor and capital was broken. Under the prodding of H. J. Poutsma, a Dutchman who had been associated in Holland with the syndicalist wing of the Dutch socialist movement and who had subsequently become the leader of the South African railroad workers, a general strike was called on the state-owned railroads in answer to dismissals. The strike was subsequently extended to most enterprises on the rest of the Witwatersrand by a four to one vote of the membership of the Federation. Painfully aware of the riots and bloodshed of 1913, the government under Botha and Smuts moved swiftly to break the new general strike. Martial law was declared and Afrikaner commandoes from the countryside were mobilized. The overwhelmed trade union leadership quickly surrendered and was imprisoned. In a final blunt stroke Smuts secretly deported to England nine of the trade union and labor leaders without recourse to the due process of the law.22

The harsh actions of the Botha-Smuts government brought further unity and determination to the various segments of the white labor movement. In the course of the strikes of 1913 and 1914 Afrikaner workers, who had come to represent half of the white work force as a result of their continual extrusion off the land, had participated. For the first time the labor organizations, which had previously been exclusively English-speaking, appealed specifically to the Afrikaners. Both urban and rural Afrikaners began to join the SALP. Jews of all classes, viewing Smuts' deportation as a potential threat to themselves, also joined the SALP.23 English-speaking middle-class white collar workers and professional men also joined the SALP in greater numbers. With few exceptions the trade unions, unlike those in Britain, did not participate in the SALP. Nevertheless, the membership of the trade unions also increased, and the last formalities in the creation of a national trade union organization were completed with the formation of the South African Industrial Federation.

Only the tiny, but vocal, avowedly Marxist and semi-Marxist propaganda groups remained outside the main political and trade union organizations of white labor. In the Transvaal the SLP still maintained its Marxist purity outside either the SALP or the trade unions, while in Durban and Cape Town the local SDF organizations, containing within their ranks various types of socialists, including Marxists, remained free from the SALP whose electoral orientation they considered insufficiently revolutionary. The absence of the tiny organized centers of Marxism from the most important labor organizations also meant that the most forthright advocates of greater attention to non-whites were isolated from the mainstream of the white labor movement.

Despite the continuing independence of the most left-wing groups from either the SALP or the trade unions, the socialist and labor movement in South Africa on the eve of the First World War was united as it never had been in South African history. Afrikaner and English-speaking workers, middle-class groups and trade unionists, craft unionists and industrial unionists, left-wing and right-wing socialists were joining an emerging labor coalition led by the SALP and the South African Industrial Federation. Linked by a common antagonism to the Chamber of Mines and the government, the components of the alliance seemed destined to fuse into a challenge to the existing alignment of South African politics.

The outbreak of war in Europe in August 1914 quickly exposed the fragility of the new labor coalition. Unity against the common enemy inside South Africa was imperiled by bitter disagreement over the proper attitude to the war outside South Africa. With the decision of the Botha-Smuts government to support the British fully in the war the issue of participation in the war became the primary issue of domestic South African politics. For twelve months, however, the South African labor movement avoided an open break over the war issue.

As news of the European mobilizations and war declarations reached South Africa there was no action to call a general strike in line with the resolution passed by the SALP in 1912. Nevertheless, the administrative council of the executive committee of the SALP, meeting on August 2, 1914, before the formal entry of Britain into the war, resolved:

The SALP at a General meeting of delegates expresses its protest against the Capitalist Governments of Europe in fomenting a war which can only benefit the International Armaments Manufacturers' Ring and other enemies of the working class, and appeals to the workers of the world to organize and refrain from participating in this unjust war.1

The SAIF passed a resolution a few days later which also denounced the war as against the interests of the workers.2 In Cape Town and Durban the small SDF groups also recorded their opposition to the war.

Those in the labor movement who favored support for South Africa's participation in the war on the side of Britain were also active. W. J. Wybergh, editor of The Worker, the official newspaper of the SALP, and a close friend of Creswell, the right-wing parliamentary leader of the SALP, endorsed participation in the war in the pages of The Worker. In the months immediately following the opening of hostilities, branch after branch of the SALP endorsed a pro-war position contrary to the pronouncement of the administrative council on August 2. Some branches went further and organized Labour Legions whose services were offered to the Botha-Smuts government. In October the South African Industrial Federation was persuaded to retract its anti-war resolution of August.

The parliamentary caucus of the SALP also supported South Africa's participation in the war. When the government's motion of loyalty to Empire was proposed the SALP caucus gave it qualified support. The reservations of the SALP were expressed through an amendment to the motion (subsequently withdrawn) presented by Creswell. The amendment urged that upon the cessation of hostilities all differences be settled by international arbitration, armaments be reduced, and populations be consulted before being drawn into future wars. The amendment demanded that during the war the government maintain economic activity, promote internal efficiency, and minimize unemployment; to these ends the government was to be given powers to take over any natural resources of which full use was not being made. In the question of the proposed expedition of South African forces to German South-West Africa the M.P.'s of the SALP were skeptical of the government's intent, but Creswell accepted the assurances of the government that it entertained no territorial ambition. Having recorded their objections, seven of the SALP caucus, including the left-wing trade unionist, Andrews, joined the majority of parliament on September 14, to endorse the motion of loyalty to the Empire.

The opponents of South African participation in the war did not remain idle in the face of the rise of pro-war sentiment in the labor movement. Early in September, Colin Wade, a Germiston dentist who represented the SALP in the Transvaal Provincial Council, issued a pamphlet calling for 'war on war.' A committee of those opposed to the war was quickly formed and the War on War League (South Africa) was formally launched in mid-September. It began to publish the War on War Gazette, a weekly newspaper. Its brief program appealed to all who opposed war: The Constitution of the WAR ON WAR LEAGUE (SOUTH AFRICA) is simple. The members 'pledge themselves to oppose this or any other war at all times and at all costs.' ''3

In its propaganda, however, the War on War League strongly emphasized international socialist solidarity as the most effective antidote to war. >From the pages of the War on War Gazette appeals were addressed to labor men to remain true to principles of international socialism in the face of unpopularity and attack. It was suggested that socialism was the only genuine opponent of both capitalism and militarism.

The War on War League was very sensitive to developments in the socialist and labor movement overseas. It acknowledged its debt to the strong anti-war stands of The Labour Leader, the ILP newspaper in London, and Forward, a labor newspaper in Glasgow. It attacked the British Labour Party for its pro-war stand, and the German Social Democratic Party as represented by Vorwärts for its pro-war stand. With favor it reported the attempts of Italian, Dutch and American socialists to call international conferences of socialists to attempt to end the war through united socialist action. In October 1914, the War on War League cited the protests of Liebknecht, Luxemburg, and other anti-war German socialists, as well as those of the comrades in Russia, as examples to be followed by the South African opponents of the war.

Identifying themselves with socialist opposition to the war throughout the world, the War on War League recognized their task as a long, lonely battle of faith and education. Strength lay in conviction of their correctness rather than in the numbers of their adherents. Already in October 1914, a spokesman for the League was looking to a new sort of long-term, well-organized world revolution:

The WAR ON WAR of the future, the beginnings of whose strategy we believe we in our small way are helping to prepare, must be something more world-shaking than even the present Armageddon; something involving unprecedented discipline and daring, sacrifice and heroism, desperate conflict with all Military Governments and ruling classes a revolution, bloodless we hope, calling for profound patience and genius in its preparation and execution, but inspired by an inflexible determination to destroy utterly the Iron Heel which crushes the world with its ever increasing weight of militarism and death.4

It was suggested that the socialists of South Africa, far from the full-scale war which was fragmenting the socialist movement in Europe, had special opportunities to lead the cause of true socialism.

The War on War League, however, was quickly caught up with an abortive attempt to maintain peace in South Africa. The Afrikaners had little enthusiasm for a war in defense of the British Empire. Many talked of neutrality. Others saw an opportunity to ally with the Germans in order to reestablish the independence of the former Afrikaner republics. To this end rebellion broke out in October 1914, in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal under the leadership of the ex-Boer generals, C. R. de Wet and C. F. Beyers. The War on War League seized the threat of domestic civil war to call for negotiations. Telegrams were sent to the Governor-General and to General Smuts offering the services of the War on War League as a mediator. Both the Governor-General and General Smuts doubted the utility of the offer and declined. The League then placed its faith in a strong public opinion to prevent bloodshed between the government and the rebels. Advancing a step further the League suggested a round table conference between the government and the rebels at which all grievances, including the place of the Union in the war and demands for a general election, would be discussed and then referred to the people for their criticism before final adoption. In the view of the League success in such a venture would set the world an example of the possibility of the coexistence of separate nationalities within the same state; it would also prevent national antagonisms from blurring class differences.

The hopes of the League came to little. The SALP took up the League suggestion and sent a three-man delegation to urge the rebellious and unheeding General de Wet to obey constituted authority; the League itself failed to contact General de Wet or his fellow rebel, General Beyers. Although Hertzog had not supported the rebellion the League sent a delegate to Hertzog in Bloemfontein in an apparently futile mission to learn the demands of the rebels. The fruitless mediation efforts of the League merely highlighted the isolation of the League from the predominantly anti-war Afrikaners, an important segment of those who had joined the labor movement in the years immediately preceding the war. As a socialist-oriented, English-language, anti-war pressure group the League had little appeal to the nationalist-oriented, anti-war Afrikaners.

Despite the heavy emphasis upon socialism in much of its propaganda, the League continued to see itself as more than a mere socialist anti-war sect:

If we were asked what is our policy, one answer is, so far as criticism can do it, to stimulate that thinking and to combat the war orators' invitations to shut our eyes and plunge a simple operation, fatally tempting to many, while ours is almost as elaborate as the points we have to raise are innumerable. We cannot present, we cannot even ourselves grasp, our whole case at once. We of the War on War League have come together from various parties and schools, united in a pledge which becomes daily more convinced and more determined, to 'oppose this and any other war'. We publish this GAZETTE [War on War Gazette] in order to give publicity to all the different considerations on which, and all the different methods by which, it is to be opposed.... We have aimed rather at indicating what are conceived by one or another, here and elsewhere in the world, to be the causes and resulting remedies for war; the futile and false ideals and criminal purposes which underlie it; the means to be taken to defeat it.5

Yet the broad invitation to all opponents of war, including mere pacifists, limited the League's membership in another direction. Andrews, an anti-war socialist (despite his support of the SALP parliamentary caucus on the war vote) refused to join the League. Although he agreed with the general anti-war position of the League he could not bring himself to join a group which claimed to eschew all wars even these fought on behalf of the working class.6

Cut off from most of the Afrikaner community and increasingly isolated from the predominantly pro-war English-speaking community (as well as from some of the more militant anti-war trade unionists) the War on War League remained a small, but vocal, group of predominantly English-speaking middle class professional men, clerks, and clergymen, most of whom were recent adherents to socialism and the labor movement. The class composition of the League was highlighted in the professions of its officers. Colin Wade, the president, was a dentist; P. R. Roux, the secretary, was a druggist, S. P. Bunting, the treasurer, was a lawyer.

Nevertheless, the League was successful in providing a focal point for anti-war agitation even if its ranks were neither large nor all-inclusive. Problems with the government censor silenced the War on War Gazette at the end of November 1914, but the agitation of the League had already helped to focus anti-war sentiment within the English-speaking labor movement.

Within the SALP divisions over the war issue became sharp, but they did not immediately cut into the party organization on other issues. In the Transvaal Provincial Council a Unionist member tried to embarrass the SALP majority by demanding a vote on the war issue. Ten of the twenty-three SALP Councillors voted against support for the government. After the vote the SALP caucus reunited and continued to vote as a bloc on the other issues which faced it.

Finally, at the annual SALP conference in East London in January 1915, dissension threatened to shatter the party. Creswell, the SALP parliamentaryleader, was away in German South-West Africa with the Union forces attacking the Germans, but other delegates vigorously urged that the SALP adopt a strong pro-war policy. Yet the supporters of an anti-war position were well entrenched. The chairman of the SALP, Andrews, was anti-war, as was the secretary of the SALP, D. Ivon Jones, a Welsh-born clerk who had joined the labor movement during the 1913 strike. A strong delegation of Transvaal provincial councillors, including Wade and Bunting, also endorsed an anti-war position. The majority of the delegates at the SALP conference were anti-war, but they did not exploit their majority to impose an anti-war position upon the SALP. Fearful of an irreparable split in the SALP and hopeful of winning over the pro-war delegates eventually to an anti-war position, Gabriel Weinstock, the treasurer of the SALP and a supporter of the anti-war position, urged compromise. His counsel prevailed; with one dissenting vote the conference passed a 'neutrality resolution' according to which each SALP member was permitted to adopt whatever attitude toward the war his conscience dictated. In the new executive committee of the SALP, however, the anti-war group was in a majority and Andrews remained as the chairman of the SALP.

In the first six months of 1915 the deepening divisions between the two groups within the SALP were contained. At the February session of parliament, Andrews attacked the war policy of the government and argued strongly for the principles of socialism. Other M.P.'s of the SALP did not follow him. They did, however, vote against the government on amendments and they did support Andrews in some of his propaganda against the Botha-Smuts government with which they associated the repression of the 1913-14 strikes.

The anti-war executive committee of the SALP continued to follow developments in the socialist movement overseas. In late 1914 the executive committee had accepted an invitation from the American Socialist Party to a 'peace conference' of the International Socialist Bureau which was never held. In April 1915, the executive committee of the SALP requested Keir Hardie to call a conference of socialists to discuss peace terms to be popularized among workers of the world. In July 1915, the executive committee of the SALP requested the British section of the International Socialist Bureau to urge the French socialists to support a peace congress of the socialist parties of the world.

Within South Africa the anti-war and pro-war factions began to marshall forces for a showdown. In March the War on War League issued a pamphlet, Keep the Red Flag Flying, in which the SALP was warned against the campaign within its ranks to crush those holding an anti-war position. The new statement of the League was apparently more emphatic in its socialism than previous statements of the League. Simultaneously, the various pro-war groupings within the SALP began to receive encouragement from the popular press which engaged in violent attacks upon the anti-war group. In the face of the impending parliamentary elections in their will. To achieve such ends the SALP was to bind itself to cooperate with the International Labour Movement in its efforts to restore peace in Europe. Looking to reconstruction after the conclusion of peace the declaration generally endorsed the main points of the Union of Democratic Control (a British anti-war group started by Liberals and supported by some anti-war Laborites) which included: no transfer of a territory without consent of its population, no treaty without the consent of parliament, no alliances to reach a balance of power, the establishment of an open international council to secure the peace, armaments control and armaments reduction.

The 'principles' enunciated in The Labour Party's Duty in the War were similar to those being offered at the time by the center groups of European socialists. Yet it appears that many of the South Africans were sympathetic to the views of the left-wing of the European socialists. Full information about the activities of the left-wing in all of the belligerent countries was difficult to obtain, but it appears that the South Africans eagerly gleaned what they could from Avanti, the newspaper of the left-wing Italian Socialists, the British anti-war labor papers, Labour Leader and Forward, and such other sources as happened to reach South Africa. The anti-war SALP members sustained faith in their stand upon learning of the anti-war stand of Karl Liebknecht, and then later of the anti-war positions of the Russian Social Democrats and the Italian Socialists. The War on War League published excerpts from Liebknecht's address to the German Reichstag at the time of his lone vote against war credits; South African workers were urged to respond to Liebknecht's call to throw down their arms. On August 11 the signatories of The Labour Party's Duty in the War issued a new pamphlet, Noblesse Oblige, in which the anti-war statements of Liebknecht's followers were printed, as well as their anti-war statement of the executive committee of the Italian Socialist Party. The statement of the Italians merely endorsed a strong neutrality position, but the statements of the Leibknecht followers went further to suggest that the war of nations should be converted into a war of classes. The South Africans did not endorse the Liebknecht proposals specifically at this time they still placed faith in agitation, organization, and moral force as opposed to violence. By printing the statements of the Liebknecht group, however, in support of their own position the South African workers brought themselves closer to the militant international socialists in Europe, on the far left wing of which was V. I. Lenin of the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Party.

The special conference of the SALP which met on August 22-23 in Johannesburg in response to the demands of Creswell and his supporters sharply delineated the differences between the anti-war international socialists and the 'see-it-through' moderates.

With Andrews in the chair, the SALP conference immediately embroiled itself in a revealing controversy over the credentials of delegates. The exact course of the debate is unavailable, but it appears that the anti-war delegates protested the credentials of many of the pro-war delegates who they claimed represented recently revived branches or newly-founded branches. The protests of the anti-war delegates were rejected by a majority of the conference. It was clear that the pro-war position would dominate the proceedings of the conference.

The conference then turned to the substantive issue in question. The Bezuidenhout Valley branch, of which Creswell was a member, moved a resolution which declared support for the Union government in its assistance to the British government in the war. Yet the support for the government was qualified, as it had been at the time of the war vote in parliament. The resolution demanded that the government assume the responsibility for the dependants of soldiers, that powers be given to the government to mobilize any natural resources of which full use might not be made, that the government, if necessary, act to control inflation and profit-taking, and that all political parties be represented in any delegation which might confer with the British Imperial Government upon peace terms. In debate upon the resolution Creswell added that the SALP should still oppose conscription. In opposition to the Bezuidenhout Valley branch, the anti-war Mayfair branch presented a motion drawn from the Declaration of Principles in The Labour Party's Duty in the War.

A vigorous and noisy debate upon the motions ensued. When Andrews refused to put the question until all had spoken, the Creswell supporters succeeded in removing him from the chair. Similarly, the Creswell majority removed J. A. Clark, the first vice-chairman, from the chair when he, too, refused to put the question. Finally, a pro-war man was put in the chair and a vote was taken. Amidst cheers, booing and singing, the Bezuidenhout Valley pro-war resolution was passed intact, 82-26.7

On the following day, Gabriel Weinstock, an anti-war delegate, proposed a motion from the Commissioner Street branch. The motion requested that the British Imperial government state the terms upon which it would be willing to discuss peace and should such terms be found just by the administrative council of the SALP full support from the SALP for the proposals would be forthcoming. The following terms were proposed as suitable: no transfer of territory without the consent of the residents of the territory, disarmament, and compulsory arbitration.

In response to Weinstock's challenge, Creswell proposed the following amendment:

That in the opinion of this Conference of the SALP when the enemy forces have been driven out of, or have evacuated, all territory outside of their borders as existing before the war, the Union Government should represent to the Imperial Government the advisability of stating the terms of peace acceptable to the Allies, and the principal of such terms should be:

The Creswell amendment was adopted by a vote of 51-22. The vote on the Creswell amendment placed the SALP firmly within the right wing of the world socialist movement which asserted that the best way to achieve the goals of labor was through full loyalty to the fatherland.

Upon passage of the Creswell amendment, Weinstock then moved a modified version of the 'Neutrality Resolution.' He proposed that the pro-war policy not be binding on dissenting members of the SALP who would still maintain their right to express their contrary opinions on the war. Candidates of the SALP who opposed the pro-war policy should be permitted to continue their candidatures, and, if elected, were to be allowed to vote according to their consciences on the question of war. The new pro-war chairman ruled that the motion was out of order; he claimed that it violated the membership pledge of the SALP which demanded submission to policy as decided at conference.

Having resolved themselves away from the international socialist position on the war the SALP conference then went further to state explicitly that the SALP was to embrace the middle class as well as the workers. The word labor was formally declared to include the interests of small traders, professional men, and farmers.

Defeated on matters of principle, and denied the right to dissent, ten prominent anti-war SALP members resigned from their offices in the SALP and left the conference. W. H. Andrews resigned as chairman and J. A. Clark resigned as first vice-chairman, while D. Ivon Jones and Gabriel Weinstock resigned as secretary and treasurer respectively. Six members of the executive committee followed their lead. Resignation from office, however, did not solve the dilemma of the anti-war international socialists should the unity of the working class in South Africa be shattered for loyalty to essential international working class principles or should essential international working class principles be compromised to preserve working class unity in South Africa?

In the hopes that an absolutely final break with the established labor party could be avoided, the dissident internationalists decided merely to form an International League within the SALP. Its program expanded upon the simple anti-war position of the War on War League:

To the banner of international socialism within the SALP came the respected and vocal minority from the August 22-23 conference, many of whom had been members of the War on War League. The leadership of the new group was that which had led the SALP from December 1914 until the August conference; W. H. Andrews became president of the International League of the SALP, and D. Ivon Jones and Gabriel Weinstock became secretary and treasurer respectively. The vice chairmanships were taken by J. A. Clark, and A. F. Crisp, both of whom were Transvaal provincial councillors and former members of the SALP executive committee.

In the face of the new challenge from the anti-war group the newly-victorious pro-war group in the SALP was not content to rest with the results of the conference. The administrative council of the executive committee, now dominated by Creswell supporters, demanded that all candidates for parliament pledge loyal support for the government for the duration of the war. When the candidates opposed to war, Andrews and Crisp, refused, the new chairman of the SALP publicly tore up their pledges of support at a meeting of the administrative council on September 5. The final gauntlet was down.

Andrews and Crisp resigned from the SALP in order to continue to run for parliament on an anti-war, international socialist platform. At a meeting on September 15 the International League decided to submit the question of withdrawal from the SALP to a vote of its membership. On September 22 it was announced that the vote had resulted in an overwhelming majority in favour of severing all connection with the SALP. The membership decided to convert the International League of the SALP into the International Socialist League (ISL).

Although the ISL was outside the SALP it retained most of the simple program of the International League of the SALP. In the provisional constitution of the ISL the two objects of the former International League were compressed into one object: To propagate the principles of International Socialism and anti-Militarism, and to maintain and strengthen International working class organisation. The constitution endorsed organization and education through the press and public meetings; at the same time it endorsed participation in elections for public bodies at all levels. Membership was open to all who pledged to abide by the constitution, and were accepted by a branch of the League or by League headquarters. All members were obligated to pay a monthly subscription and to subscribe to the League publication. Governing authority of the ISL was vested in a management committee of a chairman, two vice-chairmen, treasurer, secretary and four other members appointed for one year by an annual delegates' meeting at which each twenty-five members were to be represented by two delegates.10

The provisional constitution of the ISL did not mention industrial action. Yet the ISL quickly affirmed that work within the trade unions was an essential part of its program:

The International Socialist League will have the more significance the more it tends to pull the working class of South Africa with it. This involves a corresponding interest in industrial organisation with a view to giving it an International outlook.11

The commitment to activity within the trade unions was formalized in the membership pledge of the ISL. One of the four clauses of the membership pledge required that each ISL member must do all in his power to support the International industrial action of the working class.

Although the ISL was founded by Johannesburg-based left-wing rebels from the SALP, it quickly proclaimed itself a rallying point for left-wing international socialists of all South Africa:

The Socialists of the Transvaal have given sufficient guarantee of fidelity to the cause which they now espouse to give them the right to urge upon the organized Socialists of the other provinces to link up at all costs. The Conference of the League which it is hoped to call in afew months time should be representative of the whole of South Africa. We look with confidence to them to rise to the greatness of the occasion, and form in South Africa an organisation worthy of the International.12

Specifically the ISL urged the socialist societies of Durban, Cape Town, and Pretoria to join them in one South African international socialist organization; individual socialists who had found the SALP too moderate were also invited to adhere.

Yet the ISL did not merely look within South Africa; it saw itself closely linked with the most advanced socialists of the world. The ISL claimed that it represented the vanguard of the anti-war working class in South Africa:

It was a case of duty to the International as against the obligation to working class unity. It soon became evident however that unity for us meant unity with the anti-war minorities of Socialism all over the world. It was even felt latterly that the best answer to those who wished to 'bore from within' was that no reclamation of the party to Socialism after the war will have any virtue unless a section of it have unmistakeably rebelled against its capitulation to capitalism. We claim that in the present conflict our best service will be considering the claims of humanity at large...

And now the principles of International Socialism in South Africa are in our keeping. We have undertaken great responsibilities. Every member of the League must feel the need for concentrating all available energies on making the organisation well worthy of the principles which it is to enshrine.13

Isolated by distance and environment from developments in the overseas socialist movement, the ISL, nevertheless, proclaimed its readiness to adhere to the canons of the largely European-based left-wing international socialist movement.

In its attitude to the international socialist movement, to socialism in South Africa, and to industrial organization, the ISL appropriated for itself the role of the militant left-wing socialists of the prewar period. Yet one element mentioned by spokesmen of the ISL at the time of its establishment marked the ISL as a revolutionary step in the South African labor movement. For the first time spokesmen of a white militant left-wing organization in the Transvaal proclaimed the solidarity of their organization with non-whites:

Moreover, an Internationalism which does not concede the fullest rights which the native working class is capable of claiming will be a sham. One of the justifications for our withdrawal from the Labour Party is that it gives us untrammeled freedom to deal, regardless of political fortunes, with the great and fascinating problem of the native. If the League deals resolutely in consonance with Socialist principles with the native question, it will succeed in shaking South African Capitalism to its foundations. Then and not till then, shall we be able to talk about the South African Proletariat in our International relations. Not till we free the native can we hope to free the white.14

The formation of the ISL, then, was a turning point in South African labor history. Militant left-wing socialists had grouped themselves into an organization outside of the SALP. The new organization proclaimed itself the guardian of the true principles of international socialism in South Africa. It was to infuse internationalism into the South African trade unions. Most significantly, however, it recognized that its activities ought to include the non-white working class. The concentration of these four strands of socialism within one organization gave the ISL a unique position in South African politics.

In the last months of 1915 and in early 1916 the distinctive nature of the ISL became more pronounced. A group which had its genesis in the protest of militant anti-war socialists against the pro-war stand of the majority of the SALP became primarily an internationally-oriented Marxist organization preoccupied with problems of industrial unionism and socialism for the non-whites of South Africa.1

In the years preceding the war the South African labor movement had drawn its inspiration primarily from the British labor movement in which explicit Marxism was weak. The outposts of Marxism in South Africa, the SLP of the Transvaal (which looked to De Leon in the United States) and the SDF groups in Cape Town and Durban (which looked to Hyndman in Britain), remained on the fringes of the South African labor movement. The SALP was not concerned with Marxism. The literature sold by the new professedly left-wing ISL initially continued to reflect the previous non-Marxist emphasis of the SALP and the labor movement. In early November 1915, the ISL advertised books by Tolstoy and Kropotkin, as well as books by Norman Brailsford, Fenner Brockway and Walton Newbold of the left wing of the British labor movement. Yet no works of Marx and Engels were advertised.

Impetus for a shift to a greater emphasis upon Marx came from two sources former SLP members who affiliated with the ISL and several of the more ideologically-conscious former SALP members who were members of the ISL at its foundation. At the time of the break of the anti-war International League from the SALP, adherents of the SLP cooperated in the formation of the ISL; they brought with them to the ISL ideas about Marx as formulated by De Leon. Two key former SALP members, Jones and Bunting, were also interested in Marx. Bunting had moved from a position as a mere war-on-war crusader to a more consciously international socialist position. Jones, the former secretary of the SALP, and the first secretary of the ISL as well as the editor of The International, had also become interested in Marxism. He began to refer to Marx's works in his editorials. He urged fidelity to Marx:

What the Labour Movement requires is a return to the limpid, unequivocal affirmations of the Communist Manifesto of Karl Marx.

It is vain to look for a Man, a Deliverer, we don't recognize one when we have him.

You complain that Socialists have gone astray astray from what? They have always strayed from the clear Pole Star of the class struggle as indicated by Marx.2

The presence of the Marxists in the ISL brought a new emphasis to the concerns of the group. By the end of November 1915, the ISL was advertising pamphlets by Marx, Engels, and De Leon along with its other literature. The ISL was also apparently following the Weekly People, the journal of De Leon's SLP in the United States.

The movement of the ISL members toward Marxism was complemented and reinformed by the continuing interest of the ISL in the progress of the left-wing international socialists overseas. In the September 10 issue of The International , at the founding of the International League of the SALP, it was proclaimed: Here we plant the flag of the New International in South Africa. A week later, on September 17, 1915, the International League of the SALP published a startling Message to Europe from the pen of Bunting. In it not only was adherence urged to the true principles of socialism, but the formation of a new socialist International was specifically advocated:

Speaking in all humility from this remote corner of the globe, we venture to think that not only does the future of the whole working class movement in every land turn more than ever on the formation of a well-knit, united, executive International Socialist Organisation, but that the brightest hopes of an early peace with honour for all countries concerned in the present war depend upon action being taken at once to that end by such an organisation. We further feel convinced that the minorities above mentioned [anti-war minorities in the British and German parties] together with parties like the Italian Socialist Party and the Russian Social Democratic Party, which we have read throughout remained true to their principles, form the obvious, and for the time being, the only suitable foundation for such a structure.3

The statement, addressed to the Secretary, British Section, International Socialist Bureau, went on to urge that it be placed before the various anti-war sections of socialists in Germany, Austria, Russia, Italy, and the United States; it suggested that Karl Liebknecht be invited to take the leadership of the new organization. The statement held that the existence of a new International would rally the anti-war forces and encourage their secession from the majority pro-war socialist and labor parties. Within the statement there was no suggestion that the war between nations be converted into a war between classes; Bunting had not yet specifically appreciated the distinctions which Lenin and Liebknecht were making within the European movement. Nevertheless, the call for a new anti-war International, although vague in its terms and not specifically Marxist, furthered the affinity of the ISL for the Marxist left wing of the European socialist movement. The formal break of the International League of the SALP from the SALP several weeks after Bunting's statement and its conversion into the ISL advanced the South African left-wing socialists organizationally beyond most of the left-wing socialists of Europe who still remained within the prewar socialist organizations, many of which were dominated by pro-war and right-wing elements.

Unknown to the South Africans, representatives of the left-wing and center sections of the socialist movement in Europe had met in Zimmerwald, Switzerland, on September 5-8. At the meeting the left wing and the center bitterly clashed over the manifesto to be issued and the tactics to be adopted. The draft resolution of the left wing, obviously bearing the stamp of Lenin, condemned the war as an imperialist adventure and violently attacked the right wing and the center of the socialist movement. In specific terms the left wing resolution urged refusal of war credits, resignation from pro-war cabinets, open opposition to the war in parliaments, legal and illegal anti-war propaganda, street demonstrations, strikes, and fraternization in the trenches. Although the final form of the manifesto was modified to meet the objections of the center who commanded the majority of votes at Zimmerwald, the statement still bore strong traces of the left-wing program. Instead of specific tactical directives, the final manifesto settled for a general call for an irreconcilable proletarian class struggle. The war was condemned as an imperialist war. The policies of the majority socialist parties were indicted and the working class was called upon to fight for peace and the restoration of international working class solidarity. In addition to the conference manifesto, the French and German socialist representatives also issued a joint manifesto calling for immediate peace, denouncing working class collaboration with the government, and proclaiming firm attachment to the principle of class warfare.

At the conclusion of its work the Zimmerwald conference appointed an International Socialist Commission. In the eyes of Lenin the new Commission was the start of a new International; the majority of the conference, however, regarded the Commission merely as a clearing house for the internationalist elements in the socialist movement.4

It was not until late October that the ISL in South Africa learned about the Zimmerwald conference, and then the information came through a censored report in Avanti, the journal of the Italian Socialist Party. The censor had deleted the contents of the Franco-German resolution and the original draft resolution submitted by the left wing. Nevertheless, the ISL was able to learn the general outline of the work of the conference. Unaware of the differences at the conference, The International enthusiastically identified the ISL with the work of the conference:

We sincerely congratulate our Italian comrades on the success of their efforts and the Conference on the unanimity and enthusiasm displayed. It has given us new hope for the future and with the delegates who attended we pledge ourselves to carry on its work.5

In the ensuing months the ISL, and in particular, Jones as editor of The International, acted to affirm the allegiance of the ISL to the Zimmerwald group. On November 12 The International printed the salient points of the Zimmerwald manifesto on its first page and promised to issue a full text of the manifesto in pamphlet form. At the same time the ISL criticized the ILP in Britain for indefiniteness and vacillation with regard to capitalism. In December The International accepted that the Zimmerwald conference was really the start of the new International of class-conscious socialists. In the same month the ISL received a letter from Morgari, an Italian member of the International Socialist Commission, acknowledging receipt of the Message to Europe which had been sent to him as well as to other European socialists. Morgari informed the ISL that the Message to Europe was inspired by the same principles which animated the Zimmerwald conference. He had forwarded the Message to Europe to the International Socialist Commission and informed the ISL that the Commission would answer them directly and officially. It was announced that the League would review the Zimmerwald manifesto and discuss the question of affiliation with the New International Commission brought into existence by the Zimmerwald Conference at its first conference to be held on January 9, 1916 in Johannesburg.

Turning to the problems of socialism in South Africa the ISL moved to gather all South African left-wing socialists into the ISL. The efforts of the ISL met an uneven response.

On the Witwatersrand the ISL attracted some members from the small prewar left-wing fringe socialist groups. The import of those from the SLP has been noted. Some former members of the IWW also joined the ISL. The Pretoria Socialist Society (one of the component parts of the abortive United Socialist Party of 1912) submitted their program to the ISL and indicated that they were prepared to support a party whose programme was definitely Socialistic, and which acknowledged that reforms, whether obtained by legislation or by Trade Union action, cannot ultimately benefit the working class while the wage system lasts. The ISL renewed its invitation that the Pretoria socialists cooperate with the ISL in the formation of a South Africa-wide socialist organization. No formal action was taken to amalgamate the two organizations, but Pretoria residents interested in membership in the ISL were invited to contact W. Blake of the Pretoria Socialist Society.

In Cape Town Wilfrid Harrison of the SDF became the agent for the ISL in October 1915. Later in the month it was claimed that a branch of the ISL had been formed in Cape Town by members of the War on War League and members of the SDF. It appears, however, that the foundation of an ISL branch was abortive; the SDF remained the only existing left-wing socialist organization in Cape Town.

The situation within the SDF reflected the deep differences which plagued unity in the miniscule socialist movement in Cape Town, in particular, and in South Africa, in general. The SDF was divided into pro-war and anti-war factions; at the same time its members were divided over whether a socialist body should participate in elections or whether it should merely rely on direct industrial action by trade unions. Curiously, the SDF in Cape Town allowed these diverse views to coexist within one organization.

The diversity of the SDF precluded formal unity with the ISL. After the formation of the International League within the SALP Jones had apparently journeyed to Cape Town to urge the SDF to participate in joint anti-war propaganda; the SDF refused. Later, after the formation of the ISL, members of the Johannesburg ISL visited the Cape Town SDF again. They found the SDF divided on the war issue. Some of the SDF members, imbued with an anti-political bias, seemed to fear that the ISL would return to the SALP from which it had sprung to engage exclusively in electoral politics. An SDF spokesman also indicated that there was no reason for the establishment of an ISL branch in Cape Town inasmuch as the SDF already existed as a representative of the international socialist movement with which the ISL could cooperate. Never the less, the SDF did welcome the first conference of the ISL with the hope:

...that the deliberations there will result in the possibility of our unification as an International Socialist Organization of South Africa to work for the destruction of International Capitalism.6

In Durban the ISL encountered similar problems but ultimately it was more successful in establishing contact with the already existing Social Democratic Party. (In Durban the SDF had renamed itself the Social Democratic Party.) In late October a member of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) responded in his personal capacity to the suggestion of The International that the South African socialists link. His letter revealed a skepticism similar to that of the Cape Town SDF:

The Durban Party has seen many Parties, claiming to be Socialist parties, rise and fall, and therefore its reluctance to merge its individuality in every new party which may be established may be accounted for. And the fact that the 'International Socialist League' has split away from the SALP on a definite issue, viz. 'the see it through' policy, scarcely affords the guarantee that, at an earlier or later date, the 'International' might not again coalesce with the parent body. Let us link up by all means, but first let us clearly understand each other, and just exactly what we each stand for and are committed to.7

The letter writer went on to query exactly what the ISL meant by anti-militarism. He also demanded to know whether the ISL would recognize race, color and creed in its propaganda; he claimed that the Durban party did not.

About the same time other left-wing socialists in Durban were organizing a branch of the ISL. On October 28 the new branch met for the first time. It elected S. Pettersen, a left-wing socialist from Norway, as its chairman; W. H. Andrews, who had come from the Witwatersrand to work in Pettersen's workshop, was also a member of the Durban ISL branch. The new ISL began to conduct regular Sunday lectures and public meetings in the Durban Gardens, the local 'Hyde Park Corner'.

In early December the Durban branch of the ISL and the SDP of Durban met for discussion and an exchange of views. It was agreed to call a joint meeting of all members of both organizations on December 23 at which time definite proposals with a view to joint action were to be discussed.

Apparently no joint activity was undertaken, but friendly communication was maintained between the ISL and the SDP.

In addition to working for the unity of the existing socialist groups, the ISL also carried its message of uncompromising socialism to the public through electoral campaigns for various offices. Its propaganda found little favor with the public, no matter what the election or the nature of the constituency.

After the withdrawal of the International League from the SALP, both W. H. Andrews and J. A. Clark continued as candidates for parliament in the constituencies where they had originally been nominated by the SALP. In their campaigns the two candidates concentrated upon their opposition to the war, but they also championed the rights of all workers regardless of creed or color. Although they were harried by hecklers with rotten vegetables and verbal abuse, the two candidates stuck with their program. It was evidently not appealing even in constituencies where the English-speaking workers were concentrated; on election day Andrews received 82 votes while Clark received 58 votes in Langlaagte. Yet the ISL had some consolation. Only three out of forty-four candidates of the SALP were returned and Creswell was defeated in two constituencies in the face of a swing to the South African Party in constituencies which had previously strongly supported the SALP. In the view of the ISL the poor showing of the SALP proved that a labor party must maintain an international socialist position. With determination the ISL looked to the future:

The International League has every reason to be proud of itself. The 140 stalwart voters who supported Andrews and Clark are to be congratulated on their pluck. The League will now go from strength to strength. The salutary lessons emerging from the present smash up will be the cement of the strong movement which our members have resolved to build up.8

As if to prove that it was not deterred by the defeats in the general election the ISL immediately nominated candidates for the Transvaal municipal elections. Five ISL candidates were put up in Johannesburg and four were put up in Germiston, the neighboring industrial town. The municipal manifesto under which the Johannesburg candidates ran did not breathe the fire of a class war; rather the ISL candidates garbed themselves as radical reformers. Castigating the vested interests and claiming, as workers, to be free of them, the ISL urged city planning, taxation of site values, zoned tram fares, municipal services at cost, free public libraries, supervision of food marketing, better conditions for municipal employees, recognition of employees' unions, and the end of private contracting upon municipal projects. In the elections the ISL did fare better than it had in the general elections. Colin Wade won a seat in Germiston, while Clark eked out a close victory in Johannesburg.

When a by-election was called in Fordsburg for a seat in the Transvaal provincial council, the ISL tested its electoral appeal in an area with a heavy concentration of recently-urbanized Afrikaners. The ISL chose as its candidate Sydney van Lingen, one of its very few Afrikaner members. Van Lingen had travelled and studied mechanical engineering in England, Holland, and Germany. Despite the selection of an Afrikaner (or perhaps because the Afrikaner 'intellectual' selected was too different from the Afrikaners in the Fordsburg constituency), the ISL candidate finished last in a field of four. Nevertheless, the ISL felt that van Lingen deserves the highest praise for his fight on behalf of League principles.

The electioneering of the ISL on the basis of its uncompromising socialism did not go unchallenged, however, within the ranks of the ISL. Some of the ISL recruits from the former membership of the SLP and IWW opposed all participation in 'bourgeois' political institutions; they preferred to place faith in industrial unionism. At the time of the Fordsburg by-election the issue of electoral politics came to its first showdown within the ISL. After a bitter wrangle the pro-political outlook of the former militant SALP members triumphed:

The revolutionary character of a party does not consist in abstaining from fighting Elections. It consists in fighting them on a revolutionary issue. True that Provincial Councils offer no remedy, no revolution. We are even getting convinced that Parliament does not either. But the elections to these bodies constitute the only arena known to the people. The question for us is, shall the people be left to the false issues raised by the non-Socialist parties? (and among these must the Labour party be now accounted). To the best of our resources, regardless of the immediate results, it is the mission of the League, wherever men are deluded by false cries, encouraged to expect Edens from the Capitalist readjustments of their burdens, and to vote again their deluders and masters into prominence and power it is our mission and our duty to present to them the alternative of the International and the vast revolution in human methods and outlook which that contains at all times; and to make that change of outlook the issue in the occasional exercise of the people's will.9

The ISL placed itself with the De Leonite wing of the IWW and with the Bolsheviks of Russia; elections and 'bourgeois' political institutions were to be used to advance the cause of international socialism. In this spirit the ISL accepted its electoral defeats and yet sustained its faith in the correctness of its tactics.

At the same time that the ISL reaffirmed its dedication to participation in elections it also attacked the entrenched craft unions for alleged 'reformism'. Particular wrath was directed at Archie Crawford, the former militant socialist propagandist who had assumed the leadership of the SAIF. Under Crawford's leadership the SAIF had negotiated recognition for itself from employers in the labor-scarce wartime economy in return for a non-strike pledge for the duration of the war. Crawford concentrated trade union efforts upon the establishment of cooperative societies rather than upon participation in politics. In keeping with the new position of the SAIF, Crawford negotiated directly with Smuts over the role of labor in the war.

On the occasion of the trade union leaders' conversations with Smuts (which resulted in trade union support for the South African expedition to East Africa), The International strongly attacked the established trade unions. The 'reformism' of the trade unions was attributed to their craft union mentality, to their intolerance of the non-white worker, and to their unconcern for the lower-paid unemployed white workers, including women. The International of December 3 urged a new labor organization under new leadership in which all boundaries of craft and race would be ended by the organization of the mass of the workers.

With the approach of the conference of the ISL on January 9 the discussion of industrial unionism continued with increased emphasis upon the role of the non-white. The management committee of the ISL proposed to urge support for the organization of industrial unions on an industry-by-industry basis irrespective of race, color, or creed. The device of industrial unions for non-whites was an ideologically acceptable device to force the attention of the white workers to the otherwise unacceptable conception of unity of all workers, regardless of race. The adoption of this measure was viewed as crucial to the reorientation of the ISL in the political, economic and racial spheres:

If the Conference adopt this resolution it will be the great revolutionary fruit of an otherwise pointless agitation. This will be the permanent advance made in the outlook of the Labour movement. It will attempt a change, not only in our attitude toward the slave races of South Africa, enlisting their cooperation in the emancipation of Labour, but will shift its adherence from political to industrial organisation as the primary method of wresting power from Capitalism. Assuredly it is not proposed to neglect political action, in fact the Conference will be asked to assert the contesting of elections to public bodies such as necessary for demonstration and education.10

Although the proposal of the management committee reflected the mixed concerns of former SLP and IWW members as well as those from the left wing of the SALP who had been strong advocates of industrial unionism, more importantly, it signified a further confirmation of the radical attitude of some in the ISL to the problems of color.

At the first conference of the ISL held on January 9, 1916, in Johannesburg the various tendencies within the ISL came face to face. The full transcript of the conference is not available, but through the report of the conference in The International it is possible to get a sharp picture of the nature of the strengths and stresses of the ISL.11

The gathering of faithful was small. Thirty-two delegates (who could have represented a maximum membership of 400 according to the provisional constitution) assembled. They, with the nine members of the management committee, represented the voting members of the conference. Other members from various branches were in attendance with rights to speak, but not to vote.

The ISL reported branches on the Witwatersrand in Benoni, Germiston, Johannesburg Central and Johannesburg Eastern (the last two branches being the consolidation of several former branches of the SALP which had come over to the ISL). It was claimed that a branch was in the process of formation at Krugersdorp in the West Witwatersrand. Only a branch from Durban represented the ISL outside the Witwatersrand. Yet the ISL reported that it was maintaining friendly communication with socialist societies in Cape Town, Durban,and Pretoria. Two fraternal delegates were present from the Pretoria Socialist Society. In addition, the ISL claimed much sympathy among the most efficient officers of Labour Party branches in all the chief towns of the Union.

It is impossible to estimate the validity of the claim of the ISL. Yet it is clear that among the small membership of the ISL there were a significant number of individuals who had been prominent in the SALP or the trade unions in the prewar period. As has been noted, four senior officers of the SALP and six more members of the Executive Committee of the SALP had gone over to the ISL upon its formation. Six SALP provincial councillors in the Transvaal became members of the ISL. The most prominent recruit to the ISL was W. H. Andrews, the chairman of the ISL, who had been both a member of parliament and prominent in trade union affairs. Andrews was accompanied by a number of other important trade union personalities. The secretary of the key Mine Workers' Union, J. F. Brown, was an ISL member as was J. Clark, the secretary of the Boilermakers' Union. The chairman of the South African section of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, J. Crisp, was in the ISL, as were J. M. Gibson, C. B. Tyler, and W. Blake, leading men among the building workers. J. T. Bain, G. Mason, and A. Watson, who had been active in the prewar strikes on the Witwatersrand, also joined the ISL upon its formation.12

Although the ISL which assembled in Johannesburg was a tiny organization it seemed to have the potential for influence out of proportion to its actual numerical membership. It was centered in Johannesburg and on the Witwatersrand, the key area of labor politics in South Africa. More importantly, the concentration of prominent labor personalities within its ranks gave it an added prestige which probably helped to offset the unpopularity of some of the positions taken by the ISL. Yet divisions within the membership at the first conference on a number of crucial issues mitigated the prospective strength of the ISL.

The first motion discussed by the conference strongly reaffirmed the anti-militarism of the ISL, and at the same time, its independence from any other labor organization. At issue was whether or not the ISL would enter fraternal relations with any organization which supported the war. Several members evidently feared that the passage of the motion would interfere with their activities as members of trade unions which might be pro-war; they were assured that the measure would apply only to the official relations of the ISL. Accordingly it passed amid acclamation: That the League do not recognize fraternal relations with any organisation whatsoever that supports the institution of militarism and war.

Turning to the issue of international affiliation the conference unanimously endorsed the Zimmerwald manifesto and the affiliation of the ISL to the International Socialist Commission at Berne. The management committee was instructed to help extend financial assistance to the new International.

Yet discussion of the future of international socialism revealed some differences of approach among the delegates. The delegates agreed that the ISL recommend to the new International at Berne the formation of a Commission sitting continuously to report on all phases of the war in its relation to the working class. After some discussion it was also agreed that the commission was to prepare for a probable uprising of the proletariat at the conclusion of the war; and to investigate as to the best means of guiding such uprising, on lines least provocative of bloodshed, to the capture of increased political and economic power by the workers. An amendment was rejected which would have changed the last clause to read, with a view to the abolition of the Capitalist system and the emancipation of Labour. The commentator in The International indicated that the rejection of the amendment signified the scientific as against the catastrophic character of our Socialist belief. It would seem that the more conservative interpreters of Marx triumphed over the more impatient ISL members who had been influenced by the anarcho-syndicalism of the IWW. The South African international socialists had still not yet advanced to specific endorsement of revolutionary class war as urged by Lenin and his followers; they did, however, look for violent social upheavals in the postwar world which would advance the workers' cause.

In view of the antagonism of the former IWW members to political action, it is surprising that the ISL conference did not apparently discuss the question of participation in electoral activity. Silence on this matter did not mean unanimity within ISL ranks (as later events revealed), but the ISL did remain committed on the record to electoral activity.

In the discussion on industrial unionism the continuing commitment of the former SLP members to their De Leonite version of Marxism was shown. The Benoni delegation moved That the League adopt the constitution of the Socialist Labour Party of America. The motion was ruled out of order, yet the management committee was requested to investigate the matter. Ultimately the conference passed a motion along the lines proposed by the management committee before the conference:

That we encourage the organisation of the workers on industrial or class lines, irrespective of race, colour or creed, as the most effective means of providing the necessary force for the emancipation or the workers.

The endorsement of industrial unionism for all, regardless of race, did not mean that there was full consensus among the ISL delegates on questions of color. The debate on the specific question of the attitude of the ISL to the African worker revealed continuing differences among the ISL members. Bunting, from whose pen had come many of the pre-conference articles urging activity among Africans on the part of the ISL, proposed a Petition of Rights for the Native:

That this League affirm that the emancipation of the working class requires the abolition of all forms of native indenture, compound and passport systems; and the lifting of the native worker to the political and industrial status of the white.

According to Jones, the motion aroused misgivings among the delegates because of the inclusion of political rights for Africans.

In the ensuing discussion of the motion several different tactics were proposed, all of which would have avoided or blunted Bunting's proposal. One delegate, Clingman, proposed that A Committee be appointed to report on the proper Socialist policy on native affairs. Colin Wade, Bunting's colleague in the War on War League and in the Transvaal provincial council, introduced biological evidence which apparently intimated that the African could not develop intellectually as the white could. Andrew Dunbar, formerly of the IWW, denied that the special problem of the African existed; in his view the only problem was the class problem. Clingman's postponing amendment was lost, but Wade did succeed in changing the last clause of Bunting's proposal to read:

And the lifting of the native wage worker to the political and industrial status of the white; meanwhile endeavouring to prevent the increase of the native wage workers, and to assist the existing native wage workers to free themselves from the wage system.

Amended in such a fashion, the Bunting proposal was passed by an overwhelming majority.

The amended motion was of double significance. It showed that the segregationist, protectionist attitudes of the SALP persisted in the ranks of the anti-war internationalist ISL. More crucially, however, it showed that the ISL would go on record in conference as favoring attention to the African workers already in the urban areas (while at the same time encouraging them to return to the rural areas). The unconventional racial views which had been expressed in the pages of The International were endorsed officially by the ISL in conference.

The resolutions of the first conference of the ISL reaffirmed the radical stances taken in the latter months of 1915 with regard to international socialism, electoral activity, industrial unionism, and non-white workers. At the same time the debate on the resolutions at the conference revealed the strength of potentially conflicting viewpoints among the small numbers of left-wing socialists who composed the ISL. It seemed clear that the tiny ISL would continue to focus left-wing socialist approaches to the problems of South Africa, yet the potential for disagreement within the ISL left the question of its exact future ideological course unsure.

In the remaining years of the First World War the ISL secured its position as the left-wing gadfly of the South African labor movement. It switched from mere propaganda to limited action among white and non-white workers, but in so doing it began to encounter difficulties in the realization of its positions upon industrial unionism and upon the role of the non-white. Within its own ranks questions over the role of electoral politics brought continual disagreements. As the war progressed, however, developments in Europe increasingly captured the attention of the ISL. By identifying itself with the socialist revolutions in Europe the ISL captured new adherents within South Africa as the local representatives of the impending socialist revolution. At the end of the war the ISL was ready to identify fully with the left-wing European socialists who looked to the Russian Revolution.1

The presence in the ISL of prominent trade unionists and former SLP members assured that the ISL would devote efforts to reform of the existing white trade unions. C. B. Tyler, one of the former SLP propagandists and a carpenter, initiated a provisional committee to organize a single union of building workers which would include carpenters, masons, joiners, and all others in the trade. On June 2, 1917, The International urged all who worked on the mines to reform the locals of the South African Mine Workers' Association into branches which would include all those working in one location, regardless of craft, and exclude the old craft union divisions. Under the influence of J. F. Brown, secretary of the Mine Workers' Association, the miners' union was reorganized. Greater autonomy was given to the district leadership and efforts were made to strengthen the local organizations at each mineshaft; the craft union divisions, however, remained. It has been claimed that the reorganization brought increased membership and trade union activity.2

Yet the task of the trade union reformers was difficult. Trade union membership increased, but it was parallelled by an expansion through the South African war economy of the early wartime pattern of cooperation between management and trade unions. Not only were trade unions recognized as bargaining agents for the first time and no-strike agreements reached for the duration of the war, but the Chamber of Mines even offered to guarantee the ratio of white to non-white workers for the duration of the war. The Chamber also offered a reduced 48 1/2 hour week, a minimum wage of 12s.6d. per day after six months underground, and collection of union dues by management; in return local strikes were to be forbidden and local autonomy curbed. After some maneuvering and several ballots the miners finally accepted the security of the Chamber's terms in September 1917. Throughout the negotiations leading up to the agreement, The International attacked the leadership of the South African Mine Workers' Association, including its own J. F. Brown, for their compromise with what was considered the worst of the capitalist combines at the expense of labor solidarity, and particularly, at the expense of the non-white workers. The existing craft unions were also attacked for accepting separate agreements with managements under which wages were raised slightly in return for a guarantee not to press the issue of wages, hours, and overtime until three months after the declaration of peace.

In spite of the docility of the trade unions, The International frequently reaffirmed the support of the ISL for the concept of industrial unionism, with particular emphasis upon industrial unionism to include non-white workers. The strength of the sentiment for industrial unionism within the ISL was indicated at the January 1917 ISL conference when industrial unionism was formally added to international socialism and anti-militarism as one of the objects of the ISL. The shift to trade unionism was emphasized by the election of an almost completely new and largely blue-collar thirteen person management committee which included three carpenters, two fitters, one electrician, one sampler, one cabinet maker, one pipe fitter, and one bricklayer in contrast to the 1916 management committee of nine which included four or five who were professional men or white collar workers.

In 1917 the ISL advocates of industrial unionism began to initiate moves outside the established trade union channels to realize their goals. In April C. B. Tyler converted the provisional committee for the organization of one big union in the building trade into a formal organization, the Building Workers' Industrial Union. On August 24 The International published a call from a committee which included a number of ISL men for a conference on September 2 to discuss ways and means of urging the workers to unite and organize industrially so that they may be in a position to present a united front to the employing class, and eventually take over the control of the industry. On September 2 forty-five wage-earners, including three Africans, met and passed the following resolution:

That the Conference endorses the creation of a general industrial union embracing all industries. That a General Convention be called for the purpose of organising the movement on revolutionary industrial lines; and that a Manifesto Committee be appointed to draft a manifesto.3

A Manifesto Committee including one African was elected, and ISL men (one of whom was J. F. Brown, recently out of favor) were elected to the offices of chairman and secretary. Through September, October, and November the Manifesto Committee, which renamed itself the Industrial Committee, worked to complete its statement; in late November means were sought to finance publication of the statement. It was also decided to call an Industrial Conference at Easter, 1918.

While the efforts of the Industrial Committee were directed primarily at the white workers, ISL men who wished to focus specifically upon the non-white were also active. In the Transvaal ISL members were meeting with Africans to instruct them in industrial unionism while in Durban an ISL member had founded the Indian Workers' Industrial Union.

Both the success and failure of the agitation for color-blind industrial unionism among the white workers could be seen at the first South African Trade Union Congress held in Johannesburg at the end of December 1917. Called by Archie Crawford in an attempt to create a truly South Africa-wide trade union organization beyond the SAIF which had remained centered in the Transvaal, the Congress suffered a set-back before it opened. The color-conscious white trade unionists of the Transvaal refused to accept a Cape Province delegation which included Coloured trade unionists; as a result the Cape Province delegation did not appear. Although the Congress would not accept Coloured delegates it did seem willing to hear a Transvaal Coloured trade union organizer, R. Talbot-Williams. At the last minute, however, his invitation to speak before the Congress was cancelled. Prospects were dim for any trade union action to include non-whites.

Nevertheless, ISL members, delegates of the Building Workers' Industrial Union, and other advocates of industrial unionism were among the delegates present at the Congress. The Industrial Committee (renamed again as the Solidarity Committee) distributed its manifesto to the delegates. The existing unions were bitterly attacked:

The emancipation of Labour, nay the present day amelioration of the lot of the workers demands that the Trade Unions as at present constituted shall be swept away. Their narrow craft vanity, their still narrower colour prejudice, their exclusive benefit funds, their compromising with the robber system, their friendly agreements with their masters to the neglect of the bottom toiler, their scabbery on the unskilled and one another, all this make them a delusion and a snare, serving only the purposes of the Capitalists.4

The manifesto went on to urge the organization of workers on an industry-by-industry basis irrespective of craft or color, with the individual industrial unions in turn linking up in one National Industrial Union. Through this device the workers were to learn to control industry so that the one Industrial Union will become the Parliament of Labour and will form an integral part of the International Industrial Republic. The manifesto invited all sympathizers and believers in the principle of industrial unionism to attend the conference planned for Easter, 1918.

The South African Trade Union Congress did not endorse the manifesto of the Solidarity Committee, but it did endorse industrial unionism on the final day of the Congress. The endorsement, however, reserved to the Congress itself the right to determine when and how the shift to industrial unionism would take place. On January 4, 1918, The International sadly concluded that the Congress had been dominated by the craft union spirit; nevertheless, individual delegates to the Congress were seen as ripe for the propaganda of industrial solidarity.

The subsequent Easter conference of the Solidarity Committee, which was held on schedule, despite the unresponsiveness of the South African Trade Union Congress to the manifesto, showed that The International had badly misjudged the readiness of craft union members to depart from the established unions. Attendance at the conference was limited to white members of the ISL and a few Africans whose participation in trade union affairs was an anathema to most white craft unionists. After the expected attacks upon the craft unions and the SAIF, the conference became bogged in a debate over which of two preambles based upon IWW models it should adopt. Finally (in accord with the viewpoint of De Leon of the SLP) it was resolved to accept the preamble which specifically endorsed electoral action as well as industrial action. The conference then discussed a constitution and regulations (which remained unpublished in the ISL press) by which the organization would establish itself as the nucleus for industrial unionism in South Africa. Although the organization subsequently elected an executive committee (which included two Africans), it never advanced beyond the inaugural meetings. The abortive activities of the Solidarity Committee merely testified to the persistence of the various ideas of the IWW among a few white unionists and the existence of a non-racial vision of industrial unionism shared by a few ISL members and sympathizers.

By working within the existing white trade unions and attempting to modify them in line with developments from overseas the ISL enthusiasts were slightly more successful. In April 1917, The International indicated that it was receiving Solidarity, a new journal from England published by Tom Mann to propagate industrial unionism. At the same time the shop steward movement in England in which the rank-and-file were electing their own more militant representatives to bypass the more conservative upper leadership was described and The International implied its approval of the new movement. In June 1917, The International specifically suggested that the shop steward technique be applied in the miners' unions in order to reform the unions from below. The SAIF countered with a proposal in mid-1918 that each union appoint a shop steward subject to the approval of the leadership of the SAIF. With the return of Andrews from a stay of eleven months in Britain in July 1918, the opposing SAIF and ISL ideas of the proper application of the new British developments to South Africa became a more open controversy.

During his visit to Great Britain Andrews had gleaned new inspirations for trade union militancy in South Africa by his contacts with the militant Clyde Workers' Committee, the well-organized Welsh miners, the shop steward movement, and the small left-wing anti-war socialist parties. Immediately upon his return to Johannesburg W. H. Andrews started to report to the white workers about the new developments in the labor movement in Great Britain. Andrews attacked the SAIF proposals for shop stewards; he saw the SAIF plan as an attempt to reinforce what he regarded as its reactionary control from the center. Andrews urged that trade unionists follow the British shop steward movement under which the workers in each local unit elected stewards without granting the right of veto to higher trade union bureaucrats. At a special meeting of the ISL in August 1918, Andrews was appointed full-time organizer for the ISL to lecture and organize throughout South Africa. In the remaining months of 1918 Andrews regularly wrote a column, Industrial Notes, for The International in which he commented upon developments in the South African trade unions. He regularly preached antagonism to the leadership of the SAIF and the extension of industrial unionism and worker-controlled shop committees. In his new capacity as ISL organizer Andrews addressed over twenty trade union meetings in late 1918 by invitation at which time ISL literature was also sold. Through the prestige of Andrews the ISL began to be heard among the English-speaking trade unionists anxious for news of developments in Great Britain.

During the war years the basic ISL policy of support for industrial unionism on a non-racial basis evolved as more important to the ISL than its continuing anti-war stand. The advocacy of industrial unionism through new independent organizations had proved unrewarding, but the allegiance of the ISL to its ideals remained unaltered. With the return of Andrews and an emphasis upon working from within the existing organizations for radical reforms the message of the ISL appeared to have new possibilities. Considered in isolation the prospects for the ISL within the white trade union ranks appeared to be rising at the end of 1918.

Yet the position of the ISL must be considered in the context of its activities with regard to non-whites. The ISL became involved in much more than merely the endorsement of industrial unionism for all workers and the acceptance of non-whites in abortive organizations to promote industrial unionism. In the years 1916-1918 the ISL became the first white political group to involve itself actively with the cause of the masses of unenfranchised non-whites. This involvement brought the ISL into contact with the 'politicians' of the new South African Native National Congress (later the African National Congress), African workers, Coloured workers in the Transvaal, and Indian workers in Natal. The involvement also provoked further argument within the ISL.

In the wake of the controversial decision of the 1916 conference to approach non-whites, Bunting set out to implement the terms of the new policy. At the weekly lecture series of the ISL Bunting arranged for speakers, including non-socialists, to discuss topics relevant to the non-whites. He invited Father Hill of the Anglican Community of the Resurrection. At Father Hill's lecture on the subject of Native Aspirations, the Native Land Act of 1913 was discussed in the presence of the first Africans to attend the ISL lectures. In April George Mason talked upon Trade Unions and the Native Question; some of the twelve Africans present participated in the discussion following the lecture. In June a more shattering precedent was established when Robert Grendon, the editor of Abantu-Batho, the newspaper of the South African Native National Congress, addressed the ISL upon Links Between Black and White. Grendon's lecture, however, revealed some of the difficulties facing the ISL in its approach to the members of the Congress who apparently made up the majority of the African audience at the ISL lectures. According to The International some of the white socialists felt that Grendon did not realize what socialists did, while Saul Msane, a member of Congress who spoke after the lecture, asserted that the original purpose of trade unions in South Africa was to fight non-whites.

Difficulties occurred not only in relations with the Africans; a lack of interest in the problems of the non-whites persisted within the ranks of the ISL. Bunting complained that the pamphlets of the ISL had no reference to the Native question and that some ISL members continued to deny the existence of a Native problem. He asserted that only the conscious identification with all wage-earners, nay, an affection for them, as such, would lead us to the truth of things.5 Bunting, joined often by Jones, persisted in spotlighting the problem of the non-whites through the pages of The International.

Even if other members of the ISL did not develop an affection for non-white workers most did give verbal allegiance to industrial unionism for all, regardless of race or creed. Colin Wade, running unsuccessfully in a by-election in Johannesburg (Troyeville) in 1917 against Colonel Creswell, did not evade the issue. He asserted that:

The hope of the world therefore is for the organised working class to take over the leadership of the people. This is the great message of Socialism, a call to the workers to unite in their various industries, irrespective of race, colour, or creed, the whole world over, to capture political and economic power from the hands of the small privileged class that at present controls the machinery of production....6

Andrews, running later in 1917 unsuccessfully for provincial council, reaffirmed his belief in the industrial solidarity of labor, irrespective of race or color; he appealed to white workers to recognize their common interest with non-white workers against the common capitalist enemy. In a long, rambling article after the election, Andrews indicated in more detail his attitude to the problem of the non-whites; his attitude was probably that of many militant trade unionists who did not share the evangelism of Bunting. Andrews recognized the non-whites as part of the working class. He asserted that they were to be included in trade unions, in separate, parallel trade unions if necessary, but he felt that the organization of these unions was primarily the responsibility of the non-whites themselves.7 Andrews like Bunting, recognized that the non-whites were a particular problem which had to be recognized as such; Andrews, unlike Bunting, was not, however, willing to exert special effort on behalf of the non-whites.

Both views continued to be strongly held, but the ISL moved toward an acceptance, in theory, of Bunting's position. Early in 1917 the Botha-Smuts government proposed a Native Affairs Administration Bill which would have further limited the rights of Africans to hold land and would have granted executive power to the Governor General to regulate the lives of Africans in almost all spheres by mere proclamation. In The International of March 9 Bunting strongly attacked the proposed legislation as a mere device to create a cheap non-white proletariat. The ISL then called a protest meeting on March 13 at which Bunting, Jones, and two members of the South African Native National Congress spoke; a resolution was passed condemning the proposed bill. The text of the resolution read:

This meeting of whites and natives held at the Trades Hall, Johannesburg, protests against the Native Affairs Administration Bill now before Parliament as designed to accelerate the manufacture of cheap servile labour and to keep down the natives more than even in the position of a serf, and would further warn Parliament that the passing of this Bill in the teeth of determined opposition on the part of natives forebodes grave danger to the peace of South Africa.8

One of the Congress speakers commented in The International that the meeting had given hope to the Africans that some whites were concerned with the problems of the Africans. The small meeting was of double significance. It indicated that the 'respectables' of the Congress would respond favorably to a political move on their behalf by the white militant socialists. More importantly, the meeting marked the first political action taken by the ISL on a matter not directly related to the interests of the white workers.

Difficulties persisted in attempts by the ISL to approach the Africans directly. In June The International commended the forthright antagonism of the leaders of the South African Native National Congress to the proposed Native Affairs Administration Bill, but it also condemned their failure to recognize the enemy as capitalism and not the Afrikaner as personified by Smuts. African attendance at the regular Sunday ISL meetings in Johannesburg remained exceptional. The International confessed:

as for native workers, notwithstanding repeated advertisements welcoming 'all, irrespective of colour', they are still too shy and suspicious of the white to attend except on rare and special occasions.9

In the course of 1917, however, ISL prospects among non-white workers improved. In 1913, 1914, and 1916 African workers on various mines had engaged in limited strikes, either in support of white miners or in support of their own claims. In 1913 Indians in Natal had struck in connection with the demonstrations, led by Gandhi, to obtain limited redress for civil disabilities. Furthermore, non-white workers could not have been completely oblivious to the militant activities of the white workers before the war and their trade union activity during the war.

In March, 1917, Lee of the Durban branch of the ISL organized the Indian Workers' Industrial Union on the lines of the IWW. Indians from various industries were enrolled, Indian leaders were trained, and regular propaganda meetings were held among the Indian workers. On August 3 The International optimistically estimated that the new Indian union officials have got so good a grip of the class struggle it is safe to say that the Union can stand alone today under its own elected leadership.

On August 3 The International also laconically announced that the first of a series of gatherings of Natives to study the working class movement had been held in Johannesburg. In fact, Bunting and Jones had set out to organize an industrial union among the Africans.10 When asked what they wanted, the Africans in attendance replied, Sifuna zonke (We want everything). The Africans' reply was taken as the motto of the new organization which became the Industrial Workers of Africa (IWA), an 'all-in union' for unskilled laborers. The new organization rapidly attracted the attention of police spies. At the same time it gained approval from the Congress newspaper Abantu-Batho.

Coloured workers in the Transvaal also considered trade unions. In September, the APO in the Transvaal, a branch of the Cape political organization of the Coloureds, invited members of the ISL to lecture to Coloured workers in the Ferreirastown section of Johannesburg upon industrial organization and socialism. In October the APO requested a round table conference with the ISL to discuss the industrial organization of the Coloured workers of South Africa.

The new course was not easy. The secretary of the APO, R. Talbot-Williams, was reported to have possessed a good grasp of the class struggle, yet according to The International of September 14 he urged Coloured workers to scab upon the whites who discriminated against them. A commentator, D. (probably Jones), enunciated some of the difficulties in approaching the newly-urbanized African:

The work necessary to be done before the native can be industrially organized is to convince him that, whereas he has lost his individual property, he has also lost all hope of acquiring any except as a class. Instead of looking backward to the land of his fathers, he has to acquire the wage worker's psychology of looking ahead, of knowing that his Redeemer liveth, not in his chief or his parson, but in the working class.11

Nevertheless, there were encouraging signs. On November 15, the IWA met with the Coloureds to discuss the possibility of a joint workers' organization. In late December a conference of the APO, the IWA, and the Transvaal Native Council (the local section of the South African Native National Congress) met to consider means for common action. The representatives of the Transvaal Native Council, more sedate and middle-class looking, apparently objected to some of the militant remarks of the spokesmen for the IWA but after some discussion it was resolved to appoint a committee of all the organisations concerned to draw up a working scheme of cooperation on the industrial field, irrespective of colour. The ISL observer was pleased:

In spite of all temptations to fume at white workers to which one of the coloured speakers succumbed, the young recruits of the Industrial Workers [of Africa], aided by Talbot-Williams, kept the principle of the class struggle irrespective of colour clear before the meeting.12

In the first half of 1918 Africans seemed to be actively participating in the class struggle although not quite in conformity with the patterns advocated by the ISL. In February the IWA distributed 10,000 copies of a leaflet in Zulu and Sotho which had been drafted by two Africans and two white members of the ISL. In this leaflet, the first socialist publication in African languages, (an English language version of which was published in The International of February 15), African workers were urged to end tribal divisions and organize as workers against pass laws and low wages. Africans, however, acted otherwise on their own initiative. In mid-February Africans began to boycott the stores on the East Witwatersrand, apparently in a relatively spontaneous protest against rising wartime prices. The International of March 1 regarded the boycott as a fine example, but a misguided protest which did not attack the basic problems of the African workers.

Another African initiative in June was more in line with the program of the ISL. In the wake of a successful strike of white municipal workers in Johannesburg, one hundred fifty-two African 'bucket-boy' sanitation workers struck for a small raise in pay. In the absence of city-wide water-borne sewerage, Johannesburg immediately felt the consequence of the strike of the Africans. All one hundred fifty-two workers were arrested and sentenced to two months' imprisonment under the Masters and Servants Act (one of the many laws which gave whites close controls over African workers); in serving the sentences the Africans were charged to continue to perform their duties as bucket carriers. Although a strike for higher wages was in line with the ISL program, the ISL apparently only learned of the strike when they read about it in the newspapers. Nevertheless, The International of June 14 condemned the severity of the sentences (as did the Bishop of Pretoria and other whites).

African reaction to the sentencing of the 'bucket-boys' was swift and widespread and contrary to the advice of the ISL. The Transvaal branch of the South African National Congress took the initiative in calling protest meetings. At one of the meetings the secretary of the Congress suggested a petition to the Governor-General urging mercy for the misguided strikers; the suggestion was rejected, but further action was entrusted to a committee dominated by Congress supporters. The International feared that the Congress would divert the militancy of the African workers.

Yet when the Africans showed signs of militancy the ISL feared ill-organized precipitate action. A general strike was proposed and uncertainly accepted (over the opposition of the leadership of Congress) at the same meeting where Congress urged a petition. The ISL welcomed the suggestion as a sign of the advance of African workers, yet it opposed action upon the suggestion in view of the lack of sufficient organization. At a subsequent meeting of Africans called by the Transvaal District of the Congress the objections of the Congress leadership (and the ISL) were overruled; a resolution was passed demanding a general increase of 1s. daily for all Africans and calling a general strike for July 1. T. P. Tinker of the ISL warned the meeting that a strike without sufficient organization would only provoke capitalist violence. Subsequently The International repeated similar warnings.

The warnings were not immediately heeded. The Congress switched to support of the strike and Talbot-Williams, the Coloured leader, also urged a general strike. When the 'bucket boys' were released shortly before the strike deadline the Congress called off the strike at the last minute. Meanwhile Talbot-Williams apparently had gone secretly to the authorities for whom he promised to do all in his power to stop the strike. Nevertheless, announcement of the changed plans did not reach many Africans in their compounds on the mines. On July 1 fifteen thousand Africans struck, for the most part by remaining passively in their quarters. With police and troops the government easily crushed the strike within one day.

The government reacted sharply in the wake of the abortive strike. For many months previously newspapers had been talking of 'native unrest' and the 'sinister influence of socialists and pacifists'; Botha had warned in parliament of a serious state of affairs in which Africans were organizing into trade unions. The government now acted to apprehend those whom it regarded as the instigators of the disturbances. On July 6, Bunting, Tinker, and Hanscombe of the ISL, along with five Africans (three members of the IWA and two staff members of Abantu-Batho) were arrested and charged with public violence on the basis of the Riotous Assemblies and Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1914. At the preliminary examination government witnesses confirmed that spies had been active in the IWA since shortly after its inception (one of the spies had even become secretary of the union). In return, the ISL members seized the occasion to make propaganda for the cause of industrial unionism for all and socialism for South Africa. Ultimately the government cases foundered when a key government witness revealed that he had made a false affidavit at the insistence of the police. Despite this revelation the magistrate committed the eight to trial; the Attorney-General, however, declined to prosecute the case further. Although none of the ISL members had been convicted as a result of their activities among non-white workers, the 1918 case put the ISL firmly in the public eye as an advocate of joint action with the non-whites even though, as has been noted, the non-whites did not always follow the ISL lead.

The ISL paid a price within the white community for its activities with the non-whites. In election campaigns ISL candidates were attacked for their support of non-whites; the low polls of the ISL candidates seemed to indicate the attacks had some effect. Within the white trade union movement the ISL also suffered. In September 1917, the management of the Trades Hall where the ISL had its office ruled that non-whites could not use its facilities. The Trades Hall subsequently modified its ruling to admit Coloureds; Africans remained excluded. The ISL refused to shift its policy and was forced to vacate the Trades Hall. At the time of the threatened African general strike in July 1918, the SAIF volunteered to the government that it would raise labor batallions for use in case of an African rising; J. F. Brown, active previously in the ISL, was a member of the SAIF delegation which made the commitment to the government.

Despite antagonism from the whites and difficulties with the non-whites, some in the ISL persisted with their approaches to the non-white. In Durban in March, 1918, the ISL enrolled three non-white members, one Coloured and two Indians, and a committee was working upon literature to be printed in Tamil and Hindi. Yet nothing was said about the progress of the Indian Workers' Industrial Union. In the September 27 issue of The International Bunting reaffirmed the necessity of enlisting non-whites in the cause of international socialism in answer to a reader who wrote to query the policy of the ISL on the 'native question'. The IWA unsuccessfully attempted to reassemble with a suggestion from The International of September 13 that it concentrate upon the proper training of its rank-and-file. As if to ensure that African workers be properly trained, Tinker started classes again for Africans at the end of October. The ISL also continued to follow the affairs of the South African Native National Congress with whom they had disagreed in the past. ISL members attended the December 1918 meeting of the Congress on the instructions of the ISL. W. H. Andrews spoke to the meeting upon the ISL position. In the eyes of the ISL, however, the leaders of the Congress remained moderate, nationalist, and racialist. One of the ISL observers (probably Bunting) concluded: Our view of the Congress is confirmed. It forms an admirable buffer enabling the ruling class to stave off the real emancipation of the natives.13

Although the activity of the ISL had not ceased among non-whites at the end of 1918, the ISL seemed in a weak position to proselytize. The IWA, the once-promising independent non-white labor organization, did not succeed in regrouping its membership. Talbot-Williams, the once-sympathetic Coloured leader, had betrayed the cause. The South African Native National Congress appeared incorrigibly conservative to the international socialists. Progress was limited among Indians in Durban. Furthermore, the attractiveness of activity among the white workers at the expense of neglect of work among the non-whites increased with the return of Andrews from Britain. The commitment of the ISL to the non-white cause remained, but it seemed likely that the cautious approach advocated by Andrews would predominate over the more direct approach propounded by Bunting.

In questions of electoral activity the ISL was also plagued with difficulties in the years 1916-18. The ISL participated in elections, but it found itself increasingly isolated from the white voters. The ISL compensated for its poor showing by strengthened belief that it was the chosen and lonely defender of the socialist faith on the electoral lists. Yet within the ISL the fight over whether or not the ISL should contest elections continued.

In 1916 the ISL participated vigorously in elections upon the Witwatersrand. School board elections were seized upon as an occasion to tilt at militarism and imperialism; as the Socialist Manifesto on Education stated: The International Socialist League has nominated candidates for the present School Board election to voice the protest against the Prussian control of education, and its pollution by Jingoism.14 In the manifesto the ISL urged that more power be given to the local school boards as a counter to the Provincial Director of Education. In the event of the failure of this scheme the ISL argued that the local school board members should, nevertheless, convene local conferences to exchange views on educational methods with the object of bringing combined pressure on the Education Department to compel it to base the teaching less on a view of making them efficient for exploitation, and more on making them liberal and intelligent men and women." According to The International of June 30 the ISL distributed 18,750 copies of the Socialist Manifesto on Education. But the voters apparently were indifferent or oblivious to the message. On election day all ISL candidates were defeated; the best ISL performer (Bunting) received 930 votes, while the lowest successful candidate received 2,552 votes.

By the time of the municipal elections on the Witwatersrand, in October 1916, the ISL had shifted its approach. The ISL did not ignore the elections as some of the former SLP members urged, but the print of the SLP position was seen in the manifesto which the ISL issued. Gone were the detailed proposals for municipal reform and city planning which had characterized the ISL municipal campaign of 1915. Instead the ISL stood on a broad socialist program. The manifesto, Call to the Workers of South Africa, was printed in The International on October 6. It urged organization of all workers, regardless of race, into industrial unions; it was stated that only with the strong industrial organizations behind them could the representatives in councils or parliaments realize the aims of the workers. Bunting frankly stated the approach of the ISL in The International:

The ISL candidates are not asking for support because they hanker after the sweets of office. They ask for support both as a method of propaganda and as a means of getting an indication of the number of voters who so far have grasped the far reaching significance of the problem of Modern Society, with its incurable injustices, its poverty, its tyrannies, its wars; and who are coming to understand the Socialist solution of it, and see the hollowness of the tinkering programmes which have hitherto absorbed their attention. To vote for the ISL candidate is thus to contribute your mite to the power of the oncoming Working Class Movement of the World.15

In the ensuing election on the basis of a preferential ballot all the ISL candidates in Germiston, Benoni, and Johannesburg failed to get the necessary quota of first preference for election. Nevertheless, in Johannesburg ISL candidates polled 567, 449 and 387 first votes respectively in three separate wards and in Benoni the lone ISL candidate got one-third of the vote of the most successful candidate. The ISL professed itself satisfied with its performance.

In the provincial council and parliamentary elections of 1917 the three ISL candidates received little support. As has been noted, the ISL candidates (Colin Wade in the Troyeville parliamentary by-election, W. H. Andrews in the Georgetown provincial council by-election, and S. P. Bunting in the Commissioner Street provincial council by-election) stood unequivocally for non-white participation in socialist activity. Yet the ISL candidates did not merely run on a platform of socialism for all, irrespective of race. The ISL candidates ran as the harbingers of the final socialist revolution.

Again it was Bunting who stated the ISL hopes. He grandly invoked the Russian example of February 1917:

Contrary to expectations, a unique significance attaches to the coming Provincial Elections. The wonderful proletarian revolution has begun in Russia, but destined to encircle the civilized world, has completely thrown in the shade the parochial topics which Capitalism has hitherto allowed a Provincial Council to play with. It is a trumpet call to the nations of the earth to which South Africa, too, backward though her Labour Movement is, cannot long be deaf. Just as we seized the coincidence of the 1914 elections to protest against the deportations and Commissioner Street murders, so on a grander scale today we have the glorious opportunity by voting Socialist on June 20th of associating ourselves unmistakably with the magnificent lead of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Committees. Shall we let it slip?16

The voters apparently were willing to let the chance slip; Andrews received 335 votes and Bunting received 71 votes; (at the previous parliamentary by-election Colin Wade had received only 32 votes).

The poor showing of the ISL candidates undoubtedly gave new ammunition to the anti-political elements in the ISL. Already the issue had erupted at the annual conference of January 1917. Motions had been made to nullify the clause of the ISL constitution which endorsed electoral activity. The motions were defeated and the management committee was instructed by the conference to at all times urge on branches to take active interest in the work of state, municipal and other public bodies. In the course of 1918 The International several times returned to an endorsement of political action, interpreting it to mean not only participation in elections, but propaganda on a broad scale even outside the industrial unions, thus identifying itself explicitly with the De Leon and the Detroit IWW.

The end of the war and the prospect of a general election in 1920 shifted political possibilities. The SALP, anxious to mobilize all white labor support behind its banner, extended an olive branch to the wayward ISL. The administrative council of the SALP resolved in November 1918:

The war is now happily at an end and the differences arising therefrom being now removed the resolutions of the Party of October 10th, 1915, be rescinded, and a welcome extended to all who accept the Socialist objective of the party.17

The management committee of the ISL contemptuously rejected the suggestion that they rejoin the SALP. Citing their concern for the non-whites, the ISL reiterated their fidelity to the socialist objective at all times and for all workers, not merely for the safe times of peace or for white workers. Proclaiming the breach between the ISL and the SALP to be final, the ISL asserted anew its identification with the socialist revolution, both at home and overseas. The ISL entered the postwar world proudly committed to left-wing international socialism in any political activity.

Indeed, it was the events overseas which sustained the ISL throughout the vicissitudes of domestic ISL activity in 1916-1918. Despite the difficulties of receiving accurate information from scattered and irregular sources, The International devoted most of its articles in 1916 to overseas socialist politics, particularly the developments within the Zimmerwald movement. On March 10 The International reported that it had learned through the pages of the English Socialist Review that the Zimmerwaldian International Socialist Commission in Berne had issued a second bulletin; The International complained that the South African censors probably had not allowed them to receive this organ of the Zimmerwald movement promised by Morgari in his letter of 1915. In May the ISL felt confirmed in its suspicions. A letter from Robert Grimm, the Swiss secretary of the International Socialist Commission, arrived in which he stated that he had sent to the ISL copies of the three bulletins issued by the Commission. Despite the non-arrival of the bulletins the ISL welcomed the letter from Grimm which urged that the ISL keep the Commission informed of its activities and support it financially in return for which the Commission would keep the ISL informed of developments in the world socialist movement. At the same time the ISL also received another encouraging letter from the Italian Socialist Morgari in which he congratulated the ISL upon its position. On July 7 The International reported favorably upon the April 1916 conference of the Zimmerwald group at Kienthal, Switzerland. Gathering its information from censored reports in Avanti (the Italian Socialist Party newspaper), The International reprinted part of the manifesto issued by the Kienthal conference. Although the ISL was not aware of the bitter battles between the right and left Zimmerwaldians at Kienthal, nor of the full import of the leftward shift which the Kienthal manifesto and resolutions represented, its endorsement of even a truncated version of the Kienthal manifesto reaffirmed its affinity with the anti-war left wing of the international socialist movement.18

The international socialist enthusiasm of the ISL was kindled to new heat by the events of 1917 in Russia. In late March some details of the first Russian Revolution began to reach South Africa. Along with news of the establishment of a provisional government came reports of the re-emergence of the Soviets (which were referred to as the Councils of Workmen). In a prophetic article written in June, entitled 170 Million Recruits, Jones estimated the significance of the Russian events in Marxist terms:

This is a bourgeois revolution, but arriving when the night of capitalism is far spent. It cannot be a mere repetition of previous revolutions. It partakes infinitely more of a victory for the proletariat, as well as for the industrial capitalist. Now the two classes pursue their several ways; on e 'to prosecute the war abroad', and 'law and order' at home; the other to pursue the class war at home and 'the Socialist Republic in all countries'. Let us look forward with great hope to the entry of the Russian elemental mass into the International class struggle for human emancipation. The day of its coming seems immeasurably nearer by this awakening.19

As has been noted, Bunting invoked the Russian Revolution in his appeal to the voters in the June provincial council elections. On June 15 The International belatedly printed the March resolution of the International Socialist Commission urging that the proletariat of the world support the Russian Revolution. By the end of August the position of the Bolsheviks had become clearer. Bunting, for one, welcomed the relentless militancy of Lenin:

Somehow the Russian movement claims the bulk of our space week by week. All eyes are centered on it, for Russia is the inspiration of the Socialist world just now.

From all accounts the situation is developing in favour of the principles advocated by Lenin. Every week proves him to be right in his insistent demand for thoroughgoing application of the class struggle to the tangled knot of the world war and the internal situation in all countries.20

News of the November Revolution, then, came to the expectant ISL as a confirmation of their deepest beliefs. On November 16 The International indicated that cable reports from Petrograd were confused, but it seemed as if the Maximalists (Bolsheviks) and the Soviets were gaining strength. The following week The International affirmed not only that the Maximalists had gained power, but that through the poison gas of capitalist abuse and falsification one thing is becoming certain, that International Socialism is victorious in Russia. At the end of November The International proclaimed that the new government in Russia confirmed the prophecies of the ISL's Marxist heroes:

And not only Marx, but De Leon, his successor, is also vindicated by Russian Labour. Marx said that the Capitalist system contains the germ of its own destruction, that in the lap of the old society, the conditions are created for the new society. He said that the state is the Executive Committee of Capitalist Class. That the State must be captured, not for proletarian use, but to be destroyed. His intellectual brother Engels said that 'the government of men will be replaced by the administration of things.'

Further they did not go. But De Leon added: Yes, the Industrial Organisation of the Workers is the embryo that will burst the shell of capitalism and become the directing authority for the administration of things in the Commonwealth of Labour.

The Word becomes Flesh in the Council of Workmen. The Council of Workmen is the dictatorship of the proletariat.21

In the same issue of The International a program of the Bolsheviks as taken from the Glascow Socialist (which had taken it and translated it from the Zurich Volksrecht) was reprinted. At the annual conference of the ISL in January 1918 the Bolshevik Revolution was formally endorsed:

That this Third Annual Conference of the ISL rejoices beyond measure at the triumph of the Russian Revolutionary proletariat under the banner of the Bolshevik wing of the Social Democratic Party, and pledges on behalf of the advanced proletariat of South Africa its growing support to stand by the Russian workmen against the Capitalist Governments of the whole world, that of South Africa included.22

The conference further resolved to contact representatives of the Russian Revolution; it specifically instructed Andrews, its representative in London, to contact Maxim Litvinov, the unofficial representative of the Soviet government in Britain.

The presence of Andrews in England was the result of the inadvertent involvement of the ISL in the abortive Stockholm conference. In the wake of the Russian Revolution of February the socialists of Europe gained new strength which, in part, expressed itself in the calling of an international socialist conference by neutral socialists connected with the weakened prewar international socialist organization, the International Socialist Bureau. At about the same time the Petrograd Soviet called for support from socialists for the Russian Revolution and announced that it would take the initiative of calling an international socialist conference to secure the support. The two movements merged and throughout the remainder of 1917 the socialist world was full of maneuvers to get the various socialists from both belligerent and non-belligerent countries to a meeting in Stockholm over the opposition of the governments of the belligerents, and in some cases over the opposition of the pro-war socialists. Some Zimmerwaldians tended to support the effort towards an international socialist conference in Stockholm, but the left wing of the Zimmerwaldians, led by the Bolsheviks, violently opposed the conference as a compromise of the militant revolutionary international socialist ideal.23

Upon learning of the April and May moves towards the Stockholm conference, The International welcomed the proposed Stockholm conference as a tremendous power for peace, and with peace, for the Social Revolution. A week later, on June 8, The International asserted that it had no intention of sending a delegate to the Stockholm conference inasmuch as the real work of the ISL in South Africa was to bring the workers of the Witwatersrand up to the class-consciousness of the European workers and not to send a delegation off on a trip to Europe. Having recently received a letter from Lazari of the Italian Socialist Party and International Socialist Committee, the ISL felt that the Committee, to which it was affiliated, could adequately represent it at any Stockholm conference.

Other enthusiastic socialists in South Africa, however, forced the ISL to reverse its stand. In the first week of June J. T. Bain, the prominent prewar strike leader and socialist propagandist who had withdrawn from the ISL, and F. A. W. Lucas, a lawyer who had been a member of the War on War League, called a conference to make arrangements for sending of a delegate to the International Socialist Conference at Stockholm in support of the movement for obtaining peace by negotiation. The call was heeded largely by ISL members anxious to preserve the interests of international socialism. At an uproarious meeting Bain and Lucas proposed that Colonel Creswell be sent as a delegate to Stockholm. Infuriated that the South African who symbolized pro-war class collaboration to the ISL should be proposed, Jones moved the following amendment:

That this meeting supports the movement to send a delegate to the Stockholm Conference, and (2) affirms that such delegate must be an undoubted champion of international working class unity, and (3) that the delegate must bear credentials from the International Socialist League of South Africa, (4) that one delegate only be sent, and that such delegate be W. H. Andrews.24

Bain in the chair refused to accept the amendment, but eventually he did recognize the right of Jones and other supporters of the amendment to speak. Finally overwhelmed by the hostile audience Bain and Lucas left the conference amidst the strains of The Red Flag and repeated cheers for the Social Revolution shouted by the victorious ISL majority. The amendment was then carried amidst further cheers and singing with the additional proviso that the delegate to Stockholm be instructed to urge the conference to call upon all workers to organize on an industry-by-industry basis for the sole purpose of overthrowing capitalism.

Having seized the initiative from those whom the ISL regarded as impostors, the ISL did not move immediately upon the resolution which the enthusiastic meeting had adopted. It was not until early July that the management committee of the ISL decided to call a special meeting of the ISL to discuss the advisability of sending a delegate to the Stockholm conference or any other international socialist conference to discuss peace and the encouragement of the social revolution. In The International of July 6 all socialist bodies and sympathetic groups in South Africa were invited to send delegates to the special conference if they endorsed the following proposition: I support the proposal that the workers of the world take joint international action to bring the war to an end.

On August 5, 1917, the delegates assembled in the Johannesburg Trades Hall. The majority represented the ISL management committee or ISL branches, but delegates were also present from organizations in Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria and Kimberley. Jones moved the management committee resolution.

That a delegate be sent to the International Socialist Congress to be held at Stockholm or elsewhere or cooperate with the socialist comrades of all countries, belligerent or neutral, with a view to establishing a new International and compelling the belligerent Governments to negotiate a peace on the basis of the programme of the Russian Council of Workmen, viz.; 'without annexations and without indemnities'; and generally to press the international class struggle towards a world wide Social Revolution.25

Immediately delegates objected to the reference to no annexations and no indemnities. An amendment to delete only the reference to this proposal was voted down 21-17. Andrew Dunbar (one of the former IWW adherents) then proposed a more inclusive amendment; he urged that the following be substituted for all words after new International: And that the delegate be instructed to advocate and vote for a peace on the lines of the complete destruction of the Capitalist system and the institution of the Socialist Commonwealth. The Dunbar amendment was carried by a vote of 27-5. The amended original motion was then passed unanimously and Andrews was unanimously elected the delegate to represent the South Africans in Stockholm.

By deciding to send a delegate to Stockholm the ISL and its supporters acted contrary to the position held by the Bolsheviks and the left wing of the Zimmerwaldians whose calls for a new International the ISL had supported. Nevertheless, the language of the resolution committed Andrews to strong support of a new International, the creation of which the Stockholm conference might have postponed due to its inclusion of centrist anti-war socialists opposed to the Bolsheviks and the left-wing of the Zimmerwaldians. When the Stockholm conference failed to meet the ISL escaped a possible dilemma. It was then free to follow those advocating a new International for which the ISL had been calling since its own foundation. The action of the Johannesburg meeting in sending Andrews overseas resulted in the furtherance of this goal.

Andrews spent the turbulent months from August 1917 to July 1918 in Britain. His encounters with the pro-war elements of the allied labor and socialist parties, particularly at the Inter-Allied Socialist Conference where he was refused a seat, further confirmed his antagonism to the pro-war socialists. As a speaker for the British Socialist party, the British SLP, and other struggling left-wing socialist groups which looked to Russia for inspiration, Andrews had the chance to meet many of those who were later to coalesce into the Communist Party of Great Britain. His faith in the Russian Revolution was directly confirmed by conversations with Maxim Litvinov.26

The impact of Andrews' experience upon his return to South Africa in connection with the trade union work of the ISL has been noted. Equally significant was his encouragement for propaganda about the Russian Revolution. In November 1918, Andrews was the author of a pamphlet published by the ISL, The Workers' Revolution in Russia, in which he outlined approvingly the course of the Bolshevik Revolution, and reprinted the first constitution of the new Soviet Republic. Exhorting the faithful, he asserted:

We, the International Socialists of South Africa, on this first anniversary of the birth of the first Socialist Commonwealth in the world's history, desire to associate ourselves with our heroic comrades in Russia, and with all those who are working and suffering to bring about the Social Revolution in all lands, and confidently expect all Socialist comrades who are in sympathy with the policy of liberating the toiling masses from wage slavery by the overthrow of the capitalist system to give active support to the organisation in this country [the ISL] which has undertaken the task of carrying the Red Flag of the workers' International to a glorious victory.27

The apparent progress of revolution in Europe in the wake of the armistice, in tandem with the continuing allied intervention in Russia, catalyzed the South African international socialists into further discussions in the spirit of Andrews' appeal. The International of November 22 repeated its fears that Britain was preparing to attack Russia while at the same time it announced that a group had been formed to coordinate the forces of class-conscious workers on the Witwatersrand to hurry the coming of socialism to South Africa. The following week it was reported that the group, primarily ISL members, had met for a preliminary meeting to discuss how to receive the coming wave from Europe. The gathering was convinced that the time had come for action to secure the rule of the working class in South Africa. Clearly aware of the Russian experience, the gathering endorsed the organization of workers' committees or councils (Soviets) in South African cities for the ultimate purpose of exercising workers' control. The tiny group talked of arrangements to assemble those on the Witwatersrand who shared their optimistic view; they also hoped to extend their activities to other South African cities. Throughout December the Preparedness Committee, as this group came to be called, held weekly meetings in Johannesburg to discuss the prospects for revolution. The pace of developments in Europe had clearly convinced the Johannesburg international socialists of the ISL of the imminence of a revolutionary upsurge in South Africa.

Within South Africa, however, the ISL occupied a precarious position. It had been successful in gathering around it most of the left-wing international socialists in South Africa, yet its membership and support were restricted to a minuscule segment of the total South African population.

On the Witwatersrand the ISL already represented most of the left-wing anti-war socialists who talked in militant terms. The adherence of the followers of the SLP and the IWW to the ISL in the early months of the existence of the ISL brought Marxists and syndicalists who had been outside the SALP into the ranks of the ISL. The establishment of ISL branches in Krugersdorp, Benoni, and Germiston in late 1915, placed the ISL in the most important industrial centers on the Witwatersrand outside Johannesburg.

With the revival of these branches under Andrews' aegis as ISL organizer in 1918, the ISL reasserted its presence beyond Johannesburg. By maintaining links with the Pretoria Socialist Society throughout the war, and by establishing a branch of the ISL in Pretoria in September 1918, the ISL finally extended itself to all of the important centers on the Witwatersrand.

Outside the Witwatersrand the position of the ISL was challenged by several rivals. The different nature of the challenges reflected the peculiarities of left-wing socialism in Durban and Cape Town.

In Durban the fraternal communication which had existed between the SDP of Durban and the ISL broke down in 1917. In the Natal Advertiser of August 31, a 'bourgeois' paper, the SDP published a statement attacking the ISL as merely the SALP in another form. It appears, however, that the differences between the SDP and the ISL were deeper. The ISL objected to the pro-war sentiments of the SDP (which was merely following the position of H. M. Hyndman, the founder of the Social Democratic Federation in Great Britain), while the Durban SDP, according to The International of September 28, had apparently shifted to opposition to the non-white policy of the ISL.

The ISL in Durban took the initiative to gain the leadership of the militant socialists in Durban. At a Socialist Conference called by the SDP on September 30, the Durban ISL and its supporters apparently took control. The original motion endorsing the policy of the SDP was replaced by an amendment which stated: That as the present method of organisation of the workers is out of date and tends to perpetuate the wage system, the time has come for Class Unionism, organisation of the workers as a class, for the abolition of the wage system and to put in its place 'Industrial Socialism'.

The meeting also passed a strong motion opposing national wars as harmful to the workers' interests.28 The ISL affirmed its differences with the SDP by turning its attention to non-whites. The SDP, however, continued to hold its weekly propaganda meetings in the Durban Gardens, thus posing a socialist alternative to the ISL outside the SALP although differing with the ISL in its attitudes to non-whites and the war.

In Cape Town the ISL did not succeed in establishing a branch, but it did gather unaffiliated adherents as the war progressed and the flashes of revolution overseas became brighter.

In the absence of a clear anti-war stand by the SDF in the first years of the war, The International of August 18, 1916, welcomed the anti-war appeals of the South African Peace and Arbitration Society, a pacifist society formed by radicals in the Cape. Propaganda from the ISL in Johannesburg, however, finally provoked the anti-war wing within the SDF in Cape Town to another test of sentiment within the organization. On September 6 the Cape Town SDF endorsed the following resolution proposed by W. H. Harrison who had sympathized with the ISL since its founding:

That the SDF is opposed to all wars organised on Capitalist lines, and that we consider the present war the outcome of Capitalist machinations in which all the belligerent nations are equally guilty.29

Yet the adoption of the new anti-war stance in 1916 did not change the nature of the activities of the SDF; it remained merely a socialist propaganda organization.

The continued conservative practice of the SDF provoked a small group of its supporters (including members of the Jewish Socialist Society) to split away in May 1918 to form a new left-wing socialist organization in Cape Town, the Industrial Socialist League. The new organization was dissatisfied with the propagandistic emphasis of the ISL. It urged the organization of industrial unions. Its stated objectives reflected the outlook of the syndicalists of the IWW: The abolition of the wage system, and the establishment of a socialist commonwealth based on the principles of self-governing industries, in which the workers will work and control the instruments of production, distribution, and exchange for the benefit of the entire community.30 By September 1918 the Industrial Socialist League was holding five meetings a week; members of the League were also making attempts to organize an industrial union of the predominantly Coloured workers in the sweets and jam factories, previously neglected by the existing trade unions in Cape Town. The Industrial Socialist League also went directly into District Six, a Coloured area, to open an unsuccessful office on Hanover Street. The new activist organization established close contact with the management committee of the ISL in Johannesburg and its members began to contribute to The International.

With regard to overseas events, however, the left-wing socialists in Cape Town remained united. On the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution the Industrial Socialist League participated in a joint meeting with the SDF and the Jewish Socialist Society. All three organizations pledged themselves to carry on socialist propaganda in South Africa and to protest against the Allied intervention in Russia.

In Cape Town, then, by the end of 1918, the left-wing socialist movement remained disunited and small. Drawn together by common allegiance to the Russian Revolution the Cape Town left-wing socialists differed on tactics within South Africa. The more militant organization, the Industrial Socialist League, was moving to an activist role, but otherwise the Cape Town socialists still focused upon propagandistic activities. The small Cape Town organizations of the SDF, the Industrial Socialist League, and the Jewish Socialist Society did not pose a threat to the preeminence of the Transvaal-based ISL as the leader of the South African left-wing international socialists.

As leader of the South African left-wing international socialists, however, the ISL rested on a very narrow base. The lack of success of those in the ISL who worked among the non-whites has been noted. The ISL also failed noticeably to expand its basis of support among the white groups in South Africa.

Among the arguments of the anti-war SALP members against the pro-war policy of Creswell was the charge that the Creswell policy would alienate the Afrikaner worker from the labor movement. Despite the abortive efforts of the War on War League to mediate with the anti-war Afrikaners in early 1915, the anti-war SALP members still hoped to attract some of the Afrikaner workers to an anti-war labor organization. Thus, the definitive statement of the anti-war SALP members, The Labour Party's Duty in the War, was reprinted in Dutch (Dutch then being the written language used officially among the Afrikaners). Later in 1915, after the formal break from the SALP over the war issue had resulted in the formation of the ISL, The International of October 22 printed an article in Dutch upon the workers and the war in which the anti-war position of the ISL was stated. To further its position among the anti-war Afrikaners the ISL unsuccessfully ran Sidney van Lingen in the provincial council by-election in Fordsburg in December 1915, as has been noted.

Efforts to appeal to the Afrikaner worker quickly lapsed. Undoubtedly the increasing attention which the ISL gave to the organization of non-whites weakened the potential appeal of the ISL to the Afrikaners, but there is little evidence that the ISL made any particular efforts to attract the Afrikaner workers until late 1918. No articles in Dutch (or Afrikaans) were printed in The International in the years 1916-1918. Occasional notice was taken of the lack of organization of the Afrikaner workers, but the ISL did not go beyond the incantation of the standard ISL formula of joint industrial action for all. In early 1918, when the Afrikaner Nationalists began to praise the Bolshevik policy of self-determination as a tactic in their own drive for a republic as a part of the postwar peace settlement, The International of January 18 attacked the petty-bourgeois nature of the Nationalist spokesmen. Only in the latter months of 1918 did the ISL seem to consider a special move to attract the Afrikaners; The International appealed for assistance in the preparation of literature in Dutch and for funds to finance the distribution of the literature. Yet at the end of 1918 the ISL had few Afrikaners within its ranks.

Among the far smaller Jewish segment of the population (in 1918 the Jewish population of South Africa was 58,741) the position of the ISL was stronger. The majority of the Jews of the Witwatersrand were first or second generation immigrants from the Lithuanian area of the Russian Pale, the center for Jewish socialism. The eastern European Jews, mostly poor Yiddish-speaking petty traders and artisans, were looked down upon by the relatively successful German-speaking and English-speaking Jews who feared that the eastern Europeans had brought the virus of socialism with them. In fact, many of the eastern European Jews did carry allegiance to the Jewish Bund or other socialist organizations, as well as a continuing identification with the fate of the Russian Empire in whose poverty and restrictions many of their relatives still lived.

A small number of Jews had joined the ISL early in its existence, but the Russian Revolution gave the ISL a new appeal among socialist-oriented Jews. In the poor suburb of Ferreirastown where many eastern European Jews were concentrated there was dancing in the streets upon the news of the abdication of the Tsar in early 1917.31

During Bunting's campaign for provincial council in June 1917, from the district which included Ferreirastown, the ISL attempted to capitalize upon this sentiment by issuing propaganda in Yiddish and sponsoring meetings addressed by Yiddish speakers. Bunting fared poorly in the election, but evidently interest in the ISL continued among the Jews. In late August 1917, the ISL announced the formation of a Jewish-speaking (i.e., Yiddish-speaking) branch. In The International of September 21 the ISL claimed that the new branch helped it to recruit members who had been aroused by the Russian Revolution of February to link up with the organized socialist movement. In November 1917, the Yiddish-speaking branch took over a hall in Ferrirastown where a library was opened for the circulation of socialist literature. The mark of the new section of ISL membership was reflected in an English-language article in The International of February 8, 1918, which attacked Zionism as an archaic capitalist movement.

The membership and appeal of the ISL, however, remained concentrated in a very small section of the artisans and middle-class of the English-speaking section of the population. On June 29, 1917, The International frankly admitted that the audiences at the regular weekly Sunday meetings in Johannesburg cannot be said as yet to be even a white working class audience. The limitations of the appeal of the ISL were illustrated by the poor showing of the ISL candidates who were entered only in electoral districts where the English-speaking white artisans and workers were concentrated. More revealing were the defections from the ISL ranks of trade unionists, the most prominent of which was J.F. Brown, secretary of the Mine Workers' Union, over the ISL attitude on industrial unionism and over the ISL position on non-whites. Other prominent ISL members, including J.T. Bain and J.A. Clark, left the organization because of disagreements on tactics or because of infractions of ISL discipline in the provincial council. The membership of the League was never more than four hundred.32

The continuing dominance of the English-speaking elements in the tiny membership of the ISL was reflected in the methods of the ISL. The ISL held weekly public meetings (although at times the meetings were prevented by pro-war hecklers) as well as discussion groups for its membership and close sympathizers. It maintained a Socialist Sunday School for the children of its members. Through its Johannesburg office the ISL distributed its weekly newspaper, The International. Propaganda was supplemented by special ISL pamphlets (generally reprints of statements from The International) and by such socialist literature as could be obtained from overseas. Almost all of its publications were in English. The ISL maintained no clandestine presses, not did it make any attempt to organize for armed revolution. Only with the appointment of W. H. Andrews as organizer in August 1918 did the ISL engage a full-time worker for its cause. The conduct of the ISL differed little from that of a small British left-wing socialist propaganda group.

In the South African context, however, the ISL was a new type of socialist organization. Originally dominated by anti-militarism and white trade union militancy, the position of the ISL was increasingly shaped by its concern, active or passive, for the non-white workers of South Africa. Frustrated among the whites, in part because of its activities among the non-whites, and unsuccessful among the non-whites, in part because its socialist doctrine fit neither the moderation of the Congress leaders, nor the spontaneity of the African workers, the ISL increasingly contained its own contradictions and sustained its faith by identification with the revolutionary developments in Russia. Despite the almost impossible stress of maintaining cohesion among the conflicting versions of Marxism and left-wing socialism advocated by its minuscule membership, the ISL at the end of 1918 continued to uphold a non-racial international socialist position in the uncongenial climate of South Africa. The strength of the socialist faith of the ISL was quickly put to a severe test by the dislocations of the postwar South African world and the conflicting interpretations of the revolutionary call from overseas.

Freed from the restraints, and the incentives, of wartime restrictions, the gold-based South African economy moved unevenly in the first years after the end of the war. At first the demand for gold continued high in response to strong overseas demand, yet in 1920 the overseas gold market broke sharply and production and profits in the key industry of the Witwatersrand sagged. Throughout the period the cost of living continued to rise.1

Released from patriotic pressures to avoid strikes, the white workers responded to economic uncertainties with new agitation for higher wages. Trade union membership rose strongly, and the predominantly English speaking demobilized soldiers added another voice to the clamor of white labour. The uneasiness of the white workers was reflected by the sharp rise in the number of strikes. 2

Inevitably the issue of colour intruded to complicate the economic issues. The scarcely hidden fears of the white workers that they would be replaced by cheaper non-white workers were exacerbated in the face of declining economic prospects. Late in 1919 the Star and the Rand Daily Mail, newspapers associated with the Chamber of Mines, began to hint that the ratio between non-white and white workers should be shifted in favour of the non-whites. The majority report of the Low Grades Mine Commission in 1920 indicated that production costs would have to be reduced in order to maintain production. White miners interpreted this conclusion as a threat to the colour bar which protected their position.

The continuing difficulties of the demobilized English-speaking soldiers reinforced agitation for the continuation of the colour bar. The flavour of the concern of ex-soldiers for preservation of the colour bar and white privilege is seen in the following commentary made in the wake of suggestions by some parliamentarians that the colour bar might be modified:

Cape Town politicians are so insistent in their plea for the removal of the colour bar, that it might be assumed their ideals for national life conform to those shared by rulers of a Black Republic. According to recent speeches, the white man has no right to be here; he is an interloper, and the blacks, being the first inhabitants, should now come into their own. Indeed there seems a tinge of regret that the white man has been allowed a free hand so long. We have no desire to meddle with the views of Cape politicians so long as these are applied only to their own constituencies; but the Transvaal to a man will object strongly to any attempt being made to turn its towns into counter parts of Port Said which Cape Town apparently views as a delectable model. 3 The rise of the percentage of Afrikaners in the work force further buttressed the segregationist sentiment of the white workers. It seemed as if some of the antagonism between the pro-war and anti-war supporters would be dissipated in the face of the common fear of the non-white.

The uncoordinated and sporadic reactions of the non-whites to continuing discrimination and a deteriorating economic situation heightened the anxieties of the white workers.

In March-April 1919, the anger of the Africans at the necessity of carrying passes expressed itself in scattered demonstrations on the Witwatersrand and in Pretoria. Led by the leaders of the South African Native National Congress, Africans turned in their passes in a campaign of passive resistance. As the movement spread, Africans were arrested. The demonstrations flickered on, and large crowds of Africans came to await the outcome of the trial of those first arrested. The assembled police charged the waiting crowd, injuring women and children. Congress leaders were then arrested. A general strike apparently contemplated by the Congress leadership failed in the face of threats--and probably because of poor organization. 4

The striking white workers of Johannesburg reacted to the African disturbances with an offer to give their services to the authorities. Scattered encounters between whites and non-whites flared up, and the African demonstrations were finally extinguished.

In February 1920, discontent among African mineworkers erupted into a strike which rapidly involved 40,000 mineworkers along the Witwatersrand. The police quickly quashed the strike by the simple device of isolating each of the compounds where the strikers lived and asserting to them that all other strikers had returned to work. Isolated and without an organised union, the African mineworkers returned to work. Throughout their strike the white mineworkers had remained on their jobs.

Although the strike of the African miners had little organisation behind it, non-whites in other parts of the country were organising. Hounded from the Witwatersrand, members of the disintegrating IWA found their way to Cape Town where they began to organise the Cape Town dock workers. At the same time Clements Kadalie, an English-speaking Nyasa, also began to organise the Cape Town dock workers into the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union. The IWA and the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union were initially hostile to one another, but eventually the IWA was absorbed into the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union. The activities in Cape Town were paralleled by the successful efforts of Selby Msimang to organise trade unions among Africans in the Orange Free State. In 1920 the Cape Town and Orange Free State groups were merged and expanded in the Industrial and Commercial Union (ICU) under the leadership of Kadalie. Meanwhile Coloured workers in Kimberley, the diamond mining centre in Cape Province, had organised a trade union among horse carriage drivers. In Durban Indians were organising dock workers, hotel workers, and assistants in the various service trades.

The reaction of most white workers to the continued efforts of the non-whites was indifference or active hostility. When the African dock workers of Cape Town struck in late 1919 in response to a call from the white Cape Federation of Trades to all workers to boycott the shipment of South African foodstuffs overseas in an attempt to force a decrease in domestic food prices, the white workers remained on the job. In Kimberley white workers similarly failed to support a strike of Coloured horse carriage drivers with the result that the strike failed. In Durban white workers scabbed to break a significant strike of Indian waiters which spread to East London.

Caught between rising white discontent increasingly directed against non whites, and non-white discontent directed against a system from which white workers benefitted, the ISL reacted irregularly. At conferences and public meetings the ISL continued to go on record in favour of unequivocal support of all workers, with particular attention to the non-whites. In practice, however, the activities of the ISL tended to divide into two often conflicting approaches. The friction's between the two approaches, one directed at whites and the other at non-whites, and disagreements within each of the approaches, dominated the practical work of the ISL in the years 1919-1920.

At the opening of the January 1919 conference of the ISL, the Management Committee had noted with favour the advance of ISL concern for the non-white:

The native worker's position has for the first time been discussed from the proletarian point of view. The League in general, and three of its members in particular [Bunting, Hanscombe, Tinker] have borne the brunt of capitalist hatred for challenging its right ruthlessly to exploit the black man. It has also earned the wrath of large sections of the white workers, but the problem is now forced on their notice as an economic one, and not merely one of race. 5

In the course of the conference it was proposed that this new situation be formally recognized by the addition of the words "special attention being paid to the native workers," as part of the accepted ISL methods of organization and education.

The proposal was challenged by two separate but interrelated arguments. Some ISL delegates suggested that the attention of the ISL would be better spent upon the Afrikaner workers who would be more quickly receptive to ISL propaganda; non-whites should be their own propagandists through their own organizations. Other delegates asserted that attention to the non-white worker would handicap the ISL among the Afrikaner workers, as well as among the established English-speaking white trade unionists.

Supporters of the proposal reiterated the need for the organization of the non-white workers, the majority of the workers in South Africa, and emphasized the need for education of the white workers to the necessity of the organization of non-white workers. Two African representatives from the declining IWA reinforced the argument with pleas for the end of the color bar and an increase in socialist education among the non-whites. Apparently the arguments of the white ISL supporters and the visiting African observers were successful for the addition to the accepted methods of organization and education was adopted unanimously.

The reaffirmation of the faith of the ISL in the role of the non-white in the socialist revolution was further formalized in the closing paragraph of the "Declaration of Principles" adopted by the conference:

It is the work of the ISL to educate, agitate and organise the workers for the great task that is ahead of effecting the revolution in our own land. It is especially its work to attend to the aspect of the struggle peculiar to South Africa, occasioned by the presence in South Africa of a large mass of unlettered native population, newly emerging from primitive manhood, and partially assimilated by the system of wage labour. To awaken and inspire our native fellow workers to grapple with their responsibility as part and parcel of the world proletariat must be our urgent duty. As part of this task the white workers must be encouraged to educate, organize and cooperate with their native fellow workers at the place of work in mine, factory, and workshop; in order that the Socialist Republic of South Africa may be nominated by the unanimous solidarity of all the workers. 6

At the January 1920 conference of the ISL the delegates endorsed a proposal by Bunting, introduced by Jones, which enumerated specific tactics to be followed by the ISL. According to the unanimously adopted resolution study classes were to be instituted for Africans, leaflets were to be distributed among African workers to urge class solidarity, and working class solidarity of all workers was to be taught wherever possible. The conference also condemned the scabbing of white workers during nonwhite strikes.

An expanded and detailed resolution, "The ISL and the Coloured and Native Workers," was presented by Bunting for consideration at the January 1921 conference of the ISL. At great length the resolution analyzed the plight of various elements of the South African non-white population and their possible fate in a socialist South Africa. In closing, the statement urged the formation of a permanent council of white and non-white worker delegates which would consider action upon an eight-point program which included endorsement by white political parties and trade unions of efforts by non-whites to improve their conditions, active support for non-white industrial unions, financial assistance to non-white strikers, and propaganda work among non-white workers. In an advance upon previous statements the Bunting proposal also requested support for "bourgeois democratic liberation movements" among non-whites, with particular emphasis upon demands for the vote, the right to organise, full civil rights, and the end of discriminatory legislation such as the pass laws, special taxes, and restrictive labor legislation. Despite strong objections from the floor, the assembled delegates of the ISL endorsed Bunting's analyses and program for the non-whites unanimously.

The implementation of the steady formal endorsements of activity among the non-whites revealed the unevenness of the commitment of the ISL to an active non-racial position.

In Kimberley the ISL branch which was organized in late 1919 recruited Coloured workers in the garment industry into a Clothing Workers' Industrial Union which was organized by an ISL member. In the 1920 parliamentary elections, for which the ISL entered a candidate in Kimberley, the ISL issued a pamphlet directed at non-white voters in which it pointed out the two-faced policy of the SALP--rigid segregation in the Transvaal but rights for the non-white workers in the Cape.

In Natal the ISL continued its involvement with non-whites. When Jones visited Natal for his health he collaborated with L. Greene, an ISL sympathizer in Pietermaritzburg. Together Jones and Greene produced a small pamphlet, The Bolsheviks are Coming, which contained eight "lessons" for African workers in which they were urged to organize and link with the white workers in a common movement to bring freedom and equality to all workers. It was printed in The International of April 25, 1919, and was translated into Zulu and Sotho and distributed in Pietermaritzburg and Durban. The ISL branch in Durban probably had the greatest success in maintaining links with non-whites, in particular, Indians. In July 1919, Indian workers in the hotels and restaurants of Durban organized a trade union in which B. Sigamoney, an Indian who had been close to the ISL previously, was elected chairman. When Indian waiters went on strike the ISL urged support for them. Later during strikes of Indian workers Andrews and other ISL members addressed a number of meetings of the strikers.

Yet the strongest ISL center in Johannesburg was noticeably inactive in the face of visible non-white discontent on the Witwatersrand. Direct approaches to non-whites were mostly limited to Bunting and Jones. Jones conducted a literacy school for Africans. 7

Bunting's actions on behalf of non-whites put him much more in the spotlight. When he defended Congress leaders arrested in the anti-pass demonstrations of 1919 he was set upon by a crowd of whites outside the courtroom and frog-marched through the streets of Johannesburg. Spurred by the indignities he had suffered at a time when the white "Johannesburg Soviet" had refused to aid the African passive resisters, Bunting wrote a scathing article "The White 'Soviet' and the Red Herring," which was published in The Intemational of April 11, 1919. In it he attacked the "Johannesburg Soviet" for its indifference to the non-whites, and more specifically for the offer of the white trade union leadership to aid the authorities "to prevent outrages on white women and children" in the event of disturbances by non-whites.

The strike of the African mineworkers in February 1920 apparently caught the ISL unaware. Only at the urging of Bunting did the ISL issue a leaflet, Don't Scab, directed to the white workers. The leaflet unsuccessfully urged the white workers to support their African fellow workers, and particularly urged them not to take up arms with the white management against the African strikers. 8 In the wake of the strike the ISL considered the issue of a newspaper in African languages, but the project was never realized. 9 The shortcomings of the ISL approach to Africans were revealed by the inattention of the ISL to the rapidly growing ICU of Cape Town and the Orange Free State led by Clements Kadalie and Selby Msimang. Although The Intemational on May 2, 1919, reported that the ISL was defending Msimang, who had been arrested in Bloemfontein as a result of his organizing activity in that city, in the next eighteen months only occasional articles appeared about the attempts of the ICU to organize. While The Intemational several times qualifiedly endorsed the activities of the new union (which had, in effect, succeeded and far surpassed the IWA as the largest and most significant African workers' organization), the ISL seems to have maintained little, if any, direct contact with the ICU at this time.

The difficulties of any approach to the non-whites were magnified by differences among the two chief proponents of special approaches to the non-whites. Both Bunting and Jones advocated the unity of white and non-white workers and particular attention to the problem of non-white workers. Bunting, however, implied that the non-white worker would be the chief agent of the socialist revolution, and as such should be the primary preoccupation of the ISL. He most clearly articulated his position on the crucial role of the African in his statement, "The ISL and the Coloured and Native Worker" in which he wrote:

Without speculating on the comparative effectiveness in the struggle which is to overthrow world capitalism, of the European and the non-European workers, we may lay it down that if the abolition of wage slavery must be the work of the wage slaves themselves, then the wage slaves of South Africa have, like any other their definite part to play in the Socialist Revolution. It may be said that 'their mass solidarity, their restraint, and law-abidingness under trying conditions, their communal spirit, their freedo m from the property instinct'--these qualities, in spite of intellectual backwardness, fit them for the great task of their own emancipation, and with their own that of the white working class from the trammels of wage slavery. 10

Jones, in contrast, placed the greater emphasis upon the skilled workers as the chief agent of the revolution. In his estimation the realization of the revolution fell to the more politically experienced and educated white workers. Once the socialist revolution was achieved the non-white worker would be released to build the new socialist order and would become fully united with the white proletariat. 11

Bunting and Jones also differed slightly in their attitudes to bourgeois nationalist organizations. In Jones' view the non-white bourgeois organizations were not to be trusted; he hoped that the existing non-white bourgeois organizations such as the South African Native National Congress would rapidly become converted to fully proletarian class organizations. Bunting dissented, indicating his readiness to work with the "bourgeois democratic liberation movements." He was careful, however, to indicate that his willingness was tactical and qualified, he wanted to approach potentially revolutionary workers through the nationalist organizations and he would stop cooperation with the nationalist organizations if it appeared that they would merely substitute one exploitation of the workers for another. 12

Although Bunting and Jones disagreed on the precise tactics to be used among the non-whites, both agreed that militant white socialists, including those of the ISL, paid insufficient attention to the non-white workers. Evaluating the shop steward movement in which Andrews was so active, Jones stated that it was an artificial movement in South Africa which ignored the non-white workers and thus allowed itself to be diverted from a revolutionary path. Bunting complained openly several times in the pages of The Intemational that 'socialists' were unwilling to consider the problem of non-white workers properly, often merely avoiding the issue by repetition of the slogan of "solidarity of labour irrespective of race or colour."13

The activist position of Bunting and Jones with regard to non-white workers continued to be countered by Andrews. He never abandoned his formal support of united working class action, and several times in 1919 he advocated non-racial solidarity of all workers before audiences of white workers. Yet he did not participate in the study classes which led to the IWA, nor did he aid Jones in the operation of literacy classes for Africans. He apparently merely tolerated Bunting's approach in the interests of socialist unity. 14 Andrews believed that the white members of the ISL should concentrate their activity among militant white workers.

Andrews dramatized his approach by intervention in two tramway strikes in 1919. When tramway workers struck in Pretoria in February and in Johannesburg in March, Andrews proposed that the strikers establish a workers' council to operate the tramway system in the interests of the workers and the public. Under Andrews' plan a committee of trade unionists were to receive the money collected as fares, to pay out wages, and to hold the remaining money in trust for the municipality. The Pretoria strikers did not act upon Andrews' suggestion, but the Johannesburg strikers did. On April 1 the Johannesburg "Provisional Board of Control" ousted the City Council from its chambers and proceeded to operate the tram, light, and power systems of Johannesburg. Government ministers hurried to Johannesburg to lead negotiations with the strikers, and the demands of the men were met. The "Provisional Board of Control" dissolved itself, but not before it had become known as the "Johannesburg Soviet."

The direct action of the Johannesburg tramway workers was not immediately imitated, but militant white workers continued to agitate for a tougher line on the part of the established white trade unions. Andrews and the ISL gave full support to this agitation in a continuing campaign against the established trade union leadership headed by Crawford of the SAIF. When Crawford attempted to create a SAIF Industrial Union Andrews attacked the scheme as a device merely to maintain Crawford's position within the SAIF. Andrews continued to encourage the growth of shop steward committees on the Witwatersrand and voiced the hope that the committees would form into district groups and then later into a Witwatersrand Shop Stewards' Council. The Intemational supported him by strongly opposing the efforts of Crawford to regularize the shop steward movement through the appointment of stewards responsible to the upper level of the SAIF and the trade union leadership. Similarly, it opposed Crawford's attempts to control local strikes by means of a Central Board of Reference in which the Executive of the SAIF would have spoken for all workers. The ISL put itself forward as a focal point for the English-speaking militants in the white trade union movement.

The potential for broadening support in the white trade union movement was limited, however, by the inability of the ISL to find a satisfactory approach to the Afrikaner workers. Although the anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism of the ISL found a parallel in the hatred of the Afrikaners for overseas capitalism and British imperialism which they felt had destroyed their independence, the predominantly English-speaking ISL was suspect inasmuch as it, too, was an organization of uitlanders. In addition, the professed atheism of the ISL was unappealing to deeply religious Afrikaners coming from rural areas. The recent migration of most Afrikaners into the strange towns, compounded by linguistic and cultural barriers which set them apart from the more established English-speaking workers, further complicated any efforts of the ISL to approach Afrikaner workers on a significant scale. Overriding all other issues, however, was that of color. The strong traditional segregationist views of the Afrikaner clashed diametrically with the formal ISL position.

The ISL 'solved' the problem of the Afrikaners by largely ignoring it. The effort of 1918 to issue publications accessible to the Afrikaners resulted only in a Dutch translation of W. H. Andrews' pamphlet on the Russian Revolution which appeared in early 1919 and a Dutch translation of the Communist Manifesto which was being sold by early 1920. There were no articles in Dutch or Afrikaans in The Intemational during 1919-1921.

Yet the increasing activity of the anti-British and anti-imperialist Nationalist Party and its expressed sympathy for the principle of Bolshevik self-determination (which it did not understand in the way that Lenin intended it) forced the ISL to a consideration of the Afrikaner as a nationalist as well as a worker. In the February 28, 1919, issue of The Intemational an ISL commentator contended that a Nationalist government for South Africa would be a progressive step inasmuch as it would lead to a more open conflict with imperialism and thus speed the Afrikaners to an awareness of socialism. Later in 1919, however, The Intemational modified its position. In a message "To the Bijwoners and Afrikaner Workers" (published on October 3, inappropriately only in English), The Intemational warned the Afrikaner against Hertzog and the Nationalist Party; in the view of The International the Afrikaner workers and landless farmers could gain their freedom only by working with the Bolsheviks.

The issue was dropped from the pages of The Intemational throughout most of 1920. Interestingly, it was Bunting who forced renewed attention to the question of the Afrikaners. In December 1920, he published a long statement "Socialism and the Dutch Nationalist Movement in South Africa," which it was proposed that the ISL annual conference of January 1921 adopt. In his theses Bunting did not minimize the barriers between the anti-British, pro-segregationist Afrikaners and an English-speaking socialist movement. Nevertheless, he advocated that the ISL give qualified support to the Afrikaner nationalist movement inasmuch as it would weaken the British Empire. He carefully indicated how such support should be used for exclusively socialist ends:

Hence a Socialist Party will support agitation for the SA Nationalist principle as such--without caring whether it is practicable or not-just to the extent that it weakens British Imperialism. But the occasions when such an agitation can be segregated from the reactionary SA National Party policy as a whole will be rare. The party as such, even with its spurious banner of Labour reforms, it cannot support. Moreover, Socialist support of 'bourgeois liberation movements' defeats its own object unless continuously accompanied by explanatory propaganda pointing out the true objective of the Labour movement and its divergence from merely nationalist aims. Hence a Socialist party in South Africa can in practice do little more in this connection than, using sympathy with the separatist movement (which itself must be explained in a Socialist light) as an introduction to win confidence, to enlighten the disinherited among the Dutch people in town and country on the false position they occupy as Nationalists and Republicans, and on their only true salvation, the Socialist Republic or International Commonwealth of all workers. 15

Bunting, thus, proposed to use the white Afrikaner national movement in the same way that he wished to use the non-white nationalist groups.

Bunting's proposals provoked a heated discussion at the ISL conference of January 1921. Finally they were rejected by the conference in favor of a sweeping resolution stating that a "Communist Party can at no time identify itself with any nationalist or any other bourgeois party, and cannot support its platform." The ISL thus bound itself to aloofness from any attempts to approach the Afrikaners through the strong Nationalist Party (and by implica tion also rejected an approach to the Africans through an organization such as the South African Native National Congress).

Differences of opinion over the proper approaches to the non-whites and the Afrikaners were paralleled by continuing conflict over the proper type of political activity for left-wing international socialists. In the course of the controversy the position of the ISL was increasingly challenged by the Industrial Socialist League in Cape Town.

In Johannesburg the leadership of the ISL continued to repulse attempts to change the position of the ISL with regard to political action. At the January 1919 conference of the ISL the anti-political forces presented a motion to delete "participation in elections for public bodies" as one of the methods of struggle accepted by the ISL. After a heated debate, reported in The Intemational of January 10, in which both sides invoked the example of the Bolsheviks in justification of their positions, the pro-political forces defeated the motion by a vote of 22-5.

The pro-political position of the ISL was reaffirmed in the general election of 1920 in which the ISL ran four candidates on the Witwatersrand (Andrews, Bunting, C. B. Tyler, H. Barendregt) and one in Kimberley (F. Hicks). The ISL election manifesto stated in precise, careful terms the use which the ISL wished to make of the parliamentary elections:

The ISL explicitly identified itself with the Russian Revolution and the prescriptions for political action advocated by the Bolsheviks.

In the general election all of the ISL candidates were badly beaten amidst the general success of the SALP and the Nationalist Party at the expense of the South African Party and the Unionist Party. The Nationalist Party increased its representation from 27 seats in 1915 to 44 seats in 1920, while the SALP moved from 4 seats to 21 seats. In contrast, the South African Party dropped from 54 seats to 41 seats, while the Unionist Party dropped from 39 seats to 25 seats. The ISL candidates threatened none of the candidates of the major parties; the seventy-eight votes received by Andrews were the most given to any ISL candidate. Nevertheless, the ISL was not disheartened. In the rise of the strength of the SALP and the Nationalist Party the ISL saw portents of its own future success:

The triumph of lower middle-class democracy as expressed by Labour in the towns and nationalism in the country will form a political shield under which the Socialist movement will be able to recruit its strength for the final tussle. This representation will prevent that throttling of the propaganda of the young Socialist movement that is going on in America. We hope by this Labour resurgence to have a wider field for our propaganda.17

The International went on to assert that the ISL was the inevitable successor to the SALP and it was from the ranks of the SALP that the ISL would recruit its forces for the final victory of socialism.

The position of the ISL in Johannesburg was immediately attacked by the Industrial Socialist League in Cape Town. The Industrial Socialist League had steadfastly stood on its platform of no participation in the political institutions of the "capitalist state"; in its view the only way to advance the cause of socialist revolution was through the agency of industrial unions. In a bitter article in the April 1920 issue of its newspaper, The Bolshevik, (which had started publication in September 1919) the Industrial Socialist League attacked the ISL for its attitude toward the SALP, implying that the ISL was tolerant of the bourgeois nature of the SALP. Invoking the "example of Communist Parties in all lands," The Bolshevik asserted that it would fight unreservedly against the SALP which it regarded as a pillar of capitalism, but simultaneously it appealed for support from the many sincere working class supporters who were still mistakenly within the SALP. In effect, the attitude of the Industrial Socialist League was not that distant from that of the ISL; yet because the ISL had participated in the election and did not regard the increase in SALP strength as disturbing, the Industrial Socialist League sharpened its antagonism to the ISL.

The threat of the Industrial Socialist League of Cape Town to the ISL in Johannesburg became more direct in the course of 1919. Despite the reaffirmation of the pro-political stand of the ISL, the anti-political enthusiasts within the ISL, led by A. Dunbar, a former member of the IWW, and R. MacLean, a former member of the SLP, continued to propagate their views. Inspired by the anti-political position of the Industrial Socialist League in Cape Town, the Johannesburg opponents of political action established a branch of the Industrial Socialist League while still claiming to be members of the ISL. The ISL reacted sharply by expelling all members of the new Industrial Socialist League and forbidding any members of the ISL to join the Industrial Socialist League upon pain of expulsion from the ISL.

Yet the censure of the Industrial Socialist League in Johannesburg did not end the controversy within the ISL over political action. At the January, 1920, conference of the ISL the Yiddish-speaking branch proposed a new amendment to delete the political clause from the constitution of the ISL. The amendment of the Yiddish-speaking branch was defeated soundly by a vote of 28-1, according to The Intemational of January 2. In accord with the instructions of its membership, the Yiddish-speaking branch then withdrew from the ISL rather than continue within an organization which supported political action.

The disputes over political action, however, became intertwined with the problems of color, and the attitude of the Cape Town and Johannesburg protagonists revealed the different problems which both faced as well as the difficulty of establishing a single policy on this issue among the left-wing international socialists in South Africa. Both the ISL and the Industrial Socialist League in Cape Town advocated non-racial solidarity in theory. The maintenance of this position in the more tolerant atmosphere of Cape Town was far less difficult than in Johannesburg. In Cape Town the SALP, faced with a considerable number of enfranchised Coloured workers, split over the proper attitude to be adopted to the color bar and the white labor policy. In the course of the general election of 1920 a Democratic Labour Party was formed in Cape Town by certain members of the SALP who objected to the segregationist policy of the SALP. The new party supported the program of the SALP with the exception of the sections which excluded the non-whites from political and economic benefits. In such a situation the attitude of the Industrial Socialist League to the problems of color was little different from that of some elements of the local SALP. In contrast, the SALP in the Transvaal was united in its defense of the color bar and the white labor policy. Thus, the attitude of the ISL to the non-whites was sharply distinguished from that of the SALP. With some legitimacy The International claimed in its April 23 issue, in reply to attacks by The Bolshevik on the ISL's electoral activity, that the mere support by the ISL of non-racial solidarity among the white workers was revolutionary. The position of the ISL was strengthened by the fact that the supporters of the Industrial Socialist League in Johannesburg chose to ignore the problem of the non-white workers, following A. Dunbar's dictum that no special attention should be paid to the problem of the non-whites. By this attitude Dunbar and his followers in the Johannesburg section of the Industrial Socialist League separated themselves from the Industrial Socialist League of Cape Town. The sharp lines between the pro-political ISL and the anti-political Industrial Socialist League became blurred in questions of color.

The differences between the two trends in South African left-wing international socialism were further complicated by the concurrent efforts of both groups to identify with the Russian Revolution and the left-wing international socialists overseas. In the process further potential for dissension and confusion were created.

Although the membership of the ISL disputed among itself on the proper approach to the non-white, it was united on the question of the socialist revolution overseas. At the same 1919 conference of the ISL which disputed over the attitude to be adopted toward non-whites, unanimity was evident on the relationship of the ISL to the revolution overseas. The conference resolved:

This League acclaims the glorious advance of the Socialist Revolution in Europe; pledges itself to support it in every possible way against the attacks or intrigues of the Capitalist Powers in Russia, Germany, and elsewhere; and resolves to redouble its efforts to spread the working class movement in South Africa so as to assist in hastening the triumphs of the Revolution and the establishment of the Cooperative Commonwealth throughout the world. 18

The conference extended its fraternal greetings to all socialist bodies with which the ISL could make contact, and specifically requested that the above resolution be sent with greetings to the Bolshevik Government of Russia and the Spartacist Group in Germany "with fervent wishes for their success."

In the wake of the 1919 conference at which the ISL endorsed the socialist revolution overseas the pages of The Intemational were more and more focused on events overseas. The Intemational succinctly justified its preoccupation with overseas affairs:

The Intemational makes no apology for devoting a considerable proportion of its space each week to chronicling phases and episodes of the revolutionary movement from all over the world, not merely because example is often better than precept, but because nowadays greater importance than ever is attached to 'intelligence' of what both our fellow workers and the enemy are doing, and because it is only through studying the revolution as a whole that we arrive at a sense of proportion in our own contribution to it. 19

From whatever socialist papers became available the ISL gleaned information about the progress of the new Russian Bolshevik state, the attempts of the allies to overthrow it, and the activities of various socialist groups in support of it. With formation of the Communist International (Cl) in March 1919, The Intemational devoted increasing attention to the new international for which it had so long called. In mid-1919 The Intemational started to print the manifesto of the Cl in serial form.

The Industrial Socialist League in Cape Town also moved to identify itself with the socialist revolution overseas. The Industrial Socialist League pointed to the efforts of the English workers to organize a 'Hands off Russia' campaign. The Bolshevik urged that the South African workers move beyond the position of the English workers through affiliation with the Industrial Socialist League:

There are two courses open. We shall either desert our Russian brethren in their hour of need, and allow our Churchill to finish his campaign for democracy by strangling the Russian Revolution, and cover ourselves with disgrace, like the miserable slaves of ancient times, who said they loved their masters, and that they did not want to be free, for which they were branded for the rest of their lives, or we will, like worthy comrades of the great martyrs, rise to the occasion and respond to the call. Let the workers of South Africa not satisfy themselves with the motto of 'Hands off Russia'. This can be done-and easily done--by proper Industrial Organisation, through which the voice of South African Labour may be heard. 20

Both the ISL and the Industrial Socialist League moved to translate their affinity for the Russian Revolution into formal affiliation with the new center for the left-wing international socialist movement. At its January 1920 conference, the ISL decided to affiliate with the new Cl in Moscow. The Intemational of January 9 reported its decision of the conference: "After discussion, it was then carried that the ISL do affiliate to the Third (Moscow) International and the event was signalized by the singing of the Red Flag." Yet its claim to be the single representative of international socialism in South Africa was challenged by the Industrial Socialist League. In a parallel decision, the Industrial Socialist League also resolved to apply for affiliation to the Cl. Its decision to affiliate to the Communist International was reported as follows:

The Industrial Socialist League is proud to be able to announce that after having decided to affiliate to the Third International of Moscow, steps have been taken to carry this decision into effect. This declaration on the part of the League of allegiance to the Third International marks a new stage in the history and development of the Socialist movement of South Africa. Let us hope that working in conjunction with our Russian comrades and with the rest of the Militant Proletariat of the world, the South African workers will soon prove to be worthycomrades in the Great Cause. 21

No indication was given of the nature of the meeting at which the decision to affiliate was taken, nor were there any reports of the steps taken to secure formal affiliation.

The situation was further complicated when the Johannesburg supporters of the Industrial Socialist League, who apparently fused with some of the Yiddish-speaking anti-political elements which broke away from the ISL in early 1920, chose to call their new organization the Communist League. Thus, the first socialist organization using the word 'communist' in its name came into being in opposition to the ISL which proclaimed itself the representative of the Cl in South Africa.

The ISL moved to offset the challenge of both the Communist League of Johannesburg and the Industrial Socialist League of Cape Town by notifying overseas supporters and representatives of the Cl of its desire for affiliation. On April 23 The Intemational announced that the ISL had received acknowledgment from the office of the British SLP in Glasgow and from the short-lived Amsterdam Bureau of the Cl that its application had been received and arrangements would be made to put the ISL in official contact with Moscow. In May 7, shortly before the mandate of the Amsterdam Bureau was revoked by Moscow, The Intemational reported that the ISL had received two further communications from S. J. Rutgers of the Amsterdam Bureau of the Cl; it was stated that the communications put South Africa "in touch with the left wing movement in Europe and elsewhere." The ISL assumed that it had been recognized by the Cl, basing its belief that it had been recognized by the Cl upon a report printed in the Spanish socialist newspaper, El Socialista, in which it was stated that it was on the list of affiliates presented to the Second Congress of the Cl by Karl Radek. It appears, however, that the Industrial Socialist League also received recognition from the Cl in 1920. 22

In mid-1920 the position of leadership among the left-wing international socialist which the ISL had carefully assumed during the years of the First World War was seriously threatened. In Cape Town and Johannesburg separate organizations, either 'communist' in name, or affiliated with the Cl, challenged the ISL. Within its own ranks, the ISL continued to be torn by dissension on the question of the proper approach to the non-white. There was little indication that the ISL was expanding outward from its narrow base within a segment of white South Africa. The prospects of the ISL as the leading spokesman for left-wing international socialism seemed limited.

Developments in the Cl and the left-wing international socialist movement overseas aggravated the differences among the left-wing international socialists in South Africa in 1920-21. Yet, paradoxically, they also created the basis for a new unity among them in which the ISL of Johannesburg reasserted its former dominance.

At first the Industrial Socialist League of Cape Town took the initiative. One of its members, Manuel Lopes, who had been impressed by the success of the political institutions of the Soviets in Russia, urged the Industrial Socialist League to re-evaluate its exclusive emphasis upon industrial unionism and the general strike. After lengthy discussion the small membership of the Industrial Socialist League accepted the utility of political action through the organization of Soviets, although they carefully continued to oppose participation in electoral politics. A new constitution was called for and the Industrial Socialist League moved to convert itself formally into a 'communist' organization in line with developments overseas.

By October 1920 the Industrial Socialist League of Cape Town and its Johannesburg branch, the Communist League, had merged to form the Communist Party of South Africa. The constitution of the new organization endorsed the complete overthrow of capitalism, the class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the system of Soviets, affiliation with the Cl, and mass action by the workers as a means of seizing power. Significantly, the new document reaffirmed the opposition of its Cape Town and Johannesburg founders to electoral politics. The new constitution also endorsed the non-racialism of the Industrial Socialist League. It was stated that all means should be used to eradicate prejudice between white and non-white workers and that all workers, irrespective of color, craft and sex, should be organized. "All class conscious workers who are earnest in their desire to do something to emancipate their class" were invited to join the new party.

In Johannesburg the ISL continued to follow avidly the zigzags toward unity of left-wing international socialists overseas. With great interest it had watched the complicated moves by which the Communist Party of Great Britain was formed in mid-1920. Regular reports by a former ISL member, J. M. Gibson, who had returned to Britain, were published in The International upon the left-wing international socialist groups in Britain. During the same period The Intemational also printed reports of Lenin's advice to the British left-wing international socialists and reports about the negotiations towards a united communist party. The Intemational also regularly reprinted theses and resolutions from the Cl through which ran the constant theme of the necessity for all left-wing international socialists to organize in support of, and for the extension of, the socialist revolution as manifested in Russia. Yet the ISL initially held back from calling a unity conference of all socialist bodies out of fears that the contentious question of political action would destroy any efforts to build a united left-wing international socialist organization for all South Africa.

By late 1920, however, the examples from overseas could not be ignored. Inspired by the Council of Action which had been formed in Britain by all segments of the British labor movement from left to right in order to thwart British intervention in the Soviet-Polish War, the ISL urged that South African workers emulate the British example by uniting against imperialism in their own country. Finally in late November or early December the ISL issued a formal call to socialist unity. The appeal showed traces of Bunting's pleading for special attention to the non-whites which he had articulated in an article, "Socialist Unity--What About?", which appeared in The International of October 22. Non-white organizations, as well as socialist organizations and interested individuals were invited to send delegates to the annual conference of the ISL in January 1921, to discuss 1) the non-whites of the country, 2) the Afrikaner nationalist movement, 3) the role of a communist or socialist party in South Africa, and 4) socialist unity in South Africa. 1

The response to the ISL call before the conference revealed anew the diversity of attitudes among the small number of left-wing international socialists as well as the difficulty of uniting them and other possible sympathizers. The new Communist Party of South Africa apparently did not reply to the call of the ISL, but the SDF of Cape Town, from whose ranks had come the majority of the members of the Communist Party of South Africa, did reply. The SDF supported socialist unity, but it feared that the breadth of the ISL appeal indicated that it was willing to dilute its socialism by appealing to non-socialist groups. Furthermore, the SDF saw no necessity to give special attention to the problem of the non-whites or nationalism among the Afrikaners. In Durban the appeal of the ISL was ignored by the established SDF, but the Marxian Club, a new study group established in August 1919 as "a weekly rendezvous for Labour men and Socialists for discussions on the economics of Karl Marx in the light of current events," did answer. It, too, endorsed unity, but it was most anxious to discuss the problems of the non-white and Afrikaner nationalism. With regard to the former, the Marxian Club endorsed a non-racial socialist society, but it carefully indicated that non-whites still within the tribal society were outside the consideration of socialists; with regard to the latter the Marxian Club announced that it would have no dealings with the Nationalist Party. From Johannesburg the ISL call drew an answer from another Jewish socialist group, the Poalei Zion. As a branch of the Jewish Marxist organization which had arisen in Eastern Europe, the Poalei Zion analyzed the South African situation through the prism of the eastern European Bundist-Marxist tradition. With regard to both the non-whites and the Afrikaners the Poalei Zion suggested that the possibilities of national cultural autonomy and separate proletarian states be studied. For itself, the Poalei Zion wanted autonomy within a federal united socialist party in South Africa. Although the respondents to the ISL call in Cape Town, Durban, and Johannesburg represented only tiny sects, each one was anxious to preserve its particular interpretation of socialism.

At the conference of the ISL in January 1921 the conflicting left-wing international socialists again clashed, but the ISL was easily able to dominate proceedings within its own organization. The SDF of Cape Town did not send a delegate to support its statements, but the Marxian Club of Durban and the Poalei Zion did. The Communist Party of South Africa which had not bothered to submit a formal reply before the conference sent Dunbar of Johannesburg as its representative. There were also delegates from the Indian industrial union in Natal and individual members of the SALP, the white trade unions and the IWA, the declining African trade union in Johannesburg. Delegates from the ISL, however, predominated.

The January 1921 conference of the ISL, as has been noted, established its policy toward non-whites by acceptance of Bunting's theses, "The ISL and the Coloured and Native Worker." Bunting's proposals for a sympathetic approach to Afrikaner nationalism were defeated and the ISL appeared to continue its old policy of no particular attention to the Afrikaners. The most important decisions of the conference, however, were taken with regard to socialist unity and the question of the proper socialist party for South Africa.

The basis of the decision of the conference on the proper role of a socialist party in South Africa was a statement by the ISL published in The Intemational on the last day of 1920. The statement indicated broad agreement with the thesis of the Executive Committee of the Cl on the role of a communist party in a revolutionary situation. With regard to South Africa, however, the ISL statement asserted that the situation was not revolutionary. Accordingly, the function of the party in South Africa was merely the propagation of the principles of communism. Yet it was still the duty of the party to attempt to lead and direct the labor movement, despite the weakness of socialism in South Africa. The ISL rejected affiliation with the SALP (in contrast to Lenin's advice to the British Communists to affiliate with the British Labour Party). In the estimate of the ISL, the SALP, unlike the British Labour Party, lacked the support of the mass of the workers and thus would not serve as an effective vehicle to approach the South African workers. In an implicit criticism of the Communist Party of South Africa, the statement deplored premature revolutionary activity and welcomed the Cl endorsement of political action within the institutions of the capitalist state. At the ISL conference Dunbar, on behalf of the Communist Party of South Africa, attacked anew the endorsement of political action, but he was unsuccessful in deleting it. The conference accepted the ISL thesis on the role of a socialist party in South Africa with merely a slight dilution of the emphasis to be placed upon political action.

The most crucial document accepted by the conference was the statement of the ISL on socialist unity which had also been published in The Intemational on the eve of the conference. Its terms revealed that the stern Twenty-one Conditions passed by the Cl at its Second Congress in July 1920 had made a strong impression upon the ISL. The statement made it one of its conditions for socialist unity in South Africa that no "improper elements" such as centrists and anarchists would be permitted to join any new organization. It also unequivocally demanded a "strongly disciplined and centralised party without 'local autonomy of branches'." To assure these conditions the statement asserted that any constitution or program would have to be submitted to the Cl for approval.

The documents accepted by the ISL conference showed that it was anxious to establish its own program for South Africa, but at the same time it wanted to adhere closely to the position of the new Moscow-based international. The decisions of the conference also showed that the ISL was as determined and definite in its version of 'communism' as was the rival Communist Party of South Africa.

In a significant concluding move the conference appointed a sub-committee, immediately known as the Unity Committee, to draft a report of the proceedings of the ISL conference as a basis for unity. A further representative conference was promised at which a constitution for the proposed united organization was to be written. The continuing dominance of the ISL in further moves to unity seemed assured by the fact that at least three of the five members of the Unity Committee (Andrews, Bunting, and A. Goldman) were members of the ISL. 2

Formation of the Unity Committee signalled the start of the final steps which led to the creation of a single, united communist party affiliated with the Cl. Yet the nearer the prospects of actual unity came, the more disputatious the minuscule South African left-wing international socialist movement showed itself. Ultimately, however, the clear and specific terms of the Twenty-One Conditions of the Cl, and the more immediate, but less demanding, insistence of the ISL overcame all obstacles to the formation of a single united communist party on lines in keeping with the position of the ISL. In the process all those who would not accept the firm tenets of the Cl were cast aside.

In Cape Town the Communist Party of South Africa did not respond to the challenge of the formation of the Unity Committee by the ISL. Instead, E. J. Brown, a member of the ISL who had been expelled from Katanga in July 1920 for trade union activities among the white miners and had subsequently made his way to Cape Town, took the initiative in calling a series of meetings between the SDF, the Communist Party of South Africa (whose ranks had included the membership of the Jewish Socialist Society since January 1921) and the Constitutional Socialist League (a discussion and debating group inspired by the philosophy of guild socialism). The Communist Party of South Africa asserted that it would only accept unity upon its terms. At its suggestion its constitution was made the basis for discussion. After a point by point analysis of the constitution, most of the delegates of the various socialist groups in Cape Town agreed to accept all clauses except that which advocated abstention from political action. In a further, more definite, yet divisive, step the meeting finally adopted a resolution which accepted the Twenty-One Conditions of the Cl unreservedly. The Constitutional Socialist League then departed in objection to the endorsement of the dictatorship of the proletariat. On the other side, the Communist Party of South Africa also departed in objection to the endorsement of political action. The remaining elements, consisting of the SDF, unattached socialists, and a section of the Communist Party of South Africa, remained to reaffirm their allegiance to the Cl and to make plans to form a new party. Subsequently more of the members of the Communist Party of South Africa walked out to rejoin the anti-political group, but the majority of those who had unreservedly endorsed the Twenty-One Conditions stayed to form the United Communist Party of South Africa in March 1921. 3

(Cape Town, July 30-August 1, 1921, p. 1 (Typewritten). The first three may be identified as members of the ISL from reports of ISL activities in The International. Pincus may be identified as a member of the Poalei Zion from reports of its activities in The Intemational, but it has been impossible to identify the affiliation of Rubin.)

In its provisional constitution the United Communist Party of South Africa endorsed the class struggle, the need for a socialist revolution in which all the means of production were to be controlled by all the people, and affiliation to the Cl. In the crucial matter of political action the United Communist Party stated that "the working class must organise consciously and politically for the conquest of the powers of government, national and local in order that this machinery, including those [armed] forces, may be converted from an instrument of oppression into the agent of emancipation."

The appeal of the new united Cape Town organization among even the anti-political left-wing international socialists quickly was revealed. Lopes, the secretary of the Industrial Socialist League and then of the Communist Party of South Africa, renounced his opposition to political action; in his revised position he asserted that to obstruct unity on the grounds of opposition to political action was to betray the cause of communism. On April 1, at a joint meeting, the Communist Party of South Africa and its Jewish branch overcame their ideological objections and decided to affiliate with the new United Communist Party of South Africa. A small minority of five, still steadfastly opposed to the concept of political action, refused to accept the decision. On April 21 they gathered to form the Communist Propaganda Group. Their stand, however, did not obscure the fact that almost all the scattered left-wing socialists in Cape Town had coalesced into one united 'communist' organization on lines similar to those of the ISL in Johannesburg.

Although C. F. Glass, J. Pick, S. H. Davidoff, E. Reynolds, and A. Brown comprised the entire membership of the Communist Propaganda Group, the new splinter organization went through all the motions of the slightly larger left-wing international socialist organizations. A constitution was adopted on the model of that of the previous Communist Party of South Africa; only clause (f) was rewritten to read "Affiliation to the Third International as a sympathetic body with a consultative vote" instead of merely "Affiliation to the Third International." The new group moved immediately to write to the Independent Communist Party of Germany with a request that it place its application for consultative status before the Cl. Like both the SDF and the Communist Party of South Africa before it, the Communist Propaganda Group held four or five weekly public propaganda meetings at which its position was expounded. The group wrote, printed and distributed 1,000 copies of a handbill attacking a proposed Defence Bill. When members of the United Communist Party of South Africa were arrested for their protest against the Bulhoek shooting of the African Israelites in the Eastern Cape in late May, the Communist Propaganda Group voted to hold joint propaganda meetings with the United Communist Party of South Africa, which they had refused to join. In June the Communist Propaganda Group admitted three new members, raising its total membership to eight. The diverse activities of the minuscule Communist Propaganda Group testified both to the continued dedication of even isolated left-wing international socialists and also to the potentially divisive power of deeply-held convictions on the correct interpretation of Marxist doctrine. 4

In Johannesburg more encompassing moves to unity among all the left-wing international socialists of South Africa were undertaken by the Unity Committee established by the ISL conference. The Unity Committee held its first meeting on January 19 in Johannesburg at which time a report based on the decisions of the ISL conference was adopted. The report was sent to the various branches of the ISL, the Communist Party of South Africa in Johannesburg and in Cape Town, the Poalei Zion, the SDF in Cape Town, the SDP in Durban, and the Marxian Club in Durban. All groups were invited to send two delegates, regardless of the size of their membership, to a meeting to be held in Johannesburg on Easter Sunday, March 27, to draft a constitution for a proposed new socialist party.

The Johannesburg branch of the Communist Party of South Africa did not send delegates to the Easter Sunday meeting of the Unity Committee, yet other left-wing international socialist organizations did. The ISL, of course, sent its allotted two delegates plus an alternate (Andrews and Wade, plus Bunting) and the Poalei Zion also sent two delegates (E. Pincus and R. Feldman). From Durban came two delegates from the SDP (H. Norris and J. Irwen), while Harrison represented the new United Communist Party of Cape Town. The Marxian Club of Durban was not able to send a delegate, but it agreed in advance to affiliate to a new united party.

The meeting did not discuss a formal constitution for a new all-South African united communist organization, but it did occupy itself with the equally important task of determining the basis upon which such an organization should be formed. Harrison opened the meeting with a simple blanket resolution in which he proposed that the basis of the new organization be the unqualified acceptance of the Twenty-One Conditions and affiliation to the Cl. Before acting on Harrison's proposal the meeting considered the Twenty-One Conditions individually. In the course of discussion the delegates qualified their acceptance of two of the conditions. Condition Three demanding the creation of a parallel illegal organization by all communist parties, was rejected as unsuitable at the time for the South African situation. Condition Seven, demanding an immediate and complete break with reformism, was accepted on the understanding that reformism was to be defined as "such emphasis on reforms within the capitalist system as is calculated to obscure, impede, or delay the destruction of the system." The Committee then unanimously approved a revised resolution offered by Wade of the ISL:

This Conference has considered the twenty-one Points and agrees upon them as a basis of Socialist Unity in S. Africa. It has particularly discussed certain of the conditions and agrees on the interpretation of them attached.

The members of the Committee will do their utmost to secure the adhesion of their Parties to these resolutions and subject to such adhesion will assist in the preparation of a programme in accordance with Condition 15 [of the Twenty-One Conditions which demanded a new communist program in conformity with the decisions of the Cl]. 5

The Committee also agreed that it had no objection to the affiliation of the Poalei Zion as a national branch of the projected communist party providing that the Cl approved such an arrangement.

The report of the meeting of the Unity Committee was sent to all participating organizations as well as to the Communist Party of South Africa in Cape Town and Johannesburg. All who agreed with the report were invited to submit suggestions for a draft constitution to the Unity Committee. The report led to further disagreements among the left-wing international socialists. Yet at the same time it bolstered the strength and determination of the ISL and its supporters for a new united communist party on their terms.

The new proposals resulting from the Easter conference of the Unity Committee created havoc within the tiny ranks of the Johannesburg branch of the Communist Party of South Africa. Dunbar objected to the inclusion of support for political action among the Twenty-One Conditions; on this ground he had apparently begun to attack the 'dictatorship of Moscow'. The lnternational of April 8 responded with a recommendation that the members of the Communist Party of South Africa should read Lenin's Left Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder in order to see the error of their position. Possibly some of Dunbar's supporters did, for a group within the Communist Party of South Africa changed to support the Twenty-One Conditions. Dunbar and his few loyal supporters expelled them. Undeterred, Dunbar indicated that he would continue propaganda for his version of 'communism' even in opposition to a new united communist party. 6 Dunbar's defiance, however, merely emphasized his isolation. The supporters of the position of the ISL clearly dominated the left-wing international socialists on the Witwatersrand.

In Durban the proposals of the Unity Committee met a mixed reception. The Marxian Club and the Durban branch of the ISL accepted them and urged support for a united communist party based on the Twenty-One Conditions. The SDP, however, opposed the proposals of the Unity Committee. Despite the long-standing mutual antagonism between the SDP and the ISL and its supporters, the SDP had sent two delegates to the Easter conference. At the opening of the conference the SDP representatives stated their total opposition to the Cl, yet by the conclusion of the point-by-point discussion of the Twenty-One Conditions the two representatives changed their minds to the extent that they joined the unanimous vote of the Unity Committee which endorsed the Twenty-One Conditions, with minor qualifications, as a basis for socialist unity. 7

The act of the SDP representatives in Johannesburg in March, however, appears to have been a temporary slip from SDP orthodoxy. In May the SDP flatly rejected the proposals of the Unity Committee for socialist unity on the basis of the Twenty-One Conditions. The philosophy of the Cl was recognized as valid for Russia before the revolution, of doubtful validity for Russia after the revolution, and clearly invalid for South Africa. It was argued that denunciations and expulsions of "social pacifists" and "reformist" trade union members would destroy the South African trade union movement. Secret propaganda among the military was viewed as unnecessary within the South African situation. The SDP statement deplored the demands of the Cl for speedy decisions without discussion, while the call for periodic purges within communist parties was regarded as assuring the constant presence of strife, distrust, and suspicion. In unequivocal terms the SDP conjured a vision of a centralized bureaucratic dictatorship which it rejected:

The contents, spirit and methods of the 21 conditions can in no way be calculated to inspire to self-reliance the believers and followers of the Third International.

Its aim, perhaps unconsciously, is bureaucratic authority, centralised in the hands of officials--and must eventually become almost, if not entirely, unapproachable by any one single nation and will make possible a dictatorship of the proletariat--not a dictatorship 'by' the proletariat as many believe--which is contrary to the tenets and spirit of democracy as we understand it.

As a result of our experience we have no hesitation in stating that, at least the European workers of South Africa will neither take their lead from, nor accept the spirit of, the 21 points. They are not only not applicable to South Africa, but they are also not desirable.8

The SDP clearly put itself beyond the confines of the tight party which the Unity Committee was trying to construct.

The Intemational was quick to respond to the attack of the SDP and its response revealed much about the attitude of those who were struggling for a new united communist party within the Cl. The SDP was castigated for its lack of concern for the non-white workers of South Africa; it was implied that the ISL alone was concerned with the real workers of South Africa. More importantly, the writer of the article in The Intemational displayed the assurance of a firm believer marching into a long and difficult battle for the 'true' faith:

The SA United Communist Party will not compromise in order to attain a spurious importance but by virtue of the fact that it is in line with the development of human society and is based on the immutable laws of human progress, [it] must attract to its ranks all that is worthy in the working class in South Africa. The SDP and other survivals may stand aside and sneer. Its members may obtain the interested applause of the enemy, and be rewarded with positions of ease and profit by the reactionary forces of capitalism. In the words of Helen Crawford to the members of the ILP when the Communists seceded on the same question, we would say to the SDP: 'You are going to enter into the kingdom prepared for you. Some of us may go out into the outer darkness. The Communist movement is going out to persecution. You are going on to popularity.' We accept that position. Let all who value freedom more than comfort, justice more than the smiles and largesse of the exploiters rally to the red flag of revolutionary Communism, which will not be lowered until the last rampart has been taken and the citadel of capitalism stormed and razed to the ground. 9

It was in this spirit that the Unity Committee apparently wrote the manifesto, and the constitution and rules for the projected new united communist party. The documents of the Unity Committee envisaged the projected organization both as the leader of the coming socialist revolution and as an integral part of the Cl.

Holding forth the vision of the "World Commune to be," the manifesto called the class-conscious South African workers of all races to the banner of the new communist party. Unqualifiedly viewing history in terms of the class struggle, the manifesto rejoiced in the victory of the workers in Russia and prophesied that the remainder of the world was speedily approaching social revolution. It was time for the labor movement of South Africa to heed the call of the coming revolution and to that end the new communist party dedicated itself to the mobilization of all class-conscious workers for the final blow against capitalism. The immediate tasks of the new party were to "establish the widest and closest possible contact with workers of all ranks and races, and to propagate the Communist gospel among them, in the first instance among the industrial masses, who must provide the 'storm troops' of the Revolution, and secondly, among the rural toilers." The manifesto specifically urged the new party to utilize any discontent or disaffection among "the masses" to sharpen and hasten the final confrontation between capital and labor. The document acknowledged that the new party would "derive great strength and inspiration from its connection with the World Communist Intemational, at present headed by the Russian Communist Party." In addition it was recognized that circumstances would bring the party into special close contact with the labor movement in Great Britain. 10

Unlike the manifesto, the proposed constitution and rules of the new organization were not studded with phrases of Marxist class warfare. Yet the apparently inert language of procedure and organization clearly complemented the manifesto in outlining a new type of political party for South Africa.

The laconic first rule, "The Party accepts the '21 Points' of the Communist International," marked the formal acceptance of the discipline of the Moscow-based Cl. Within South Africa the rules provided for a centralized party. Although the annual congress of the party was established as the supreme authority of the party, the central executive elected by it was given full powers to control all work of the party between congresses. Yet the rules concerning the selection of delegates for the congress were weighted in favor of the central executive. Delegates from the established branches were to be chosen on the basis of two delegates for every twenty-five members or part thereof not less than ten, but the central executive was to have the power to select an undefined number of delegates to the congress to represent party members unaffiliated to an established branch. Furthermore, all members of the central executive were to be delegates to the congress. Given the probable small membership of the new party the position of the central executive was particularly strong. Its position was further enhanced by the proviso that it had the final authority to decide upon the establishment of new branches. Its ability to perpetuate itself was helped by the clause which allowed it to fill vacancies in its ranks occurring between congresses.

Not only was the organization potentially centrally-controlled, but it appeared as if control would be in the hands of the Johannesburg membership. The terms for the selection of delegates weighted the congress in favor of the larger membership of Johannesburg. To compensate in part for this three seats on the central executive were reserved, one each for Cape Province, the Orange Free State, and Natal. The holders of the three reserved seats were to be selected by the membership of the local branches in each area, rather than by the congress. Yet the rules also stated that the central executive (with its membership of a chairman, secretary, treasurer, nine members elected by the congress, and three provincial representatives) was to be located in Johannesburg. It could be expected that the majority of the membership of the powerful central executive would come from the Johannesburg area.11

On May 27 the Unity Committee, acting in consultation with the various groups which had agreed to amalgamate, announced in The International that a conference would be held to form a new party not later than August 1 in Cape Town. Delegates were to be selected on the basis of the clause in the draft working rules which prescribed two delegates for every 25 members, or part thereof, such part being not less than ten.

On July 30 fourteen delegates, all English-speaking whites, assembled in Cape Town. Nine delegates represented the ISL (all were from the Johannesburg area), four delegates represented the United Communist Party of Cape Town, and one delegate (Harrison of Cape Town) was appointed to represent the unattached members of both organizations. The Marxian Club of Durban and the Poalei Zion of Johannesburg indicated that they had not been able to send delegates but that they were prepared to come into the new party.

The powerful appeal of a new communist organization to all who considered themselves 'communist' was seen in the fact that two of the four delegates from Cape Town (J. Pick and C. F. Glass) were former members of the splinter anti-political Communist Propaganda Group which had merged with the United Communist Party after mid-May despite the support of the latter organization for political action. The exact nature of the reconciliation between the Communist Propaganda Group and the United Communist Party of South Africa is not known. According to the "Minute Book of the Communist Propaganda Group" its last meeting was held on June 24,1921. By that time it was already holding joint meetings with the United Communist Party of South Africa. It might be assumed that the joint meetings, and the prospect of the inauguration of a South Africa-wide Communist Party in Cape Town, were sufficient cause to push the membership of the Communist Propaganda Group back to association with those from whom it had originally split over the question of political action.

In the course of the proceedings of the three-day inaugural meeting none of the delegates directly challenged the draft manifesto or the constitution and rules. Some of the suggested amendments to the constitution submitted before the meeting revealed, however, that the Marxian Club and some of the delegates from Cape Town were wary of the potential centralized structure of the party. Both the Marxian Club of Durban and Pick and Glass of Cape Town wished to dilute or delete the clause requiring a formal pledge of allegiance from all members; they preferred to rely upon the integrity of each member without a formal pledge of allegiance. The Marxian Club wanted to make the central executive more responsible to the local branches by giving the local branches, instead of the congress, the power to elect all central executive members, with the exception of the secretary and treasurer; in a similar vein it proposed that each local branch be given the power of recall of the central executive member elected by it as well as the power to replace their representative in the event of dereliction of duty. The Cape Town delegates wanted to broaden the base for the election of the entire central executive by making the entire membership of the party responsible for their election rather than merely the delegates to the annual congress.

None of the submitted decentralizing amendments were carried amidst the general agreement to the proposed constitution and rules. The advocates of decentralization did win one small victory, however, when an amendment proposed from the floor to exclude central executive members from automatic delegate status at the annual congress was passed unanimously. Without any further substantial amendments the constitution and rules were passed almost as proposed by the Unity Committee.12

The manifesto proposed by the Unity Committee also was passed without any changes. The delegates continued to a discussion of the problem of propaganda among non-whites without reaching any definite decisions. It was decided, however, by a vote of 8-2 to accept a resolution proposed by Bunting that the new party consider the possibility of contesting a parliamentary seat in a constituency with a large number of African voters. The new party seemed ready to continue and expand the left-wing international socialist position of the ISL.

The dominance of the ISL in the proceedings of the inaugural meeting was underlined by the selection of officers for the new party. Bunting and Tyler, the two candidates for chairman of the party, were from the ISL; Tyler was elected over Bunting by a vote of 8-5. Andrews was then unanimously elected secretary of the new party and Bunting was unanimously elected treasurer. Of the nine members of the central executive of the new party elected by the inaugural meeting at least six were identifiable as members of the ISL from previous reports of their activities in The Intemational: A. Goldman, R. Rabb, Mrs. S. Bunting, J. den Bakker, T. Chapman, R. Gelblum. E. Pincus was similarly identifiable as a member of the Poalei Zion, but it has been impossible to identify the affiliations of G. Arnold and H. Lee.

The inaugural meeting, however, was not preoccupied with immediate details about its policy or organization in South Africa. There were no disagreements on the broad outlines of the new party. Emotionally the meeting centered upon events overseas in which the delegates could see themselves as a part of the coming world socialist revolution. Letters from Jones and J. den Bakker, two members of the ISL who had reached Moscow, were read to the meeting amidst applause. One of the first acts of the meeting was a unanimous resolution establishing the new party as the Communist Party of South Africa (Section of the Communist International). At the same time the meeting moved that the new party should apply formally for affiliation to the Cl. With the passage of the resolution the entire assembly of delegates and sympathizers rose to sing The Red Flag. 13

The establishment of the Communist Party of South Africa (Section of the Communist International) signalled the bringing together of all the important followers of the Russian Revolution and the militant left-wing international socialism which it proclaimed. In the process of organizing the new communist party elements on the 'left' who opposed the use of political action and elements on the 'right' who refused the stringent conditions of the Cl were excluded. The new party, dominated by the former members of the ISL, represented all those who were willing to declare formally their allegiance to the left-wing international socialism or communism of the Cl which they believed conformed most closely to the left-wing international socialism for which so many of them had been struggling since the start of the First World War.

Yet the formation of the new party left many of the peculiar problems of left-wing international socialism in South Africa unresolved--and it created a new range of potentially perplexing difficulties for the new party.

The contradictions in the program of the party between support for the white workers and support for the non-white workers remained. The problem of the relationships between the party and the trade unions was still outstanding and the issue of the attitude of the party to nationalist organizations would arise again. While the basic principles enunciated in the manifesto and constitution and rules gave an outline for guidance, they did not define in detail the tactics to be followed in the resolution of outstanding problems.

In addition, the adherence of the new party to the Cl brought with it a range of potential new problems. At the time there seemed to be no contradiction between the program of the new party and the principles established by the Cl in Moscow. The formal acceptance by the South African party of the discipline of the Cl meant no more than a declaration of affinity in 1921. Yet it did create the possibility of close supervision and control in the future in the event of a difference of opinion over ideology or tactics. In turn any close supervision and control carried with it a potential for dissension within the ranks of the party members in South Africa.

In 1921 the actual number of supporters of the new party were literally merely scores among the seven million inhabitants of South Africa. If the terms of the new party rules were followed in the selection of the delegates for the inaugural meeting, the fourteen accredited delegates represented a maximum membership of one hundred seventy-five. The membership of the Marxian Club of Durban and the Poalei Zion of Johannesburg, smaller organizations which were not represented by delegates, probably together was not more than one hundred. Thus, the new party was backed by a membership of about three hundred from the tiny organizations which it fused.

The new party was not only exceedingly small in numerical strength, but its membership represented only a very limited section of the multi-racial, multi-national population of South Africa. It is doubtful if the party included more than a few non-whites. Likewise only a few Afrikaners were members of the new party. Jewish support for the party was limited primarily to the Poalei Zion which demanded autonomy on its terms. 14 The membership of the party was concentrated among English-speaking left-wing international socialists, either middle-class professional men or militant trade union leaders. Furthermore, the bulk of the tiny membership of the new party was concentrated in and around Johannesburg on the Witwatersrand.

The geographical and social concentration of the membership of the new party both strengthened and weakened its potential cohesion. The common experiences and origins of the group were a possible cementing influence. More crucially, the shared faith of the members in the correctness of their isolated position despite the hostility of white and non-white South Africa created further strong bonds. Simultaneously, however, the complexities of the shared Marxist faith and the difficulties of applying it to the varied and unique situations of South Africa represented a potential source of disagreements within the tiny organization.15

It was not immediately evident how the new Communist Party of South Africa (Section of the Communist International) would evolve. It was sure, however, that the tiny organization formed with such enthusiasm in Cape Town on July 30, 1921, faced unusual and formidable problems in its quest of the socialist revolution in South Africa.

Tiny, but determined, the new Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) was immediately caught up in the unresolved problems of white and non-white South Africa. During the months while the left-wing international socialists, now communists, had been preoccupied with jostling for unity, agitation among non-white and white workers had increased. The communists were forced to take notice of the new developments.

Although Africans on the Witwatersrand were quiet, elsewhere in South Africa there was a new ferment among Africans. In Cape Province the organization of the ICU spread rapidly. Separatist religious organizations, sparked by the inflow of ideas from America, continued to expand while the new postwar message from America of Marcus Garvey's messianic black nationalism further fueled African aspirations. Inevitably, the new African organizations clashed with white South African authority.

In October 1920, demonstrations in the wake of the arrest of Masabalala, the ICU organizer in Port Elizabeth resulted in the death of twenty-three Africans. In May 1921, a separatist sect, the Israelites, clashed with government soldiers and police at Bulhoek, near Queenstown; one hundred sixty three Israelites were killed and one hundred twenty nine were wounded. South Africa and the world were shocked into momentary awareness of South Africa's race problem. Both the ISL and the left-wing international socialist groups in Cape Town condemned the deaths in Port Elizabeth and Bulhoek in their respective publications, The Intemational and The Bolshevik.

After the formation of the CPSA in July 1921, the Johannesburg branch of the party (formerly the ISL) inconclusively considered the admittance of non-whites to membership. It was cryptically reported in The Intemational of August 19 that "a keen debate took place apropos of a number of applications by natives for election to membership of the branch," but the question was not mentioned again. T. W. Thibedi, an African who had been a member of the ISL, was apparently the only African member of the CPSA in Johannesburg.

In Cape Town the communists began to approach African leaders. Bennett Ncwana, the publisher of the short-lived newspaper, Black Man, which was sympathetic to African nationalism, allowed communists to write in his newspaper. Apparently Ncwana turned toward the communists as a result of their stand in the wake of the Bulhoek shootings. He endorsed the candidacy of Harrison for the Cape Town city council, but he also endorsed SALP candidates for a parliamentary by-election. The communists were less successful with the ICU, which carefully refrained from supporting the CPSA (or any other political party). Nevertheless, new opportunities seemed to be opening for the CPSA among non-whites.

Developments in the non-white world, however, were quickly overshadowed by rising tensions in the white labor world. In November 1920 Ernest Shaw, an ISL member (and subsequently a member of the CPSA), and Percy Fisher, a militant left-wing trade unionist not a member of the ISL (nor of the CPSA subsequently) led a short and successful strike at the City Deep Mine which thrust them into prominence among the increasingly militant white trade unionists. Shaw, Fisher, and other white militant trade unionists subsequently clashed with the established trade union leadership over their direct appeals to the workers, particularly during a strike at the Langlaagte Mine in February 1921. For their role in obstructing the established trade union leadership, the militants led by Shaw and Fisher were disciplined by the Mine Workers' Union with fines and suspension from union offices.

The militants reacted to the decision of the leadership of the Mine Workers' Union by the establishment of a Council of Action to continue agitation among white trade unionists. In its manifesto the Council of Action proclaimed the need for workers to understand the class struggle, the science of revolution, and the economic and political needs of a future "Industrial Republic." To this end the manifesto urged the teaching of the principles of Marxism.

Andrews took the lead for the CPSA in supporting the Council of Action. He also continued his agitation for the organization of industrial unions outside the control of the leadership of the SAIF. Andrews' attention to the white workers was supported by Jones (who, in early 1921, had arrived in Moscow on behalf of the CPSA). In a dispatch from Moscow published in The Intemational of August 26, Jones wrote that "the African revolution will be led by white workers." He clarified his position by explaining that propaganda among white workers to unite with the non-white workers will raise the class-consciousness of both with the result that the non-whites, although still insufficiently class-conscious, will not block the socialist revolution when the white workers make it. The communists, however, apparently did not attempt to coordinate their efforts among the white trade unionists. As Jones put it in another dispatch from Moscow in The International of September 9: "so far, our own members have gone their own individual ways within the unions. The International [Cl] says that this must now be ended...if the parliamentary group must form a caucus and act on party instructions, so must the trade union groups."

In the last months of 1921 a new series of developments brought agitation among the white workers to a new heat. In October the Chamber of Mines reasserted its right to complete control over hiring practices by refusing government intervention in a dispute of victimization. In November, Smuts, speaking for the government, indicated that adjustments would have to be made to keep the low grade gold mines open. In December the coal mines of the Transvaal, closely linked with the Chamber of Mines, announced a wage cut for the white coal miners. The announcement of the wage cut for the white coal miners was followed shortly by demands that the white gold miners accept alterations of the work schedules and revision of the wartime Status Quo Agreement freezing the ratio of white and non-white workers. The white miners immediately interpreted the demands as a threat of wage reductions, and more significantly, as a threat to replace many of the relatively well-paid white miners with much lower-paid nonwhite miners. The issue quickly became one not of wages alone, but one of color and "white civilization."

Attempted arbitration failed in the dispute of coal miners and management. By an eight to one margin the coal miners voted to strike on January 1 against the wage cut. On December 31, the Chamber of Mines presented an ultimatum to the white gold miners. It was announced that as of February 1, 1922, the Chamber of Mines would unilaterally cancel the Status Quo Agreement and set its own conditions for work. Simultaneously, white power station workers and white workers in the engineering trades were notified of immediate wage cuts. The angry workers responded to the ultimatums with an overwhelming ballot for a strike. On January 10 twenty-four thousand white workers in the mines and related industries on the Witwatersrand came out on strike. 1

The most extensive analysis of the events leading up to the strike and the events of the 1922 strike itself is to be found in Bernard Hessian, "An Investigation into the Causes of the Labour Agitation on the Witwatersrand, January to March, 1922," M. A. Thesis, Department of History, University of Witwatersrand, 1957. Hessian attempts to isolate the various issues of the strike and to discuss them analytically without necessarily taking the side of either the strikers or the management. A number of partial accounts of the strike exist both in support of the strikers and in support of the management. On the side of the strikers the account as given in Cope, op.cit., pp. 227-283 is perhaps the most useful with the greatest amount of detail upon the activities of the militant communist and socialist elements in the strike. The official communist account is also useful, but it is perhaps not as rich in detail as Cope's book. S. P. Bunting, The Red Revolt (Johannesburg: Communist Party of South Africa, 1922). The more general attitude of the English-speaking trade unionists, stated in polemical terms also, is Story of a Crime (Johannesburg: Transvaal Strike Legal Defense Committee, 1924). A more recent pro-trade union account, Walker and Weinbren, op.cit., pp. 91-158, is good for the atmosphere of the strike, but it contains little new material or substantial analysis. On the side of the management, two pamphlets published shortly after the end of the strike state the interpretation of those opposed to the strike. 'Brutus', Never Again, The Psychology and the Lesson of The Rand Revolt, 1922 (Johannesburg: Central News Agency, n.d.); William Urquhart, The Outbreak on the Witwatersrand, March 1922 (Johannesburg: Hortors, Ltd., 1922). Of the two, the Urquhart pamphlet is more useful for factual information. The report of the government commission, Union of South Africa, Report of the Martial Law Inquiry Judicia

The organization of the strike was unique. The supreme authority of the strikers was the Augmented Executive, an improvised body of trade-union officials organized by the weakened SAIF Executive in December in response to the challenge of the Chamber of Mine's ultimatum. Its membership included the SAI F Executive as well as more numerous representatives from member SAIF unions and non-member SAIF unions concerned with the strike. Yet the day-to-day activities of the strikers were in the hands of ad hoc local and district strike committees, coordinated together in a Central Strike Committee, which was responsible in theory to the Augmented Executive. The third, and most distinctive, organizations of the strikers were the commando units which began to be organized spontaneously within two weeks after the start of the strike. The commandos originated among the Afrikaner workers, now in a majority, who introduced their traditional means of military organization into the new industrial strife in which they now found themselves. The para-military commando units drilled and organized the strikers and reinforced picketing against strikebreakers. Their strongest links were with the Afrikaner workers and Nationalist ideology; their relationship with the strike committees and the Augmented Executive was undefined. On February 7, however, the Augmented Executive authorized their use for the pulling out of strikebreakers.

In the political sphere the strike brought the SALP and Nationalist Party closer together. Members of both parties supported the strike immediately, and talk was heard of seizing the occasion to move to an independent republican government. A motion urging the formation of an independent republic was proposed by an M.P. of the SALP and endorsed by a mass meeting of the strikers. At subsequent meetings of SALP and Nationalist M.P.'s the resolution was disavowed. Both parties preferred to continue their opposition through constitutional channels. Throughout the strike the SALP M.P.'s struggled strenuously in Parliament to bring government intervention on the side of the strikers. The Nationalists, for different ends, and with varying enthusiasm, also continued to attack the government for inaction on behalf of the strikers.

The nature of the strike caught the CPSA by surprise. In December Andrews endorsed the rejection of the wage cut by the white miners and urged that the executive of the Mine Workers' Union call a strike. He went further:

The obvious and proper course to be pursued by the workers' representatives is to take advantage of the present crisis and adopt drastic and united action...a situation has been created, if strong hands were at the wheel, and informed and honest heads guided them, the master class might be taught a lesson even more salutary than that of 1913. If the challenge is not accepted promptly and the fight carried into the enemy's country, the back of the industrial movement will be broken for a considerable time to come. 2

Andrews clearly wanted militancy, yet he seemed to doubt that the established trade unions would seize the opportunity for it. When the ultimatum from the Chamber of Mines did result in an overwhelming vote for a strike upon which the Augmented Executive did act, The Intemational could not conceal its amazement:

The unexpected has happened, and in spite of the chaotic and illogical methods of organization which have grown up rather than [being] consciously adopted by the white workers of the Transvaal, a common will has made it possible, or rather imperative, that the various crafts, sections, industrial unions, federations, etc., should unite against the common enemy. This is an answer to the pedants who argue that nothing can happen until every individual worker, or at least a large proportion of them, are intellectually convinced of the need for action and scientifically organised for that purpose.

It were better, of course, if the majority were really class-conscious, that all were in a perfectly suitable industrial organisation, and fully aware of the economic facts underlying social phenomena, but this is a council of perfection not likely to be reached excepting in some isolated instance perhaps, and not essential to the overthrow of the capitalist system and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The present action of the Rand workers is largely a spontaneous revolt against the domineering attitude lately reassumed by the money lords. 3

Despite skepticism about the organization of the strike, The Intemational supported it. In the first weeks of the strike the communists clearly felt themselves on the outside. In a statement of "Communist Greetings" addressed to the strikers, The International of January 27 complained that "circumstances, not untraceable to pro-enemy propaganda and intrigue, have excluded a definitely Communist element from your guiding councils in the fight, and hence it would be uncalled for for outsiders to attempt to advise on tactics." Nevertheless, The Intemational urged that all recognize that the strike was a part of the inevitable and continuous struggle of the exploiters and the exploited. In the face of the great strength of capitalist propaganda and military might it was most important that the workers concentrate upon strike organization. Workers of all races were urged to fight for workers' control and the administration of industry for the common good of all.

Hence, without necessarily identifying itself with every slogan heard in this strike, the Communist Party of South Africa gladly offers its assistance to the Strike Committee, convinced that essentially this is a fight against the rule of the capitalist class, a fight which, if energetically pushed, may drive at least one more nail into its coffin and contribute to its eventual downfall--the only real 'settlement'.

The manifesto continued, urging that the workers rely only upon fellow workers, white and non-white. The ultimate hopes of the CPSA for the strike were clearly stated:

And the more militant the struggle, the greater is the circle of workers drawn in, and simultaneously the more revolutionary becomes the aim, until it is realised by all that every road must lead to the one goal; the end of the capitalist system of profit and the establishment of the Workers' Republic of the World for the common and equal benefit of all workers. 4

The moderate conduct of the official leadership of the strike quickly came under the fire of communist critics. Immediately after the declaration of the strike the Augmented Executive accepted an offer to negotiate with the Chamber of Mines. In a sharp article on January 13 in The Intemational, Andrews condemned all attempts at arbitration and conciliation; instead he urged an expansion of the strike to make the stoppage complete. The negotiations with the Chamber of Mines were broken off after thirteen unsuccessful days, but attacks in The Intemational continued against any who urged compromise and moderation. Crawford, recently returned from overseas, felt the particular wrath of the communists as he began to question the constitutionality of the Augmented Executive which had been created in his absence. The Augmented Executive itself also did not escape renewed criticism. Its failure to take the initiative in organizing the strikers further led to a demand that the composition of the Augmented Executive be changed by the exclusion of those "with cold feet" and the inclusion of two representatives from each union elected directly by the striking members of the union.

In line with its program of support for action by the rank and file of the workers, The International had little enthusiasm for the Nationalist and SALP politicians who were supporting the strike. The Nationalists were seen as landowners interested only in cheap farm labor, while the SALP, representing in part the middle class, was viewed also as an unstable ally. The impatience of the communists with the established leadership of the strike and its political allies was paralleled by enthusiasm for the more militant alternative organizations which seemed to be capturing the attention of the strikers. At the start of the strike the Council of Action held a single official meeting, but henceforth it did not function as an organized body. Nevertheless, the old membership of the Council of Action continued to meet informally. It was this group, meeting in the offices of the CPSA in Trades Hall, which acted as a nucleus for the communists and other left-wing socialist militants who wanted to inject direct action into the strike. Members of the group, Fisher and Shaw, in particular, as well as Andrews who became closely associated with them, spoke to meetings of strikers urging solidarity and an expansion of the strike. In the absence of steady, coordinated propaganda from either the Augmented Executive or the Central Strike Committee, the members of the former Council of Action and their associates found an enthusiastic audience among the increasingly impatient strikers. When the uneasy authorities arrested Fisher, Shaw, and three other members of the grouping on February 8, a mass meeting of strikers demanded their release and urged a general strike. The Augmented Executive refused to accept the call for a general strike, but it was clear that the militants of the Council of Action grouping had achieved popularity for themselves and their program.

The strikers' commandos represented the other, and more extensive, militant organization which grew up as the strike lengthened. Although the communists were initially not close to the Afrikaner leaders of the commandos, they welcomed their organization and activity:

And so we should refrain after all from criticising overmuch those militant strikers or their leaders either, for 'Playing at soldiers'. There is everything in it, and what is more, when all friends of the workers' cause are groping for ideas how to hit the enemy harder, and when in many cases criticism of 'the leaders' only conceals a bankruptcy of fruitful advice, a lack of plan of campaign, or suggestion for effective moves, on the part of the critic, meanwhile the commandos, by forming themselves, have done something, have cleared away masses of debris of superstition, and laid a foundation that will last. By instinctive deed rather than conscious word of mouth they have propagated a great revolutionary truth, and brought us sensibly nearer 'The day.'5

In the confusion of the strike the determination of the commandos represented to the communists an instinctively militant response among the white group in which the communists had enjoyed the least success.

The most intractable problem for the communists in the strike was that of color. From before the start of the strike writers in The Intemational urged unity of black and white worker. Andrews asserted that there could be no successful strike without the unity of black and white workers; he repeated his assertion on January 6 after the strike ballot. On January 13 Bunting emphasized that the strike should not be considered a strike for the retention of the color bar, but a strike against the lowering of wages. A week later, in the wake of the successful working of the struck coal mines with non-white labor and white supervisory personnel, The Intemational underlined its call to the white workers for united action with the non-white workers to defend their own interests.

Yet the communists were out of step with the strikers and much of the strike leadership. Increasingly calls for the retention of the color bar and exhortations for the maintenance of white South Africa dominated the thinking of many of the strikers and their leaders. In vain The Intemational continued to lecture the strikers on the need for equality of pay and the unity of all workers. Fisher and Harry Spendiff (another militant trade unionist who was not a member of the CPSA) actively intervened on several occasions to prevent attacks on non-whites by white strikers. It was Bunting alone, however, who tried unsuccessfully to focus the attention of the strikers on the non-whites.

The extent of the failure of the communist message on color, as well as the strength of the appeal of militant communist slogans, were revealed ironically by the very commandos which the communists had welcomed. In a parade of the Fordsburg commando (from an area where the communists had a number of sympathizers among the mixed English-speaking and Afrikaner working class population) the strikers marched under a carefully displayed banner: "Workers of the World, Fight and Unite for a White South Africa." In a quick response Bunting agreed that the slogan was wrong, yet he hopefully interpreted it as a significant symbol of the adherence of the Afrikaner to the cause of the working class. He forced himself to be convinced that:

Chaotic and illogical as the whole position appears, the central fact must be recognized that town and country workers are for the first time in South African history united against big business, and as the position becomes clearer the true remedy will dawn upon the workers, and they will see that the only remedy is not the feeble barrier provided by the colour bar in the mining regulations and the status quo agreement, but the consolidation of the forces of the entire working class for the purpose of overthrowing the capitalist gang who have so long dominated the lives of the South African people, and taking control of South Africa for the benefit of South Africans. 6

The dilemma of deciding between the white and non-white workers was escaped by the assertion that the misguided approach of the Fordsburg commando was an unconscious step by the white Afrikaner strikers on the road to full non-racial socialist emancipation.

In February the tempo of the strike quickened. In the wake of unsuccessful conversations between Smuts and the trade unionists over the possibility of a return to the status quo ante in return for a promise of an 'impartial' investigation, the government seemed to move noticeably to the side of the Chamber of Mines in the eyes of the workers. Government protection was extended to strikebreakers and no visible moves were made to pressure the Chamber of Mines to alter its position. The police force on the Witwatersrand was augmented and special constables were enrolled. The Augmented Executive drifted in a policy of inaction before the determination of the Chamber of Mines and the government. The Central Strike Committee and its local affiliates became more the centers of power, yet even they were increasingly displaced by the expanding commandos. On February 22 the government forbade the commandos to act against strikebreakers; the possibilities of clashes between the commandos and the government forces grew. More significantly, but clandestinely, various Afrikaner commando leaders were apparently attempting to establish links with Afrikaner supporters of the Republican ideal with the idea of using the commandos to convert the strike into a revolution for an independent South African republic.

On February 28 police opened fire on the commando in Boksburg. Three strikers were killed. The following day tens of thousands of demonstrators gathered at a public funeral for the dead strikers. The Chamber of Mines made no move to compromise in the deteriorating situation, but the Augmented Executive decided to make another attempt to meet with the Chamber of Mines. A request was sent to the Chamber of Mines on March 3 for a meeting with a delegation from the SAIF; on March 4 a sharp letter from the Chamber of Mines rejected the offer and further declined to recognize the SAIF in the future as the representative of the striking miners. The hard line of the Chamber of Mines provided a decisive opportunity for the communist and left-wing socialist militants to channel the rising anger of the strikers into direct action.

When the militants of the Council of Action grouping were released from prison on February 22 they quickly resumed their active roles in conducting propaganda for the strike and attempting to coordinate militant groupings. In the pages of The Intemational the workers were urged to extend the strike in order to strengthen the negotiating position of the strikers. Simultaneously Fisher was making approaches to the commando 'generals' in an attempt to coordinate the activities of the commandos. Nevertheless, the existing workers' organizations, including the commandos, were still regarded by the communists as inadequate for the full protection of the workers' interests and for the advancement of the socialist revolution.

In the wake of the abrupt rejection of the Chamber of Mines of the Augmented Executive's offer to negotiate, the weakened Augmented Executive decided to request a ballot of the strikers on whether or not they should return to work. Sensing a 'sellout' of the workers' interests as they saw them, the informal group organized around the Council of Action designated six of their members (Andrews, Fisher, Shaw, Mason, Spendiff and Wordingham) as a Committee of Action to seize the initiative from the Augmented Executive. At a meeting called by the Central Strike Committee outside the authority of the Augmented Executive, Andrews argued that the threats of the Chamber of Mines should be met not with a ballot on whether or not to return to work, but with a general strike of all workers. After a long meeting, the Central Strike Committee endorsed the proposal of Andrews. The members of the Committee of Action and their supporters spent the remainder of Sunday, March 5, at meetings of strikers along the Witwatersrand urging support for a general strike. Utilizing its contacts among the commandos the Committee of Action urged them to a mass meeting on Monday, March 6, outside the Trades Hall where the executives of the trades unions would meet to consider the Augmented Executive's suggestion of a ballot. On Monday over five thousand commandos and strikers assembled outside the Trades Hall while the executives met indoors. After an all-day meeting during which it became clear that the demonstrators outside would not accept a decision in favor of a ballot, the Augmented Executive yielded and called a general strike effective immediately. A council of five was designated to conduct the strike, but they quickly formally abdicated their position to the Committee of Action.

In an attempt to enforce the general strike the commandos along the Witwatersrand pulled out workers. Yet the railwaymen and printers refused to heed the call, and outside of the Witwatersrand there was almost no response from workers in other centers of South Africa.

Substantial violence against non-whites broke out for the first time at several places along the Witwatersrand. Communists regarded the attacks on the non-whites as part of a government-inspired provocation to provide an excuse for intervention; accordingly they issued a leaflet, A Dastardly Frame-Up, warning the strikers to refrain from any attacks on non-whites. The sudden outbreak of attacks on the non-whites was perhaps the result of outside instigation, yet it also was probably a reflection of the uneasiness, particularly among the Afrikaners, before the prospect of an imagined 'native' uprising. In any case, the incidents contributed to the rising level of violence on the Rand.

With the leadership of the Augmented Executive and the Central Strike Committee displaced, representatives of the two activist groups, the Committee of Action and the largely Afrikaner commandos, met on March 8 in the office of the CPSA to plan for central leadership of the strike. The two groups shared a determination to maintain a militant front against the government, but they could not bridge the gap between their backgrounds and outlooks. The English-speaking Committee of Action, drawn from the communist and left-wing socialist trade unionists, wanted to press its Marxist-syndicalist structure upon the organization of the general strike. The Afrikaner commando leaders, closely linked with the platteland and Afrikaner nationalism, longed to recreate an independent Afrikaner state. The commando leaders refused to subordinate their organizations to the Committee of Action; the Committee of Action had to settle merely for a continuation of the ad hoc working relationships which had evolved. Thus, the only significant para-military organizations among the strikers remained outside the control of the militant socialists. As if to symbolize their independence, the commando generals ended the meetings with a session in the CPSA office from which all members of the Committee of Action were excluded .

The failure of the two militant groups to reach an agreement upon the direction of the general strike did not stop the strikers from continued hurried preparations for an expected government attack. It also seems that some of the commando leaders were planning an armed rebellion to establish an independent Afrikaner republic. The government, faced with the threat of armed resistance among the strikers, and a possible rebellion supported by a wider element among the population, also acted. On the morning of March 10 martial law was declared throughout the Witwatersrand. Government troops, reinforced by citizens' units from the platteland, moved against the strikers and the commandos. In most areas the government troops were quickly victorious, but the commandos in Fordsburg and Benoni held out through several days of shellings and bombings before capitulation. Some communists, particularly in Fordsburg, played a prominent role in local resistance. In the course of the actions both government soldiers and strikers, including Fisher and Spendiff, lost their lives. The death of several Afrikaner prisoners, allegedly shot while trying to escape, and the widespread arrests and prosecution of the strikers kept the workers' resentment high against the government for many months. But the strike and the threatened revolt were broken.

Immediately in the wake of the suppression of the revolt major newspapers began to assert that the strike and its violent end were part of a diabolical Bolshevik plot financed from overseas to overthrow the government. Representative of their sensationalism was the following report in The Cape Times:

The police authorities have secured voluminous evidence bearing upon the existence of a Bolshevist plot to undermine the constitutional government of the country.

So great is the mass of papers seized by the police, which has still to be examined and collated, that particulars were not yet available for publication.

Sensational rumors are afloat which at the present moment it is impossible either to confirm or deny concerning the details of the plot, by which an endeavour was to be made to set up a Soviet Government."7

Other South African newspapers contained similarly headline-grabbing news releases. The great strike quickly became known as the 'Red Revolt.' A subsequent governmental Commission of Inquiry also laid blame for the strike on the machination of the communists. 8

Yet the allegations of a communist plot for an immediate socialist revolution do not square with the facts. It is true that The Intemational during the strike continually emphasized that the workers could hope only for temporary amelioration of their status under capitalism no matter what the outcome of the strike. It was often asserted that the only solution to the problems of the workers was the achievement of a socialist republic and all

were urged to struggle toward that end. Some enthusiasts apparently privately hoped to convert the strike into a socialist revolution. Yet Andrews early in the strike concluded that the strike was doomed to founder on the rock of white prejudice against joint action with non-whites. 10 Shaw indicated that he and the other members of the Council of Action (not all of whom were communists) were pessimistic about the outcome of the strike in January. 11 When communists analyzed the strike publicly in the pages of The Intemational on February 3 and February 17 it was quite specifically stated that the conditions on the Witwatersrand were not ready for the step to a Soviet Republic.

It also seems quite sure that distant Soviet Russia, preoccupied with internal difficulties and the interrelated attempt to regularize relations with the western European capitalist countries, had neither the will nor the means to intervene directly in South African affairs. In its efforts to 'prove' the existence of a conspiracy directed from overseas the report of the government's Commission of Inquiry could only produce extracts from proclamations of the Second Congress of the Cl and extracts from articles written by Jones in Moscow on the South African situation. Yet the citation of the extracts did not prove that the statements from Moscow had found a response in South Africa nor did it prove that overseas communist organizations had directly aided the South African communists before or during the strike. The Commission of Inquiry could cite neither arms shipments nor specific messages to the CPSA from the Cl.

The actions of the communists during the strike would seem to confirm that they did not organize the strike as a device to realize the socialist revolution.9 The strike originated contrary to communist expectations. Among the communists Bunting focused upon the problems of the non-whites, in keeping with his past positions. He found little support among fellow communists for his single-minded concern. Instead the majority of the communists worked among the white trade unionists. Initially the communists were excluded from the directorship of the strike. Even when the communists did become active and influential in the leadership of the strike, first in the Council of Action and later in the smaller Committee of Action which was created by it, they were neither a majority nor were they always in agreement.

The key members of the Council of Action upon its formation appear to have been Shaw, Fisher, Spendiff, Pate, McDermid, and Wordingham. In the report of the Commission of Inquiry Shaw, Fisher, and Wordingham were specifically labelled communists; the other key members of the original Council of Action were not named as communists although the Commission of Inquiry would have had every desire to so name them. Yet official communist sources recognized only Shaw among the key members of the Council of Action as a communist. In the case of the Committee of Action which included Andrews and Mason, as well as Fisher, Spendiff, Wordingham and Shaw, communist representation seems to have been higher. Both official communist sources and the Commission of Inquiry claimed Andrews, Mason and Shaw were party members. 12 The communist and the non-communist members of the Committee of Action sometimes had disagreements, both on specific issues and on broader questions of left-wing socialism. 13 The communists never had a firm, monolithic control over the Committee of Action which played one of the key roles at the violent end of the strike. Rather it seems that the important communists who worked within the white trade union movement were concerned, particularly in the latter stages of the strike, merely that the workers remained true to the militant proletarian ideal to which they subscribed. Thus, they were not willing to let the moderates or the 'reformists' take control of the strike, yet at the same time they did not have a preconceived plan to convert the strike into revolution.

When the opportunity came on March 8 to endorse the use of the armed force of the strikers to set up a rival government on terms desired by the Afrikaner commando leaders, the communists (and the other members) of the Committee of Action refused to agree to a revolution whose ends they did not support. In the wake of the strike Bunting described the attitude of the Committee of Action thusly:

The Commandants refused to accept instructions from the Big Five and their unofficial committee [the Committee of Action], who had to content themselves, rightly or wrongly, with defining their own attitude thus: 'We are not prepared to let our industrial strike weapon pass out of our hands or to involve ourselves in any political move to set up a rival Government, WE INTEND TO FIGHT THIS AS AN INDUSTRIAL STRUGGLE and to keep control of it as such.' That attitude was endorsed by, among others, the Communists present, although it would have been only human nature if later on some Communists also, when they saw their fellow-workers firing or being fired on, if possessed of a rifle, had sprung to their side. While some may regret having done so, many will probably regret not having done so.14

Bunting went on to assert, "The fact remains that this project of armed resistance was conceived almost wholly among the Afrikaner miners."

During the strike communists performed not as coordinated revolutionary plotters, but as militant left-wing socialist individuals who tried through several, sometimes uncoordinated, methods to deflect the strike into ideologically correct channels. By means of their activities communists succeeded at various times during the strike to influence the strikers to greater militancy or to stricter discipline. They did not, however, push for the socialist revolution in a situation for which they were unprepared and which they estimated to be essentially non-revolutionary.

The government itself gave further indirect proof in the wake of the strike that the communists were not the prime movers of the armed revolt which ended the strike. In the widespread prosecutions which followed the suppression of the strike eighteen death sentences were brought in by the courts and hundreds were sentenced to long imprisonment. Yet not one communist was among those sentenced to death. Of eight hundred sixty-four charged with treason only one was a member of the CPSA; furthermore, he was not a member of the Committee of Action which had occupied one of the key positions at the violent end of the strike. The three communists on the Committee of Action were all acquitted on a charge of inciting public violence. A number of other party members were arrested and released. Only eight party members were sentenced or fined, the harshest sentence received by any of them being two years. The prosecution of the government fell overwhelmingly on the Afrikaners, with whom the communists had little influence during the strike. Judicially the story of the 'communist plot' was not sustained.15

After the collapse of the strike the position of the CPSA was precarious. In a raid of the party headquarters on March 10 government agents took most of the party's records and much of the party's literature. At the same time the press on which The International was published was badly damaged by the police. Although only a few communists were convicted in the martial law period the imprisonments and trials of the party members weakened the strength of the already small party. In addition, the martial law regulations themselves hindered immediate attempts at reconstruction of the party organization. In the latter half of 1922 the CPSA estimated its membership at two hundred of which only one hundred were regular full-time dues-paying members. 16

Nevertheless, the communists were optimistic. In their estimation the bitter and resentful mood of the white workers in the period following the strike was highly favorable for the advancement of their cause. Bunting indicated his belief that the experience of the strike would lead to eventual victory in spite of, or because of, momentary defeat:

Bunting went on to suggest the possibility of a temporary SALP-Nationalist coalition to defeat the Smuts government, but he was convinced that in the long run the Afrikaner workers were losing their faith in nationalism. He saw more hope in a pure united front labor movement which would develop on the base of common resentment among English-speaking and Afrikaner workers. Bunting also optimistically estimated that the hostility of the white worker to the non-white worker had greatly decreased. In closing he drew a parallel with the Russian Revolution of 1905; both the Witwatersrand strike and the 1905 revolution were seen as harbingers of the successful socialist revolutions to follow.

The optimistic post-mortem of the communists failed to discuss in detail the position of the non-white workers. The omission was perhaps unintended, but it did reveal both the reorientation of the party to the whites and the corresponding potential difficulties of the party among the non-whites. Although the weakened non-white organizations on the Witwatersrand had remained quiescent through the strike in view of the barely latent hostility of the white strikers to them, they had not done so in other parts of South Africa. In Cape Town, in particular, the communists were caught directly in the contradictions of their policy of simultaneous support for non-racial unity and support for the strike of the white workers for the retention of the color bar. In The Cape Times of February 2 it was reported that, at a meeting convened by the Cape Town branch of the CPSA to hear a representative from the Mine Workers' Union on the Witwatersrand, Dr. Abdurahman, the leader of the APO, vigorously heckled the meeting, questioning how white workers had helped to raise non-white wages on the Witwatersrand. The lnternational could reply, as it did in its issue of February 17, that the only real solution to the problem of white and non-white wages was a socialist revolution. Yet this did not solve the immediate problem of obtaining support from both white and non-white workers for the position of the CPSA. In March after non-whites were attacked on the Witwatersrand and government forces had intervened against the strikers, the precariousness of the communist position was again revealed. At a meeting of the ICU reported in The Cape Times of March 13, Kadalie, seconded by Ncwana, proposed a resolution endorsing government efforts to "maintain law and order" on the Witwatersrand and condemning the principle of the color bar. An attempt by the local communists to move an amendment in favor of support of the Witwatersrand strike on the grounds that its failure would be a defeat for the white and non-white working class was defeated. Communists encountered further opposition from Coloured hecklers at their own outdoor meetings in support of the strike. The stance of the communists in the Witwatersrand strike unmistakably clouded the prospect for communist activity among non-whites.

The militancy of the white workers in the strike of 1922 seemed to confirm the contentions of Andrews (and Jones) that the party could rely upon the revolutionary potential of the white workers. Yet the increased emphasis by the communists on the whites threatened the tenuous standing of the party among the non-whites. The continuing controversy within the party over the place of white and non-white could only be aggravated.

In the flush of fervent hopes engendered by the strike the party did not pay full attention to the increasing dangers of its ambivalent policy on non-white workers. And the party incorrectly read the mood of the angry and defeated strikers as favorable to non-racial socialist revolution. The consequences of the strike and the party's estimation of its significance were to set off developments within the party which were to split its minuscule ranks brutally within three years.

In the wake of the Witwatersrand strike white politics in South Africa were dominated by the attempts of the English-speaking SALP and the Afrikaner Nationalist Party to negotiate an electoral pact with the immediate aim of ousting the Smuts government of the South African Party (whose ranks had included the Unionist Party since a merger in 1920). With the prospects for an eventual victory strong on the basis of a common front of the Afrikaner farmer, the Afrikaner worker, and the English-speaking worker, the pressures on both sides for concessions were great. The points of difference quickly narrowed to the SALP commitment to eventual socialization and the Nationalist dedication to an independent republic outside the British Empire. After a complicated series of maneuvers within and between both parties Malan and Creswell reached agreement upon an informal pact between their parties in April 1923. Under the terms of the pact the Nationalists were to postpone their demand for a republic in return for a postponement by the SALP of its demand for socialization; both parties joined on a common platform of antagonism to Smuts, expansion of protective legislation for the white worker, and an extension of social services for whites.

The CPSA watched the maneuvers of the SALP and the Nationalist Party with a mixture of antagonism and enthusiasm. The communists were aware that both parties regarded them with hostility. Commentators in The International in late 1922 and early 1923 continued to criticize the SALP, and Creswell in particular, for 'reformism'. During the same period others urged full support for any SALP-Nationalist alliance under the argument that the CPSA temporarily had no choice but to rely on the SALP, the party of the white workers, to work for the advancement of all workers until the non-whites would become active politically. With the announcement of the conclusion of the electoral pact The Intemational critically endorsed the pact as a necessary step:

We already see the result of the alliance between bourgeois Nationalism and Labour Imperialism in the refusal of the Labour Party to take part in any demonstration in which the Communist Party is represented. Notwithstanding this and the obvious insincerity of the whole arrangement, we recognize that a general assault on the Smuts Chamber of Mines combination must be made. Whether a purely Nationalist or Labour-Nationalist government comes into power does not matter much.

The workers will rapidly discover that the administration of the country will not be materially different to that at the present time. New groupings will inevitably take place. Clever maneuvering by party leaders and wire pullers cannot for long obscure the essential fact of modern society--the antagonism between the exploiting and exploited classes. The rank and file of both the Labour and Nationalist parties must sooner or later refuse to follow their bourgeois leaders, and will form a real workers' party not to be side-tracked either by British Imperialism nor reactionary bourgeois Republicanism, but organised, drilled and determined to unceasingly work for the overthrow of the capitalist system 1

In the Marxist eyes of the communists the victory of the pact would spur the class-consciousness of the white workers and prepare the stage for the rise of a true revolutionary socialist party.

The communists also continued to work directly among the white workers in order to realize their vision. During the period of martial law the communists in prisons had participated in the creation of an informal united front organization. With the end of martial law and the release of many of the prisoners, a short-lived united front movement was formally organized from communists, SALP members, and white trade unionists. It undertook a series of campaigns on behalf of the remaining strike prisoners, it ran candidates in several municipal elections, and it attempted to further the formation of a strong anti-Smuts labor and political organization. 2 In a parallel move communists participated with white trade unionists in the organization of an ad hoc committee which brought the renowned British communist trade unionist, Tom Mann, back to South Africa for a four-month speaking tour in 1922-23. Tom Mann's presence and the work of the united front movement helped to keep alive memories of militancy and to sustain the animosity of the white workers toward the government. No new permanent organizations were created but communists were able to participate in the post-strike agitation of the white workers.

During the same period the communists encouraged the reorganization of the shattered white trade union movement. Drawing consolation from the fact that Crawford had lost his power in the strike, the communists in mid-1922 renewed their demands for a radical reorganization of the white trade union movement into industrial trade unions including non-whites. The hopes of the communists that the post-strike bitterness of the workers could be channelled into new forms of trade union organization and new attitudes to non-whites proved vain. The weakened trade unions resumed their pre-strike bickering over the proper role of craft and industrial unions, and they were unable to organize a new coordinating body to replace the defunct SAIF. Nevertheless individual communists were elected to office in several unions and the central executive of the party was convinced that party "members are permeating the membership and branches [of the trade unions] with more modern ideas."3 Although the advances of the communists were small it did seem that they were capitalizing upon the discontents of the white workers as well as any of the white militants.

In early 1923 the party moved to consolidate its new position among the white workers. C. F. Glass, who had recently come to Johannesburg from Cape Town, was appointed to the post of party organizer. As a result of his efforts the Springs branch of the CPSA was reactivated, another branch of the party was established in Johannesburg, and the party resumed its propaganda in Pretoria and Benoni; steps were also taken to reorganize the dormant CPSA branch in Durban.

In a mood of cautious optimism that the first fruits of post-strike activity were being harvested, the CPSA met for its postponed second congress in Johannesburg on April 28-29, 1923. The report of the congress which appeared in The Intemational of May 4 showed that the CPSA was convinced that the most direct path to greater influence for its cause was through work among the white workers.

The most keenly debated proposition at the second congress reflected the heightened interest of the party in white politics. In accordance with the example set by the Communist Party of Great Britain (and rejected by the writers of the manifesto of the CPSA) it was proposed that the CPSA apply for affiliation to the SALP. Despite strenuous opposition to the proposition, it was accepted by a two to one vote. The central executive of the CPSA was ordered to contact the SALP to seek the affiliation of the CPSA.

The concern of the congress with the white workers was also shown in the incomplete national program passed by the congress. The more general planks of the program, such as demands for increased wages and shorter hours, organization of the unemployed, the right to a union shop, and maintenance for children and women unable to work, could have been regarded as applicable to all workers. But inasmuch as they were coupled with demands for amnesties for the remaining strike prisoners (all of whom were white) and pleas for shop committees, workers' councils, and councils of action (all forms of organizations exclusive to white workers) it seems clear that the congress had its eye primarily upon white workers. Furthermore, the program emphasized the organization of the white workers through trade unions and unemployment committees.

The congress, however, did not completely ignore the non-whites. As a part of the program the congress passed a series of "native demands" for the abolition of special taxes on Africans, the end of the pass system, the enfranchisement of non-whites, freedom to organize politically and industrially, free universal compulsory education, equal justice, and increased power for non-white elected councils. The lack of full commitment was revealed in the reluctance of some of the delegates to endorse demands for the non-white workers unequivocally. Moreover, the congress did not specifically urge that the CPSA concentrate its efforts upon the organization of non-whites to achieve its "native demands".

In the months following the second congress the activities of the CPSA implicitly affirmed the emphasis of the discussion and decisions of the second congress. On the political plane the CPSA tried to work with the SALP. The CPSA also continued its efforts to revitalize the white trade union movement. In a new effort to reach whites outside the trade union movement the CPSA also actively pushed the organization of unemployed white workers. The imminence of general elections added relevance and urgency to the efforts of the CPSA.

Shortly after the end of the second congress the CPSA made formal application to the SALP for affiliation. The application of the CPSA recognized that the SALP would have to change its constitution to admit the CPSA, yet it argued that "technical difficulties are comparatively unimportant as against the desirability of a more united Labour Front in opposition to the capitalist offensive and in pursuance of both transitional and fundamental demands of the working class." The CPSA unequivocally stated its intention to carry on its activities as it always had. Furthermore, it boldly suggested that the SALP accommodate itself to allow communist participation within its ranks:

Of course it is not proposed that the Communist Party should surrender or compromise any of its principles or freedom of propaganda and criticism. Rather it is suggested that the Labour Party might well enlarge its scope so as to become, as it were, a federation somewhat on the lines of the British Labour Party, capable of including such bodies as the ILP or the CP. It is true that the CP of Great Britain has not yet been so included, but that need not be a precedent for South Africa. After all there is today, we feel convinced, among the rank and file of the workers of all races in South Africa as elsewhere, a widespread common determination to overthrow the rule of the capitalist production; and the consolidation of this sentiment affords a common ground broader and greater than our separate standpoints. 4

In view of the past antagonism of the SALP to the CPSA it hardly seemed that the terms of the CPSA would be accepted.

The SALP did not immediately respond to the overture of the CPSA. Its delay, and further hints of continuing SALP antagonism, only provoked The Intemational into bolder statements of its intentions towards the SALP. On June 15 The Intemational explicitly stated that the CPSA wanted to use affiliation with the SALP to reach the white workers with the correct CPSA viewpoint in order to hasten the inevitable disintegration of the moderate SALP.

In mid-July the SALP rejected unqualifiedly the CPSA application for affiliation in a statement which was printed in the July 27th issues of both an SALP-oriented Durban newspaper, The Guardian, and The International. Citing its adherence to political action within the existing representative institutions rather than outside them, and its faith in economic and social change through evolution rather than through revolution, the SALP indicated that its policies had little, if anything, in common with those of the CPSA. Furthermore, the SALP estimated that any association with the CPSA would decrease the growing strength of the SALP among the "wage and salary earning classes in South Africa and by the public generally." Looking at the other side of the same coin, the SALP stated that any association with the CPSA would ruin the SALP as it had existed in view of the stated intentions of the communists to transform the SALP. The SALP reply also implied that the attention of the CPSA to non-white workers was a further barrier to any cooperation with the SALP. Any 'united front from above' with the leadership of the SALP was precluded by the reply of the SALP.

Undaunted, the CPSA reiterated its intention to save the SALP from itself by a 'united front from below.' If the leadership of the SALP would not allow the CPSA to affiliate, then the CPSA would approach the rank-and-file of the SALP directly. The communists were confident that the truth of their message would win them adherents among the white workers who supported the SALP. At the same time the prime goal of ousting the Smuts government was seen as further justification for an attempt to maintain a united front of some sort with the supporters of the SALP.

The announced intention to approach the English-speaking supporters of the SALP was not paralleled by any specific approach to the Afrikaans speaking supporters of the Nationalist Party. It was recognized that the Nationalist Party was the more openly bourgeois party of the two allied in the anti-Smuts pact, but at the same time the Afrikaner workers were seen as increasingly ripe for militant propaganda. Suggestions were made to appeal to the anti-imperialist sentiments of the Afrikaner worker. There is no evidence in The International, however, that the communists made any particular approach to the Afrikaner workers in Afrikaans with the exception of an open letter appealing to white mine workers to admit non-white mine workers to their union and an appeal urging financial support for the German Famine Relief Fund. Once again, the English-speaking membership of the CPSA did not go beyond occasional socialist platitudes to tackle the formidable barriers separating it from the increasingly numerous Afrikaner segment of the white working class.

Continued defeats of pro-Smuts candidates in by-elections, and increased majorities for anti-Smuts candidates in by-elections in districts held by the SALP or the Nationalists, sustained the hopes of the CPSA for a quick defeat of the Smuts government. When the call for a general election did come in the wake of the Wakkerstroom test by-election in April 1924, the CPSA was ready with an Election Manifesto directed at the white electorate. The CPSA underlined its full support for the drive to oust the Smuts government; simultaneously it reaffirmed that it did not support either the programs or the outlooks of both the Nationalists and the SALP. Succinctly, the CPSA repeated that any Nationalist-SALP victory would merely be a necessary stepping stone to the eventual communist victory. 5

Although the attention of the white labor movement was centered upon the political struggle the communists still worked to strengthen the voice of white labor through a reorganization of the trade unions. The CPSA was unsuccessful in its attempts to encourage the South African Mine Workers' Union to admit non-whites, and its calls for a new coordinating body of trade unions also brought no immediate results. Yet, particularly with the return of Andrews from overseas in early 1924, the CPSA continued its agitation for revitalization of the white trade union movement. In the pages of The International on March 24 Andrews urged a revival of the Trades and Labor Councils, the earliest form of coordination of white trade unions in South Africa.

The communists initially found more promising ground for their agitation among the unemployed whose numbers sharply increased in the wake of the economic dislocations of the Witwatersrand strike. Unemployed Committees were established under communist leadership in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Benoni. An attempt was made to start a newspaper for the unemployed; in July 1923 a single issue of The Torch, "an organ of the unemployed of South Africa," was printed by the ISL Press. Three members of the Johannesburg Unemployed Committee gained brief publicity for their cause in late June when they chained themselves to the guard rails of the visitors' gallery in parliament in Cape Town while they harangued the M. P.'s below about the necessity of immediate action on the unemployment question. Yet the enthusiasm of the white unemployed workers waned particularly as the government began to provide small-scale relief projects away from Johannesburg and Cape Town. Communists also were discouraged by the strength of the anti-African attitudes among the unemployed in Johannesburg. By early 1924 the Unemployed Committee in Johannesburg had ceased its activities and the Cape Town group was still restricted to occasional demonstrations and propaganda meetings.

With the overwhelming electoral success of the Nationalist-SALP pact in the June 1924 elections the terms of white politics began to change sharply. In vain the CPSA urged the SALP not to enter the new government on the grounds that the most effective concessions for the white workers could be obtained through pressure from outside the government rather than from cooperation within the government. The actions of the new Hertzog government (which included two SALP ministers, Creswell and Boydell), however, seemed to invalidate the strategy of the CPSA. The Hertzog government moved quickly to assuage many of the chief grievances of the white workers.

For the first time in South African history a Ministry of Labour was created; Creswell took office as the first minister of labour. Creswell immediately called a government-sponsored conference to discuss the problem of the unemployed. It also seemed that he would use the powers of his office to encourage the formation of a new trade union coordinating body. The new government began immediately to fulfil its campaign promises of a "civilised labour" policy. Non-white workers were discharged from the government jobs and white workers taken on in their places. In addition, the government talked of new legislation to secure the color bar which had been overturned by the courts in September 1923. The Hertzog government also pressed for a broadening of social services to white workers by an increase in the coverage of workers' compensation schemes, expansion of insurance coverage, and the institution of unemployment benefit programs.

The program of the Hertzog government posed a direct threat to the appeal of the communists among the white workers. By focusing on trade unions and unemployment the government weakened the argument that the communists alone could take the proper care of the interests of the white workers. By instituting a "civilised labour" policy the new government appealed directly to the prejudices of the white workers, and more importantly, it stopped what appeared to be a direct and immediate threat to their means of existence. By expanding the role of the government in securing benefits for the white workers the new government removed sources of discontent which might have been used by the CPSA to harness the white workers to a revolutionary movement.

The success of the Hertzog government highlighted the ambivalence and dilemmas of the CPSA. With the militancy of the white workers diverted by the program of the Hertzog government the communists who concentrated their efforts among the white workers were left with a barren field for propaganda. Yet to desert the field completely to the SALP, the Nationalists, and moderate trade union leaders would mean a denial of the revolutionary potential of the white workers which had so long been a cardinal tenet of many communists. More significantly, however, the policies of the Hertzog government cast a spotlight on the question of the attitude of the CPSA to the non-whites. The enthusiastic response of the white workers to the segregationist measures of the Hertzog government indicated anew the difficulties, if not the impossibility, of bringing the white workers into unity with the non-white workers. The tactics of the CPSA, which were grounded in the principles of class solidarity, regardless of race, came under new questioning. For the first time since the formation of the CPSA the advocates of the cause of the non-whites found new ammunition and support for their arguments. In their view most of the white workers had been shown convincingly to be both 'reformist' and segregationist. Accordingly, they were convinced that the CPSA should turn its greatest efforts to work among the non-whites who represented the true class-conscious workers of the future. Their arguments were reinforced by new developments among the non-whites.

The non-whites of South Africa in the early 1920's were beginning to organize as they never had before in the history of South Africa. Among the Indians and the Coloureds the old-style moderate pressure groups of the South African Indian National Congress and the APO continued to dominate, but among the Africans there were important new developments. Within the South African Native National Congress an increasingly articulate nationalist protest emerged, and more significantly, the ICU continued to expand as a semi-political trade union into all four provinces.

Both the Congress and the ICU presented the CPSA with vexing problems. The Congress made demands for civil rights which were similar in many respects to the demands for workers' rights advocated by the CPSA.

And the increasingly anti-imperialist tone of the Congress placed it closer to the anti-imperialism of the CPSA. But the Congress was still willing to negotiate with white capitalists for concessions and it gave no indication of particular sympathy for the problems of the workers. The ICU was even more perplexing. At times the ICU proclaimed solidarity with all workers, while at other times it urged organization on the basis of racial solidarity. At times the ICU urged the non-white workers to work with white trade unions, while at other times it proclaimed white trade unions to be the prime enemy of the non-white worker. In its platform the ICU asserted that it was unaffiliated with any political party, yet in the 1924 elections the ICU supported the Nationalist-SALP pact. Upon occasion the ICU indicated that it favored the Bolshevik Revolution, yet just as often it affirmed that it was opposed to Bolshevism. 6

The CPSA responded to the bewildering challenge of the new developments within the African organizations with mixed measures. The protests of the Congress against legislation of the government were received sympathetically and endorsed in the pages of The International. Yet the communists were careful to point out that the protests of Congress were inadequate to the full needs of the non-white workers. Earlier both Bunting in Johannesburg and Glass in Cape Town had attacked growing African nationalism, and in particular the potential threat of Garveyist philosophy emanating from the United States. 7 The Congress was viewed as a bourgeois organization which conformed ultimately to the demands of the white capitalists. The problem of the ICU was more difficult to meet. Commentators in The Intemational in 1923-24 criticized the "confused" thinking evident in The Workers' Herald, the newspaper of the ICU. At the same time communists praised the resolve of the ICU to organize non-white workers into a trade union. Likewise the communists sympathized with the antagonism of the ICU to the segregationist program of the SALP. In the absence of another organization for non-white workers the communists saw the ICU as the most promising means to mobilize the non-white workers. Yet the communists could not conceal their continued impatience and frustration with the contradictions and inconsistencies in the propaganda and practice of the ICU.

Despite continued interest in the affairs of the African organizations the CPSA did little to approach the Africans directly. The lack of direct initiatives was a reflection of the preoccupation of the small CPSA with the pressing problems of the white workers in the wake of the 1922 strike. Many communists preferred not to emphasize the interest of the party in the non-white workers lest they prejudice the work of the party among the segregationist white workers. Although the party did not renounce its commitment to the idea of non-racial proletarian solidarity, most communists worked exclusively among the white workers.

It was Bunting who continued to serve as the gadfly of the CPSA on questions of color. In discussion of the Nationalist-SALP pact he focused attacks on the openly segregationist policies of both parties. In discussion of trade union reconstruction he urged the convocation of a joint conference of white and non-white workers. To show his concern for the non-whites Bunting made an unsuccessful attempt to join the Joint Council of Europeans and Natives, a fact-finding group of white liberals and moderate African leaders formed to ease tensions between the races.

At first Bunting's only consistent support for his effort to reorient the CPSA came from communists in Cape Town who had traditionally been concerned for the non-white in the more tolerant atmosphere of Cape Town. The communists in Cape Town who organized the Unemployment Committee worked among non-whites. Both Glass and Lopes of Cape Town also wrote articles in The Intemational to support Bunting in urging that the party honor its program for non-whites.

Neither Bunting, Glass nor Lopes immediately forced the party to a confrontation of the contradictions within its color policy. Instead, the first direct confrontation over the color question came within the ranks of a new organization affiliated to the party, the Young Communist League (YCL). The YCL had been formed shortly after the end of the 1922 strike by a group of young whites, most of whom were probably about twenty years of age, who had been excited by the events of the strike. 8 They were anxious to channel their admiration for the workers' struggle which they had seen into active work for the communist cause. The group enthusiastically held several weekly discussion meetings and began to distribute pamphlets in the secondary schools in Johannesburg.

Edward Roux, who had come under the influence of Bunting, and William Kalk, the son of a German cabinet maker who had been reared in the tradition of the left-wing German Social Democrats, began to urge that the YCL devote itself to the non-whites. After the second congress of the CPSA in April 1923, one member of the YCL (probably Roux), welcomed plans to organize a YCL branch in Cape Town as it would allow the YCL an opportunity to approach directly the "native and coloured youth within our ranks, a task, which, on the Witwatersrand, we have left entirely alone." Other members of the YCL opposed the plan to approach the non-white workers, arguing that the African was inferior, or that young white workers should be organized first, or that non-whites should organize themselves separately. The opponents of work among the non-whites, led by E. S. "Solly" Sachs and Sarah Sabel, were initially victorious, but the defeated exponents of a direct, and special, approach to the non-whites appealed over their heads to the headquarters of the Young Communist International (YCI). From the YCI overseas came a ruling that the YCL of South Africa must organize all workers, regardless of race. The Johannesburg YCL then reversed itself with a resolution that "the main task of the YCL of South Africa is the organization of the native youth."

In the late 1924 the YCL was instrumental in the formation of the Euro-African Debating Society in Johannesburg where whites and non-whites discussed such issues as segregation. More importantly, the YCL aided the ICU to open its first office in Johannesburg when it decided to expand north into the Transvaal. The YCL itself, however, was able to attract only two Africans, Stanley Silwana, a teacher, and Thomas Mbeki, a worker, as members of the YCL.

The new attitude of the YCL strengthened Bunting's hand. At the time of the 1924 general election Bunting wanted to express his concern for the rights of Africans by specifically mentioning their grievances in the election manifesto of the party. Roux and Kalk, newly elected to the central executive as representatives of the YCL, endorsed Bunting's proposal. The 'traditionalist' majority of the executive committee, including Andrews, opposed the mention of the grievances of the Africans. In an uneasy compromise specific demands for Africans were included, but they were stated in general language so that the average reader of the election manifesto would have not necessarily caught the reference to Africans. The position of color remained ambiguous within the CPSA. 9

The convocation of the third congress of the CPSA in late December 1924 provided an arena for further confrontation between the 'traditionalists' and the 'radicals' led by Bunting. Ironically, it was Glass, who had been a strong advocate of the non-whites in Cape Town, who led the 'traditionalist' forces in the sessions of the congress. Probably Glass had been influenced by his work among the prejudiced white unemployed on the Witwatersrand, as well as by his work among the white trade unionists on the Witwatersrand as the secretary of the Tailors' Union and organizer for the party.

Glass presented a strong memorandum, "Relations with the S. A. Labour Party", in which he urged another attempt to affiliate the CPSA directly to the SALP. In the memorandum Glass, who had always been sensitive to developments in the socialist and communist movements overseas, justified his position by the invocation of overseas practices. He cited the success of the left-wing socialists on the continent of Europe in converting large sections of the prewar socialist parties into mass-based communist parties in the postwar period. In contrast he noted developments in the English-speaking world. There the 'reformist' socialist parties, such as the British Labour Party, had not been discredited as had their counterparts on the continent with the result that they still held the allegiance of the majority of the workers. The communist parties in the English-speaking world remained small propaganda sects, cut off from the mainstream of workers' politics. It was Glass' contention that it was necessary for the communist parties of the English-speaking countries (including South Africa) to seek affiliation with the 'reformist' labor parties in order that they might preserve access to the majority of workers. Glass further justified his position by citing the example of the Communist Party of Great Britain. He posed a sharp either/or proposition for South Africa:

I believe, therefore, that the Communist Party in South Africa, as in other English-speaking countries, is faced with two alternatives: either it must be prepared to become an integral part of the whole labour movement and work consciously towards that end or else remain a comparatively small propaganda sect isolated from, and consequently possessing no decisive say in, the affairs of the movement.10

Glass specifically proposed: "That this Congress of the Communist Party of South Africa reaffirm its desire to affiliate with the South African Labour Party and instructs the incoming Executive to make an application in this respect to the forthcoming Conference of the SALP."

In his argument Glass did not justify his position by asserting that the white workers were the primary engine of the socialist revolution (although this was implied). Instead, he spoke in terms of function, arguing that the time had come for the CPSA to move from its position as a propagandist sect to an activist role within the labor movement by converting the 'yellow' SALP into a 'red' SALP from within. Furthermore, he asserted that the SALP, as the party supported by the white workers, rightly or wrongly, and by an increasing number of Coloured and African voters in Cape Province, was the best vehicle for extending propaganda to both white and non-white workers.

Reports of the third congress do not indicate fully the extent of the debate on the memorandum of Glass, but it is clear that the congress regarded the proposal as crucial to the future direction of the policy of the party. Andrews seconded Glass' proposal for renewed affiliation with the SALP. S. Buirski of Cape Town then countered with the proposition: "That affiliation with the SALP be not sought for the present, but that individual members should be allowed to join subject to the approval of their branches." A third variation was offered by T. Chapman of Benoni who put forward the following motion: "That the relations of the CP to the SALP be on the united front basis rather than affiliation or joining up individually to the Labour Party."

In the final vote on the question which took place in the afternoon of the second (and last) day of the congress the proposition of Glass was defeated by a small majority. Buirski's motion was also defeated and the congress adopted Chapman's motion by a vote of two to one. Chapman's motion affirmed the decision and practice of the second CPSA congress in 1923 to seek conditional affiliation to the SALP. The refusal of the congress to accept Glass' proposal was, in effect, a step towards a reorientation of the party to the non-white workers.

Further evidence that the majority of the congress was anxious to shift explicitly the emphasis of the party's activities was seen in the draft party program adopted by the delegates after the decision on the question of SALP affiliation. The nature of the new orientation was formally stated:

The Communist Party stresses the prime importance of mass organisation of labour for the development of the labour movement. It aims at forwarding the industrial organisation of ALL sections of the workers, especially those hitherto unorganised, with a view to their cooperation and ultimate consolidation into One Big Union on class lines, in the struggle against capitalism which divided they cannot sustain. It [the CPSA] declares unhesitatingly that the problems of the South African working class can be solved only through a United Front of all workers, IRRESPECTIVE OF COLOUR. 'The unity of labour is the hope of the world.' It is also the only hope for South Africa. 11

This statement was not a sharp departure from previous formulas accepted by the CPSA; nevertheless, in the context of the congress it reinforced the intent behind the rejection of Glass' motion.

The remainder of the draft party program repeated standard communist analyses, but scattered through it were indications of a particular attentiveness to the problems of non-whites. The introductory section recapitulated a standard and simple Marxist interpretation of the nature of capitalism and its extension in the form of imperialism to the African continent. It was stated that only the CPSA could properly lead South Africa to the proper socialist revolution. In a closing statement of immediate demands the program repeated its general demands in such matters as unemployment compensation, better regulation of working conditions, and expansion of educational opportunities. Yet the program also repeated the previous demands for the extension of full civil rights to non-whites, the extension of all social services to non-whites, and the equality of treatment for non-whites in all economic matters. In addition the program touched upon concerns of the non-whites previously unmentioned in party statements, such as the demand that more land be made available to Africans and the demand that the chiefs be deprived of their powers.

The specific details of the draft party program were not of great significance at the time of the congress. More important were the tenor of the discussions and the intent of the decisions. Bunting indicated that the delegates were conscious of the potential impact of their decisions:

In short it may be said that a characteristic note of the Conference, expressed by a majority of delegates, was a determination to explore more thoroughly the avenues of such approach [to the non-whites], especially in view of the evidence of a rapidly increasing interest in Communist propaganda among the natives now actively advancing in class organisation. Here at least a vast and virgin field for pioneer work seemed to present itself in which time will show how much can be done. 12

The victory of the 'radicals' was capped symbolically by the election of many of them to the top offices of the CPSA. Bunting, the tireless proponent of the cause of the non-white workers, was selected as the chairman of the party. Roux, one of the articulate YCL spokesmen for the cause of the non-white, was elected to the post of vice-chairman. Two other YCL members were elected to the central executive along with Chapman, the mover of the victorious resolution on SALP affiliation. The remaining five central executive members elected were also new, furthering the overturn of the old leadership. On the basis of printed information it is not possible to tell the relationship of the remaining five members of the central executive (Mrs. Green, V. Danchin, D. Cohen, S. Rubin, C. J. Andrews) to the 'radicals' or the 'traditionalists.' Prominent 'traditionalists,' however, were not completely excluded from the upper echelons of the party. Andrews was elected secretary, while Glass was elected treasurer. Nevertheless, the composition of the new leadership clearly reflected the shift of emphasis within the CPSA at its third congress.

A new stage had been reached in the history of the CPSA. The white trade unionists, represented most prominently by Andrews, had been outvoted. Thus, the previously dominant element within the party which linked the CPSA tenuously with the white workers was shunted from leadership. Bunting, the new chairman, long noted for his outspoken position within party ranks, represented not only those sympathetic to the non-white cause, but also the section of the party composed of professional men and white-collar workers.

The YCL, whose vigor and intensity had impressed the congress, spoke for a younger, less experienced element of students and white-collar workers. Yet what the YCL members lacked in trade union experience, they compensated for through enthusiasm and determination. The impact of, and the respect for, the YCL within the party can be seen in Andrews' characterization in The International of March 14, 1924: "The growing numbers, activity, and enthusiasm of the Young Communist League branches in South Africa is perhaps the most encouraging feature [of communist activity]. Branches are being established in various centres in the Transvaal, Cape Colony, and Natal, and it has long passed the stage of a mere debating society." S. Buirski of Cape Town was also impressed with the YCL at the time of the third congress:

The faith of the YCL in the workers' cause came not so much from long association with white workers, but from readings in socialist classics and identification with South African and overseas trade unionists and communists. Untied by past links with white workers, the YCL was willing to become involved in the affairs of the non-white workers.

The third element of the new alliance in the CPSA was the Cape Town branch of the CPSA. Its membership, mostly older white propagandists not directly involved in the generally weaker trade unions of Cape Province, had regularly preached their message to non-whites (albeit with limited success) in the easier, more tolerant atmosphere of Cape Town.

Despite the differences between the Cape Town communist propagandists, the young YCL activists of Johannesburg, and Bunting, all, to varying degrees, had in common an isolation from trade union work, an intellectual and propagandist interest in socialism, and a concern for the non-white. The converging interests of the new dominant groups within the CPSA brought to the forefront a different set of problems for the CPSA. The new course charted by them at the third congress may have resolved some of the dilemmas of the previously ambiguous CPSA policy on color, in theory, but it was difficult to see how it could be realized immediately, in practice. The dangers and uncertainties were many. The sudden shift threatened to leave in its wake the small, but still significant informal support of some white trade unionists, many of whom had practical experience. The possibility of the desertion or retirement of prominent white communists posed the more crucial question of a weakening of already small ranks. Although committing itself to the non-whites the CPSA still had hardly any non-whites within its ranks to ease the passage into the new course. The diverse and poorly understood currents of non-white politics hid potentially treacherous shoals upon which the frail party might founder. The CPSA began 1925 by embarking upon an avowedly difficult policy in the face of sure hostility from white South Africa, probable indifference from some of its own membership, and uncertain support from non-white South Africans among whom the party proposed to labor.

The storms threatened by the action of the third congress broke upon the CPSA in the early months of 1925. The victorious 'radical, majority reaffirmed its determination to approach the non-white workers. In response many ,traditionalists, committed to the white workers withdrew or resigned from the party.1

The defections from the ranks of the party were disturbing in terms of the prominence of those defecting. On February 13 The Intemational laconically announced that Andrews was resigning his position as editor of the paper. Subsequently it was revealed on February 26 in The Star that Andrews had also resigned as secretary of the party. In an interview on the following day with The Star Andrews denied that a split over principles existed within the party; he merely asserted that a difference over tactics had led to his resignation from office. It was clear' however, that the tactical differences related to the new program of the party. Andrews unequivocally supported the necessity of organizing all workers regardless of color, but he clearly indicated that he disagreed with the emphasis and speed with which the new leadership of the party proposed to tackle the job. Andrews indicated that he would henceforth devote his energies to his position as a member of the executive of the Amalgamated Engineers, Union, one of the most powerful of the trade unions of the skilled white workers.

At the same time Glass resigned as treasurer of the party. In the pages of The Star on February 27 he also stated his broad agreement with the position adopted by Andrews and indicated that he would concentrate his efforts upon the Tailors, Union of which he was secretary Yet Within three months Glass formally resigned from the CPSA, again choosing The Star of May 14 and May 15 to elaborate upon the reasons for his resignation.

He asserted that the party had become an anti-white sect biased in favor of non-whites. Glass, like Andrews, reaffirmed the right of the non-whites to organize, but he believed that the most fruitful area for those interested in the cause of labor was among the white workers. To symbolize his tactical preference Glass affiliated his trade union with the SALP.

The resignation of Glass was not followed immediately by a mass exodus from the party, yet many did withdraw their support from the new policy of the third congress. Some merely abstained from party activities. Some defied the decision of the third congress and joined the SALP on an individual basis in an attempt to create a left wing within the SALP. Others formally resigned from the CPSA in order to join the SALP. The fears of the 'traditionalist' minority at the third congress were realized as white activists fell away from the 'new' CPSA.

The advocates of the new course reaffirmed their faith despite the defections. Former communists who joined the SALP were bitterly castigated as even more dangerous enemies to the working class than longtime SALP members. The remaining party members rested satisfied in their conviction that they represented the courageous and correct vanguard of the South African socialist revolution. In the pages of the party press their dedication was characterized as follows:

Those who have stood firm, and those new members who have so rapidly filled up the gaps, realise that everyone of them must expect no smooth waters, no escape from risk, no shelter behind a 'popular' wave, but must always be in front ready to occupy the most dangerous posts and to give and receive the deadliest blows; for only of such is the kingdom of labour. The South African revolution is destined to be a rude, uncouth, inelegant affair, perhaps, but sure it is, and no Communist may shirk it, or any single task in the long preparation for It.2

The conversion of the CPSA to a still smaller white sect occurred against a backdrop of rapidly broadening opportunities for white workers under the policies of the Hertzog government. The initial encouragement by Creswell of the white trade unions quickly became active support. Under the prodding of the minister of labour a conference of white trade unions was called to create a new trade union coordinating body. In March 1925 the conference of trade unions, representing predominantly the skilled and semi skilled workers of the Rand, met to form the South African Association of Employees' Organisations (SMEO). The rules of the new organization carefully indicated that member unions were to retain full rights over their own internal affairs; the SAAEO would intervene in labor negotiations or legislation only when asked to do so by its members. The creation of a new trade union coordinating body under government blessing opened a new channel for two-way communication between white labor and the government.

In the context of the other actions of the Hertzog government the formation of the SMEO took on an added significance. Extending from the "civilised labour" policy inaugurated soon after its assumption of power in 1924, the government in 1925 passed a formal "Colour Bar Act" under which certain categories of jobs were reserved for white workers. Other government legislation established machinery for the regularization of negotiations between labor and management and provided incentives for industry-wide bargaining and wage regulation. In addition social services were extended for white workers. The benefits promised by the SALP-Nationalist pact for the white workers quickly materialized.

In addition, the government planned further broad schemes of segregation. Speaking at Smithfield in Orange Free State in late 1925 Hertzog announced a program of legislation for the non-whites which was designed to limit further their rights to political participation, restrict the land in South Africa available to them, and accentuate the divisions among the non-white groups in South Africa. It was proposed that Africans be removed from the common roll in the Cape Province, segregation measures be extended throughout the Union, and that the civil rights of Africans already in the cities be further restricted. In an open appeal to the Coloureds to formalize their second-class status, Hertzog proposed a Coloured Persons' Bill which would have retained the common vote for the Coloureds, yet confirmed their intermediate social status below the whites, but above the Africans. To the Afrikaner electorate behind the Nationalists and to the English-speaking workers behind the SALP the 'Native Bills' announced by Hertzog were additional stones in the wall of the segregationist fortress being constructed for their protection from non-white competition.

In the face of the policies of the government some communists still attempted to enlist the white workers in the cause of non-racial socialist revolution in South Africa. In particular the white communist trade unionists who disagreed with the emphasis of party work, but not with the theoretical approach of the party, continued to further the communist cause as they interpreted it. By full-time devotion to the affairs of the new SMEO in his capacity as secretary of the organization, Andrews continued to hold the respect of the white workers. He recognized that the white trade union membership, particularly with its increasing Afrikaner composition, would not accept mass non-white trade unions within its own organization, but he continued to encourage the organization of non-whites by non-whites. In support of his position he appeared at ICU meetings and encouraged the South African Trade Union Congress (the renamed successor to SMEO) to maintain an open membership policy. Other communist trade unionists such as Ben Weinbren, "Sony" Sachs, William Kalk, and Fannie Klenerman pursued a more openly communist course within the South African Trade Union Congress (SATUC). 3 In this fashion the communist position, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, was kept before the white trade unionists.

Yet the activity of the party after the third congress increasingly centered among the non-white organizations. From a distance, but later directly, the communists continued their interest in the affairs of the South African Native National Congress. More closely, and often directly, the communists followed the explosive rise of the ICU, the African workers' organization whose membership was ideologically appealing to the communists.

In dealing with the Congress the communists were presented with many of the same problems which had hindered contact between the two organizations in the past. The leadership of the Congress remained largely in the hands of middle-class Africans, mostly educated within the missionary tradition, who continued to petition and press for negotiated step-by-step improvements from local authorities and the national government. Many of the Congress leaders had entered into the Joint Council movement, from which Bunting had been excluded, to participate with liberal (and often paternalistic) whites in discussions of non-white problems. The always frail organization of the Congress became merely a shell in the mid-1920's.

New emphases within the Congress, however, posed sharper problems for the communists. In the early twenties the Congress devoted increasing attention to racial and national considerations. In Cape Town, in particular, the national-racial consciousness of Marcus Garvey was directly felt in the person of Dr. James Thaele. Returning from the United States, where he had been educated and where he had become familiar with the Garvey movement, Thaele took the leadership of the Cape Town branch of the Congress. Under his missionary drive the Congress branch in Cape Town was revitalized and the message of Garveyism was regularly preached from the platform of the Congress. In support of his efforts Thaele published a newspaper for the Congress, The African World, whose slogan was 'Africa for the Africans.' The African World appeared first on May 23, 1925, as a weekly newspaper, becoming erratic in late 1925, and finally ceasing publication in July 1926, after 24 issues. Throughout its brief existence The African World regularly published extracts from the overseas Garveyist press as well as editorials urging South Africans to support Garveyist principles. In line with these principles the newspaper urged the Africans to have confidence and pride in themselves and to encourage the use of the terms 'African' and 'Negro', rather than the terms 'native, Bantu', 'kaffir', 'bushman', or coolie'.

In the early 1 920's important members of the Congress entertained ideas of segregation providing the division of South Africa was upon an equal basis. 4 The Congress also became increasingly conscious of its potential role within all of Africa. Before the annual conference of the Congress in 1925 it was proposed that the Congress convene an Africa-wide conference for national and progressive organizations of Africans from the entire continent. Out of fear of governmental hostility the executive of the Congress did not accept the proposal. But it did agree to another proposal to delete the words 'South' and 'Native' from its title. The oldest African political organization within South Africa thus became merely the African National Congress.

The communists met the rising nationalist emphasis of the Congress with hostility. Reports from Cape Town in The South African Worker in mid-1926 specifically criticized Thaele and his 'Africa for the Africans' slogan. Thaele's approach was attacked because it sidetracked legitimate discontent over Hertzog's proposed legislation into futile nationalist channels, because it bolstered the position of allegedly opportunist leaders who were supposedly not interested in the struggles of the workers, and because it delayed the formation of a united front of all workers, non-white and white. Discussing the Congress as a whole communists label led it as an openly racialistic organization. 5 At the same time, South African communist commentators specifically attacked the United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), the political organization of Marcus Garvey, for its deleterious effect upon African thinking in South Africa. When the Congress changed its title to the African National Congress (ANC) the communist press used the new title. Nevertheless, communists in their writings continued to refer to Africans as 'natives' in keeping with the traditional practice of white South Africa.

The communists also continued to be critical of the tactics of the ANC. According to The South African Worker of July 16 the leaders of the ANC correctly attacked the segregationist measures of the Hertzog government, but they incorrectly persisted in keeping faith in the efficacy of study groups, and more particularly, in petitions and representations to achieve concessions from the government. The communists were dubious about the organizational abilities of the ANC which one communist critic had asserted possessed "little real organisation worth speaking about."6 As in the past the CPSA remained sympathetic to the causes for which the ANC fought, but hostile to the methods which the ANC used.

Developments in the ANC in 1925-26, however, were overshadowed by those within the ICU. In 1925-26 the ICU expanded its activities and membership spectacularly to become the most prominent African organization. The move of Clements Kadalie to Johannesburg in 1925, followed by the removal of ICU headquarters from Cape Town to Johannesburg in 1926, brought the leadership of the ICU to the area of most significant white trade union activity, as well as the center of communist activity. The ICU claimed a membership of 30,400 in 1925 and 39,400 in 1926. 7 White South Africa took notice and became alarmed.

The alarm of white South Africa only increased the interest of the CPSA in the ICU. Communist speakers, especially Bunting, Roux, and Sachs, participated frequently in ICU meetings, and joint propaganda campaigns were conducted. When the ICU expanded its operations in Johannesburg to open a joint headquarters and social center, Workers' Hall, Andrews delivered an address of support at the inaugural ceremonies. The ICU began to celebrate May Day. Mbeki, the young African worker who had been a member of the YCL, became the Transvaal secretary of ICU. As the most consistent and active white supporters of the ICU the communists achieved respect from the leaders and the rank-and-file of the ICU.

In Cape Town the communists also contributed support through propaganda and personnel to the ICU. Silwana, the other young African who had joined the YCL in Johannesburg in 1924, went to Cape Town where he became a clerk in the head office of the ICU. The Cape Town communists spoke at ICU rallies and contributed occasional propaganda articles to the Workers' Herald which was published in Cape Town. Through close contact with the communists two key officers in the Cape Town office, James La Guma, the national secretary, and John Gomas, the Western Provincial secretary, became party members.

The mark of the new proximity of the ICU to the communists could be seen in the language used by the ICU. At the fifth annual conference of the ICU, held in Johannesburg for the first time in April 1925, the ICU reformulated its objectives as follows:

We are aiming at the building up in Africa of a National Labour Organisation of the aboriginals, through which we shall break the wills of the white autocracy. We must prevent the exploitation of our people on the mines and on the farms, and obtain increased wages for them. We shall not rest there. We will open the gates of the Houses of legislation, now under the control of the white oligarchy, and from this step we shall claim equality of purpose with the white workers of the world to overthrow the capitalist system of Government and usher in a cooperative Commonwealth one, a system which is not foreign to the aboriginal of Africa. 8

In Kadalie's speeches there were more references to the overthrow of capitalism and the cause of the proletariat.

Yet the vigor of the ICU language was not immediately accompanied by a change in the tactics of the ICU. In the Workers' Herald of February 20 Kadalie repeated his faith in Hertzog and continued to make representations to the government for improvements of the conditions of African workers. The ICU conducted almost no strikes and sought means whereby the ICU could be placed within the negotiating machinery for trade unions established and encouraged by the Hertzog government.

Yet the concerns of the ICU were not strictly economic. When the government threatened to force the African women of Transvaal to carry passes as did the African men of the Transvaal, Orange Free State, and Natal, the ICU apparently considered the possibility of a general strike to back up its political protest. Underlining the political concern of the ICU, the Workers' Herald reported that speakers from the ICU, including Kadalie, joined with the ANC to protest against the proposed passes for the Transvaal women. The ICU members were urged to link with the ANC:

We therefore [believe] that unity must prevail everywhere and call upon the workers to sink all tribal jealousies and the fall in line with the only active labour organisation--the ICU and should they desire to use political weapon[s] we advise them to enroll as members of the African National Congress--the only political body we recognise and through these organisations they shall explain in one loud voice: That we desire to 'be free men and women in the land of our forefathers'. 9

When the ANC set up a 'shadow' cabinet in 1925, Kadalie accepted the post of secretary of labour. The ICU thus identified itself closely with the established, but weakened, nationalist ANC.

The ICU also reflected the racial influences operating upon African politics within South Africa. The newspaper of the ICU, the Workers' Herald, advertised itself as the "Only African Racial Journal." Some of its reporters openly endorsed the Garveyist movement. The president of the ICU, J. Gumbs, was a West Indian from Cape Town who was active in the local UNIA. Thaele, the Garvey-influenced ANC leader from Cape Town, was associated with the publication of the Workers' Herald in 1925. The ICU saw itself as an organization of African labor with a racial mission in Africa beyond the borders of the Union of South Africa.

In the face of the apparently contradictory positions of the ICU the communists were unsure of their attitude. The continuing rapid expansion of the ICU brought respect from the CPSA:

A development is now taking place in Africa which will make some people sit up and rub their eyes in a few years time. The whole labour movement here waits upon the unionisation of the native workers for its next step forward. And unionisation is proceeding apace. Lenin insisted that an essential condition of revolution was that it stirred the masses, including the most backward sections of the population. That is what the ICU is doing. 10

Yet early in 1926 one communist commentator from South Africa felt that the ICU had not become a proper trade union organization, but rather was a racialist organization whose ranks included non-working class elements; as such it could not be trusted. 11

In 1926 the ICU continued its growth and the hostility of white South Africa to it mounted. On April 6 the Cape Times reported that when the annual conference of the ICU met in Johannesburg both the mayor of Johannesburg (who had opened the 1925 annual conference of the ICU) and representatives from the SATUC refused to attend. In a move to hinder the expansion of the ICU, the government banned Kadalie from entering the province of Natal. The government continued its agitation for the 'Native Bills' which Hertzog had proposed at Smithfield. The proposal for the 'Native Bills' finally turned the ICU against Hertzog. Kadalie ascribed government policy as the catalyst for the ICU's rapid growth in 1926:

The demands to suppress my free movements, or that I should be sent away from the country altogether, became voluminous, while on the other hand such action consolidated the forces of the African workers. The consolidation of our forces was inevitable, and at the opening of the current year [1926] one witnessed a campaign to organise all African labour into One Big Union becoming a reality. What brought about this yearning among the proletariat? It was not other than the infamous Smithheld declarations, in which it was said that the black men and women of this land should remain for ever as 'hewers of wood and drawers of water.' With the consent of the National of my Organisation, I exploited this opportunity and visited all parts of the country. The response to the call was noble and unanimous, and all over South Africa one heard a joyful prayer from people who had lived in darkness for the last three hundred years.... 12

An additional government proposal to introduce a Sedition Bill, clearly aimed at the ICU, further antagonized the ICU.

The CPSA benefitted directly from the ICU reaction against the harsher climate in South Africa. At the annual conference of the ICU in April 1926, the failure of the ' respectable' whites to attend left the field clear for the white communists. Communist speakers continued to appear regularly at ICU functions. With the ban of Kadalie from Natal, the ICU turned to Bunting for legal advice. Through Bunting Kadalie obtained an opinion from S. Solomon, a prominent Johannesburg barrister, upon the wisdom of entering Natal in the face of the government's ban in 1926. The pages of The South African Worker were opened to ICU officials for articles on ICU business. The more intimate relationship between the ICU and the communists was evident in an ICU circular signed by Kadalie urging support for May Day and proclaiming solidarity with Soviet Russia.13 Kadalie also spoke at CPSA meetings. He was reported to have suggested that the 'Red Flag' should be substituted for the Union Jack. On a wide front prospects seemed good for expanding cooperation between the two organizations.

The communists responded to the new situation by ending their criticism of the ICU as a racialist body. Communists were clearly impressed by the further expansion of the ICU and the extent to which its message was being heard all over South Africa. The new emphasis of Kadalie upon class struggle and the need to overthrow capitalism led one communist commentator to label him 'a native working-class leader who takes a fully-class-conscious view, insisting that the native worker must organise on the lines of the class-struggle, and not be side-tracked into mere racial animosity."14

The South African Worker of August 13 unqualifiedly urged its readers to join the ICU in the same breath as it urged them to join the CPSA.

A structural change in the ICU in 1926 created further potentialities for closer liaison between the CPSA and the ICU. Impressed by the opportunities offered in Johannesburg, Kadalie decided to move the headquarters of the ICU from Cape Town to Johannesburg. Despite opposition from the officials in Cape Town (many of them Coloured Cape Town residents and thus probably fearful of the distant African environment of Johannesburg), Kadalie carried his decision through the annual conference in April 1926. The shift of headquarters to Johannesburg brought La Guma, the active and capable communist national secretary of the ICU, to Johannesburg for the first time. A reliable communist high up in the ICU hierarchy was thus close to the center of communist activity and those communists most interested in the ICU. Communists acquired easier access to accurate information about the ICU and improved opportunities for working within the organization .

The communists and the governmental authorities were not the only ones to pay attention to the rapid rise of the ICU. While in Durban earlier Kadalie had received support and advice from Miss Mable Palmer, a university lecturer who was a Fabian socialist. White liberals in Johannesburg, active in the Joint Council movement, also began to make approaches to Kadalie and the ICU. Through the efforts of Ethelreda Lewis, the novelist, Kadalie was contacted and lectures by white liberals were arranged for Workers' Hall in mid-1926. It was through Ethelreda Lewis that Kadalie met the English novelist, Winifred Holtby, when she toured South Africa to further the cause of the League of Nations in 1926. Impressed by Kadalie's efforts and ambitions, and frightened by the attention of the communists to the ICU, Miss Holtby undertook to inform English socialists and labor leaders about the ICU upon her return to Britain. Meanwhile Miss Palmer, who was visiting Britain, suggested to Arthur Creech-Jones, the secretary of the Transport Workers' Union, that he meet with Miss Holtby upon her return to organize a committee to support the ICU. 15

Upon return to Britain Miss Holtby did consult with Creech-Jones. Contacts were established with the trade union movement and the ILP. In the latter part of 1926 Kadalie and Creech-Jones began to exchange correspondence. 16 Through the efforts of Miss Holtby and Miss Palmer the ICU began to receive books from England for its library in the latter part of 1926.

The attention from labor circles in Britain apparently came in response to the efforts of Miss Holtby and Miss Palmer. Yet Kadalie himself clearly had been looking to the establishment of connections with British labor in order to gain influential white allies which he could not find in South Africa. In this vein the ICU conference in April 1926 had passed the following resolution:

That in view of the rapid development in the introduction of fundamental changes in the Native Policy under consideration, and in view of the seemingly compromising attitude of the European population as a whole, particularly in regards to the Prime Minister's Smithheld declaration, this Conference instructs the National Council of the ICU to enter negotiations for the affiliation of this Organisation to the British Trade Union Congress, with the further object of bringing the case of the African workers before the League of Nations and public opinion throughout Europe. 17

Kadalie was informed by the British Trade Union Congress that it did not accept overseas affiliations; he was advised to apply to the IFTU in Amsterdam. Advice to apply to the IFTU was also received from Miss Holtby and Creech-Jones; accordingly negotiations were started for the affiliation of the ICU to the IFTU. By December 1926, the ICU had received news that the IFTU would act favorably upon its application. 18 The expanding links with overseas socialist and labor groups gave the ICU seemingly powerful overseas allies through which it hoped pressure might be brought upon both white unionists in South Africa and upon the Hertzog government itself.

The unequivocal support which the ICU received from white trade unionists overseas contrasted sharply with the antagonism directed at the ICU by many white trade unionists in South Africa. Communists associated with the white trade union movement in South Africa faced an increasing dilemma over their attitude to the ICU. Although SMEO did not bar non-whites from its member unions, it did reject a request from the ICU to send a fraternal delegate to its 1926 annual conference, at which time it became the South African Trade Union Congress (SATUC). 19 The white trade unions also refused an offer to join the ICU in a boycott of coal shipments in support of the strike of the British coal miners. In both cases the white trade union leadership feared the reaction of their deeply prejudiced white membership to any official association with the ICU. Nevertheless, Andrews, secretary of the SATUC, continued to speak at ICU functions in his personal capacity as did other white communist trade unionists.

Ironically, it was Andrews who provoked Kadalie's renewed ire against white trade unions. A report in the Rand Daily Mail of August 31, upon a speech which Andrews had made at a meeting in Pretoria in his capacity as secretary of the SATUC, implied that Andrews had characterized the Hertzog government as sympathetic to the needs of the workers. Kadalie immediately criticized Andrews' statement in The South African Worker of September 3 and in the Workers' Herald of September 14, denying that the government had any sympathy for the non-white workers. Under Andrews' leadership the SATUC also had started a 'Back to the Unions' campaign in 1926 (which was supported qualifiedly by the CPSA). Kadalie suggested that the scheme was useless unless non-whites were included. Nevertheless, Kadalie apparently did not lose his respect for Andrews as a person later describing him in the following terms:

W. H. Andrews...also gave unselfish help. It was Bill Andrews who more or less influenced the SATUC to deal sympathetically with our request for cooperation. [Kadalie refers to the request of 1928 discussed in Chapter X below]. On some occasions Bill Andrews addressed ICU meetings in the Workers' Hall. During my persecution in connection with pass laws, Andrews supplied the ICU attorneys with a favourable affidavit for use in the Supreme Court. The ICU looked upon Bill Andrews as a great trade unionist who recognised no colour bar.20

Yet his late August statement further fueled the suspicions which the ICU leadership entertained towards the white trade unions.

The suspicions of the ICU leadership were undoubtedly fanned by their new-found friends among the South African liberals and the British socialists. The South African liberals clearly were concerned about communist influence in the ICU. It is equally clear that the concern of South African liberals was conveyed to the anti-communist British socialists and labor leaders. 21 It seems reasonable to assume that both the South African liberals and the British socialists warned Kadalie of what they regarded as dangers implicit in any association with communists.

The communists, on their side, began to doubt again the reliability of the leadership of the ICU. It does not appear that the communists were aware of the full extent of the correspondence between Kadalie and the British socialists, 22 but the results of the advice of the British socialists aggravated communist suspicions of the ICU. When the ICU announced its intention to affiliate to the IFTU in line with the advice of the British socialists, the ideological hackles of the communists were aroused. Regarding the Amsterdam IFTU as an agent of 'labour reformism' and an implacable enemy of the true socialist revolution, The South African Worker of November 19 warned the ICU to reconsider its intention.

Practices within the ICU in South Africa, however, provoked greater communist concern. From La Guma the communists must have learned that the constitution of the ICU was often disobeyed, the organization of the ICU was shaky, and its finances inadequately supervised--despite, or perhaps because of the rapid increase in membership. 23 From rank-and file ICU members who attended CPSA meetings the communists learned of discontent with the inactivity of the leadership. From L. Greene, a white communist in Pietermaritzburg who had joined the ICU, the communists learned that the ICU leadership was apparently quashing rank-and-file discontent with its administration and continuing to place its faith in legal proceedings rather than in strike action. The communists reacted with support for Greene's criticism of the Natal leadership for its high dues and faith in legalism. The communists began to demand militant action, including a general strike in protest against Kadalie's banning from Natal. After he broke with the communists Kadalie revealed in the Cape Times of December 22 that the communists had urged a general strike upon him. Knowledge of the internal state of the ICU spurred The South African Worker to criticism of the ICU and its leadership, particularly with regard to corruption, bureaucracy, and mismanagement. The CPSA became a focal point around which discontented elements could rally within the ICU.

The renewed animosities between the communists and the leadership of the ICU erupted into public view in the latter part of 1926. In the August 20 issue of The South African Worker, Champion, the leader of the ICU in Natal, was permitted to reply sharply to Greene's criticism of the affairs of his group. He asserted that the practices of the ICU were a concern for the ICU and not the communists. He imputed that the communists were trying to utilize their white skins as an excuse to 'advise' the ICU. At a meeting of the Johannesburg branch of the ICU Kadalie successfully blocked a resolution that the branch celebrate the ninth anniversary of the Russian Revolution. Attacking Communism as a 'I second master" which members of the ICU "cannot serve," Kadalie argued that the resolution was out of order inasmuch as the national council of the ICU had not sanctioned such a celebration. Communists were indignant at the actions of the ICU, and particularly with the tactics of Kadalie. Nevertheless, publicly in the pages of The South African Worker the communists chose to regard Kadalie's outburst merely as a temporary shift of attitude. In private, however, Bunting recognized the danger of a split which he hoped could be avoided with the aid of the membership at large:

Behind the scenes the ICU Secretary, who when all is said is vain and anxious for the limelight, though not yet a bad lot, is coming under influence of reactionaries, including Champion who is now hostile, and quite a coolness now prevails between us. But it would be a topsy turvy event if the mass he represents should be jockeyed into going to Amsterdam. I think the fight should not be unduly intensified into a split, but our views must be made to prevail on every occasion of division, and the rank and file accustomed to act as a team and take the lead. 24

In pursuance of their aims the communists attempted to persuade the ICU to participate in the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities which was being organized to take place in Brussels in early 1927. The Congress had been called at the instigation of the Cl in order to mobilize potential support among the national liberation movements, sympathetic European and American intelligentsia, and trade unionists for a broad campaign against imperialism. In particular, the organizers of the Congress were anxious to coordinate support for the Kuomintang in China with which the Cl was still allied. It is equally sure, however, that the organizers of the Congress also wanted to establish machinery through which the national liberation movements could be better linked with communist organizations. 25

The CPSA was anxious to secure the representation of the ICU at the Congress. On September 3 The South African Worker published a statement from the League Against Colonial Oppression in Berlin, the international front organization headed by Willie Munzenburg which was organizing the Brussels conference, in which the ICU was invited to send delegates to the Congress. The South African Worker of November 19 indicated that it hoped that the ICU would be among the South African groups represented at the Congress. The newspaper also directed that "communists on the various bodies invited must urge them to rise to the occasion and act in cooperation to the desired end."

The records of the discussions within the ICU are not available, but it is possible to surmise what probably happened. In the interim after Kadalie was invited he had received a promise of funds from the secretariat of the League. He had also undoubtedly been continuing his correspondence with Creech-Jones and with the IFTU offices in Amsterdam. Both the British Labour Party, of which Creech-Jones was a leading member, and the IFTU were bitterly opposed to the Brussels Congress. Very probably their opposition was communicated to Kadalie. In keeping with advice received from his new allies overseas Kadalie was probably not willing to go to the Brussels conference. Or Kadalie may have decided not to go without any advice from overseas; he may merely have reacted suspiciously and contrarily to the repeated urgings of the local communists that he attend. Yet the communists clearly wanted him, or some representative from the ICU, to go to Brussels to represent the national liberation movement of South Africa properly. Thus, it appears that they either actually nominated La Guma as CPSA representative in late December, or talked of nominating him. In any case, La Guma was considered by Kadalie to have been nominated by the CPSA as a delegate to Brussels in December. 26

The maneuvers of the communists over the Brussels conference finally provoked Kadalie into a direct challenge of the CPSA. The national council of the ICU had been summoned to meet in Port Elizabeth on December 16, 1926. At the opening of the meeting at which thirteen of the nineteen members of the national council were present Kadalie asserted that communist members were interfering with internal affairs of the ICU, and specifically, that in view of the 'Bolshevik' control of the proposed Congress in Brussels it would not be wise for the ICU to send delegates. Challenged by La Guma, Kadalie angrily withdrew from the meeting. Shortly afterwards he returned to support a motion presented by the provincial secretary of the Orange Free State, A. Maduna "that no officer of the ICU shall be a member of the Communist Party." In hurried response Mbeki presented an amendment "that no official shall be expelled by reason of his being a communist." By a narrow vote the Maduna resolution, supported by Kadalie, was approved in a six to five vote. On the following day the communist members of the national council were challenged to resign from the CPSA or from the ICU. Four communists, La Guma (general secretary), Gomas (Cape provincial secretary), Khaile (financial secretary), and Mbeki (Transvaal provincial secretary) refused to do either and were promptly expelled from the ICU by the national council. 27

Kadalie clearly regarded the action of the national council as a final declaration of war upon the communists. In an interview published in The Star of December 22 Kadalie declared that the communists were out to divert the ICU from its stated constitutional position as a bona tide trade union into a revolutionary body subject to the CPSA. In his statement Kadalie emphasized that white communists had tried to take over the affairs of a non-white trade union. The tone of his position echoed Champion's sentiments against the interference of whites in the affairs of the non-white ICU. Kadalie's subsequent conduct at a stormy meeting of the Johannesburg branch of the ICU as reported in The South African Worker of December 31, tended to confirm that racial considerations were among those which he used to justify expulsion of communists.

Although the communists had been increasingly suspicious of the leadership of the ICU, the expulsion of its members at the meeting of the national council caught them by surprise. Nevertheless, the communists quickly answered Kadalie's challenge with an equally strong declaration of war against the move of the national council of the ICU, and against the leadership of Kadalie and his supporters:

We can also assure Kadalie and his associates that the matter does not rest at this. Their attempt to split the ICU in two is foredoomed to failure. Our expelled comrades will immediately press might and main for reinstatement, and the rescinding of the reactionary Port Elizabeth decision. The Communist Party answer to this latest move will be to increase its work amongst the native masses ten-fold and to pledge itself to spare no effort until complete reinstatement is attained and the enemies of the working class movement are cleared out from the ranks of the non-European industrial organisation. 28

An open letter from the expelled members was published in The South African Worker of December 24 urging the ICU rank-and-file to call for an immediate conference of the ICU, to press for a 'non-interference' clause on officers' politics, to demand the unconditional reinstatement of the expelled officers, and to organize active resistance against the pass laws in conjunction with other organizations. In an accompanying manifesto the CPSA echoed the demands of the expelled officers and went on to present a united front program which demanded the abolition of pass laws, freedom of organization, equal pay, full civilian rights, confiscation of large land holdings, and the extension of the franchise to all Africans. The demands werent new, but the restatement of them at this time clearly indicated that the communists planned to appeal on a broad basis to the rank-and-file of the ICU for their support against the ICU leadership in an open effort to convert the ICU into a trade union following lines approved by the communists. As the CPSA had appealed to the rank and file of the SALP upon its rebuff of the SALP Executive in 1923, so the CPSA appealed to the rank and file of the ICU.

The internecine struggle provoked by the mutual hostility of the ICU leadership and the CPSA shook the ICU in many centers of South Africa. Its manifestations were reported regularly in December, January, and February in the pages of The South African Worker. In Port Elizabeth the local ICU protested the expulsions. In Johannesburg, where the communists most interested in the ICU were concentrated, the local ICU branch succeeded in passing a resolution opposed by Kadalie which demanded that the expulsion of the communist ICU officials be reconsidered by the annual conference of the ICU to be held in Durban in April 1927. In Cape Town, where La Guma and Gomas had been important figures in the ICU for a number of years, and where Silwana and R. de Norman, the next most important members of the ICU in Cape Town were also party members, the local ICU branch initially decided to urge reinstatement of the expelled officials while simultaneously refusing to expel Silwana and de Norman. In Vereeniging the local ICU branch also protested strongly against the expulsions at Port Elizabeth. With regularity The South African Worker continued to urge the rank-and-file to repudiate the leadership of Kadalie and Champion.

The efforts of the CPSA to undermine the leadership of Kadalie and Champion were unsuccessful. Centers of communist strength were too few and the rank and file were generally unresponsive to the pleas of the CPSA which probably remained unheard in most ICU centers. More crucially, Kadalie and Champion retained control of the central machinery of the ICU and apparently the loyalty of the great majority of the local leadership which controlled the delegates to the annual conference. Shortly after December 16 Mbeki backtracked and resigned from the CPSA to keep his position as Transvaal provincial secretary of the ICU. The dissension in Cape Town apparently greatly weakened the ICU, but Kadalie was able to persuade de Norman and Silwana to resign from the CPSA and remain within the ICU. The dissidence in Vereeniging was resolved by the expulsion of the entire Vereeniging branch.

It is also possible that the emphasis of the ICU leadership upon the threat of white communists and apparent whispered attacks against Coloureds (among whom were both La Guma and Gomas) solidified support for the decision to expel communist officials. In The South African Worker of January 14 it was noted that: "again there is the underhand propaganda being indulged in by certain officials, which aims at creating a wave of racial sentiment against those who are not full-blood natives, viz. the colour Ed members." The decision of the ICU to hold its annual conference in Durban further strengthened the position of the national council. Durban, still unorganized by the communists and also the bailiwick of strongly anti-communist Champion, was not a city in which the communists could easily rally support as they might have in Johannesburg or Cape Town. In April 1927, the annual conference of the ICU reaffirmed the decision of the national council at Port Elizabeth and extended the ban on communist activities within the ICU by resolving that no members of the ICU be allowed to identify themselves "in any way" with the CPSA.

The action of the conference did not, as the communists had warned, immediately appear to harm the ICU. Kadalie, seeking recognition for his claim that the ICU represented the workers of South Africa, travel led to the meeting of the International Labor Organization in Geneva with the active support of his British sympathizers. While overseas he consulted at length with British trade unionists and labor leaders and received promises of support. The publicity surrounding the trip undoubtedly helped to keep Kadalie's stock high among the ICU membership. The membership of the ICU continued to rise, particularly in the agricultural areas of Natal and the Orange Free State.

The inability of the CPSA to transform the ICU was particularly vexing in the political setting of 1927. The united front appeals which the CPSA issued in the wake of the expulsions from the ICU national council were not merely tactical moves to counter Kadalie; they were part of a broader campaign which the communists had undertaken in the face of the proposed Hertzog 'Native' bills, and particularly the reaction to the proposed Sedition Bill which they felt threatened themselves as well as non-white organizations. At the CPSA congress in January 1927, the CPSA had enunciated its program:

It [the congress] calls upon organised labour to engage in the Union wide campaign against the Bills and to compel the Labour party in power to insist on their total withdrawal, on pain of an appeal to the country on the basis of a genuine united front of all sections and races of workers against the parties of predatory capitalist and imperialist exploitation.

It invites all native organisations, national and industrial, to intensify their opposition, and in particular to proclaim a general stoppage of work as their only effective form of protest, which white labour organisations, if only in their own interest, should support. 29

The party's appeal was obviously directed particularly to white and non-white labor organizations, but it also clearly looked beyond to the national organizations of the non-whites. The group which had been working closely with the Africans in the ICU began to shift their attention to the ANC. Only there did the communists still find fertile soil for their efforts to induce a more militant attitude among the non-whites.

Although the communists had been unable to persuade Kadalie to go to Brussels, they were successful in persuading James T. Gumede, the president of the Natal Province ANC, to go to the Congress. Gumede, a middle-aged Roman Catholic, had long been active and prominent in ANC affairs. Undoubtedly frustrated by the increasing disabilities of Africans and the inability of the traditional tactics to bring amelioration of the condition of Africans, Gumede very possibly began to search for a new source of support. It was probably in this spirit that he accepted an invitation from the League Against Colonial Oppression to attend the Brussels Congress (in the company of Daniel Colraine, a white trade unionist who had been chosen a delegate from the SATUC, and La Guma, who did travel to Brussels as the CPSA delegate).

Prior to departure for Europe The South African Worker of April 15 reported that Gumede was suspicious of the communists. His experiences on the communist-supported tour of Europe changed his viewpoint. At the Congress in Brussels he participated equally with delegates of all races in the work of the Congress which resolved to support the cause of Negroes and Africans. The delegates to the Congress included American Negroes, a Negro from the French West Indies, and an African from Senegal as well as Asian and Latin American nationalists and communists, in addition to the European and American trade unionists, intellectuals, and communists. The Congress passed a resolution specifically devoted to the world Negro problem which was subsequently reported in The South African Worker of April 1. More importantly, Gumede found that he was warmly received by white communists in England and Germany where he went before and after the Congress on tours arranged by the communists.

The 'investment' which the CPSA had made in arranging for Gumede's trip to Brussels was handsomely repaid. Upon his return to South Africa in April 1927, Gumede spoke of the communists as friends of oppressed people and desirable allies of Africans in their struggle against the government. More crucially, Gumede spoke out against the attitude of the ICU and urged the immediate reinstatement of the three communists who remained expelled. In Gumede's estimation unity against the imperialists was foremost; he urged a common front of the ICU and the ANC against the government. The communists responded warmly to Gumede's remarks:

The question of creating a common front of the oppressed masses of South Africa in order to combat the capitalist enemy, has once more been brought prominently to the forefront, by the return of comrade Gumede from the Brussels Conference. Comrade Gumede, although not a member of the Communist Party, has had his eyes opened to the fact that only unity of the oppressed people of this country can provide a solution to the problems which confront them.

His declaration at Cape Town last week that 'Division amongst our ranks is helping to maintain the present despairing conditions,' allied to his appeal for cooperation between the ICU and the African National Congress, is a clarion call to the long-suffering native masses to close their ranks. 30

In the ensuing months Gumede's call for unity met no response from the ICU, but Gumede's actions within the ANC continued to cheer the CPSA which regularly reported them in the party newspaper. Under Gumede's prodding attempts were made to revitalize the ANC. At the annual conference of the ANC in June 1927, it was resolved to improve the organizational structure by instituting individual membership on the basis of a required yearly subscription of six shillings. In an attempt to reach the workers (and probably as a belated reaction to the success of the ICU) the ANC set up an African Labour Congress under its aegis which was to organize trade unions and concern itself with the affairs of workers. The ANC conference also favorably received Gumede's report from Brussels in which united action of non-white and white against imperialism was endorsed. More importantly, Gumede was elected president of the ANC, and Khaile, one of the expel lees from the ICU, was elected to the national council of the ANC. The communists regarded the changed situation within the ANC with favor. It was estimated that communist prestige within the ANC was on the rise. The communists were unable, however, to translate their new influence into party membership. It was recognized that the "more advanced elements of the native movement did not join the party."31

Old patterns within the ANC also remained a continuing concern for the CPSA and tempered their hopes about the transformation of the ANC. Shortly after the June conference Professor Thaele, who in 1926 had urged that Africans burn all pictures of the British royal family, now turned about to endorse the sending of a delegation to Britain to protest against the deletion of the Union Jack from the proposed new flag for South Africa. In the face of such an incident The South African Worker on July 29 and August 5 voiced fears that once again the non-white workers would be 'misled' by the leaders of the ANC. The unreliability of the changing ANC reconfirmed the earlier estimates of the CPSA that the national liberation movement alone was not a proper vehicle for the non-racial socialist revolution. Pessimistically the CPSA surveyed the prospects for independent non-white organizations on the tenth anniversary of the Russian Revolution in 1927:

On the other hand the prospects of an exclusively black emancipation movement are not at present very brilliant. Despite all the plaudits gained by sundry Messiahs and all the hot air emitted both for and against the ICU for instance, there is as yet no truly revolutionary native organisation in existence. Perhaps for that reason, too, the African people have not yet thrown up that degree of capable, fearless, class-conscious, honest, self-sacrificing, steadfast and incorruptible leadership (instead of weather cocks, Chamber of Mines tools, job hunters, cowards, deniers of their faith, sly poseurs, liquor sellers, drunkards, embezzlers or crooks) required for a successful liberation movement especially among a credulous and also a defenseless people--to say nothing of the technical capacity to administer such modern industry as has been evolved in this country. Such things have still to be evolved. 32

The non-existence of ideologically satisfactory independent non-white organizations highlighted the need for ideologically reliable organizations under the more direct influence and control of the CPSA.

Since the shift of policy at the third congress in December 1924, the new leadership of the CPSA had been aware of the desirability of training non-whites directly in the ways of Marxism as proclaimed by the Party. It was recognized that the best non-white supporters of the CPSA would be those who were members of the party or in organizations controlled by it. Yet the party was hampered initially in its efforts by the fragility of its own organization and by disputes within the organization over the place of the non-whites. 1

After a year of the 'new course' in late 1925 party membership was estimated to be about 300. Most all of the membership was white and it was divided among five party groups, three of which were located in Johannesburg. The party confessed that it had not defined the tasks of the various groups and that it had no control of its members who were in the trade unions. The financial situation of the party was so desperate that the size of the newspaper had to be reduced from eight pages to four pages. Testament to the weak condition of the party was given in its assertion that its most important activity in 1925 was work among the striking British seamen in Cape Town in support of the world-wide strike of British seamen. 2

At the time that the CPSA turned its face to the non-whites it had one African member, T. W. Thibedi, and two Africans who were members of the YCL, Mbeki and Silwana. The effort to enroll additional African party members met with resistance from established and influential white members until at least 1927. 3 It was probably for this reason that the party established a separate No. 2 Branch of the Johannesburg Group of the CPSA in Ferrierastown. In the regular announcements of the meetings of the No. 2 Branch in The South African Worker there was no specific indication that the group was primarily for non-whites. The reports of the meetings, however, indicate that Africans made up the membership of the group and that white communists participated as leaders or guests only. According to The South African Worker of August 6, 1926, the party in Johannesburg was attracting some rank-and-file ICU members to party membership through the No. 2 Branch. Yet the No. 2 Branch by its very designation signified the difficulties of integrating the new African members into the predominantly white party. At the Fifth congress of the CPSA in January 1927, the difficulties with African membership were recognized:

During 1926 the Party had gained much in drawing into its ranks an increasing number of native workers, and in future these must be brought into taking part in administrative work. More practical work amongst the non-Europeans was the chief need of the moment. 4

The party claimed a non-white membership of only fifty out of a total membership of four hundred in January 1927.5
Despite its diffficulties the party initiated direct approaches to the Africans outside of the ANC or the ICU. In Cape Town the communists operated through the African Cultural Debating Society, a weekly discussion group. In Johannesburg the communists seem to have abandoned the Euro-African Debating Society which had been started by the YCL in late 1924. In its place the Johannesburg communists with the help of Thibedi started a night school for Africans in a rented church hall in Ferrierastown. By candlelight white communists taught semi-literate Africans from an English language version of Bukharin's ABC of Communism. In 1926 a simplified Communist Primer for South Africa was devised and printed serially in The South African Worker as a replacement for the Bukharin text. The party also once again mooted the publication of a newspaper in African languages, but the project was dropped for lack of money. 6 The South African Worker, however, began to print articles in African languages and in late 1925 its price was lowered from 3d. to 1d. in a conscious effort to attract African readers. 7

The expulsion of the communists from the ICU confronted the CPSA with a new tactical challenge in their work among Africans. Enthusiasm among communist supporters in a few branches of the ICU led to the suggestion that independent militant unions be established in opposition to the ICU. The communists initially rejected this tactic. On February 27, 1927, The South African Worker unequivocally urged communist sympathizers to remain within the ranks of the ICU to fight to oust the Kadalie leadership. Developments within the CPSA and within the ICU combined to further a reconsideration of this strategy. In February 1927 communist speakers expanded from the party schoolhouse directly into African locations in Johannesburg where they conducted weekly propaganda meetings. In Vereeniging, when the ICU leadership expelled the local ICU branch for its opposition to the Port Elizabeth expulsion, the advice to remain within the ICU became irrelevant. It appears that most of the ICU branch, along with others in the Vereeniging location, founded a branch of the CPSA which could not be refused by the communist leadership at Johannesburg. Yet renewed appeals were made in The South African Worker to the rank-and file of the ICU to work within the union to topple the Kadalie leadership and set the ICU upon a militant course. By mid-1927, however, prospects for overturn of the ICU leadership seemed remote. The language of the communist appeals to the rank-and-file began to hint at possible shifts in communist strategy:

The seriousness of the ICU's recent position is very grave. Unless the native workers wake up to the menace at hand, a group of opportunists may throw the whole movement back for a decade or more. Salvation from this disastrous outcome can only be had in one way. The rank and file must rouse themselves to action and clear out the 'good boys' who seek to curry capitalism's good wishes by acts of treachery to the working class. Leaders who fail to lead must be swept aside before it is too late and the way cleared for a forward move on the part of the oppressed. It rests with the native workers to do the job and so safeguard the only hope of the future. 8

The "native workers," however, did not organize to change the position of the ICU. In the latter half of 1927 the communists finally concluded that it would be impossible to shift the ICU to a militant course. It was decided that the party itself would organize industrial unions. Weinbren, a communist laundry truck driver who had been organizing white workers in the laundry trade in Johannesburg extended his work to the non-whites in the Iaundry trade. In short order Weinbren began to organize bakery workers, clothing workers, mattress and furniture workers.

Symbolically the party in Johannesburg shifted its offices from the Old Trades Hall to the site of the party school in Ferrierastown in mid-1927. The move was dictated in part by financial considerations, yet it marked a severing of the links with the white trade unions and a conscious identification with the non-white workers. The new party office rapidly became a center for social activities among Africans, for trade union organization, and for party education among Africans.

The year 1928 promised a rich harvest for the communists who had so long labored seemingly fruitlessly in the unyielding South African vineyard. Limited thaws within the SATUC, long-expected internal storms within the ICU, sometimes warm breezes from the ANC, and threatening pressures from white South Africa loosened the soil for deeper communist efforts. The tiny shoots planted in the isolated years 1925-1927 began to grow so lustily that it became unsure that the CPSA could control the new crop of communists and communist sympathizers.

The efforts of Andrews and other white communist trade unionists on behalf of the ICU showed their first results among white trade unionists in 1927-28. Following an exchange of fraternal telegrams with the ICU at Easter, 1927, the SATUC had received a formal request from the ICU for affiliation in 1927. At the time the SATUC was concerned to expand itself nationally. To this end it set up a Trade Union Coordinating Committee with the Cape Federation of Trade Unions in an attempt to devise a formula for unity. It was this body, with members drawn from the non-racial (but predominantly white) Cape Federation of Labour and from the almost exclusively white SATUC, which considered the application of the ICU. Fearing domination of the white trade union bodies by African trade unionists, and the possibility of racial bloc-voting, the Coordinating Committee rejected the ICU offer of affiliation. It did, however, leave the door open for further joint action by proposing that the ICU and the white trade union bodies meet from time to time to discuss common labor problems. The action of the Coordinating Committee was confirmed by the national executive council of the SATUC. Kadalie, however, angrily rejected the SATUC 'compromise' and renewed his pledge to continue his drive for full recognition as the leading union of South African workers. 9

The smallness of the concession of the Coordinating Committee reflected the fact that the leadership of the white trade unions feared the reaction of their trade union memberships to any liaison with the ICU. Nevertheless, behind the scenes members of the SATUC, Andrews in particular, gave support to non-white trade unions. It was Andrews who accompanied Kadalie to Walter Madeley, the new SALP minister of posts and telegraphs in the Hertzog government, in order that Kadalie could attempt to negotiate a wage increase for ICU members employed in the Johannesburg General Post Office. (For meeting with Kadalie contrary to the orders of the government Madeley was subsequently expelled from the government by Hertzog). Other communist SATUC members, led by Weinbren, encouraged the organization of non-white industrial unions in Johannesburg.

The slight changes in the attitude of the SATUC and the continuing work of the white communists were overshadowed by the spectacular developments within the ICU in 1928. Kadalie's five month tour overseas in 1927 brought him wide contacts among British and western European trade unionists and socialists, and more particularly, intimate contact with the ILP and Creech-Jones of the British Labour Party. According to The Star of November 16 Kadalie returned to South African with promises of a British adviser to follow, a new constitution for the ICU model led after British trade union documents, determination to regularize the practices of the ICU after overseas trade union models, and a plan to reorganize the ICU on the basis of industrial sections. In his absence, however, the frail structure of the burgeoning ICU had begun to show the first strains of personal rivalries and financial malpractice. In late 1927 Sam Dunn, the ICU organizer for Natal, was convicted of the misuse of hundreds of pounds of ICU funds, and subsequent investigation revealed further questionable procedures in the financial affairs of the Durban branch. In an attempt to restore ICU integrity, the national council of the ICU suspended Champion in April 1928, pending further investigation. The suspension of Champion resulted in the secession of the Natal ICU. The loss of the fast growing Natal section, potentially the largest contributor to the central ICU coffers, aggravated the financial malaise of the ICU. Keable Mote, the ICU leader in the Orange Free State, led another group away from the central office. The Cape Town branch, its large Coloured component discontented over the neglect of Afrikaans in the ICU and particularly suspicious of white advisers, also seemed ripe for secession. 10 And in The Cape Times of June 26,1928, it was reported that eleven of the twenty-nine members of the national council had condemned the head office for poor administration and poor financial practice. The exposures of malpractice and dissension sparked a parade of creditors to the door of the ICU, threatening further the tottering organization.

In the midst of the disintegration of the organization, William Ballinger, who had been selected as adviser by the English sympathizers of the ICU, arrived in South Africa. Familiar with the regular trade union and ILP practices in Motherwell, Scotland, Ballinger was shocked by the irregularities which he found within the ICU. Nevertheless, he set resolutely to work to attempt to bring the ICU in line with the British trade union systems which he knew. The reforming efforts of Ballinger were met initially with enthusiasm by Kadalie and the head office of the ICU. 11 Yet Ballinger quickly became the focal point for further dissension within the ICU. Unaware of the structure of the ICU, he began to work closely with previously minor officials, thus arousing the ire of Kadalie and other higher ranking ICU officials. Ballinger's active presence provoked the Africanist sentiments of those actively or latently opposed to the participation of a white man in ICU affairs. Branches in Cape Province, including Cape Town, refused to recognize the authority of the head office. In the ensuing friction Kadalie himself came under attack from Ballinger and his new allies for his personal conduct and financial practices. Finally, early in 1929, Ballinger succeeded in gaining the support of a majority of the national council for the temporary removal of Kadalie from his position as general secretary.

The CPSA moved to utilize the internal problems of the ICU for its own ends but it still refrained from advocating the destruction of Kadalie's organization. Its attitude was restated by the party newspaper:

As is well known, the policy of the Communist Party towards the ICU is one of support and encouragement. Native workers are not discouraged from joining the ICU; on the contrary, the ICU as a mass organisation of the oppressed workers of South Africa is widely popularized as an important organisation Al weapon of the African workers.

The Communist Party reserves the right to criticise the existing leadership of the ICU and to expose on every occasion, deviations from the line of the class struggle. 12

Writing in Moscow for the organ of the Red International of Labour Unions, Roux more candidly indicated that the CPSA had one aim: to attract the rank-and-file of the ICU into the CPSA. 13 In pursuance of the aim Roux advocated united front tactics from below (allowing individual ICU members to join communist unions) and united front tactics from above (including a united front with the leaders of the ICU if they seemed to be supporting the interests of the workers.) Roux cautioned against provoking the ICU into a further solidification of its organization by direct hostility; he rather suggested that a more equivocal attitude on the part of the communists would best serve their interests. In practice the Roux strategy was followed; criticism of Kadalie and the ICU leadership continued amidst appeals to the rank and file of the ICU, but the communists still participated with the ICU in joint political campaigns.

The CPSA found the ANC, under the leadership of Gumede, a more promising non-white organization. In late 1927 Gumede had accepted another trip arranged by the communists--this time to the Soviet Union for the tenth anniversary celebrations of the Russian Revolution. Gumede was accompanied by La Guma, who had become provincial secretary of the ANC in Cape Province. While in the Soviet Union Gumede and La Guma travel led to the Caucasus where both were feted as honored foreign guests in a non-Russian part of the Soviet Union. Upon his return to South Africa in 1928 Gumede made speeches in favor of the Soviet Union at numerous meetings of Africans throughout South Africa; his remarks were reported frequently in The South African Worker in March and April. The party newspaper published an editorial, "Turning Point in African History," in which it indicated its expectations about the effect of the trip:

The establishment of contact between Soviet Russia and the African National Congress through the visit of President-General Gumede and Cape Provincial Secretary La Guma constitutes a manifestation of the revolutionising of the oppressed masses of South Africa.

The return of the delegates coinciding as it does with a new wave of oppression instigated by the present Government is clearly a call to the oppressed people to commence the first stage of the journey to independence and emancipation. 14

The editorial concluded with the demand that "united direct action" was the immediate task of all organizations in the form of "concerted demonstrations of protest."
Within two weeks The South African Worker announced that a Free Speech Defence Committee was being organized under the lead of the ANC with the cooperation of the ICU and the SATUC. At a subsequent meeting of representatives of the ANC, SATUC, APO, CPSA, Interdenominational Ministers' Association, and African trade unions resolutions were passed condemning the use of the 'hostility' clause of the 1927 Sedition Bill. An executive committee of the new organization with Gumede as chairman and Douglas Wolton, a white communist, as secretary, was elected to carry on the work of the Committee.

The Free Speech Defence Committee seems to have been a stillborn organization, particularly as developments within the ANC and the ICU seemed to promise joint action by the two organizations on the government measures which the CPSA opposed. The achievement of the basis for joint action, however, almost resulted in a repudiation of the communists by the ANC.

In April 1928, both the ANC and the ICU met almost simultaneously in Bloemfontein. In keeping with the highly formal constitution of the ANC the Upper House of Chiefs met to comment upon the affairs of the organization. Sentiment among the chiefs was hostile to the growing cooperation of the ANC with the CPSA. It found an echo among some of the 'old guard' who had led the ANC in the early twenties before the election of Gumede. The anti-communist sentiment within the ANC crystallized in an encounter with the national council of the ICU. At a joint meeting of the national council of the ICU and the executive committee of the ANC the following resolution was endorsed:

That this joint meeting of the Executive of the African National Congress and the National Council of the ICU convened by the chiefs now in session under the aegis of the African National Congress, agrees in principle that cooperation between the Congress and the ICU in matters of national policy, namely, the Government's Native Bills and the Pass Laws, is essential if the political and economic progress of our people is to be secured, but it declares that in pursuing these objects the African National Congress hereby repudiates its association with the South African Communist Party, which of late has openly identified itself with the Congress--details of how these organizations can cooperate to be arranged by both the Executive of the African National Congress and the National Council of the ICU after this formula has been submitted to their respective congresses. 15

Gumede apparently reacted to this implied attack upon his position by a strong speech to the chiefs in which he denied that the ANC was in any way attached or affiliated to the CPSA The joint resolution was referred back to the ANC executive for further consideration. No further action was taken. Although the meetings of the ANC and the ICU did not result in a formal resolution for joint action, contact was established. There was no immediate joint action, but in September Kadalie called an Anti-Pass Conference in Johannesburg to which the ANC, African trade unions, and white sympathizers were invited. On September 19 The South African Worker reported that the Conference endorsed a resolution for a deputation to the government to demand the abolition of the pass system, or at least a suspension of the pass system for a two year period. Another committee was established and plans were made for a further meeting after six months. The CPSA, specifically excluded from the conference by Kadalie, regarded the Anti-Pass Conference as a step forward. They argued, however, that any attempt to topple the pass system must be supported by active anti-pass committees throughout the country which would conduct agitation in coordination with the directives of the national committee. The Kadalie organization failed to heed the suggestion of the communists and it was left to the ANC to attempt the organization of a further campaign against the passes. In late October Gumede's headquarters announced that the ANC would appoint an Anti-Pass Central Committee of 20 members, including the executive of the ANC. In addition, Gumede proclaimed the intention of the ANC to organize local committees to gather information and conduct agitation according to the directives of the Anti-Pass Central Committee. In fact, however, Gumede's intentions were never realized.

In 1928, as in previous years, the efforts of the CPSA to work with independent non-white organizations brought mixed results. The ICU remained hostile to cooperation with the South African communists. Within the ANC Gumede continued to be responsive to communist suggestions, and he apparently considered joining the CPSA in 1928. 16 In Cape Town the ANC, under the influence of La Guma and other communists, became outspokenly pro-communist:

This General Meeting of the Cape Town Branch of the African National Congress, though it affirms the statement of the President, Mr. J. T. Gumede, to the Convention of Chiefs held in Bloemfontein in April last, that the African National Congress is in no way attached or affiliated to the Communist Party of South Africa, hereby places its full and unqualified confidence in the CPSA, in view of the fact that of all political parties of South Africa the Communist Party alone unreservedly advocated freedom and equality for the non-European people of South Africa with other races.

Further, that it is the only political party that champions the cause of the workers of South Africa irrespective of colour and knows no colour discrimination within its ranks.

16 Bunting noted in 1928 that ' what anti-imperial steps the ANC has taken in recent years have been the result of direct suggestion or presence by the CP." Notes of S. P. Bunting at the Sixth Congress of the Communist International, 1928 (Handwritten). At the same time Mrs. Bunting claimed that Gumede had informed the Buntings that he wanted to join the CPSA on the day that they left for the sixth congress of the Cl in Moscow. Notes of R Bunting at the Sixth Congress of the Communist International, 1928 (Handwritten).

Further, as the aims and objects outlined in the constitution of the Communist Party are correct interpretation of the aims and aspirations of the workers of South Africa, this meeting calls upon the Headquarters Executive of the African National Congress to consider and explore every avenue towards the closest cooperation with the Communist Party of South African as the only party correctly interpreting the aspirations of the working class of this country, especially the subject peoples. 17

Yet the attitude of the Upper House of Chiefs showed the continued existence of a strong opposition to cooperation with the CPSA. Furthermore, the ANC did not carry out the campaigns which it initiated. Bunting stated that the ANC as a whole remained "under the domination of reactionaries and direct agents of the bourgeoisie, except in the Cape where a few Communists have kept it alive at the cost of neglecting the CP itself."18

It was against this backdrop of conflicting movements in the ICU, ANC and SATUC that the CPSA pushed its own direct approaches to non-whites. The party continued to operate the school for Africans which it had opened in 1925. Under the leadership of Charles Baker, a retired school teacher who had been attracted to communism, the school spurted ahead. On February 17, 1928, The South African Worker reported an enrollment close to one hundred. Three months later, on May 11, The South African Worker reported that enrollment had risen to one hundred and fifty. The curriculum of the school was extended beyond the elementary literacy classes to include "English, Reading Grammar and Composition, Elementary Economics and Economic Science, Economic Geography, Arithmetic, Bookkeeping and Shorthand." In an effort to emulate the success of Johannesburg, the Cape Town comrades established an African Labour College at their party office. The newer party branches in Vereeniging and Potchefstroom also established more rudimentary schools.

The schools were a valuable device for generating support and sympathy for the CPSA. The fact that the curricula of the schools do not seem to have been overly oriented to exclusively communist propaganda must have brought the communists respect for the job which they were doing within the African community to give elementary education to illiterate and semiliterate African workers. At the same time the nature of part of the curriculum, and more particularly, the example of the white communist teachers, must have brought new adherents into the party--both out of personal respect for the white communist teachers and out of sympathy with the teachings of part of the curriculum.

The continuing efforts through the party schools were complemented by the revival of the party newspaper in February 1928, after a hiatus of six months. Under the editorship of Douglas Wolton, the new secretary of the CPSA from Cape Town, the newspaper even more consciously became a vehicle for non-white news and propaganda. Half of the pages of the newspaper were written in African languages and the remaining pages of the newspaper carried more news of South African non-white affairs than previously had been the case. The activities of the ANC were regularly covered, as well as the activities of the ICU and the new communist-sponsored industrial unions for Africans.

The main thrust of the communist activity, however, was channel led into the new trade unions. In late March 1928, delegates from the new nonwhite industrial unions of laundry workers, bakers, clothing workers, and mattress and furniture workers gathered to establish a formal coordinating committee for non-white trade unions on the Witwatersrand . With speeches of encouragement from Andrews and Tyler, the delegates formed the Native Federation of Trade Unions with Weinbren as chairman.

The rise of the new Federation within it first year was quite remarkable. In July 1928, the Federation claimed a membership of 1,178. Several of its unions conducted a number of successful strikes for small wage increases or reductions of work time. Requests for organizers came from all sides, but the new Federation was not able to satisfy but a part of the demand for white or non-white organizers. Nevertheless, by the beginning of 1929 the Federation added unions of chauffeurs and mechanics, drivers, textile workers, dairy workers, and workers in the steel and machine building industries; it claimed a membership of 3,612. 19

The advances of the Federation on the Witwatersrand led the communists to expand their horizons to the rest of South Africa. Their activities were reported regularly in The South African Worker throughout the remainder of 1928. In May non-white drivers and laundry workers were reported organizing in Cape Town. La Guma, the former ICU General Secretary, and subsequently Cape provincial secretary of the ANC, was brought to Johannesburg in mid-1928 as general secretary of the new Federation. The non-white emphasis in the Federation was continued when Thibedi, the long-time African communist factotum on the Witwatersrand, replaced La Guma as general secretary in December. The Federation changed its name to the South African Federation of Non-European Trade Unions and it proposed to gather together all the small and independent non-white trade unions in South African in an "all-in Trade Union movement of non-European workers of South Africa."

In a parallel development the party itself started to expand out of white areas in Johannesburg and Cape Town. When Bunting defended Thibedi in Potchefstroom after he had been arrested there, Wolton led a series of demonstrations which rallied the residents of the African location to the communist banner. Within eight weeks the branch of the party in Potchefstroom claimed a membership of one thousand; two full-time party officials were appointed for the branch. In Vereeniging the party was forbidden to meet within the location at one time. Nevertheless, the branch gained new strength and constructed its own headquarters in which it began to conduct a party school. In Pardekop the communists also found a response among the Africans in the location. In mid-1928 the party opened a branch in Evaton, a large African community between Johannesburg and Vereeniging, in response to requests from local residents. A party branch was also established in Sophiatown, the home of most politically-conscious Africans around Johannesburg. Regular communist meetings were also held outside several compounds housing African workers in Johannesburg. Representatives from Durban and Pietermaritzburg in Natal and Bloemfontein and Bethlehem in the Orange Free State attended the sixth congress of the CPSA in December 1927 (but there is no information available as to the nature of the branches which they represented). 20

In numerical terms the membership of the CPSA expanded almost as rapidly as that of the Federation, according to communist statisticians. In mid-1928 the party claimed a membership of 1,700 of which 1,600 were non-white. 21 By the end of 1928 the party reported a membership of "nearly 3,000. 22 The last report did not break down the membership into racial categories, but it can be presumed that the reported membership was overwhelmingly non-white in view of the concentration of the party on non-whites and the continuing hostility of whites to the non-racial policy of the CPSA.

The upsurge of non-white membership brought in a new group of communists to complement the white communists who had previously led all the party activities. Many of the Africans who began to participate in the party were school teachers such as John B. Marks, Edwin Mofutsanyana, S. Kotu, and Albert Nzula who were attracted to the party through the new party branches established in the Transvaal. Yet the new African trade unions in Johannesburg also supplied important recruits in Johannes Nkosi, Gana Makabeni and Moses Kotane. The new emphasis of the CPSA on non-white activities also brought new white communists to the forefront of party ranks. The most significant of the newly prominent white communists were Douglas Wolton, a clerk who had joined the party in 1925 in Cape Town with the strong conviction that the party must devote itself to non-white affairs, and Molly Wolton, his wife, a fiery orator. Elected as the first full-time party secretary and newspaper editor in December 1927, at the sixth congress of the CPSA, Wolton threw himself wholeheartedly into the drive to recruit non-whites for the party. Throughout he was backed by his wife. The growth of the CPSA among the non-whites brought in its wake a new host of problems. The communists found that many of the Africans whom they did actually recruit into the party were woefully ignorant of the nature of party membership. In the assessment of Roux, written fifteen years later:

At first many of the new adherents were rather vague as to the nature of C. P. membership. Asked to prove they were members of the Party, the would produce a trade union card, or night school pass. It was all very shocking to some of the Comintern purists, but as time went on things began to sort themselves out. 23

The sudden sharp shift in the racial composition of the party aggravated the problem of trained personnel, at least temporarily. With the decrease in both the percentage of whites in the party and the absolute number of whites in the party, the party lacked an adequate trained cadre familiar with the practice of the party to conduct the ordinary affairs of the party, to say nothing of a group able to cope with the sudden inundation of new members. Many Africans were illiterate or semi-literate, reflecting the conditions of the community from which they came. In a party which stressed ideological loyalty as well as the normal regularity of any efficient political-labor organization, the new membership was a potentially disturbing factor. The already low ideological level of the party was threatened by the lack of training of the new members whose enthusiasm could hardly make up for the long experience of the white members who had withdrawn from the party. Financially, the small contributions of the rapidly expanding non-white membership would not compensate for the regular and higher contributions of the previous white trade union and white collar membership.

Seen within the context of white South Africa as a whole the new non-white strength of the CPSA highlighted the tiny white base upon which the party rested. The previous segment of the white population from which the party had drawn its support was limited to the workers and white collar workers of Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban. The upsurge in non-white membership to the point where non-whites overwhelmingly dominated the party made the party even less attractive to much of the very segment from which it had drawn its limited strength in the past. Many who in the past had accepted a non-white party in theory recoiled from a non-white party in practice. An increasingly non-white party was even less appealing to the more numerous, most prejudiced, but less well-educated and poorer Afrikaner section of the white workers. Similarly, the more prejudiced and probably less educated section of the English-speaking white trade unionists were now further spurred to move away from the predominately non-white communists. Remaining were a few dedicated English-speaking trade unionists (who in many instances gave only verbal support to many of the new activities of the party from their official positions within the trade union movement), and white collar workers and professional men, most of whom could hardly be regarded as proletarian.

In the context of non-white South Africa the advance of the CPSA among non-whites was also uneven. The relatively more skilled, relatively more wealthy, and relatively more educated Indian and Coloured sections of the population were not included in the advance of CPSA membership (except for some few Coloureds in Cape Town). Geographically, the communist advance was also limited although the major expansion was in the Transvaal where the greatest concentration of African workers was located. In terms of the five million Africans of South Africa, the small number of new communists were a small proportion.

The success of the communists, however, in terms of their own ideology and commitment was considerable. For the first time in the history of the party the overwhelming majority of its adherents were located among the non-whites who made up the majority of the South African proletariat. At the same time the party had preserved its non-racial nature. The unfulfilled demands of new supporters seemed to promise further rapid expansion of the party on a wave of discontent with the government. The sympathy of Gumede in the ANC and the vacuum created by the disintegration of the ICU encouraged hope for further advances. The prospects for the small CPSA had never seemed brighter.

Preoccupied with South African affairs, the CPSA gave little thought to the affairs of the Cl. In turn, the Cl paid no specific attention to the CPSA. It was thus with surprise and shock that the South African communists suddenly received hints that a radical new policy was being devised for South Africa in distant Moscow.

The harbinger of Moscow's unexpected concern in the affairs of the CPSA was La Guma, the CPSA delegate to the tenth anniversary celebrations of the Russian Revolution in Moscow in November 1927. The first non-white member of the CPSA to reach Moscow, La Guma was received by Bukharin, the head of the Cl. In discussion of the South African situation Bukharin advanced an analysis and prescription for South Africa which radically departed from the policy pursued by the CPSA since its inception.

Defining South Africa as a colony or semi-colony of British imperialism, Bukharin postulated that the struggle in South Africa was primarily an anti-imperialist nationalist struggle, rather than a direct anti-capitalist proletarian struggle. According to Bukharin's analysis the Africans of South Africa were being kept in subjugation by British finance capital and its ally, Afrikaner imperialism, in order to provide super profits, most of which were exported to Britain, but some of which were distributed among local South African capitalists and landowners to maintain their acceptance of the dominance of overseas capital. To end the rule of British finance capital it was the task of communists, according to Bukharin, to overthrow the British and Afrikaner imperialists in order to establish a democratic independent 'Native' republic as a stage toward the final overthrow of capitalism in South Africa. Within the bourgeois-democratic republic there would be full 'minority' rights for other non-white groups and all non-exploiting whites.

That the Bukharin propositions represented the intention of the Cl for South Africa became clearer in early 1928. The CPSA received for discussion a "Draft Resolution on South Africa" which had been drawn up by the Cl. Expanding upon the theses presented by Bukharin to La Guma, the document culminated with the suggestion that the main slogan of the CPSA was to be "an independent native South African republic, as a stage towards a workers' and peasants' government with full, equal rights for all races, black, colour Ed, and white." The South Africans were instructed to discuss the document with the understanding that it was to be adopted as policy by the Cl at the impending sixth congress of the Cl to be held in Moscow in mid-1928.

The new slogan created chaos behind the bustling facade of expansion in the CPSA. To most of the remaining white communists within the CPSA the new slogan seemed to contradict directly the non-racial proletarian solidarity which they had so painstakingly made the policy of the CPSA. In their eyes the CPSA was being asked to emphasize African nationalism instead of the equality of all workers, white and non-white. The opposition of the majority of the white communists was supported by African members of the party who had worked with the whites to extend the party among the non-whites. Only a minority of the party accepted the new policy from the Cl. La Guma, to whom the policy had been first outlined, and the Woltons, white activists among the Africans, but relative newcomers to the party, led the minority who supported the new line suggested by Moscow. The majority of the CPSA delegated Bunting and his wife to proceed to Moscow to the sixth congress to detail their opposition at the seat of Cl authority. 1

The issue of the "independent native South African republic" shook the CPSA to its roots for the next eight years. In order to comprehend fully the nature of the disturbances it is necessary to explore the origin of the slogan and the pressures which brought its application to South Africa. To do so requires a probing of diverse concerns and organizations within the network of international communism. In the process much is revealed about the nature of the relationships within the international communist movement on the colonial and Negro question, and in particular, about the relationship of the CPSA to the international communist movement.

The affiliation of the CPSA with the Cl at the time of the founding of the CPSA on July 30, 1921, was merely a reaffirmation of the attitude of the South African left-wing international socialists and a continuation of the formal affiliation of the ISL with the Cl. The admiration of the CPSA for the Cl in Moscow continued to grow in the early 1920's with the visits to Moscow of leading South African communists including Jones, Bunting and Andrews.

At the time of the formation of the CPSA, Jones was already in Moscow from where he sent back enthusiastic reports in support of the tactics of the Soviet communists in Russia and in the Cl. When Bunting, with his wife, went to Moscow for the fourth congress of the Cl in 1922 he also enthusiastically endorsed the Cl and the Soviet communists. Although Bunting was unable to meet Lenin or the other top leaders of the Cl, he left Moscow asserting: "...having failed to get an audience with them, one feels that no one else is worth consulting!" In 1923-24, Andrews served in Moscow as the South African representative on the Executive Committee of the International (ECCI); he, too, reported his respect for the leaders of Soviet Russia and the Cl.2

The enthusiasm and admiration of the South African communists for Soviet Russia and the Cl did not mean, however, that the CPSA accepted all the decisions of the Cl as immediately applicable in South Africa. When Jones reported enthusiastically about the purge within the Russian Party in 1921, The Intemational of October 14 carefully rejected the policy as inappropriate to South African conditions. In the same issue Andrews, then the editor of The Intemational, qualified his acceptance of an ECCI circular regarding the nature of communist newspapers. In the face of directives from the Cl the central executive of the CPSA in late 1924 confessed its inactivity:

Our relations with the Communist International have been confined chiefly to the receipt of various circular letters calling upon us for returns of activities most of which are impossible to comply with in the case of so small an organisation as ours. One point, the conversion of territorial branches into branches at the point of work (mine, factory, or workshop branches or nuclei) has been greatly stressed by the Communist International of late: but it has not seemed possible to carry it out.

The most numerous circulars received from overseas have been from the International Red Aid, an off-shoot of the Communist International which is attempting to collect funds for the relief of class war prisoners and victims and their depend ants all over the world, pool them and apply them where needed. The idea is a fine one, but in view of the difficulty of raising such funds even for local application, we have thought it impossible to carry it out in South Africa. 3

Pleading smallness of size and poverty of resources, the CPSA exempted itself from certain practices urged by the Cl. Throughout the 1920's the CPSA never reorganized itself to conform with the models decreed by the Cl.

Yet the CPSA never questioned the ultimate authority of the Cl, and in fact, the authority of the Cl was invoked occasionally within South Africa to settle disputes within the party. In 1923 a section of the membership, led by Harrison of Cape Town, challenged the united front policy which the CPSA introduced in the wake of the 1922 strike. Bunting, who had just returned from Moscow where he had attended the sessions of the fourth congress of the Cl which had ratified the ECCI decision to embark upon a united front policy, invoked the decision of the fourth congress of the Cl in The Intemational of March 30 as a justification for the party's policy. Harrison was permitted to reply in the The International of April 12, but the discussion was then terminated with the assertion that Harrison's position contravened the decisions of the Cl.

Throughout the 1920's the pages of The lnternational and its successor, The South African Worker, regularly carried news of developments in Soviet Russia and in the Cl without questioning the Soviet line. For example, the moves against the 'opposition' in the Soviet Communist Party were reported with apparent approval, as were the expulsions from the Cl of Fischer and Maslow, the German 'ultra-leftists' in issues of The South African Worker on January 7,1927; January 21,1927; and March 4,1927. In a more active fashion the South Africans supported appeals of the Cl for demonstrations in behalf of causes endorsed by the Cl. A former member of the CPSA has caught the sincere and unquestioning dedication of the South African communists:

Ukases from the Comintern would reach us periodically. There were any number of days that had to be celebrated with the fervour of a holy festival--and this in a country where very few had even heard of the Russian Revolution. On some sunny day, when everybody was hard at work and thinking of nothing in particular, we would find ourselves, fifty strong, marching down the busiest thoroughfare of the city [Johannesburg] in a procession with banners and all the other paraphernalia--for it was International Women's Day, or Youth Day or some other Day that the Comintern had instructed us to celebrate. 4

The actions of the CPSA indicated that it regarded itself as a loyal, yet autonomous section of the Cl. The CPSA rejected Cl policies and Soviet practice which it felt irrelevant to its situation. Yet it invoked the authority of the Cl when necessary in order to enforce policy within its own ranks, and it continued to identify broadly with the line of the Cl internationally.

The CPSA was able to maintain its position in part because of its location on the periphery of the international communist movement. After the return of Andrews to South Africa in March 1924, followed shortly thereafter in June 1924 by the death of Jones in the Crimea, the South Africans lost their last regular direct link with the Soviet Union. 5 A delegate sent to the fifth congress of the Cl in 1924 was unable to remain in the Soviet Union long enough to attend the congress. 6 From 1924 until late 1927 it appears that the visit of "Sony" Sachs to the Soviet Union in late 1925 was the only direct contact of South Africans with the Soviet Union. 7 The absence of South Africans from the Soviet Union was matched by the apparent lack of special interest on the part of the Cl in South African affairs. Bunting was made unhappily aware of the low priority of South Africa in the Cl during his visit to Moscow in late 1922:

Indeed --so grossly is our Martial Law Commission in error in imagining that 'Moscow takes a special interest in South Africa'--my chief regret is that during all the time I have been in Moscow, the 'Presidium', i.e., in effect this 'Big Five' have never found time to discuss South African affairs either with me or without me; not indeed, for want of interest, but because other matters are even more engrossing; delegates from countries with a bigger party and more immediate prospects are more important--Moscow soon takes the conceit out of a fellow! 8

Until 1927 the CPSA continued to attract no particular interest on the part of Moscow; it merely remained on the mailing list of the Cl. 9 Isolated from the intervention of the Cl, which in other parties was becoming significant in the mid-1920's, the CPSA made little conscious effort to shape a comprehensive Marxist ideological formula for South Africa. In the years before 1928, however, the CPSA did emphasize certain elements of Marxism in its analyses. At the time of the fourth congress of the Cl when the question of the united front was prominent in the discussions of the Cl Bunting was very much concerned with the idea of a colonial labor front which would bring together the non-white workers of the world with the white workers of the world. Explicitly Bunting rejected the reliance upon either nationalist movements or upon peasant movements:

In cases like South, West and East Africa, or the Pacific taken as one unity, or the United States, where a real national liberation movement of the colour Ed races is hardly practical politics and a peasant movement with any hope of success hardly exists among the colour Ed peoples, the only revolutionary movement of the subject races is the movement of their workers organised as workers. 10

In Bunting's estimation the communists were not to make any special approaches on a nationalist or agrarian basis.

The practice of the CPSA until 1928 generally conformed to the views held by Bunting in 1922. The second congress of the CPSA in 1923 resolved to aid all "anti-imperialist" movements, 11 but no special attempts were made to ally with either the ANC or the Afrikaner nationalists on a common anti-imperialist platform. Throughout the 1920's the CPSA continued to regard the nationalist tendencies of both the ANC and the ICU with suspicion and antagonism.

The questions of the peasantry and the land received less attention from the CPSA. At the congresses of the party sections of the platforms and resolutions were devoted to the problem, but no specific approaches to the peasants seem to have been undertaken. 12 Instead, the CPSA concentrated its efforts upon the "workers organised as workers." For this reason the ICU held the attention of the party, and after its harsh rejection of communist support, the party turned its main efforts to its own trade unions. Throughout this period 'ideology' tended to be restricted to hortatory manifestos and stereotyped repetitions of the standard Marxist slogans. Yet in early 1928 the CPSA did issue a small seven-page pamphlet, What Is This Party, in which its view of its function and purpose was summarized. In its first pages the pamphlet reiterated a classical Marxist analysis of the world in terms of the class struggle and the need to realize the inevitable proletarian revolution which would usher in a 'cooperative commonwealth' where ALL MEN SHALL BE SOCIALLY, ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY FREE AND SHALL SHARE ALIKE IN THE FRUITS OF THEIR JOINT LABOUR, WITH EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND EQUAL ACCESS TO ALL THE GOOD THINGS OF LIFE.

The example of the Russian revolution was invoked, and the inevitability of social revolution according to Marx was cited as assurance that the proletarian revolution could be properly organized in South Africa. Specifically, the pamphlet urged properly class-conscious agitation, education and organization. The pamphlet very definitely stated the aims of the communists:

The immediate aim of the Communists is the same as that professed by all other working class parties; organisation of the workers on a class basis, overthrow of the supremacy of the owner and master class, and conquest of political power by the workers. They support any working class or national liberationist organisation, such as the ANC or ICU in so far as it pursues this aim.

The only difference in principle (whatever differences there may be in practice) between Communists and other working class parties is that in the various national struggles of the workers the Communists stress THE COMMON INTERESTS OF THE WORKING CLASS IRRESPECTIVE OF NATIONALITY; and again, that in the various stages of the struggle between the workers and capitalists they always stand for THE INTERESTS OF THE WORKING CLASS MOVEMENT AS A WHOLE. 13

Although the program clearly indicated that the support of the trade union members and ANC members would be sought, it equally clearly indicated that such support would only be sought from them as workers. The program implied that the only function of the CPSA was to become the vanguard of the workers which would lead the forces of labor directly to the proletarian revolution. There was no indication that the CPSA planned to make any appeal upon a specifically nationalist or agrarian basis in view of the peculiar racial, national, and social structure of South Africa.

At the same time that the CPSA was regarding South Africa in relatively orthodox terms as an industrial state, the Cl was considering South Africa as a part of the colonial and national problem, and more specifically, as part of the world Negro problem. With the "Draft Resolution on South Africa" the 'ideology' of the Cl was placed in direct conflict with the 'ideology' which the CPSA had evolved independently for South Africa. Ironically, South African communists had helped to define the situations in which the South African problem was considered by the Cl as a part of the whole Negro problem.

Both Jones and Bunting travel led to Moscow in the early 1920s with the aim of interesting the Cl in the problem of South Africa and non-white labor. 14 At the third congress of the Cl in 1921 Jones spoke during the brief discussions in the congress of the national and colonial question. He urged the Cl to consider the problem of the Negro which in his view was centered in South Africa. Upon Jones' initiative, the congress passed a motion requesting that the ECCI devote serious attention to the question of the Negro and the proletarian movement among the Negro as an important part of the Eastern question. 15

The Cl apparently took no action on the motion which Jones had initiated, but the problem of the Negro was raised again at the fourth congress of the Cl in 1922 at which Bunting was a delegate. Bunting's claim to speak for the non-whites or Negroes was implicitly challenged before the opening of the congress by the presence of two Negroes from the United States, Claude McKay, the young Negro poet who had been invited as an unofficial delegate, and Otto Huiswood, a West Indian by origin, who came as an official communist delegate although he was also a member of the African Blood Brotherhood, a small militant Negro nationalist organization the leadership of which had joined the Communist Party of America. A Soviet commentator indicated before the meetings of the congress that the American Negroes would be more favorably regarded than the white South Africans as the spokesmen for all the Negroes of the world. 16

The proceedings of the congress confirmed the primacy of the Americans as spokesmen for the Negroes of the world, yet at the same time they reaffirmed that the Cl considered South Africa as part of the world Negro problem. Bunting was not even originally a member of the Negro Commission which was established to study the question at the congress; only at his request was he included on the Commission. As the records of the discussions of the Commission are not available, it is impossible to tell whether Bunting participated. In any case, he did not participate at all in the brief discussions of the Negro problem on the floor of the congress. The most prominent role in the discussions of the congress was played by Huiswood, who presented the "Theses on the Negro Question." 17

The "Theses on the Negro Question" as passed by the fourth congress placed the problem of the Negro in the context of the national and colonial question. 18 The theses argued that the Negroes throughout the world were experiencing the exploitation of imperialism and were reacting accordingly. Because of the advanced state of capitalism in the United States the American Negroes were seen as the most revolutionary Negroes and thus the logical agents of communism to the Negroes of the rest of the world. The theses urged that Negroes everywhere be organized, particularly in trade unions, in order to weaken imperialism. In an implicit recognition of the success of the Garveyist movement and the Pan-African Congresses under W. E. B. DuBois the theses urged that immediate steps be taken by the Cl to call a world Negro congress.

Despite misgivings about certain provisions of the theses Bunting warmly welcomed the action of the Cl:

I venture to think this policy of bringing the Toilers of Africa (and their American cousins), as the toilers of the Far East have already been brought, within the scope of the world revolutionary proletarian movement, is perhaps the most important piece of new ground covered, 'new money' as it were brought in at the Congress; a policy which it will be the task of, among others, our Party to further to the best of our ability. 19

Bunting agreed with the placing of South Africa in the context of the world Negro problem, the revolutionary center of which the Cl had determined to be in the United States. A precedent had been established for the Cl to consider the problem of South African non-whites in the possibly irrelevant context of the American Negro problem or the world Negro problem.

At the same time the affairs of the CPSA were put under the jurisdiction of the Anglo-American Colonial Group of the Cl, which also included Britain, the United States, Canada, Ireland, India, Egypt, and Australia. The Anglo-American Colonial Group was one of the five regional groupings within the Cl established "to make the relations between the Comintern and the Sections [of the Comintern] easier, likewise also between the different sections and to give each Section an opportunity for a better treatment of its affairs." The inclusion of South Africa with Great Britain and the United States (and their colonies) meant in the future that South African matters might well be considered together with British or American affairs quite unrelated to the demands of the South African situation. 20 Another precedent was established.

In 1924 both the Cl and the Red International of Labor Unions (RILU) reaffirmed the theoretical interest of international communism in the world problem of the Negro and the colonies. Although no South Africans were present, the actions of the Cl and the RILU had implications for South Africa.

The fifth congress of the Cl did not discuss the Negro question except as part of the general discussion on national and colonial issues. The main concern of the American participants, Negro and white, was to prevent the application of the Leninist-Stalinist formula of self-determination for nationalities to the American Negroes. They were successful, and no specific resolution was taken by the congress on the Negro question. Nevertheless, it was proposed at the end of the congress that a Negro Commission be established for propaganda among the Negroes with a membership of one representative each from the ECCI, the Communist Party of France, the Communist Party of Great Britain, and the Communist Party of Belgium. 21

More significantly, the fifth congress attacked the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) along with the other communist parties of the European colonial powers, for their inattention to the problems of the colonies. Although discussions focused upon India, it was suggested that the CPGB should devote much greater attention to the problems of all its colonies (among which was included South Africa). 22 Thus, impetus was given for another overseas communist body to follow the affairs of the CPSA.

The more general concern of the fifth congress with the question of 'Bolshevization' also was of potential significance for South Africa. As a part of the process of centralizing the organization of the Cl all member parties were ordered to convert their party structures to conform with the model of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Loose organizations of territorial groups bound together by socialist affinity and yearly meetings were to be replaced by highly centralized structures, the basic units of which were to be disciplined cells within the factory or at the place of work. It has already been noted how the CPSA rejected this form of organization for itself. Insistence upon it by the Cl contained the seeds of conflict between the CPSA and the Cl.

The meeting of the third congress of the RILU also did not specifically concern itself with South Africa. l n the debates on the Negro question which focused on the United States, one of the main proponents of attention to the problems of the Negro was the head of the RILU, A. Lozovsky. Over the opposition of some of the American delegates his proposal endorsing separate unions for non-whites and whites was accepted. In an action parallel to that of the Cl, the RILU also charged its member unions in the imperialist countries to render all support possible to the trade unions in the colonies of their countries. At the end of the congress it was announced that a special Negro Commission was to be chosen to study the Negro problem in detail in order to present concrete proposals to the next RILU Congress. In the interim all supporters of the RILU "in America, South Africa, and other countries where there are Negro workers" were urged to work among Negro workers to further the linking of their organizations with those of the white workers. The disjointed actions of the third congress of the RILU did not immediately affect South Africa, but they did bring the South African situation under the surveillance of other organizations in the international communist movement. Perhaps most significantly, they revealed that Lozovsky, a key individual in the international communist hierarchy by virtue of his position in the RILU, was particularly interested in the Negro problem 23 which he, too, extended to include both the United States and South Africa.

There is no evidence that either the Negro Commission of the Cl or the Negro Commission of the RILU met to plan a coordinated attack upon the problem of the Negro workers. 24 Yet it does appear that the Cl did direct the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) to form a communist front for Negro farmers and workers. The American Negro Labor Congress, which the CPUSA organized, was conceived primarily and specifically as a device by which to attract American Negroes into the CPUSA. Yet at the same time the organizers of the Congress clearly hoped to use it as a platform from which an appeal could be made to all Negro workers of the world for a world conference to be held in 1926. In this vein Kadalie was apparently invited to attend. 25

At a poorly attended meeting in Chicago the American Negro Labor Congress met in October 1925. Most of its work was devoted to the problems of the American Negro, but the Congress did instruct its National Executive Committee to convene a world Negro conference in order to lay the foundation for a world organization of the workers and farmers of our race and to make this organization a leader and fighter in the liberation movements of all darker-skinned peoples in the colonies of imperialism everywhere. 26

Subsequently, it was reported in the February 26, 1926, issue of The Workers' Weekly of London that a decision had been taken to hold a World Congress of Coloured Workers in Brussels in March 1926, at which it was hoped to gather delegates "from America, the Sudan, West and South Africa, etc." The Congress, however, was never held and remained another example of communist inability to mobilize its forces for a Negro conference to compete with those of the Garvey movement and of the Pan-African Congress led by W. E. B. DuBois.

The American Negro Labor Congress itself remained a very small organization within the United States which never fulfilled the grand purposes which its organizers envisaged. Nevertheless, it did have both a symbolic and a direct impact upon future discussions of the world Negro problem. It reaffirmed the preeminence of the CPUSA in the international communist consideration of the world Negro problem. Although it did not recruit many American Negroes into the CPUSA, one of the few whom it did recruit, James Ford, became a strong force later in urging a reorientation of the policy of the CPSA. Perhaps most ironically, the American Negro Labor Congress was important because it did not succeed. Its failure in the face of repeated communist promises to devote attention to the problem of the Negro provided a spur for further re-evaluation of tactics toward the Negro.

In late 1925 the first group of Negroes recruited by the CPUSA for study in Moscow (four American Negroes and one student from the Gold Coast who had been studying in the United States) arrived to attend the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, an institution in which Stalin had particular interest. Shortly after their arrival, the group was taken for an interview with Stalin. At the interview Stalin, the authority of the Soviet Communist Party on the question of nationalities, appeared to regard the Negro problem in the United States as a national problem and the lack of solution to the Negro problem as the result of a failure to consider the Negroes as a nationality. At the time of the interview Stalin did not offer a detailed solution for the Negro problem, but he did suggest that the American Negroes learn from the Leninist-Stalinist theory of nationalities.

By 1927 Stalin apparently had translated his interest in the American Negro into a new, concrete policy. Lozovsky is reported to have shown an American communist an outline of new theses in which the Leninist-Stalinist theory of national self-determination was applied to the American Negroes. Furthermore, Stalin was present at a presentation of the new theses in a meeting of the Anglo-American Secretariat of the Cl and did not question the presentation. The new formulation inspired by Stalin did not, however, convince most of the American communists, Negro and white, in Moscow. They still maintained that the solution of the Negro problem lay in the granting of full social, economic, and political equality to the Negroes within the larger American society, rather than treating Negroes as a nation to whom rights of self-determination were to be granted. Nevertheless, the new program for the American Negro supported by Stalin gained ascendancy in the councils of the Cl. 27

It is impossible to tell whether Stalin also worked out the idea of an "independent native South African republic"; there is no evidence to indicate that he did. Yet it is clear that the formula which he had inspired for the Negroes of the United States was taken up by the Cl and extended to South Africa.

In late 1927 or early 1928 a Negro Sub-Commission was established within the Anglo-American Secretariat or the Colonial Secretariat of the Cl. Its chairman was N. Nasanov, a Russian communist youth leader who had once been the representative of the YCI to the YCL of the United States. Its vice-chairman was Harry Haywood, an American Negro communist student who was a close friend of Nasanov and who, unlike the other American Negro communists in Moscow, had accepted the new formula for the American Negro. The Negro Sub-Commission worked out a resolution n the American Negro and it also prepared the "Draft Resolution on South Africa." In the course of its work the Sub-Commission apparently consulted with La Guma during his visit to Moscow, but it seems clear that he, at most, supplied specific details about the South African situation for inclusion in a resolution whose main outlines he had heard from Bukharin. It was thus a 'made-in-Moscow' product which was presented to the CPSA in the "Draft Resolution on South Africa."28

The controversial new positions on the Negroes in the United States and the South African question were part of a general reorientation of the policy of the Soviet Union and the Cl in 1927-28. In the summer of 1927 the stormy relations of the Soviet Union with Great Britain came to a breaking point. The breach seemed to be the culmination of progressive Soviet isolation in Europe, and precipitated a war scare within the Soviet Union. Meanwhile in Asia the bloody attacks on the Chinese communists by their former Kuomintang allies seemed to prove the futility of cooperation with a bourgeois nationalist movement. Stalin extrapolated the difficult international problems into his intra-party struggle with Trotsky. Fearing Trotskyist criticism about the failure of his China policy, Stalin exploited the war panic to demand discipline within the Soviet Communist Party. Trotsky refused to yield. The overwhelmingly Stalinist majority of the central committee of the Soviet Communist Party voted to oust Trotsky from the party in November 1927 and a month later the dutiful fifteenth congress of the Soviet Communist Party endorsed the expulsion. Both the internal and external threats to the position of Stalin demanded a shift in tactics and a general tightening of discipline throughout the communist hierarchy.

It is in this context that the sudden interest of the international communist movement in the previously neglected world Negro problem and the South African question is more comprehensible. As the most exploited group in the increasingly strong capitalist United States, the Negroes were obviously an important component of any revolutionary strategy to be devised to counter the heightened danger of any capitalist attack on the Soviet Union. At the same time the American Negroes were regarded potentially as the most effective communist missionaries in the African colonies of the European powers. South Africa, as a part of the British empire in which revolutionary movements had to be encouraged to offset the expected war threats from Britain itself, became an area of particular concern to the Cl for the first time. It became imperative that the process of 'Bolshevization,' enunciated in 1924 but still unapplied to South Africa, he extended to include the CPSA if communist activities in South Africa were to be coordinated properly against the anticipated threat to the Soviet Union and the international communist movement.

The fourth congress of the RlLU, meeting in Moscow in March-April 1928, provided a number of clues to the intentions of the communists. In the 3-1/2 years preceding the fourth congress the question of South Africa was seldom discussed by the central executive of the RILU. Nevertheless, Lozovsky had maintained his concern. In 1926, at the March meeting of the central executive, Lozovsky had specifically included the Negro question, in the United States and South Africa, as a part of the immediate tasks of the RILU. He castigated the American and South African communist trade unionists for not having attacked the problem of organizing the black workers in line with the proposals passed by the third congress of the RILU in 1924.29

At the fourth congress of the RILU Lozovsky renewed his attacks. In his introductory speech Lozovsky specifically attacked the Americans for their failure to move beyond their resolutions of support for the cause of the Negro worker. He also reminded the trade unionists of Europe of their duty to aid the colonial workers in their own countries' colonies.

There were no South Africans, white or non-white, at the congress. Thus, it remained for Heller of the Soviet Union in his keynote speech upon the labor movement in the colonial and semi-colonial countries to devote a specific section to South Africa. Helter asserted that in South Africa, as in Africa and the metropolitan countries, the positions of the African workers and the white workers were worsening under the impact of new imperialist penetrations. To counter these developments Heller suggested that there was only one solution--a single trade union center of white and non-white workers and a united front of all the South African proletariat against the attacks of capitalism. Heller said nothing about the question of temporary separate unions for non-white workers (which Lozovsky had implicitly endorsed again for the American Negro workers). Instead Heller urged a broad campaign against the proposed Hertzog 'Native' Bills. In Heller's view the increase in the numbers of the poor whites and the growth of the size and skill of the non-white labor force inevitably would create conditions for cooperation between white and non-white labor. Significantly, Heller concluded with the assertion that the problem of unity between white and non-white labor transcended the borders of South Africa to include all of Africa and even the United States; he regarded attention to the problem by the RILU as a "most important and first-ranking task."

In the course of the congress the cause of the Negro workers was pushed most strongly by Ford, who arrived in Moscow as the first American Negro delegate to attend a congress of the RILU. Resentful of the lack of attention by the American supporters of the RILU to the Negro worker, Ford urged that the RILU establish the closest cooperation between the workers of the United States, the West Indies, Latin America, and Africa. In an attempt to ensure close attention to the problems of the Negro worker, Ford demanded that the fourth congress add a resolution charging the central executive of the RILU to call a conference of Negro workers "to work out immediate practical measures to realise the line established by the Congress in the question about the organisation of Negro workers in the United States and Africa."

The final resolutions of the fourth congress of the RILU formalized the concerns of Lozovsky, Heller and Ford. In the general resolution on the tasks of the RILU there was a section devoted to white and non-white labor in the United States which reiterated the position of the third congress of the RlLU that the Americans should take immediate steps to organize Negro workers, in separate unions if necessary, with the end of bringing eventual unity between all workers. In the resolution on the work of the RILU in the colonial and semi-colonial countries the propositions of Heller on South Africa were incorporated unchanged, including the assertion that work in South Africa was significant for all of Africa, the United States (and the French Negro colonies in the West Indies). In a change of strategy from the third congress of the RILU it was specifically stated that the "fundamental task" of the South African RILU supporters was the uniting of white and non-white workers into "a single trade union center"; nothing was said for or against temporary dual unions, but the implication seemed to be that they were not to be used as the situation was seen ripe for joint action by workers of all races. The RILU adherents in Great Britain were specifically urged to help the organization of colonial workers in their colonies. In a special resolution on Negro workers, the congress affirmed Ford's demand for a conference of Negro workers to discuss the implementation of the congress resolutions on the Negro. 30

The meeting later in 1928 of another international communist organization, the YCI, offered additional evidence both of the nature of the international communist interest in the Negro, and of the aggressive concern of the American Negro communists for action. The inattention of the American and the South African young communists to non-white workers was decried. Several American Negro speakers sharply criticized the position in the United States, but some also did discuss South Africa. In particular, Ford, in attendance as a delegate from the RILU, asserted that more attention must be devoted by the YCI to the question of African workers. He suggested that the YCI follow the guidelines established by the RILU and work with the RILU upon the Negro question. The chief rapporteur of the colonial commission went further to echo the contentions of the speakers at the fourth congress of the RILU that both the United States and South Africa should provide trained Negro leaders for all the areas in which Negroes were found. 31

Although British communists had not participated in the discussions on the Negro question at the RILU or the YCI meetings, they were also showing quickened interest in the South African problem. In the mid-1920's the interests of the CPGB in the colonial problem were initially focused upon India. Even when the CPGB began to turn to South Africa it saw the problem largely in terms of India. 32 It does not appear that the CPGB sent any representatives to the CPSA in the 1920's.33 But by mid-1927 intellectuals in the CPGB were debating the nature of super-profit in the British colonies and its relationship to the national-revolutionary movements in the colonies. 34 While Roux was a student at Cambridge University he was invited to serve as a part-time member of the colonial department of the CPGB. Through Roux the lab our research department of the CPGB invited Bunting to send information to Britain for a book on South Africa which it was considering early in 1928. 35 In a parallel move, the National Minority Movement, the British section of the RILU, attempted to secure the attendance of the SATUC at the fourth congress of the RILU in Moscow in 1928. 36 By mid-1928 the CPGB was working behind the scenes on Shields and Roux to encourage them to accept the new program of the "independent native South African republic" for the CPSA. 37

The actions and activities of the RILU, the YCI, and the CPGB made no public reference to the questions of "self-determination for the Negro" or the "independent native South African republic." Yet they did give notice of increased interest in the problem of the Negro and South Africa. Renewed emphasis was placed upon the oneness of the world Negro problem, and upon the leading position of the United States and South Africa within that problem. The new concentration upon South Africa as a focus for any attempt to work among African workers provided openings for advice and intervention by the RILU, the YCI, or the CPGB. And the angry insistence of Ford upon immediate attention to the Negro problem indicated that an American Negro communist might serve as a catalyst to activate the interest of the international communist movement in direct approaches to the Negro and African.

It was against a backdrop of obviously rising interest in South Africa and the Negro problem that the sixth congress of the Cl met in mid-1928. It was clear that the "Draft Resolution on South Africa" represented an extraordinary challenge to the position of the CPSA. Yet the South Africans were unaware of the forces and pressures within the international communist movement that were converging upon them to demand conformity and adherence to the new line.

Convinced of the correctness of their estimation of the South African situation and buoyed by their recent successes among the non-whites in South Africa on the basis of their own painfully-envolved policies, the delegates of the majority of the CPSA, Bunting and his wife, and Roux (who joined them in Britain), travel led to Moscow anxious to present their positions to the Cl whose ultimate authority they never questioned. The Buntings tended to think that the new slogan of an "independent native South African republic" was a result of La Guma's machinations while in Moscow, while Roux felt that it had been derived by the Cl without full understanding of the South African situation. All three, however, opposed it. 38

Upon arrival in Moscow the South Africans found an atmosphere of intrigue and tension, part of which included them. Apparently the few South African proponents of the new program had sent condemnations of the Buntings and the CPSA leadership to Moscow along with their minority report. 39 The South Africans found themselves accused as 'white chauvinists.' The Buntings and Roux were deliberately avoided by some delegates, and Ford, the American Negro communist who had become so interested in the world Negro problem, refused to speak to them. Bunting complained in his first speech to the Congress:

At any rate, we ask to be considered a little more as representing equally masses of workers, and not treated with, shall I say, a sort of contempt as representing mere shapeless 'masses.' When I camehere an official of the Communist International said, 'We are going to attack you.' That is rather a poor sort of reception to give to representatives elected by the vote of the Party, in which there is a huge preponderance of natives. It is rather a poor reception to give to their representatives before anything has been discussed to say 'we are going to attack you.' We came here to take counsel together as to how we could strengthen each other. Certainly in our own party, whatever the differences between us we do not treat each other likethat, 40

When the South Africans attempted to seek out the leaders of the Cl, they were informed by the Russian head of the Anglo-American Secretariat, A. J. Ben net, that the South African question would be decided by the Anglo-American Secretariat along with the Negro question at a later date. Relegated to attendance at the main sessions of the sixth congress, the South Africans prepared speeches for delivery before the congress. Mrs. Bunting and Roux both delivered brief, general speeches to the congress, Mrs. Bunting (on July 25) focusing on the need for activities among women, and Roux (on July 26) discussing the need for greater attention to Africa on the part of the Cl. 41 It was Bunting himself who raised the more specific question of South Africa in his first speech to the congress on July 23. Although he did comment about the rude treatment the South Africans had received, Bunting carefully refrained from mentioning the crisis over the slogan of the "independent native South African republic." Instead, Bunting concentrated upon a restatement of the 'ideology' and strategy which the CPSA had developed under his leadership. Pleading the need for a much more careful study of the peculiarities of the different parts of Africa, Bunting explicitly noted the uniqueness of South Africa:

Conditions in South Africa are different from any other part of that continent. South Africa is, owing to its climate, what is called a 'white man's country' where whites can and do live not merely as planters and officials but as a whole nation of all classes, established there for centuries of Dutch and English composition. 42

In such a situation, Bunting argued, the communist strategy dictated approaching the problem not primarily from the point of view of nationalism, but primarily from the orthodox point of view of the class struggle, particularly since nationalism in South Africa was restricted to white Afrikaner workers. He argued that the contribution of the white workers, as workers, should be recognized. Analyzing the position of the non-whites, Bunting asserted that they were part-time peasants and part-time workers in most cases, and thus in terms of communist strategy should be regarded as workers. In effect, Bunting rejected the view that the agrarian or the national problem was the primary question in South Africa. Emphatically, Bunting urged that the colonial workers be regarded as workers only and that strategy be tailored accordingly.

On the following day, William Dunne, one of the white American delegates, attacked Bunting's speech as "social democratic." Seizing Bunting's characterization of South Africa as a "white man's country," Dunne urged that "the Congress must take action against this comrade and that an example must be made of this instance to prove to the colonial people and especially to the millions of Negro workers and peasants that the Congress of the Comintern does not and will not approve of such utterances from this rostrum." Dunne's attack against the South Africans was echoed a few days later by Bennet, and on July 30 Bukharin clearly implied that the South Africans were showing survivals of race prejudice in the discussions of the Negro Commission. 43 It was in this hostile atmosphere that the South Africans continued to present their viewpoint during the remainder of the congress.

After weeks of unsuccessful attempts to get to the seat of authority, Bunting finally took to the floor of the congress to present the South African viewpoint on the question of the "independent native South African republic." Earlier, on August 9, Bunting had protested against the charges of white chauvinism which had been level led against the CPSA, but on August 20, he presented an argument against the new program in which he mentioned the controversy over the slogan of the "independent native South African republic" for the first time. In an attempt to refute the arguments behind the new program, Bunting took direct issue with the contention in the new program that "the national question in South Africa, which is based upon the agrarian question, lies at the foundation of the revolution in South Africa." He denied that support for this contention could be found in the "National and Colonial Theses" passed at the second congress of the Cl. On the contrary, Bunting stated that the "National and Colonial Theses" asserted that any communist support for a revolutionary movement in the colonies should be determined by a study of existing conditions. Bunting then proceeded to give an estimate of the existing conditions in South Afric a which, he argued, dictated that the communists should not support the nationalist movement in South Africa. Again Bunting repeated his earlier contention that the non-whites were being rapidly proletarianized and organized as a working class, but as agrarian masses they showed no sign of revolt. Bunting denied the existence of a significant non-white bourgeoisie in South Africa. Further, he specifically rejected the suggestion that the CPSA attempt to strengthen the ANC:

The African National Congress, which the resolution wants us to boost up, is a moribund body, it has had its day. In any case its demands were not nationalist demands proper, but such as the following: removal of all special race oppression and discrimination, land and more land, equality with whites, equal votes, equal education, equal justice, equal treatment, rights and opportunities everywhere. It has usually sought redress for grievances by sending deputations to the King of England, which of course have resulted in nothing. We believe the class stimulus is a greater stimulus even to the native masses, it has actually stimulated greater sacrifices and devotion already, and it has the added advantage of gaining, instead of perhaps forfeiting, the alliance of the white workers. The CP is itself the actual or potential Ieader of the native national movement; it makes all the national demands that the national body makes, and of course much more, and it can 'control' nationalism with a view to developing its maximum fighting strength. 44

In Bunting's view, the South African experience demanded continued concentration upon the class struggle, perse, with the CPSA as the leading organization embodying the most advanced demands of all revolutionary groups. Bunting then discussed the more 'practical' reasons why the majority of the CPSA opposed the new slogan. He claimed that emphasis on the national movement would drive the white worker to side with the white exploiter against non-white nationalism; already the tendency existed for the non-white nationalists to attack the class movement of the white workers. He claimed that the proposed formulation of the new slogan would indicate to the white workers a black race dictatorship. In Bunting's view, some attempt would have to be made to devise a formula which would put less emphasis upon nationalism in order to avoid giving the impression to the white workers that any "independent native South African republic" would ignore their interests, even if, in fact, it would not. Bunting went on to refute anew the allegations of white chauvinism in the CPSA and then to reiterate the need at least for the neutrality, if not the support, of the white workers In order to carry on the extremely difficult work and propaganda of the CPSA successfully. Asserting the right of the CPSA to be heard on the basis of its work in the face of difficult odds, Bunting predicted that the racial emphasis of the new slogan would give the government an easy pretext to persecute the CPSA, would create a basis for a fascist alliance with the bourgeoisie, and would generate violent racial hostilities which would blot out the class struggle.

In closing Bunting invoked the clause on South Africa in the proposed theses on "The International Situation and the Tasks of the Communist International" in which no mention was made of the slogan of an "independent native South African republic." Bunting stood on the past program of the CPSA for proletarian equality, fullest majority rights, an end to all racial discrimination, and direct action towards the proletarian revolt ion.

Bunting's last and most direct plea was ignored as were his earlier pleas. Behind the scenes in the Negro Sub-Commission the final formula for the CPSA (as well as that for the American Negro policy of the CPUSA) was hammered out to the tune dictated by the Cl authorities. The membership of the Negro Sub-Commission numbered 32, among which were five American Negroes, two white Americans, nine Russians, five Asians, and one Englishman. 45 Bunting was the lone South African representative on the rolls of the Negro Sub-Commission. Among the 32 members were Ford and Bennet, both of whom had been hostile to the South Africans, Haywood and Nasonov, who had been active in the formulation of the slogan of the "independent native South African republic," and Heller of the RILU who had singled out the South African problem at the recent RILU Congress. The composition of the Negro Sub-Commission seemed unusually stacked against the South Africans.

The records of the meetings of the Negro Sub-Commission are not available, but the accounts of the meetings which have become public indicate that the South Africans were given no real opportunity to present their arguments. 46 Still loyal to the Cl, but convinced that they better understood the South African situation, the South Africans attempted to modify the program which had been prepared by the Cl. Roux, still opposed to the slogan, but believing that the South Africans were weak in Marxist theory from which the program had been deduced, tried to work within the new program. He proposed an amendment to the key phrases of the new slogan which he thought might make it more palatable to potentially sympathetic white workers in South Africa. In place of the slogan "an independent native South African republic as a stage towards a workers' and peasants' republic, with full, equal rights for all races, black, colour Ed and white," Roux proposed "an independent workers' and peasants' South African Republic, with equal rights for all toilers irrespective of colour, as a basis for a native majority government." In a letter to a South African comrade, Roux elaborated the thinking behind his amendment:

Supplemented by immediate demands for an equal franchise throughout the Union, the admission of natives to Parliament, and the abolition of all he lot relations, this will be a revolutionary rallying slogan guaranteeing to the CP the leadership of the racial struggle of the natives. At the same time it will enable us to argue our case in the white trade unions. If we say a 'Black Republic' and then qualify this by saying that there will be autonomy for whites we cannot but expect to be howled down in the white trade unions; we shall not even be allowed to state our case. At the mention of 'Black Republic' the bricks will begin to fly and our subsequent qualifications will be relegated to the post-mortem examination. It is much more sensible to approach the white workers in these terms: 'You are workers, trade unionists; you are exploited and shot down by the boss; unite to overthrow capitalism; unite with your native fellow workers; demand full equality for all workers; the native workers are the majority you must therefore be prepared to grant them their majority rights.' This will also probably be howled down in many cases, but at least it provides a tactical approach to the subject. 47

Bennet and the members of the Negro Sub-Commission would not allow Roux's amendment or any other. They claimed that even a slight editorial change would be interpreted as a partial victory for the "social democratic" South Africans.

Roux had to return to England, but the Buntings stayed on in Moscow in the faint hope of modifying the new program. Their efforts continued to be treated with contempt--so much so that they were refused copies of the record of the meeting in which Roux had proposed the amendment. 48 By September the Buntings had returned to London completely unsuccessful in the mission which the majority of the CPSA had delegated to them.

The machinery of the Cl continued to grind out the new program for the CPSA which the South African delegates had been unable to change. On October 19 the political secretariat of the ECCI approved the new program worked out by the Negro Sub-Commission, making it official and binding policy of the Cl; on October 30 a Russian-language version was published in Pravda.

The final resolution of the ECCI, "The South African Question," focused on the "native" or "negro" (the terms were used interchangeably). It was postulated that South Africa was a "British Dominion of the colonial type." In the view of the resolution of the ECCI the developing capitalist production of South Africa did not alter the colonial nature of the country inasmuch as the new South African bourgeoisie was as equally interested as British imperialism in the merciless exploitation of the "negro" population. The "negro" population was seen as predominantly landless, without any bourgeoisie as a class. It was recognized that the majority of the workers of the country were "negro" (but nothing was said to indicate that the majority of the "negroes" were workers as Bunting had argued). As in all colonial situations the difference in living standard between white and non-white workers was "the characteristic feature of the colonial type of the country."

In political terms the resolution determined that the country was directed by a white Afrikaner bourgeoisie which had made its peace with the British imperialists in a united front for the colonial expansion of British capital and against the "native population" which had no rights whatsoever. The influx of British capital was accompanied by the British practices of the corruption of labor. Thus, through the SALP white labor was being attracted to the side of the bourgeoisie, as were the Coloureds and certain "native" reformists (the latter through such agencies as the ICU). In such a situation the CPSA, "the only political Party in the country which unites the white and black proletariat and the landless black peasantry for the struggle against British imperialism, against the white bourgeoisie and the white and black reformist leaders," was in a complicated, but favorable position.

In a series of tasks, which implicitly and explicitly criticized the past practice and 'ideology' of the CPSA, the resolution indicated how the CPSA could take advantage of its favorable situation to develop influence among the "workers and peasants." First, it was decreed that the CPSA was to reorganize itself on a "shop and street nuclei basis" as a part of a program to build up a mass party. Second, the party was ordered to base itself "chiefly upon the native toiling masses while continuing to work actively among the white workers"; specifically "native" membership was to be brought into "much more active leadership of the Party." In its fight against all "anti-native" laws and British domination, the CPSA was to use the already controversial slogan, "an independent native South African republic, with full, equal rights for all races, black, colour Ed and white." It was asserted that the black peasantry were the "basic moving force of the revolution in alliance with and under the leadership of the working class." Hence the national question, which was based upon the agrarian question, was of primary importance. It was proclaimed that the CPSA, if it "correctly understands its political tasks...will and must become the leader of the national agrarian revolutionary movement of the native masses."

The resolution went on to spell out how the tasks were to be realized. In its concentration upon the national question the CPSA was to pay particular attention to "embryonic national organisations among the natives, such as the African National Congress." Quite specifically it stated:

Our aim should be to transform the African National Congress into a fighting nationalist revolutionary organisation against the white bourgeoisie and the British imperialists, based upon the trade unions, peasant organisations, etc., developing systematically the leadership of the workers and the Communist Party in this organisation. 49

Simultaneously, the party was to work out an agrarian program with particular attention to "concrete partial demands which indicate that the basic question in the agrarian situation in South Africa is the land hunger of the blacks and that their interest is of prior importance in the solution of the agrarian question." To back up the agrarian program plans were to be drawn for the organization of peasant unions and unions of "native" agricultural workers. At the same time the problems of the poor agrarian whites were not to be neglected.

The new resolution, however, did not neglect the trade union work of the party. It was asserted that the main emphasis in support of the new program was "the organisation of the native workers into trade unions as well as propaganda and work for the setting up of a South African trade union centre embracing black and white workers." Communists were enjoined to work against the splitting policy of the ICU and to participate actively in building up a left wing in the trade unions under communist leadership. A similar policy was to apply to trade unions affiliated to the SATUC. To buttress work within the SATUC the party was to continue to expose the SALP.

The South Africans were warned that fear of government prosecution must not deter them from resolute application of the new slogan. In the same vein the party was urged to continue to work among the "non-exploiting elements of the white population." It was categorically stated that "the white toiling masses must realize that in South Africa they constitute national minorities, and it is their task to support and fight jointly with the native masses against the white bourgeoisie and the British imperialists."

The resolution rested confident that action in accord with the prescribed tactics would build up a strong communist movement to meet the anticipated attacks of the government and the ruling classes. More crucially, the resolution was sure that the new role which it proclaimed for the working class would result in new unity between white and black workers instead of hostility:

The Communist Party must continue to struggle for unity between black and white workers and not confine itself merely to the advocacy of 'cooperation' between whites and blacks in general. The Communist Party must introduce a correct class content into the idea of cooperation between the blacks and whites. It must explain to the native masses that the black and white workers are not only allies, but are the leaders of the revolutionary struggle of the native masses against the white bourgeoisie and British imperialism. A correct formulation of this task and intensive propaganda of the chief slogan of a native republic will result not in the alienation of the white workers from the Communist Party, not in the segregation of the natives, but, on the contrary, in the building up of a solid united front of all toilers against capitalism and imperialism. 50

The extensive resolution of the ECCI on "The South African Question" was notable for the considerable detail in which it directed the tiny CPSA. The details were part of a formula which was derived both from the general Cl analyses of the colonial situation and from the Leninist-Stalinist theories of nationality. In both cases the original analyses were not superimposed upon the South African without any consideration of South African peculiarities. The full detailed formulas of self-determination for all national minorities up to and including the right of secession were not brought into the South African program (as they were into the program for the American Negro); it was merely proclaimed that the "natives" would rule the new independent South African republic with full rights for all other groups within it. In the analysis of South Africa as a colony the resolution did note some of the distinguishing features of South Africa and tried to tailor its suggested tactics accordingly. Yet the new formula contradicted much of the experience of the CPSA--experience which seemed to have brought the CPSA to the verge of a breakthrough among the non-whites of South Africa. Furthermore, the new formula spotlighted some of the remaining ambiguities of the appeal of the communists to workers of all races. It threatened a loss of influence for the CPSA among the white (and non-white) workers. It was couched in terms which increased the possibility of a direct government persecution of the communists. The 'wisdom' of the new resolution devised at a great distance from South African affairs was thus questionable.

At the same time as the new resolution was notable for the considerable detail with which it directed the CPSA, it was also notable for the details of the South African situation which it neglected to mention. There was no mention whatsoever of the Indians. The Coloureds were mentioned only in reference to the attempts of the white bourgeoisie to 'corrupt' them; no special tactics were suggested to keep the Coloureds from the clutches of the bourgeoisie. The resolution distinguished between British imperialism and the "Dutch" white bourgeoisie of South Africa, yet it made no attempt to discuss the differences between the English-speaking and Afrikaner workers. Equally in its brief mention of "poor agrarian whites" (almost all of whom were Afrikaners) it did not indicate the nationality of these workers and whether the national question was relevant in any approach which might be made to them. The lacunae in the resolution, as much as the contents of the resolution itself, revealed the lack of understanding of the South African situation which the new detailed Cl program entailed.

The incomplete comprehension of South Africa exhibited in the resolution on "The South African Question" only achieves its full significance when the authority of the resolution is also taken into consideration. For the first time since the adherence of the CPSA to the Cl in 1921 and its acceptance of Cl discipline the CPSA was explicitly and particularly directed from outside South Africa to change its program. The choice was direct and painful: either accept the new program despite its unsuitability to the South African situation or reject the new program and risk the wrath of, and possible expulsion from, the Cl to which the CPSA had always given its loyalty. The secretary of the Negro Sub-Commission starkly stated the attitude of the Cl:

I believe that we must tell the majority of the leadership of the South African Party that they must unconditionally correct their attitude; their opposition in the question of the slogan of the Native Republic must be given up. 51

The question of the new slogan thus became, in essence, a question of Cl discipline and a test of the loyalty of the membership of the CPSA to Moscow.

It took over two years for the full intentions of the Cl towards the CPSA to become manifest. In the process much was revealed about the potentialities and difficulties of incorporating the new slogan into the strategy of the CPSA. Simultaneously, the efforts of the party to expand its program on the basis of its interpretation of the new slogan showed much about the position of communism in the larger context of South African politics, white and non-white. Most fascinating, however, were the operations of the machinery of international communism as it endeavored to ensure the conformity of a constituent section, even at the periphery of the international communist movement.

None of the CPSA delegates to the sixth congress of the Cl rejected the decision of the Cl once it had been made. Roux became convinced by his experiences in Moscow that the CPSA was weak in Marxist theory and had failed to emphasize properly the racial and national nature of the struggle of the Africans in South Africa; he thus accepted the new slogan quite easily once the determination of the Cl to impose it was unmistakable. Bunting, on the other hand, remained convinced that the previous activities of the CPSA had quite sufficiently involved the national and racial interests of the Africans. Bunting was dubious about the prospects of the CPSA with the new slogan--particularly in the face of expected government persecution. Nevertheless, he resolved to "make the best of it "1

Immediately upon his return to South Africa Bunting felt the hostility of white South Africa. On August 25 the Cape Times had published reports, date lined Riga, that Mrs. Rebecca Bunting had pointed out the danger of the new program of 'a black South African Soviet Republic.' When the Buntings landed in Cape Town they found themselves faced with a barrage of questions from reporters. On November 3, four days after the publication of the condensed version of the ECCI resolution in Pravda, the Cape Times picked up the report of the decision. The condensation of the text as published in Pravda was translated and printed in the Cape Times of November 14. The leadership of the CPSA, which had previously refused to reply publicly to any questions, was forced to make a public pronouncement about the new program.

On November 17 a letter from Bunting was published in The Star of Johannesburg. He denied that Mrs. Bunting had ever said anything about the new slogan at the sessions of the Cl congress (she had not), but he did admit that there had been involved discussions about the new slogan at the congress. Bunting reported that the South Africans had maintained that the existing program of the CPSA contained most of the points of the suggested new program, and that the language of the key slogan of the new program might arouse serious misunderstandings, but they had been overruled by a majority of the Negro Sub-Committee (Bunting did not mention the Negro Sub-Committee by name). Bunting asserted, however, that the Cl version of the new program which had been adopted was not a change of policy, but merely a new emphasis within the principles upon which all communists agreed. In a most un-Marxist way Bunting explained the meaning of the "independent native South African republic":

You can all come in and all play an important and useful part; but there will be no more rule or privilege of race over race, and consequently the majority, being native, will, of course, give a decided native character to the whole republic. The 'native republic' as such excludes none, but means a republic in which the native people enjoy (after all it is their own country) the fullest rights, and consequently the rights of an overwhelming majority which are not merely quantitative, but qualitative.2

There was no mention of the unpleasant atmosphere which had pervaded the meetings in Moscow.

On the following day, November 18, the new slogan was presented to the CPSA officially for the first time at a meeting in the party hall in Johannesburg. It was Wolton who announced the new slogan: "A South African Native Republic as a Stage Towards a Workers' and Peasants' Government with Full Protection and Equal Rights for All National Minorities." Bunting followed with a rambling speech in which he characterized the nature of imperialism, particularly as it was manifest in South Africa. He justified the new slogan as a legitimate response to the call for race domination and white rule advocated by Nationalist spokesmen. 3

A more careful presentation of Bunting's views appeared in a 61-page pamphlet, Imperialism and South Africa, which was published in November by the CPSA. Written by Bunting on the long boat journey from Southamptom to Cape Town, the pamphlet showed itself as the base upon which Bunting had prepared his letter to The Star and his speech to the CPSA meeting. In great detail Bunting discussed the nature of race oppression in South Africa as a consequence of the imperialist penetration of Africa. He argued that the only way to end such oppression was on the basis of an overturn of the system through self-determination and independence from Great Britain. Bunting carefully indicated that the independence of which the Afrikaner Nationalists talked would not suffice:

Real liberation means not just formal independence of the S. African bourgeoisie from the British bourgeoisie, but freedom of the S. African natives as a race, and also freedom of the S. A. working class and peasantry, who are mostly but not all black, as an exploited class, from the rule of the white race as such and from the rule of both the British and the S. African bourgeoisie. The primary struggle of the S. African natives for liberation, as it must apparently be carried out in practice, is in substance the same as, or part of, the struggle of the exploited in all countries for the overthrow of their own bourgeoisie and of the entire bourgeoisie as an international class, and for the rule of the workers and peasants. In political form, it is a struggle for a S. African Workers' and Peasants' Republic, as contrasted with the present regime of white rule over black and capitalist rule over worker. 4

Bunting, thus, telescoped the bourgeois democratic nationalist revolution, represented by the slogan of the "independent native South African republic as a stage," together with the proletarian revolution, represented by the idea of "a S. African Workers' and Peasants' Republic." Bunting's explanation was, in effect, a device to incorporate the new slogan into the program of the CPSA without any significant change in the tactics which the party had followed since 1924.

Bunting's problems with the CPSA were not, however, merely the adaptation of the new slogan to an approximation of the status quo ante in the party. The mere intrusion of "The Draft Resolution on South Africa" earlier in 1928 had already acted as a catalyst which had irreparably upset the uneasy equilibrium which had prevailed within the growing party. Bunting returned to South Africa to find the party split in a variety of ways. The Woltons and La Guma continued to support the new proposal and thus kept the animosity of the majority who continued to oppose it. The white trade unionists, including Andrews who had previously supported selected efforts of the CPSA, would have nothing to do with the new slogan. Weinbren, respected white organizer of the South African Federation of Non-European Trade Unions, maintained his opposition to the new slogan, supported by Thibedi, who became the secretary of the Federation in December 1928. Many African party members and trade unionists also continued to oppose the new slogan. Personal rivalries were aggravated by the dissension over the slogan. Thibedi and La Guma jostled for power within the trade unions, their personal rivalry heightened by their differing stands on the new slogan. In addition, Thibedi's personal conduct aroused the antagonism of many of the white members of the party. The promising advances of the party in 1927-1928 were distinctly threatened. 5

It was against a backdrop of rivalry and bickering that the seventh congress of the CPSA assembled in Johannesburg in late December 1928, in an attempt to reassert party unity within the framework of the new slogan. Ten white delegates and twenty non-white delegates discussed the affairs of the party. Opposition to the slogan remained, but Bunting as chairman ruled that any motions involving its rejection or modification were out of order under statutes of the Cl. For over a full day the question was discussed, and finally the controversial section of the new CPSA program, "Self-determination of the African peoples," was approved by a vote of 11-4. (There is no indication why only half of the delegates voted nor how particular delegates voted.) The formula adopted by the congress was involved and also different from the more simple Cl prescription:

Self-determination of the African peoples, i.e., their complete liberation from imperialist as well as bourgeois and feudal or semi-feudal rule and oppression, whether 'British' or 'South African' and wresting of power for a Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Republic wholly independent of the British or any other Empire, and comprising all the toiling masses, whether native or otherwise, of the Union and adjacent protectorates, etc. under the leadership of the working class, with the slogan of 'An Independent South African Native Republic as a stage towards the Workers' and Peasants' Republic, guaranteeing protection and complete equality to all national minorities' (such as Europeans); leading to the reconstruction of the country and rehabilitation of its people on a non-lmperialist, Socialist basis.6

Clearly it represented a victory for the views evolved by Bunting. The remainder of the new program adopted by the CPSA also reflected the vision of Bunting. In meandering fashion the program touched upon the nature of imperialism in South Africa, the tasks of the CPSA (a restatement, in fact, of the activities of the CPSA to date), the nature of the African national cause, and the place of the "non-exploiting whites" in the coming proletarian struggle. Soviet Russia was merely invoked as an example, and the Cl was mentioned only as proof of the possibility of socialist unity. The program concluded with a detailed set of "general" and "particular" demands. The general demands included the controversial section on the "independent South African Native Republic," but also demands for the full equality of all races, land for the landless, unity of the working class, and support of the USSR. The extensive and involved particular demands were divided into categories of "Political and Social," "Judicial," "Lab our," and "Lab our, etc." Subsumed under the various heads was a listing of the various measures which the party estimated would be necessary to bring about full equality of all races within South Africa; the totality of the demands represented a call for massive government intervention to reform the judicial and labor system, coupled with huge governmental investment to bring facilities for the non-whites up to those of the whites. Full freedom for labor was demanded, but there was no mention of the nationalization of any economic enterprise. Only in the question of land did the program demand expropriation, but the land was to be redistributed to "landless squatters, poor peasants and labourers, black and white." In discussing the immediate tactical plans of the CPSA there was no call for the reorganization of the party. The program merely pledged more intensive efforts to organize committees of action, cooperatives, and trade unions of all workers as well as increased efforts to expand "organisation Al contact and cooperation" between urban and rural workers, between non-white workers and white workers, between South African workers and the workers of imperialist Britain and socialist USSR. Only in the last clause of the program which called for a "strenuous campaign in lab our organisations against white 'Chauvinism,' against all illusions of 'class peace' or 'the classless state' under capitalism, against bourgeois reformism, social democratic confessionalism, corruption and treachery" did a hint of the harsh language of the sixth congress of the Cl creep into the program. The new program of the CPSA, thus, was more a reaffirmation of past tactics, rather than a call for radically new tactics.

Unmentioned in the program, but an important complement to the strategy which it advocated, was the decision of the seventh congress to put up communist candidates for parliament for the first time in predominantly African districts. Since mid-1928 it had been suggested that a communist candidate would run from the Cape Flats constituency, which included a semi-urban slum area outside of Cape Town with a considerable Coloured and African population. 7 Now the party also decided to contest Tembuland in the Transkei, one of the rural constituencies in the Eastern Cape with a significant proportion of African voters among its electorate. Wolton was chosen to contest the Cape Flats seat, while Bunting himself took on the more arduous task of going to the African reserves in which the Tembuland constituency was located.

The proceedings of the congress were marred by a sharp attack upon the conduct of the party by Wolton. Wolton, who had announced in the course of 1928 that he wanted to leave for England, and that party offices should be immediately taken by non-whites, reiterated his intentions and his demands. He went on to attack the party for alleged "chauvinistic errors." The congress, however, persuaded Wolton to stay at his post of secretary and editor, and to accept the nomination of the party to contest the Cape Flats seat.

With the exception of Wolton's conduct, Bunting was pleased with the tenor of the seventh congress. He felt that Wolton's attack had not been taken seriously by the congress and that the explanation of the new slogan which was adopted had done much to solve the crisis within the party. He noted that Weinbren and Thibedi were still opposed to the new slogan, but he was optimistic that their viewpoint would change.

The seventh congress of the CPSA took place amidst a rising uneasiness among whites about the imminence of disturbances among the non-whites. The flickering activities of the various ICU branches, particularly those of Champion's growing ICU base Natal in Durban, seemed to provide further justification for the fears of the South African whites. In Cape Province the ANC showed signs of activity which also caused anxiety. With an election pending, the issue of the 'native question' became particularly prominent. In the election of June 1929, the Nationalists, anxious to achieve exclusive power on their own without the aid of the SALP, brought forward a 'Black Manifesto' in which the electorate was promised that a Nationalist victory would assure white rule in South Africa. Support for the Hertzog 'Native' Bills was reaffirmed and the Nationalists also promised to tighten other laws affecting political activity among the non-whites. The opposition parties, not to be outdone, also showed a greater concern with the 'native question' than in the past.

The same developments which frightened white South Africa spurred the hopes of the communists in their electoral campaigns. The CPSA, like its predecessor, the ISL, expected little from parliament:

If the CP puts forward two Parliamentary candidates in this election, it is not because it has any illusions about Parliament, but the only aim or purpose of the CP is to state during the election and from inside Parliament, the case of the working masses and to prepare them for a real defence of their interests. 8

Consequently, the communist candidates concentrated upon propaganda activities to dramatize the plight of the Africans and to create a base for subsequent expansion of the party.

In the Cape Flats constituency, where the communists had been active before the election, the electoral activity of the communists was merely an expansion of previous tactics. Wolton led a demonstration of the African and Coloured residents of Ndabeni location to the City Hall in Cape Town to protest the raising of rents and other hardships of the location. 9 Although Wolton asserted in his electoral propaganda that the CPSA was the only party of black and white which struggled to mobilize the oppressed "natives" and the working class for "an Independent S. A. Native Republic with Equal Rights for all Races as a stage towards a Workers' and Peasants' Government," he much more emphasized interim demands for equality in all spheres as well as expanded social welfare activities for all.

Bunting's effort in the Tembuland constituency of the Transkei was much more daring and difficult. Like Wolton, he mentioned the new slogan in his electoral manifesto, but he, too, concentrated upon the more limited, but still vital, demands for an extension of the franchise, the raising of wages, the amelioration of the land shortage, and the extension of educational facilities. Yet unlike Wolton, Bunting could not capitalize upon previous communist activities in the Transkei for there had been none. Accompanied by his wife, an African as an interpreter, and an African driver, Bunting toured Tembuland for almost three months, penetrating to many rural settlements as well as to the principal towns in a constituency with a population of 1,000,000 Africans and only 20,000 whites. The voting roll of several thousand, however, was at most only half African; nevertheless, Bunting spoke to all types of Africans, voters and non-voters, throughout the constituency. Everywhere he was watched by the police, and in the course of the campaign he was prosecuted several times for various offenses including alleged violation of the new 'hostility' clause of the revised Native Administration Act. White officials openly campaigned against him. 10

The results of the communist electoral efforts were numerically disappointing. In the Cape Flats constituency Wolton lost his deposit, receiving only 93 votes out of a total of 3,082. In the Tembuland constituency Bunting performed much better, receiving 289 votes out of 2,302. Wolton had put up the communist standard in an area where it was known, yet had attracted only limited support--in part, apparently, because of the successful (and traditional) vote-buying efforts among the non-whites by the established parties. On the other hand, Bunting aroused respectable support in an area where there had been no communists, and where the instruments of the government and white society directly harassed the communists.

Communist work within the established African organizations was not particularly successful. Gumede remained president of the ANC and sympathetic to the cause of the CPSA. Yet his influence was sharply limited within the ANC leadership. The plans of 1928 for a national network of anti-pass committees remained stillborn, and when communists suggested organization for demonstrations at the 1929 conference of the ANC, the proposal was voted down. Faced with the continuing threat of the Hertzog 'Native' Bills and the new 'Black Manifesto' of the Nationalists, the ANC leadership continued committed to moral pressure through resolution and respectful representation. In the view of The South African Worker of April 30, 1929, their dignified, but unorganized opposition remained inadequate and reformist.

Only in the Cape Province did the communists show gains within the ANC organization. Party members continued to be active within the ANC organization which began to extend itself to the rural areas of the Western Cape. A measure of their success was the appearance of Professor Thaele at the party school in Johannesburg with words of encouragement for the CPSA as reported in The South African Worker of July 31, 1929.

The disintegrating ICU posed difficult problems for the communists in 1929. Shortly after Kadalie stepped down as general secretary of the ICU, he determined to return to his position despite the opposition of Ballinger. Ballinger and his supporters refused to yield, and Kadalie appealed to the other ICU lieutenants who resented Ballinger's intrusion into the organization. Supported by diverse elements within the ICU (some of whom had attacked Kadalie earlier in 1928), Kadalie formed the Independent ICU in February 1929. In an attempt to outflank the Ballinger-led organization Kadalie harangued for an overthrow of capitalism and tried to affiliate with the League Against Imperialism which had emerged from the Brussels congress of 1927 which he had refused to attend. The South African communists, however, were wary of Kadalie; they advised the headquarters of the League in Berlin to reject Kadalie's application. 11 Within South Africa Kadalie continued his strong rhetoric, but the Independent ICU never became more than a loose organization of several ICU centers whose leaders participated only as long as it suited their own particular local interests. Kadalie retired to East London in 1929 to become the head of the ICU organization in the African location there.

The Ballinger-led branch of the ICU became increasingly a rump organization--retaining only the legal name, the huge debts, and scattered, but poorly organized adherents. The stated constitutionalism and moderation of Ballinger were not appealing to the communists who refused to attend the annual conference of the organization. 12 Nevertheless, the communists did cooperate apparently with individual members of the Ballinger-led ICU and Ballinger, in turn, lent his support to some of the communist efforts to organize trade unions in Johannesburg. 13

Of the ICU bodies the ICU base Natal under Champion exhibited the greatest strength and the best organization. From his base at the Natal Workers' Club in Durban, Champion consolidated and expanded his organization among the Zulu workers of Durban. When Wolton and Nkosi came to Durban to start a branch of the CPSA in early 1929 they were invited to address meetings of the ICU base Natal. Members of the ICU base Natal joined the CPSA and were allowed to retain membership in the ICU base Natal. Yet Champion carefully remained a non-communist although he did continue to allow the communists to use his facilities for some months. By the latter half of 1929, however, he apparently cooled towards the communists and discouraged his union members from joining the CPSA. 14

In the course of 1929 there were various attempts to reunite the scattered ICU branches, none of which were successful. Roux suggested privately that the communists step into the vacuum by calling a unity conference of all factions of the ICU and of the communist-sponsored Federation in order to create a single new broad trade union federation. There was no special unity conference called by the communists, but at the second annual conference of the Federation delegates were invited from both Kadalie's Independent ICU and from Ballinger's ICU.15

Communist activities within the trade union field remained concentrated within the Federation, but the Federation was plagued with internal difficulties. Several new unions were formed in Johannesburg in the course of 1929, but the Federation did not expand into other cities of South Africa. No attempts were made to draw in white workers, in line with Heller's proposal at the fourth congress of the RILU. The member unions did not stage any successful strikes during the year. Weinbren and Thibedi, as has been noted, opposed the new slogan which the Federation was supposed to support. Thibedi came under attack for questionable financial practices. The spectacular advance of 1928 was not sustained.16

The greatest communist success in 1929 occurred within a new organization, the League of African Rights. 17 With the Cl in Moscow and with the CPGB in Britain the South Africans had discussed the idea of front organizations to work among Africans in order to avoid the inundation of the party by unprepared enthusiasts. The response which Bunting met during his campaign in Tembuland prompted him to establish the League of Native Rights for which he apparently obtained the consent of the party in Johannesburg in mid-1929. Gana Makabeni was detailed by the party to work in the Transkei and branches of the League were organized in several places. In a letter to the Secretary of the CPSA Bunting was candid about the nature of the new organization:

Nevertheless we put through a provisional organisation (designedly innocuous) called the League of Native Rights, with the preservation and extension of the native franchise and universal free education equal to whites as the prime objectives, the Communist Party's interest in the scheme not being expressed but not necessarily to be concealed. 18

In Bunting's view the League was ideal for the rural areas where trade unions and party branches could not easily be organized.

The initial success of the organization in the Transkei led the CPSA to establish the League of African Rights in August 1929. The new organization approached leaders of African organizations and successfully enlisted Gumede as President, D. Modiaghotla, Research Secretary of the Ballinger ICU as Vice-President, and N. Tantsi of the Transvaal branch of the ANC as Vice-Chairman. The remainder of the Executive Committee were white and non-white communists. In imitation of the Chartist movement the League conceived a "Petition of Rights" demanding an end to the pass laws, universal education, the extension of the franchise for Africans to all provinces, and full freedom of speech and meeting for all races. A campaign was mounted for a million signatures to the "Petition of Rights" which was to have been presented in parliament. Demonstrations were planned, particularly for Dingaan's Day, December 16, to counter the celebration of the Afrikaners commemorating their victory over the Zulus in 1837.

The League of African Rights was founded at an auspicious time. In the June elections the Nationalists had obtained a majority (although not the two-thirds majority necessary to pass the 'Native' Bills unaided) and the non-whites were uneasy about the new government. Unrest in Natal over the monopolization of the brewing of African beer by the white municipal governments had culminated in riots in Durban in June in which six Africans and two whites had been killed. Resentment was high among Africans. In the absence of a national ICU, and in the face of the unwillingness of the ANC to organize national protests, the League of African Rights sparked great enthusiasm throughout South Africa. Signatures to the "Petition" began to come in to the head office, and the League planned a national meeting on Dingaan's Day in Johannesburg to consolidate its new forces.

Suddenly, in the midst of the most significant communist campaign of the year, a telegram arrived from Berlin from the ECCI in late October criticizing the League of African Rights as a mere organization of leaders and the petition scheme as a reformist maneuver; the dissolution of the League was demanded. According to the distant communist oracles the continuation of the new organization would blur the identity of the party and destroy its leadership of the struggle of the masses. In vain, the CPSA protested that the League of African Rights was not a reformist organization and that the party ran no risk of losing control of it. The ECCI, however, was adamant, and the still-loyal CPSA yielded to the dictates of Moscow. The petition campaign was dropped, although the demonstrations on Dingaan's Day were held under party auspices. The first annual conference of the League of African Rights was held as announced, but in 1930 the promising League of African Rights was allowed to die. 19

The intervention of the ECCI to change a specific tactic of the CPSA marked a new stage in the supervision of the Cl over the CPSA. Previously, the Cl had limited itself to demands for adherence to general policies; now the Cl gave notice that it would intimately supervise all aspects of the activities of the South Africans. It is necessary to examine now the instrumentalities by which the Cl apparently intended to exercise its supervision over the South Africans.

The promulgation of the new programs for South Africa was a relatively unimportant part of the total activity of the sixth congress of the Cl. It was closely linked with the promulgation of the new program of self-determination for the Negroes of the United States, and thus with the communist approach to the world question of the Negro. More importantly, both questions were a part of the larger and more all-embracing approach of the Cl to the revolutionary movement in the colonies. It was proclaimed that world capitalism was entering a new phase of disintegration after temporary stabilization in the mid-1920's. Thus, the situation throughout the world was viewed as promising for proletarian revolution. In a sharp switch of policy, clearly a reaction to the disastrous tactics pursued in China in 1926-27, the Cl now rejected alliances with the bourgeois nationalist movements. Communists were enjoined to engage only in a united front from below with bourgeois nationalist movements (i.e., to approach the rank-and-file over the heads of the leaders and not to work for alliances with the leaders). Confidently, the communists predicted that their prescription would advance the communist cause in the coming revolutionary situations throughout the world. To assure the continued strength of the Soviet Union as a beacon for overseas proletarian revolutions, all communists were also urged to support the Soviet Union in every way possible from attack on the part of 'their' imperialist country. 20

The new 'hard' line of the Cl demanded the allegiance of all sections of the communist movement. Although South Africa was at the periphery of the world communist movement it became clear that it, too, was expected to follow the line set in Moscow. No longer would Bunting have cause to complain that the leadership of the Cl had not communicated specifically with the CPSA.

The South Africans had failed to found a local branch of the League Against Imperialism in the wake of the Brussels congress of 1927. Possibly this entered into the conversations at the sixth congress about the formation of front organizations. It is also probable that the International Secretariat of the League urged the South Africans to establish a section of the League in order to have representation at the second congress of the League scheduled for Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany, in July 1929. In The South African Worker of January 31, 1929 it was announced that the ANC had adhered to the League and would send delegates to the coming congress of the League. Also in January a South African section of the League Against Imperialism was founded, with Gumede as President, and an executive committee composed of ANC and CPSA members. By mid-1929 it was claimed that the SATUC, the South African Furnishing Trades Union, the South African Federation of Non-European Trade Unions, the ANC, Lekhotla La Bafo (of Basutoland), the Indian National Congress (Natal Section), and the Chinese Nationalist Party (Johannesburg) were affiliated with the Secretariat of the League. Before his return to South Africa in mid-1929, Roux met with the Secretariat the League Against Imperialism in order to make plans for South Africa. 21 Roux's conversation with the Secretariat revealed that it hoped that South African delegates would attend the second congress of the League Against Imperialism. The League planned to use them upon their return to South Africa in a conference to which delegates from the above organizations would be invited. A South African branch of the League clearly in line with the views of the Secretariat was then to have been reorganized. It was programmed that the organization would engage in propaganda to draw in "native groups," distribute literature, supply press information to local papers, and maintain careful contacts with the Secretariat. It was specifically stated that the secretary of the South African branch of the League was to be a member of the CPSA.

The grand plan remained on paper. Gumede was named a delegate to the second congress of the League Against Imperialism but he was unable to attend the congress. 22 There was no reorganization of the South African section of the League, which remained stillborn. Nevertheless, the interest shown by the Secretariat of the League Against Imperialism in the South African situation revealed concern that the practice of South Africa be coordinated with that of other sections of the international communist movement.

More significant was the interest in South Africa displayed by the RILU. It appears that Ford's insistence upon action by the RILU, in tandem with Lozovsky's conviction that the Negroes of the world represented a potentially powerful section of the unorganized workers which should be harnessed within the RILU, resulted in quick organizational action on the part of the RILU. In July 1928, the executive committee of the RILU organized a conference of Cl delegates from countries with Negro populations and imperialist countries with Negro colonies. There is no indication whether the South African delegates participated or not, but it is clear that Ford was the dominant figure at whatever meetings there were. It was decided to create the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers (ITUCNW) directly under the RILU with Ford at its head in order to carry out the program of the RILU. The chief attention of the new ITUCNW was to be directed to the United States and South Africa. 23

By late 1928 Negro Worker, the mimeographed journal of the ITUCNW, was reaching South Africa. The South African Worker of November 30 recommended it to "every class conscious worker, whether black or white." More crucially, as reported in The South African Worker of December 24, the South African Federation of Non-European Trade Unions decided to affiliate with the RILU. In accepting the affiliation of the Federation the executive bureau of the RILU clearly indicated that it hoped to do more than mere supervision of trade union work; the executive bureau decreed that the ITUCNW was to draft a letter to the Federation in which the viewpoint of the RILU on the problem of the "Black Republic" was to be stated as well as the tasks of the non-white trade unions in South Africa. 24

In one letter which the ITUCNW sent to Africa the focus was apparently only upon the organization of more unions among the Africans and among the unorganized. With regard to the ICU the letter advised the Federation to establish links with the "healthier elements inside the union" and to explain the mistakes of Kadalie's policy to them, rather than to attack the ICU frontally. It reaffirmed that the primary task of the Federation was to organize "a strong revolutionary federation of native trade unions."25

An apparently more important directive was sent by the ITUCNW under the signatures of Ford and 1. Jusefovich, an important RILU official. It outlined specific immediate demands to be advocated by the Federation, such as equal-pay-for-equal-work, an eight-hour day, an end to forced labor, the right to organize and strike, opposition to racial prejudice, better living conditions for non-white workers, and civil rights for all workers. The letter repeated exhortations for resolute struggles against Kadalie, Ballinger, and 'reformists' in general. At the same time it reasserted the prime necessity of organizing the workers in the basic industries. Most significantly it concluded with the demand that the work of the Federation be fully integrated with that of the CPSA in accord with the new slogan:

In South Africa, as elsewhere, the trade unions are the leading elements in the economic struggles of the workers. At the time of the big struggles the revolutionary trade unions must strive to transfer the economic struggles into political struggles and strike out for Self-Determination. The trade unions must take a leading part in the struggle to achieve a native republic in South Africa. 26

The actions of the ITUCNW indicated that it was another coordinated auxiliary of the fast-expanding international communist attention to South Africa. The main thrust of the effort to bring the CPSA within the orbit of the Cl rested with the Cl itself, and its 'deputy', the CPGB. Shortly after the departure of the unenthusiastic South African delegation from Moscow in 1928, the Anglo-American Secretariat of the Cl was already considering how to assure the full acceptance by the CPSA of the new program which had been decreed by the ECCI.

The proceedings of the Anglo-American Secretariat of the Cl are not available, but there is evidence to indicate both that questioning of the slogan remained within the councils of the Cl and that the Cl was also determined to ensure that the CPSA properly instituted the new program. V. Dan chin and W. Kalk, two longtime white communists, arrived in Moscow in 1928 after the sixth congress as the first South Africans assigned for study to the Lenin School. They learned that plans were in motion to send a letter to the impending congress of the CPSA and that the Political Bureau of the ECCI was apparently to undertake a discussion of the South African question. Dan chin and Kalk were invited to attend the discussions of the South African question taking place in the Anglo-American Secretariat of the Cl. They attended a meeting on December 21. The main report on South Africa was made by Reesema, the Dutch communist representative to the ECCI who apparently followed the South African situation closely through both English-language and Afrikaans-language South African newspapers. In a report which included reference to Bunting's statement in The Star on November 17, and the report of the CPSA meeting on November 18 (at which the new slogan was officially announced) in The Star of November 19, Reesema summarized:

In conclusion, we may say that, after the return of Comrade Bunting and the answer of the Party to the general attack of the bourgeois press and Minister Roos, the inner Party situation has proved to be not so bad as it appeared to be after hearing the report of the two members of the Central Committee to the Anglo-American Secretariat. 27

Reesema's sympathetic estimate apparently was not accepted by the meeting. Referring to Bunting's statement in The Star, the majority held that this was further evidence that Bunting did not believe in the new slogan, but merely had accepted it as it was a decision of the Cl (which was true). They were concerned that the seventh congress of the CPSA would endorse the new slogan without truly understanding it." Apparently the sending of a Cl representative to South Africa was contemplated. Dan chin and Kalk, as they had done previously, defended the CPSA, and even continued to oppose the new slogan. To their surprise they found support from Reesema who argued that the slogan was inapplicable as there was not a native bourgeoisie in South Africa.

The objections of the South Africans in Moscow, and the intervention of their Dutch supporter, apparently had little effect in the subsequent discussions within the Cl (of which there are no available records). Shortly after the conclusion of the seventh congress of the CPSA a cable was received from Inkpin (the British representative on the ECCI) requesting postponement of the congress until March. It seemed clear that instructions were being prepared to assure that the CPSA 'properly' understood the new slogan.

The CPGB participated directly as an agent of the ECCI to supervise the South African party. Under heavy criticism itself in 1928 from the Cl for its lack of attention to the colonial problem, and for its incorrect evaluation of it, the CPGB was probably anxious to prove to the Cl that it could perform the tasks assigned to it. In early 1929 Roux continued his talks with the British communists about the correct application of the new program to South Africa. In particular, they discussed the nature of the mass organizations to be established to attract peasants and rural workers to the party. During 1929 the CPGB continued to advise the CPSA to conform with the new program decreed by the Cl . Bunting replied to the criticism of the British communists in a letter to the Colonial Department of the CPGB in October 1929; he used the occasion to justify the establishment of the League of African Rights. 28

The Cl, however, apparently had decided that a direct representative of the Cl must visit South Africa in order to assess the situation and to inculcate the proper understanding of the new program. In June 1929, Paul Merker, a German, visited South Africa as a representative of the Cl. The choice of Merker for the South African assignment probably reflects the importance which the Cl attached to trade union work at the time. Merker, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany, was in charge of trade union work in Germany for the party. He was also very probably attached to a secret office of the RILU which was in Berlin at the time. 29 While in South African he consulted with Weinbren about the conduct of the South African Federation of Non-European Trade Unions which Weinbren had organized; the exact nature of their discussions is not clear. 30 Merker also consulted with the party about the form of the prospective League of African Rights--and the South Africans gained the impression that Merker approved of their plans. 31 It is also alleged that Merker corrected the electoral manifestos which Bunting and Wolton used in their parliamentary campaigns. 32 Other details of Merker's visit are unavailable, but it does seem that he probably only gathered information and consulted with the party leaders. The brevity of Merker's visit precluded intimate supervision of any attempt to reorient the CPSA. Nevertheless, the mere fact that Merker had been sent to South Africa as the first official representative of the Cl confirmed the new closeness with which the Cl was following affairs in South Africa.

The cable from the ECCI in October criticizing the tactics of the League of African Rights indicated that the South African question remained significant for the Cl and that the South Africans had probably not adequately understood the message which Merker had brought. It is also probable that the information which Merker brought back with him provided the Cl with ammunition for future attacks. Hints of a coming effort by the Cl to bring the CPSA more closely into line began to appear.

In the November 1929 issue of Kommunisticheskii Intematsional, the Russian-language journal of the Cl, Nasonov, who had been so active at the time of the formulation of the new program for South Africa, wrote an article in which he analyzed the South African situation. 33 In his estimate new offensives against the South African workers, black and white, on the part of the capitalists and the government were producing a counter-offensive on the part of the workers against the government. According to Nasonov, for the first time the leading role in the drive of the workers was being played by the CPSA. Prospects for a further revolutionizing of the South African situation were excellent and thus Nasonov asserted that it was crucial for the CPSA to follow the line worked out at the sixth congress. Nasonov complained that instead the CPSA appeared to rely upon petitions and was not taking "open leadership of the growing movement." Instead of utilizing only the united front from below the CPSA was utilizing the united front from above. The references were obviously to the League of African Rights. Nasonov went on to declare that the CPSA must concentrate upon the strengthening of revolutionary trade unions and upon the development of a revolutionary agrarian program. Ominously, Nasonov concluded that, above all, the CPSA must fight the opportunist mood within its own ranks which was dragging the party along a reformist path. Nasonov's article was not printed in the English-language edition of the Cl journal, and thus probably did not receive much attention in South Africa.

In early 1930 another sign of the continuing displeasure of the overseas communist authorities appeared in an obscure English-language publication, the Eastern and Colonial RILU Bulletin. 34 The South African Worker was criticized for its reportage of a strike by Africans in which the whites had failed to come out in support of the Africans; in the view of the overseas communist critic (who signed himself J. Reed) the newspaper erred in attacking the white workers as whites and not as reformists. The author continued with the demand that the South African unions must be properly organized on a class basis. Specifically he urged that Ballinger, Kadalie, and Andrews be exposed as 'reformists'; thus, for the first time Andrews, who had remained primarily dedicated to his trade union work, was brought under fire.

In the same issue in another article, J. Reed also criticized the South Africans for their inactivity in the face of further government legislation directed against Africans. I n the view of Reed, the CPSA and its trade union wing, the Federation, had done nothing to attack the protest meetings and petitions of Gumede, Kadalie, and Champion, which were clearly 'reformist' diversions; there had been no communist-led mass demonstrations against the government action. Clearly the critic called for a change in leadership:

Unfortunately, neither the Communist Party of South Africa, nor the Federation of the Non-European Trade Unions rose to the situation. Instead of rousing the masses to struggle actively against the new measures, they themselves have fallen to the bait of the liberal traitors and are now supporting all the constitutional rumpus. The revolutionary organisations must immediately rectify their mistakes. Serious activities must be conducted among the native population. We must carry out the Sixth Comintern Congress decision on mobilizing the masses around the slogan of a 'NATIVE REPUBLIC.' Developments since the Sixth Congress have thrown up into distinct relief the bankruptcy of the right opportunist elements who have been sabotaging the decision. 35

The distant and probably not immediately perceived challenge to the leadership of the CPSA was overshadowed within South Africa by an immediate and strong challenge to the CPSA from the South African government. The strength of the Nationalist electoral victory had given the government new confidence and determination. Tielman Roos, the previous minister of justice, was replaced by Oswald Pirow, an ambitious and more aggressive young lawyer. The beer riots in Durban renewed concern about 'native unrest' and the efficacy of existing legislation designed to curb political activity of the non-whites. It was popularly and judicially assumed that Champion was giving witting or unwitting support to communism. The concern of the government was increased by a decision in the Supreme Court of the Eastern Cape which cleared the Buntings and Makabeni of charges arising out of the campaign in Tembuland. The judge ruled that all three were merely engaged in the dissemination of the doctrine of a recognized political faith and thus could not be accused of the intention of inciting hostility.

In mid-August new vitality was injected into the question when General Smuts, speaking as the leader of the opposition, noted the increase in 'agitation' among non-whites. He called attention to the judgement in favor of Bunting and suggested that the government should not let the matter rest. In the face of the threats of the ICU base Natal and the communists, Smuts argued that the government should move to tighten up the laws and the administration of legislation. Prime Minister Hertzog replied that new legislation was under consideration.

In early November a proposed amendment to the Riotous Assemblies Act was published which would have given the minister of justice the power to ban 'agitators' from specific areas if he judged that they were preaching sedition contrary to the public interest. Shortly after the publication of the proposed new amend ment the opposition of African dock workers in Durban to the payment of the poll tax was highlighted by a well-publicized movement of police to Durban for a projected raid upon the workers. In the wake of well-organized raids by the police on the discontented dock workers of Durban, Pirow justified the actions as necessary in view of evidence in his possession which showed that the communists were planning mass demonstrations and unrest, particularly on Dingaan's Day. 36

It appears that the disturbances in Durban were unconnected with communist activity, but Pirow had indeed intercepted the cable from the ECCI of October 22 and the reply of the CPSA (a relatively easy matter inasmuch as all telegraph services in South Africa are government-operated). In the cable the ECCI had not only criticized the League of African Rights, but it had also made suggestions about the correct slogans for the party and tactics to be followed on Dingaan's Day. In addition it had urged that demonstrations be held also on December 14 as part of an international communist campaign. For once, the allegation of outside communist interference in South African affairs did have a basis in fact.

The prospects of more stringent government legislation clearly worried the leading communists. Already in 1928 Bunting had been concerned that the new slogan would result in more active persecution of the party. 37 In the wake of the call by Smuts for action in 1929 and the promise of Hertzog that new legislation would be forthcoming the South African communists feared that the CPSA would be banned. In this context the League of African Rights acquired a new function for the CPSA:

The organisation of the League of African Rights is thus in one sense a preparation for approaching illegality of the CP. It is less likely to be proscribed than the CP itself, but this is not so important as the fact that as a result of the formation of the League we are broadening our influence and making contacts among natives all over the country thus improving our chance of resistance should the Government attempt to drive us underground. 38

The fears of the communists, however, did not lead them to abandon the demonstrations on Dingaan's Day. There apparently were no communist demonstrations on December 14 as the ECCI had wanted, but on December 16 the communists did mount demonstrations in several cities in South Africa in protest against the Riotous Assemblies Amendment Bill and other pending legislation affecting the African. In Potchefstroom angry whites fired upon the African crowd at the demonstrations sponsored by the CPSA, resulting in the death of one African and the wounding of another. The demonstrations, particularly in Potchefstroom, received considerable attention in the press and only strengthened the hand of the government in its drive against the communists. 39

The twin pressures from the government and from overseas communist critics of the leadership of the CPSA forced the leadership to advance the eighth congress of the CPSA from Easter 1930 to December 1929. The decision was announced somewhat enigmatically:

Like a bolt from the blue a situation has arisen that makes it absolutely imperative that the Conference should take place without a loss of time. The Executive Bureau has therefore decided that the Conference should take place on 29 December, 1929.

It is hardly necessary for us to point out the factors that make up the present political situation. The proposed Amendment Bill to the Riotous Assemblies Act as we explained in our previous leader means the illegalisation of the Party. Then also there is dissatisfaction with, and opposition to, the recent policy of the Executive Bureau, which, we feel, only the Conference could put a stop to. 40

The poorly reported proceedings of the congress reveal that the party was determined to attempt to thwart the new legislation of the government. The methods which they chose, however, opened them to further criticism from overseas communist critics. In addition, personnel problems within the CPSA impaired the efficiency of any communist efforts--and at the same time provided another opening for communist critics.

The congress strongly condemned the attacks upon the African demonstrators in Potchefstroom on Dingaan's Day. The indignation of the congress, however, was focused upon the impending government legislation. In a brief, but strident manifesto the congress urged "fellow Communists, African patriots, all who love freedom but toil in slavery in your own country" to rally against the proposed new legislation with mass meetings and demonstrations throughout the country. As in the past, the manifesto urged that trade unions be strengthened and that party branches be built up, but still there was no call for reorganization of the party on the basis of factory cells. In addition, the manifesto exhorted: "let every man and woman get inside some honest and militant association of the slaves and oppressed." It did not, however, specify which organizations these were; it merely stated that Africans should reject "self-seeking leaders and quarrelling groups who stand in the way of national unity." The slogan of the 'Independent South African Native republic' was mentioned only in passing. In a supplementary resolution the congress indicated the tactics which it had in mind:

This conference of the CPSA calls upon all organisations of the working class and oppressed peoples to join in a united protest against the attempt of Mr. Pi row to introduce his fascist and feudal legislation which if allowed to become law will put power in the hands of a Minister to crush all his political opponents and stifle all agitation and organisation. It further calls upon all such organisations to prepare for mass action by means of a general strike, refusal to pay taxes without representation, passive resistance, boycotts or otherwise should the Government persist with these bills. 41

The new tactical emphases did mark a shift in the stance of the CPSA, but they did not clearly indicate whether the united protest was to be upon the basis of a united front from above or a united front from below. Furthermore, there was no detailed and specific attack upon 'bourgeois reformist' leadership, nor were past tactics of the CPSA with regard to the ANC and the ICU questioned. To those closely attuned to the requirements of doctrinal orthodoxy the position of the CPSA would have been unsatisfactory.

The internal situation within the party also did not bode well for the future. The party continued to be active in the southern Transvaal and the work of Malkinson in Bloemfontein seemed to be bringing results. Yet the new branch in Durban had become a small group after a promising start earlier in 1929, and in Cape Town the party branch atrophied as the non-whites concentrated their work upon the ANC and the whites remained disturbed by the new program. More crucially, the party had felt it necessary to discipline key non-white members in 1929. Brands by Ndobe and Elliot Tonjeni, African party members who were active in the ANC in Cape Province, were dropped from the party. For aiding an independent Nationalist candidate in the 1929 general election, the experienced Coloured member, La Guma, was also suspended in Cape Town. 42 In Johannesburg, the conduct of Thibedi within the Federation became so questionable that the party reluctantly decided to suspend the first African to join the CPSA. 43 Behind the scenes, Nzula, who had taken over the job of Secretary upon the departure of Wolton for overseas in mid-1929, began to arouse the concern of the party leadership, in particular that of Bunting, for his frequent drunkenness. The difficulties with key non-white members who would have borne the brunt of any expanded activity among non-whites spotlighted the weakness of the party. Yet any expulsion of them, or indeed even suspension of them, opened the party leadership to charges of 'white chauvinism' of the sort which had been level led at the party by critics in Moscow in 1928 and by Wolton in South Africa.

Despite its precarious position, the CPSA under Bunting did not flinch from its course. The readjustment which the party had made to the new program of the Cl had not destroyed the party as had been feared. The South Africans remained convinced that they were acting loyally within their interpretation of the new program. More immediately, the spreading effects of the world depression seemed to offer new opportunities to the communists, among both white and non-white workers. The threat of impending government legislation seemed to offer a platform for expanded work among Africans. Amidst heightening tension between white and non-white in South Africa, the CPSA hoped to canalize the discontent of white workers and non-whites into support for its version of the 1928 program.

The hopes of the CPSA were quickly shattered. In the course of 1930 its old 'right wing' politics of qualified zcooperation with non-white organizations finally proved unworkable and bankrupt while the efforts of the party to strengthen its own organization brought little return. The Nationalist government stepped up its pressure upon the party after the successful passage of the Riotous Assemblies Amendment Bill. Most significantly, the closer attention from Moscow presaged in the latter half of 1929 materialized and culminated in the form of a Moscow-authorized overturn of the leadership of the CPSA. 1

Contrary to the instructions of the new 'hard' line of the CI, the communists continued attempts to work with the leadership of the non-white nationalist organizations. In January 1930, communists participated in the second Non-European Conference called by Dr. Abdurahman, the leader of the APO in Cape Province. Communists found limited support for their program from delegates representing former constituent sections of the ICU, but otherwise the communist program was unacceptable to the majority of the delegates who reaffirmed their faith in the traditional methods of petition and representation. Within the ANC the latent animosity to Gumede's relationship with the CPSA and the place of the communists within the organization finally crystallized into a successful attack by Gumede's opponents. Gumede reaffirmed his commitment to militancy including cooperation with the communists, and a coalition of Bloemfontein and Johannesburg communists, Cape Town militants, and Champion of the ICU .Natal attempted to reelect him as president of the ANC at the annual conference of the ANC in late April 1930. The conservatives and the moderates, however, mustered more votes, and in a stormy session of the conference Dr. P. I. Ka Seme, the founder of the Congress in 1912, was elected to the presidency by a vote of 39-14 2

Defeated within the national ANC, the communists continued working within the Cape Province section of the organization. Amidst threats of riots and shootings the efforts of the communists and their militant allies in Western Cape Province met with some success, but the uneasy leadership of Professor Thaele in Cape Town finally reacted by using its dominance of the ANC provincial organization to expel the communists and the militants. The leading militants, Ndobe and Tonjeni, convinced of the correctness of their militant policy and hopeful of support in the rural areas for it, decided to establish a rival organization, the Independent ANC. The communists gave qualified support to the new organization with its strong program for equal rights for Africans and its demand for a return of the land to the Africans. Yet the Independent ANC disintegrated in the face of government hostility and the difficulties of mobilizing its rural supporters. With its demise the communists lost their last toehold in the African nationalist movement. 3

The efforts of the communists among the scattered fragments of the ICU were not more successful. They sympathized with Kadalie when he came under renewed attack by the government, but he lost favor with the CPSA when he attacked its attempts to mount demonstrations on Dingaan's Day 1930. In Durban the communists had an uneasy relationship with Champion, who finally cooled to communist attempts to work among the rank and file of the ICU base Natal. Only in the Orange Free State could the communists claim limited successes with local ICU members and leaders.

Ironically, the most hopeful developments for the communists occurred within the white SATUC. Contrary to the suggestions of the Cl the white communists within the trade unions had not pursued an intensive campaign against the leadership. There were signs that the CPSA was going to step up its demands that the SATUC actively work among non-whites; after the April conference of the SATUC UMsebenzi in its April 25 issue, criticized the memb er unions of the SATUC for failure to carry out annual resolutions urging the organization of non-whites. Yet the prospects of the creation of a larger all-South African trade union center in 1930 restrained the communists. The new organization, the South African Trades and Labour Council (SATLC), which included trade unions from Cape Town, proclaimed that all trade unions could affiliate regardless of racial composition. On October 10 UMsebenzi gave qualified support to the new SATLC.

The new interest of the CPSA in the established trade union organizations was a reflection of its inability to develop its own trade union organization. In Johannesburg Nzula replaced Thibedi as secretary of the Federation, but it appears that Thibedi was brought back into the organization by the rank-and-file of the Federation against the wishes of the leadership of the CPSA. Dissension continued to plague the Federation in Johannesburg and its first attempts to reach the workers in the basic industries, particularly in mining, remained no more than appeals in the pages of UMsebenzi, such as those which appeared in the August 29 issue. Only in Cape Town were there new successful, but very small-scale efforts to organize trade unions among non-whites. 4

The demands of the new program as well as the lack of success in working with any of the established non-white organizations probably prompted the communists to intensify their efforts to gather African support through a series of specific campaigns and demonstrations. At meetings protesting against the terms of the Riotous Assemblies Amendment Bill, calls for mass demonstrations and passive demonstrations were raised. In the last months of 1930 the CPSA mounted an anti-pass campaign to focus upon pass-burning demonstrations on Dingaan's Day. On Dingaan's Day the response was disappointing. In Johannesburg, the center of party activity, merely 150 passes were burned; in Pretoria the total was 400, while Potchefstroom reported 300. The only success was reported in Durban, still in turmoil after the beer riots of 1929 and continuing agitation by the ICU base Natal. At a meeting on Cartwright Flats, the regular platform of Champion who had been deported under the terms of the new Riotous Assemblies Amendment Act, Nkosi, the African leader of the Durban branch of the CPSA, led a demonstration at which some 3,000 passes were burned. When the police moved to break up the demonstration violence broke out. Trying to quiet the crowd, Nkosi was among four Africans who were shot. He died shortly thereafter, the first African communist martyr.

The martyrdom of Nkosi symbolized one of the few tangible evidences of communist 'success' in 1930, yet determined police action in Natal quickly destroyed the party branch he had begun to build. Elsewhere, there were few indications that the party was growing stronger, except in Bloemfontein. There were no attempts to restructure the party organization. The longtime white members who had opposed the new slogan remained aloof and there were no special approaches to the Afrikaner 'poor whites.' No particular attempts were made to work among Indians or Coloureds. Among the new African membership there were few signs of stability and cohesion. The dissension within the Federation in Johannesburg threatened to alienate the largest group of prospective African recruits. Finally, after great reluctance, Bunting suspended Nzula, Wolton's hand-picked candidate, from the post of CPSA secretary for his seemingly habitual drunkenness.

The inadequacy of the structure of the CPSA, and the variety and vacillation of its activities in 1930, continued to expose its leadership to fire from its communist critics inside and outside of South Africa. In the context of the accelerating drive of the Cl for conformity among all its sections the unorthodox position of the CPSA could not be tolerated.

In the May 16th issue of UMsebenzi an unnamed spokesman for the executive committee of the CPSA suggested that the party could only successfully perform the demanding tasks before it if it followed the Bolshevik principles of democratic centralism which Lenin had enunciated in 1902 for the Russian party. The spokesman called for "a really centralised and disciplined organisation" and announced that the executive committee was to carry out a re-registration of all party members in order "to purge its ranks of all the inactive and doubtful members and to put the Party on a real sound foundation." There was no immediate response to the call for a purge in the party and its reorganization.

Clues to the intentions of the international communist movement toward South Africa were visible in the actions of international communist organizations. There is no indication that the League Against Imperialism or the YCI pursued their plans for activity in South Africa which they had enunciated in 1928 and 1929. Yet the ITUCNW and its parent RILU intensified their interest in South African affairs.

Under the leadership of Ford the ITUCNW concentrated its efforts upon an International Conference of Negro Workers. At the second Congress of the League Against Imperialism in Frankfurt-am-Main in 1929 Ford had organized the first provisional committee of the ITUCNW and plans were made for convening an International Conference of Negro Workers in London in July 1930. South Africa was invited to send African delegates to the Conference, but the anti-Gumede coalition in the ANC apparently blocked efforts to designate ANC members. Subsequently the government refused passports to six non-ANC African delegates. Ford also reported that it was feared that three others had been murdered by the captain of the ship on which they were traveling. Ultimately the CPSA apparently delegated "Sony" Sachs, a white party member and the organizer of the Garment Workers' Union, as the South African delegate to the Conference. 5

Banned by the British government from London, the Conference assembled in July 1930 in Hamburg, Germany. Ford, other American Negro communists, and their sympathizers dominated the proceedings. Nine of the seventeen delegates were Americans. Only six delegates came from Africa--of these Sachs was the only white delegate. The Conference heard reports from the various delegates and passed a series of resolutions which reflected the hard line towards nationalist organizations which had been adopted the previous year by the League Against Imperialism. The Negro and African middle class and intelligentsia leadership of the nationalist movement were attacked as were the 'reformist' leadership of all trade union efforts among the Negroes to date. In addition, the Conference formulated a list of demands including full political and economic rights for Negroes, the end of forced labor, full social welfare for Negro workers, the end of the color bar, the end of all discriminatory taxes against African peasants, and an end to lynching. A demand "for self determination and full independence for the Negro toilers in Africa, West Indies, and the Black Belt of the USA" was also included. Finally, the Conference established an ITUCNW executive to sit in Hamburg with the clear intention of establishing more intimate coordination of the efforts among the Negro workers:

The purpose of the Executive is to give concrete aid and assistance to all Negro workers and to help them build up class unions in their countries. The Committee will do all in its power to organise trade unions, unemployed councils, and peasant committees. Every Negro worker must realise his class and understand that workers whether they be black, white, yellow or brown, can only hope to win their freedom by organising and supporting the principles of the revolutionary class struggle. 6

Again the determination of the ITUCNW to bring the Negro workers of all countries within its organization was directly stated.

There is no indication that the Conference passed any specific resolution regarding South Africa. It is clear, however, that the attitude of the South Africans was under scrutiny. At the Conference Sachs claimed that the ICU had never been a proper trade union, but a political party, and that the membership of the ANC did not support the leadership of the ANC. The implication was that reformism in South Africa was weak and thus the CPSA had been justified in its attempts to work with the ICU and the ANC. Immediately after the Conference Ford attacked Sachs sharply for his incorrect underestimation of the dangers of 'national reformism. 7 In addition, the tenor of the general resolutions of the Conference with their strong emphasis upon the threat of 'reformism' also implied criticism of the work of the Federation and of the CPSA. The emphasis in the resolutions of the Conference of the need to work among the peasant population also provided another position from which to attack the inactivity of the South Africans.

The Conference was regarded by its organizers as an important preparatory step in the organization of a coordinated campaign among the Negro workers of the world. Yet it is clear that Ford felt that the impending fifth congress of the RlLU in Moscow was the place for the ITUCNW to work out its program in coordination with the parent RILU. A number of Negro delegates from the Conference in Hamburg continued on to Moscow for the fifth congress of the RILU. Sachs, the white delegate from South Africa, also went to Moscow for the fifth congress. It was at the fifth congress of the RILU that the next steps in the campaign, including tentative recommendations for South Africa, were worked out.

After preliminary discussions, including speeches on the Negro problem by Lozovsky and Ford, the fifth congress enacted a "Special Resolution on Work Among Negroes in the United States and the Colonies. 8 The resolution outlined the harsh oppression of the Negro workers throughout the world--an oppression aggravated by specific limitations due to race. Yet optimistically it suggested that the very severe oppression under which Negroes lived raised their class-consciousness. In such a situation the efforts of the ITUCNW and its constituent sections had been inadequate. In a specific reference to South Africa the resolution declared that the Federation was a small-scale sectarian group; it was particularly condemned for its inability to penetrate into the key industries of mining and transportation. In general terms, similar to those expressed in the program of the ITUCNW as outlined at the July meeting in Hamburg, the supporters of the RILU and the ITUCNW were urged to rally the Negro workers of the world behind a series of demands for equal political rights, equal participation in social welfare schemes, the abolition of discriminatory practices and forced labor, and the demand for self-determination (in the African colonies and in the south of the United States).

The attention of the RILU and its affiliated ITUCNW to the question of South Africa as a part of the question of the world problem of the Negro workers was paralleled by close and direct attention to the question of South Africa per se by the ECCI. It is highly probable that Wolton had continued to supply the Cl with reports on the South African situation from the time that he had first sent the minority report to the Cl in early 1928 in support of the new slogan contained in the "Draft Resolution on South Africa." It may have also been the case that Wolton's desire to leave South Africa in 1928 was due to a suggestion from the Cl that he come to Britain and to Moscow to consult with the higher authorities of the Cl. In the event he remained in South Africa and contested the Cape Flats constituency in June,1929. When he left South Africa for Britain the next month The South African Worker of July 31 merely stated that he was the "bearer of a message to overseas Comrades, the result of the closest investigation here." In Britain he stayed for a while in Liverpool, at the time the center of Britain's largest colony of West Indian Negroes. It was subsequently reported in UMsebenzi of July 11,1930, that in Liverpool he had continued his activities among non-whites on behalf of the communists, working to establish a committee affiliated with the ITUCNW. While in Britain, Wolton was invited to go to Moscow for the fifth congress of the RILU. Once in Moscow, Wolton consulted with the Cl on the basis of his earlier 1928 minority report. In the course of long sessions with the officials of the Cl, Wolton gained an appreciation of, and a respect for, the Soviet approach to the nationalities problem. He became further convinced that an application of this policy to South Africa through the new program was necessary as the only means by which the Africans could be drawn fully into the work of the CPSA, an objective which he considered primary.9

It is not sure to what degree Wolton participated in the evaluation of the South African situation undertaken by the ECCI for the Cl. Undoubtedly he contributed information about the South African situation and a willingness to agree to changes suggested by the leadership of the Cl. Yet unquestionably the final form of the new directives for the CPSA were shaped by the Cl in Moscow. Upon his departure from Moscow in fall 1930 Wolton carried them with him in the form of a letter from the Presidium of the ECCI to the CPSA, "How to Build a Revolutionary Mass Party in South Africa.

The ECCI directive for the CPSA was based upon the assumption that South Africa was caught in the world economic crisis with a resulting sharpening of the attack of the bourgeoisie upon the "native working masses and on the lower paid section of the white workers.," At the same time the ECCI perceived an upsurge in the class struggle for national liberation in South Africa. The ECCI asserted that the CPSA had taken advantage of its more favorable situation to expand its agitation' to increase its membership among Africans' and to become a "real political force in the country." Yet the ECCI recognized that the influence of the CPSA was still confined "to a narrow sphere chiefly around Johannesburg,", The contacts of the CPSA with "the basic masses of Native workers,' were judged to be so weak that the party was practically isolated from "the spontaneous movement of the masses and it drags at the tail of that movement."

The reasons for the weakness of the CPSA were unequivocally stated in the ECCI letter with reference to the controversial slogan:

The party leaders are committing serious mistakes of a Right opportunist character. The reason for this is the fact that the Party leaders have not yet carried out the 1928 resolution of the Cl which demands that the Party take the initiative in and lead the struggle of the Natives against the foreign yoke under the slogan of an Independent Native Republic.

An Independent Native Republic means, primarily, the return of the land to the landless population and those with little land, which is impossible without revolutionary liberation from British imperialism and the organisation of a revolutionary workers' and peasants' government on the basis of Soviets... The principle feature of the Right opportunist mistakes committed by the Party is the failure to understand the decisive importance of the hegemony of the proletariat and the complete independence of the vanguard of the revolutionary proletariat' the Communist Party, in the nationalist revolutionary movement and the failure to understand the significance of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the social revolution. 10

The letter went on to explain how the revolution in South Africa in its first stages would inevitably be a bourgeois democratic revolution. Yet in view of the weakness of the "native bourgeoisie in South Africa the only class capable of leading the revolution would be the "Native proletariat, supported by the most exploited masses of the white proletariat. In such a situation there was danger that the proletariat would become absorbed in the petty bourgeois nationalist movement which it must lead; to prevent this development it was proclaimed that the independence of the proletariat must be assured by its vanguard being organized into "an independent class revolutionary party, having for its aim the complete carrying through of the nationalist revolutionary struggle, and, as the subsequent stage, the socialist revolution."

The leadership of the CPSA was then accused of a failure to comprehend this necessity as reflected in its attitude towards the slogan of the "Independent Native Republic." In particular, the white members of the CPSA had not cast off the remnants of white chauvinism inasmuch as they persisted in underestimating the nationalist movement by attempting to reduce the struggle of the South African proletariat to a purely proletarian struggle. On the other hand, the Africans were accused of too great attention to the nationalist struggle with a resulting lack of comprehension of the nature of the proletarian struggle. The letter of the ECCI tried to document its charges by reference to the League of African Rights. By organizing the League, but not continuing to dominate the League, the ECCI said that the CPSA allowed "reformist" nationalist elements to seize control of an important nationalist manifestation which the CPSA itself should have been leading. And by acquiescing in the mild program of the League, from which the slogan of an "Independent Native Republic" was absent, the CPSA, according to the ECCI, lagged behind the revolutionary determination of the "Native proletariat" as manifested in the Durban beer riots and other demonstrations. Finally' by joining the League merely as a constituent member subject to the "reformist'' leadership of the League the CPSA fully associated itself with the "reformist', policy of the League at the same time as it lost its independent vantage point from which to criticize the "reformism" of the League. The letter continued with a criticism of the 1929 campaign of the CPSA on Dingaan's Day as well as an attack upon the failure of the CPSA to take full advantage of the resentment against the Hertzog 'Native' Bills.

The letter then turned to a direct attack upon Bunting and Roux in which they were accused of attempting to create a theoretical basis for reformism in South Africa. Reference was made to a letter by Bunting to the Colonial Department of the CPGB in October 1929. According to the interpretation by the ECCI of Bunting's letter he had denied the revolutionary role of the peasantry and thus had attempted to skip the bourgeois democratic stage of the South African revolution. Similarly he had underestimated the nationalist character of the revolution, and he had rejected the slogan of the "Independent Native Republic." Bunting's sin was label led "exceptionalism." Bunting was thus placed in a class with Jay Lovestone of the CPUSA' the originator of the idea of "American exceptionalism, who had just been expelled from the CPUSA and the Cl for "rightist deviations. The ECCI was explicit that the views of Bunting clearly were 'reformist' and would have to be exorcised from the CPSA:

Therefore, these theories which represent a serious obstacle to the revolutionary movement in South Africa and reflect white chauvinism in the Communist Party must be resolutely condemned and rejected. There is no room for them in the CP.

Without the most ruthless criticism of such anti-revolutionary theory, without the recognition and condemnation of ALL mistakes made by the Party owing to the misinterpretation of the independent native republic slogan, or the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat, there can be no prospect of working out a correct Bolshevik political line corresponding to South African conditions. 11

The terms of the letter bluntly ordered an attack upon Bunting and the course upon which he had led the CPSA.

As a first step the letter ordered the formulation of a new party program upon the basis of the resolutions of the Cl. The program was to include the slogan of the "Independent Native Republic" which was to be linked with a long series of more immediate demands connected with the expansion of political rights, the end of various restrictions on Africans, campaigns for return of the land to the Africans, vigilance against the supposed threats of "native reformism," and the creation of a united front of the poorer section of white workers with the "native toiling masses." In fact, the immediate demands differed little from those which the CPSA had advocated (with the exception of the greater emphasis placed upon the danger of "national reformism and the distinction made about the poorer white workers as opposed to the white workers as a whole), but it was clear that Bunting and his associates were not to be involved in the making of future policy in the CPSA.

The Bunting leadership was also condemned for its failure to reorganize the party as directed by the ECCI resolution of 1928. It was asserted (correctly) that the CPSA was an amorphous organization with fluctuating membership which could not impose discipline upon its membership for the achievement of tasks proclaimed by the party leadership. The letter demanded an immediate reorganization of the party on the basis of the factory and street nuclei system which the Cl had decreed for its constituent parts since 1924. It was directed that a special effort be made to recruit members from workers in large-scale industry' particularly from the mines. All members were to be drawn into party activities and given proper Marxist-Leninist training. A special effort was to be made to draw "native comrades into the leadership of the party.

According to the letter of the ECCI, the CPSA so reorganized would then be able to establish close contact with the masses. The ECCI was clearly fascinated with the achievements of Kadalie's semi-political ICU despite its "reformist" character; thus it proclaimed that revolutionary trade unions incorporating political demands were the first priority of the CPSA. The existing South African Federation of Non-European Trade Unions was to be the base for the development of proper revolutionary trade unions under the leadership of the CPSA. At the same time the party was to organize the peasantry to assure that the bourgeois democratic revolution (which in South Africa would be based upon the peasantry) would remain under the hegemony of the proletariat. Poor peasants and tenants were to be organized and trade unions were to be founded for farm workers--both types of organizations were to be based upon the concrete demands of their memberships linked with the general program of the CPSA including the slogan for the "Independent Native Republic.

In closing, the letter of the ECCI indicated that the reorientation of the CPSA had significance not only for South Africa, but for all of Africa:

At the present time the Union of South Africa is the only country on the Black Continent where there is a comparatively highly developed lab our movement led by the Communist Party. This imposes upon the Communist Party of South Africa the enormous task of taking the initiative and being the ideological organisation Al leader of the revolutionary communist movement in the other parts of Black Africa. Hence: one of the most urgent tasks of the Party is to establish direct contacts with the revolutionary toiling masses in the African countries so as to assure the hegemony of the revolutionary proletariat in the coming agrarian national (bourgeois-democratic) revolution of the toiling masses in all parts of Africa, preparing thereby the ground for the establishment of independent Native Workers, and Peasants' Republics as a transitory stage towards the subsequent Union of Socialist Soviet Republics of Africa. 12

In the heavy language of the Cl of 1930 the earlier visions of Bunting and Jones of the CPSA as the leaders of the African continent were at last recognized. In the context of the letter of the ECCI, however, the recognition was merely another one of a series of arduous tasks imposed upon the tiny, threatened, and strife-torn CPSA. Yet it also indicated the importance attached by Moscow to the complete reorganization of the CPSA.

The letter of the Cl gave Wolton a clear mandate for a thorough purge of the party and an easy device for the assumption of power by himself and those who would ally themselves with him. Any opposition could be easily attacked as opposition to Cl discipline.

On November 13, 1930, Wolton suddenly appeared in Johannesburg with the announcement that he had been delegated by the ECCI to work full-time in the CPSA. At the time Bunting and his supporters in the party were intensely busy with agitation for the demonstrations planned by the party for Dingaan's Day. Wolton refused to become involved. Instead, at a meeting of the Johannesburg branch of the party he harshly attacked Bunting as he had done at the 1928 congress of the CPSA. Shortly thereafter he left for Cape Town in order to introduce the ,new line, to the branch there. Wolton's intentions became evident in the discussions in UMsebenzi of the ninth congress of the CPSA scheduled for December. The presence of the "right wing danger within the ranks of the Party" was label led as the cause of the lack of leadership and inadequate organization within the party. The "right wing" was accused of opposition to the "political lines of the Party as adopted at the 1928 Conference of the CPSA" and of a wilful continuation of the old policies of the party masked by nominal acceptance of the new policy. In addition, the "right wing', was accused of "white chauvinist disbelief in the capacity of the Natives to play their full part in the leadership of the Party. In thinly-veiled terms a purge was announced:

The Ninth Conference of the Communist Party of the South Africa must mark a turning point when the party will decisively set itself against the right-wing danger and all opportunist and white chauvinist manifestations. >From the forthcoming conference a leadership must arise which is politically united on the new Party line and which is determined to carry it out in practice by setting up the necessary organisation Al forms and taking the Party forward to meet the responsible tasks which lie ahead of it. 13

The congress which met in December 1930, under Wolton's direction, was a turning point in the history of the CPSA. 14 The congress proclaimed its intention to reorganize the party on 'Bolshevik' lines. The old system of territorial branches was to be replaced by a system in which the basic units were to be communist groups in factories, mine-compounds, farms and locations. It was asserted that until the restructuring was realized the CPSA could not become "a real Bolshevist organisation capable of leading the masses in the struggle for power."

The positions of the congress on the economic condition of South Africa and the role of the party in it showed the hand of Wolton and the ECCI directive which he had brought from Moscow. "Reformist" organizations were condemned harshly and it was asserted that the party must take an independent and leading role in the struggle of the workers and peasants, non-white and white. Prospects were judged to be good for the party to seize the lead in view of the "growing revolutionary activity of the masses. It was emphasized that the party should always conscientiously follow the wisdom of the Cl in its policy in South Africa. Perhaps more noticeable was the tone of the resolutions; for the first time the language of Soviet-style rhetoric then found in the pronunciamentos of the Cl was employed to express the new positions of the CPSA.

The 'new line, was symbolized by the change of the leadership of the CPSA. For the first time the executive committee, renamed the central committee, undoubtedly in accord with 'Bolshevik, practice, was elected as a bloc. The slate was chosen by Wolton and he suggested that any opposition to it was equivalent to opposition to the Cl . Wolton, Sachs, Roux, and Lazar Bach, a recent Jewish immigrant from Lithuania who had participated in underground communist work there, were the whites on the new central committee. In addition, twenty-three Africans were elected to the new central committee. The predominance of Africans conformed with the demand of the Cl for "Native leadership." The exclusion of Bunting eliminated the "right-wing danger". Roux, then the editor of UMsebenzi, had come to accept the 'new line" while Sachs had returned from Moscow more convinced of the need for militancy. Yet, it was Wolton, assisted primarily by Bach, who assumed the leadership of the CPSA, heading a newly created political bureau, directing the central committee like its ,Bolshevik, namesake at the head of the central committee of the Soviet Communist Party.

The sudden prominence of Bach reflected a significant shift in the nature of the white membership of the CPSA with profound implications for the future of the CPSA.

With the falling away of the older white trade unionists (either through resignation or through inactivity) and the downgrading of the small white group around Bunting who had worked among the non-whites' the decreasing number of white adherents of the party consisted increasingly of Jewish artisans' semi-skilled workers, and clerks, most of whom were recent immigrants from Eastern Europe. These new white members of the CPSA brought a distinctly different perspective to their work within the party.

The traditional links of the South African Jewish population with Lithuania, and to a lesser extent, Poland and Latvia, were strengthened in the 1 920's by the renewal of immigration which had been cut off during the war. In the late 1 920's, particularly after the relaxation of administrative restrictions under the Smuts government, and before the imposition of the Immigration Quota Act of 1930, Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe was about 2,000 annually. 15 As in the past, most of the Jews were not socialists, but those who were socialists were particularly significant for the CPSA. Whereas in the past many of the Jewish socialists were Bundists and Social Democrats, many of them were now communist or left-wing socialists who had left eastern Europe because of economic hardship or political persecution. New in a strange country, mostly speaking only Yiddish, some of the left-wing socialists and communists banded together in a club for common cultural activities and political fellowship like clubs they had known in eastern Europe. Thus was born the Jewish Workers, Club in the late 1920's.

Although the leadership of the Club first invited ,bourgeois' Yiddish speaking lecturers to its meetings, it rapidly discarded them in favor of lecturers from its own ranks who spoke in the communist idiom with which they had become familiar in their work in Eastern Europe. The activities and lectures of the Club were initially devoted exclusively to the revolutionary movement, in general, and to the movement in eastern Europe, in particular. Isolated from the larger South African surroundings, both because of its preoccupation with the revolutionary movement in eastern Europe and because of the inability of its membership to speak any other language but Yiddish, the Jewish Workers' Club became a compact organization, most members of which were familiar with, if not loyal to' the intricacies of Marxism-Leninism as expounded by the Cl.

In the second year of its existence, under the stewardship of a committee anxious to integrate the membership with the local communist movement, the Jewish Workers, Club embarked upon a series of lectures which dealt specifically with the situation in South Africa, in particular with the problems of African workers. Contacts were established with sympathetic South African communists (probably initially with those who also spoke Yiddish). As more of the membership learned to speak English, non-Yiddish-speaking South African communists began to address the Club. Some of the membership of the Club began to participate actively in South African communist activities.

The entry of the new Jewish communists into the CPSA brought in a group which viewed the South African situation through the prism of the communist ideology which they had learned in eastern Europe. They did not share the racial attitudes of the older South African white trade unionists; they more easily looked at the Africans in ideological terms as fellow workers. In addition' some of the members had actively participated in the work of the communist movement in eastern Europe, often under conditions of harsh persecution in which underground activity was the primary form of communist work. Their experiences in eastern Europe and their unfamiliarity with the South African situation inclined them towards a more unquestioning support for the policy of the Cl. For the first time a significant group of members of the CPSA had proper 'Bolshevik, training. A loyal cadre of recently-recruited white members was available to support all types of communist campaigns' as well as to provide proof of the interracial nature of the proletarian struggle waged by the CPSA. Perhaps most significantly, in Lazar Bach' Wolton gained an eager ally whose familiarity with the Marxist-Leninist classics and the theory and practice of the Cl provided Wolton with the proper ideological orthodoxy with which to justify his actions. 16

The new Wolton-Bach leadership was pledged to act in terms of the letter of the Cl. The letter demanded a number of rapid achievements by the CPSA in the fields of organization, propaganda, and influence. The demands placed upon the CPSA by the letter of the ECCI would have taxed a large, well-organized party in the hostile environment of South Africa; in the disorganized state of the small CPSA of 1930 they represented an almost impossible challenge to any leader of a reorganization of the CPSA.

Failure to ruthlessly reform the CPSA would invoke again the wrath of the vigilant Cl. Yet resolute application of the directives would perhaps destroy the fragile structure of the African-oriented party so carefully developed by Bunting in the face of the opposition of white South Africa, domestic communist critics, and overseas communist supervisors. Such destruction could not be regarded by the Cl as a consequence of faulty directives from the infallible Marxist-Leninists of the Cl; it could only be regarded as 'incorrect' application of the correct directives from Moscow. In such a case, too, the wrath of the vigilant Cl would fall. The position of Wolton and Bach, while initially strong and invulnerable, contained the seeds of their own destruction.

Spurred by conviction' and prodded by instructions from Moscow for immediate results, the Wolton-Bach leadership rapidly struck out in all directions in an attempt to 'Bolshevize' the CPSA. The language of the Cl was introduced almost unchanged as 'Bolshevik' clothing for the orders and reports of the new leadership as they applied frantic directives and critiques to all aspects of party life.

In keeping with the insistent demands of the ECCI the new leadership moved to reorganize the groups of the party on the basis of factory, mine, and location groups. Some of the difficulties which they encountered were highlighted by the effort to reorganize the Johannesburg branch of the party.

A re-registration of the membership was ordered and all who were not prepared to do active work were struck from the rolls. There was no indication of the size of the remaining membership, but the breakdown of it in the new groups indicated that the strongest section of the party of the proletariat was neither very strong nor very proletarian. It was with unusual candor that the report stated that "it was discovered that only a few members were actually working in factories, while not a single miner was to be found." The party established two factory groups. The furniture factory group consisted of "three comrades actually employed in a large furniture factory, together with four other comrades, who, though not factory workers, have been added to the group to strengthen it and assist it in its work." The clothing factories group consisted of a number (unspecified) of workers employed in adjoining clothing factories; in any one clothing factory there were not more than two party members. In a further confession of weakness the party established a new category of three groups with "merely a concentration character." These three groups were composed of party members detailed to recruit members from two specific gold mines and one municipal compound to put proper proletarian flesh on the new skeleton of the party. In a final flourish the party organized a location group: This group merely is residential in character and therefore not completely in conformity with Bolshevik organisation Al principles. Its main field of work at present will be among the housewives, who as 'workers on the job', should be organised and led by the Communist Party. 1

To all its newly-created sections the Johannesburg district committee sent a seven-point instruction demanding regular registration and dues payments, active participation in the sale of UMsebenzi, the preparation of proper agendas for group meetings to be held regularly, weekly reports to the district committee' and educational work among the membership. On paper the reform did move towards conformity with the model dictated by the Cl. It seemed unlikely, however, that the reform would result in a strengthening of the party. To the contrary, the new division of the tiny forces of the CPSA in Johannesburg and the new bureaucratic demands placed upon them courted organizational confusion, if not chaos.

The push of the new leadership to shape the party in the proper 'Bolshevik' image was extended to the campaigns conducted by the party in 1931. An attempt was made in UMsebenziof February 20 to use the anti-pass agitation of late 1930 in order to spur demonstrations on March 6, the International Day of Struggle Against Unemployment. When discontent erupted among African women at the threat that they would be forced to carry night passes, the communists attempted to integrate their discontent with the overseas communist call for demonstrations on August 1, the International Day Against War, in the following terms:

August First must be made the day of mobilisation of broad masses of African women against the carrying of passes, who must not content themselves with struggle against this incident of persecution, but, together with the men of Africa' together with the workers and peasants, employed and unemployed black, white, colour Ed, and Asiatic, must fight against the whole system of Imperialist oppression, for a Native Republic, in defence of the Soviet Union where all women are free and equal, and against the Imperialist war preparations for attack on the Soviet Union.2

In analogous rhetoric UMsebenzi on April 17 called for demonstrations on May Day and on October 16 the newspaper again called for demonstrations on Dingaan's Day. The format of the campaigns became monotonously similar. Calls were made for the burning of passes and poll tax receipts. The appeals were regularly orchestrated by standard themes on the return of the land, the end of unemployment, support for the "Independent Native Republic"' and the defense of the Soviet Union. For variety appropriate obligatos were added according to the nature of the 'international, day. The calls resulted only in scattered demonstrations and there is no indication that the communists gained in immediate strength as a result of the new-style 'Bolshevik' campaigns. The May 15 issue of UMsebenzicontained reports of party branch activity in Johannesburg' Cape Town, Durban' Potchefstroom' Vereeniging' Bloemfontein, Port Elizabeth' Pretoria' Umtata, and Brakpan. Subsequently, however, there were no further reports about the branches and UMsebenzi merely referred only to party activities in Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban. It would seem that the other branches had become inactive.

The communists remained unsuccessful in engaging the peasantry. All propaganda was replete with appeals to the peasantry and with emphasis upon the 'agrarian crisis" but it seems that communist activity in this sphere did not go further than propaganda. There were not even attempts at the organization of peasant leagues or cooperatives.

The party did, however, show some awareness in its propaganda of the vast problems of the poor whites. The poor whites on the land and in the cities were overwhelmingly Afrikaners, generally poorly-educated and strongly prejudiced against non-whites. In the course of the depression their worsening plight caught the attention of several Nationalist and SALP politicians who made attempts to form workers' and farmers' parties based on the Afrikaner poor. The most important of the ,populist, parties was the United Workers, and Farmers' Bond which grew out of attempts by Dr. W. P. Steenkamp, the Nationalist M.P. from Namaqualand, to focus on the problems of the poor Afrikaners. Subsequently a Center Party emerged in 1932, apparently as a successor to the Bond. The attempts were not ignored by the CPSA despite its orientation to the non-whites. The Afrikaans propaganda in UMsebenzi which had been started in 1930 for the Coloureds in Cape Province was redirected to the poor Afrikaners. The appeals attacked the new Afrikaner ,populist, parties and offered the CPSA as an alternative, but they did not compromise on the party's program for the non-whites, including the question of the "lndependent Native Republic."

At the same time the party made efforts to organize the white and non-white unemployed through a South African Unemployed Workers' Union, the program of which was published in UMsebenzi of May 15. The non-racial efforts of the party met with hostility or indifference from most white unemployed. Yet the party did rally a few Afrikaner adherents behind its banners on May 1 when it led momentarily spectacular demonstrations of whites and non-whites before prominent places in Johannesburg. 3 The success of the party among the Afrikaners was fleeting, and probably was more a testament of the desperation of the Afrikaner unemployed than a witness to the adherence of the poor Afrikaners to the ideals of the CPSA. Nevertheless, the party could point to 'proof that its new policy was succeeding among the white workers.

In the trade union field the hand of the new 'Bolshevik' leadership was uneven. The efforts of the communists to resuscitate the Federation were unsuccessful. The Federation was renamed the African Federation of Trade Unions (AFTU) and in UMsebenzi of January 16 it was reported that Thibedi was expelled. Yet the attempts of the renamed AFTU to organize in the mining and transport industries remained mere appeals in the pages of UMsebenzi with the exception of a small group among the dock workers in Durban. 4 In the latter half of 1931 UMsebenzi reported that the AFTU had achieved some success among the garment workers in Cape Town' while in Johannesburg the Clothing Workers' Union, led by Gana Makabeni, remained the only strong unit within the AFTU . Within the 'reformist' SATLC the communists achieved some limited successes, with Sachs particularly successful in organizing Afrikaner women garment workers in very difficult conditions. Increasingly belligerent advocacy of the communist position by white communist trade unionists sitting on councils of the SATLC suggested a new approach to their trade union work. 5

Despite the lack of success of the AFTU, the new leadership of the CPSA still considered it an important organization in its attempt to create a 'Bolshevik' pattern in South Africa. Along with two other organizations' Ikea la Basbenzi and Friends of the Soviet Union which were created in 1931 ' the AFTU was to serve specifically as a front organization. The CPSA stated its intentions both for the AFTU and for the new organizations:

Ikaka la Basebenzi, and Friends of the Soviet Union' broad mass organisations of workers, must be set up to organise new sections of workers and poor farmers in defense against attacks of the ruling class. 6

In accord with the desires of the CPSA the local South African organization of Red Aid, which previously had been restricted to the Jewish community, was converted into Ikaka la Basebenzi (Xhosa for 'shield of the Workers'). It began to concern itself with "class war victims" in South Africa and to make propaganda about "class war victims in India and the United States. Most particularly, it gave financial support to Africans who were restricted in one way or another for their participation in communist activities. 7

Later in 1931 the CPSA was instrumental in forming a South African branch of the Friends of the Soviet Union, a front organization which was designed to rally supporters of the basic policies of the Soviet Union who might not be willing to identify completely with the CPSA. On October 31 UMsebenzi published the six-point program of the new organization:

The new front organizations performed several functions for the CPSA. As a legal and financial aid society Ikaka la Basebenzi carried on a useful service on behalf of the party. More importantly it and the Friends of the Soviet Union were attempts to create new means by which new supporters could be rallied to the communist cause. In addition' the mere existence of the satellite organizations could be cited as a sign that the CPSA was becoming a proper 'Bolshevik' party. Yet the appeal of the organizations remained limited.

Many of the difficulties encountered by the Wolton-Bach leadership could be traced directly to its removal of Bunting and others from office. The resulting new dissension magnified the problems of the new leadership just as it was trying to make the party into a miniature 'Bolshevik, monolith.

Malkinson, who had been instrumental in building up the party branch in Bloemfontein among the Africans' was among those removed from the central committee by Wolton at the ninth congress of the CPSA. Malkinson and his African supporters could not understand why the lone representative of the Orange Free State who had obviously done so much for the party should be removed. Roux was delegated to explain to the Bloemfontein comrades why Malkinson was not equipped to be among the leadership of a new 'Bolshevik' party, but he proved unsuccessful. The Bloemfontein branch of the party then sent a letter to the central committee in Johannesburg demanding the reinstatement of Malkinson. Malkinson was then summarily expelled from the party "for fractional activities against the Party line. The expulsion of Malkinson resulted in the disintegration of the lone organized section of the CPSA in the Orange Free State. 8

The Wolton-Bach attack on Bunting apparently also had an unexpected side-effect among Africans whose support the new leadership did not want. Thibedi, who had opposed the idea of the "lndependent Native Republic"' and who subsequently had been suspended and then expelled from the party for his questionable practices within the Federation' apparently had gathered his African supporters into an organization which was called the Communist Party of Africa. Thibedi's group was apparently successful in getting support from a small group at one of the few mines where the regular communists felt that they had limited prospects for success. When Wolton accused Bunting of "white chauvinism" Thibedi apparently quickly appropriated the charge as a platform upon which to demand the reinstatement for himself and his group into the CPSA. Claiming that Thibedi's fractional activities were the result of instigation by Bunting, the Wolton-Bach leadership sharply rebuffed Thibedi's approach. 9

Bunting also reacted to the attacks upon himself. Through the kindness of Roux he was able to insert a letter in UMsebenzi of January 23 charging that the ECCI had grossly misinterpreted his letter to the colonial department of the CPGB. The publication of Bunting's letter brought an immediate sharp retort from the political bureau printed in UMsebenzi the following week. Bunting was accused of "confusion and muddle headed Ness" in the national question, a stubborn refusal to recognize the importance of the peasant question, and failure to establish training classes in Marxism-Leninism. Most harshly he was attacked for "white chauvinism" and charged with conducting a "social-democratic campaign of vilification against leading native comrades in the Party."

The renewed attack by Wolton and Bach infuriated Bunting, particularly as the charges about his removal of Africans and a campaign against them could only have applied to his reluctant removal of Nzula for drunkenness. Yet the pages of UMsebenzi were closed to him. Bunting controlled his indignation and continued to serve the party as an attorney for party members who were arrested in the course of the campaigns decreed by the new leadership. There is no evidence that Bunting at this time attempted to rally his supporters to challenge his ouster from office.

The new leadership recognized the continuing weakness of the party despite their frenzied efforts to create a new 'Bolshevik' organization. Acutely sensitive to the requirements of Moscow which expected rapid development of the party in a situation it judged highly favorable, the new leadership summoned the central committee to Johannesburg for a critical mid-year survey of the work of the party. 10

At the meeting Sachs, who at this time was closely allied with the Wolton-Bach leadership, noted that political clarity had been emphasized in the economic work of the party, but he admitted that organizationally the party was still far behind the masses. In particular, he pointed to the familiar Achilles, heel of the lack of organization in the basic industries of South Africa. Wolton talked in outspoken ,Bolshevik, terms. He frequently referred to the Cl and to the recent decisions of the eleventh plenum of the ECCI. Obviously trying to copy the rhetoric of the ECCI, he invoked great images of disturbance and unrest with talk of the sharpening crisis in South Africa, the decline of capitalism throughout the world, the rise of the Soviet Union. Yet he complained that the communist movement' including the CPSA' was behind the revolutionary tenor of the masses. According to Wolton the party in South Africa was not organizing the peasantry; it was not fully utilizing its opportunities to lead the unemployed. Wolton's explanation of the continuing inadequacy of the CPSA was simple--the fight against the right danger had not been sufficiently vigorous. A further attack on Bunting and his supporters was presaged.

Within a month after the July meeting of the central committee at which Wolton and Sachs had delivered the main reports, an ominous hint of impending conflict appeared. A letter headed, ',Worker Protests Against Opportunism," signed merely by 'Garment Worker" appeared in UMsebenzi of August 21 with an attack on Sachs. The leader of the Garment Workers' Union was accused of non-attendance at demonstrations sponsored by the CPSA on May 1 and August 1; at the same time it was alleged that Sachs was threatening resignation from his post in the Garment Workers' Union unless his salary was substantially increased. 'Garment Worker' asked if the CPSA agreed with the "opportunism" of Sachs. In a brief editorial note it was stated that the CPSA did not agree with the "opportunism" of Sachs and that a "special investigation of his actions was being conducted.

The "special investigation of the conduct of Sachs was apparently part of a larger review initiated by Wolton and Bach of all potential sources of the "right danger." The results of the "special investigation" broke spectacularly upon the little circles of the CPSA in early September 1931' without any further advance notice. In the four-page September 9 issue of UMsebenzi, a full-page article, "The Fight Against the Right Danger - Expulsions from the Party," announced that Andrews' Tyler, Sachs' Bunting, Mrs. Glass (F. Klenerman), and Weinbren had all been expelled from the CPSA by an act of the Political Bureau. With a single printed page the new leadership attempted to eliminate an entire spectrum of potential active and passive opponents of its narrow interpretation of the new policy of the CPSA.

In South Africa, the internal situation of the party has been characterised by the existence of strong right wing elements which have revealed themselves in opposition to the leadership of the party, in unprincipled opportunistic acceptance of the line of the party in words, whilst rejecting it in deeds; in sabotage of the activities of the party, in attempts to discredit the leadership of the party in the eyes of the masses; in passivity in regard to the work of the party, in the increasing drawing away from the party and its activities, and in the crystallisation of definite fractional activities against the leadership of the party. These tendencies have been manifested in all phases of party work, whether in the party organs themselves or in the Trade Unions and Mass organisations. 11

While in one way or another all of those expelled were in some way guilty of the sins of which they were accused by the new leadership, they were neither part of any organized group of opposition, nor were they agreed among themselves as to the course of future CPSA policy' nor were they all of the right wing. In fact, the six expelled members represented both the right and left wings of the party, as well as the center. Within the party they had little in common except their disagreements with the new leadership.

The expulsions of the six deprived the CPSA of its strongest leaders. Although Andrews and Tyler had been inactive for many years' their continuing association with the party, even if in a nominal capacity, lent prestige to the party, particularly among the militantly-inclined among the white trade unionists. Their expulsion almost severed the last tenuous links which the party had with the white trade union movement from which it had derived its support at the time of the origin of the ISL. The expulsion of Weinbren was a loss of another sort to the CPSA. By attacking Weinbren the new leadership cut off from the party the man who had been most instrumental in building the influence of the party among the African workers in an organized form. With the expulsion of Sachs the party lost one of it most activist members, and the one member of the party who was having success in organizing among the Afrikaner workers who made up the overwhelming majority of the poor white workers which the party considered part of its proletarian realm. In addition, the separation of Sachs from the CPSA meant that a loud exponent of Marxism-Leninism was given an independence to pursue his unique interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. The expulsion of Mrs. Glass (F. Klenerman) had a different import. Through her husband Mrs. Glass had become interested in Trotskyism. 12 Her expulsion from the CPSA seemed to be further confirmation to her and her friends that the 'Stalinists' had indeed taken over the CPSA. Another ideological enemy of the party gained new ammunition for future attacks on the party. It was the expulsion of Bunting, however, which stood to hurt the party the most. For Bunting, at times single handedly, had been instrumental in reorienting the party to the non-whites. Among the African membership of the party the expulsion of Bunting would be difficult to explain. It seemed likely that white supporters of his position would also rally to his cause to create further dissension within the party.

The style of the spectacular expulsions was a stark testament to the introduction of 'Bolshevik' methods to the CPSA. In keeping with the practice elsewhere at the time in the Cl, the efforts of the existing leadership to preserve its position against all challenges were dressed in the acceptable ideological terms of the moment. Thus all those expelled, whether in fact from the right or left or center, were tarred with the brush of the 'right danger' at a time when the main struggle decreed by the Cl was the alleged ,right danger, both within the communist movement and outside of the communist movement. The expulsions by the new leadership seemed to be satisfying the code of the Cl for proper ideological vigilance against the decreed chief enemies of the moment.

The unusually significant action of the Wolton-Bach leadership did not go unnoticed in Moscow. In a letter to the CPSA which was published serially in South Africa starting in late December, 1931, the ECCI both commended the new leadership for its resolute actions against the "anti Leninist line of the Bunting group" and exhorted it to new intensified efforts to command and lead the allegedly revolutionary situation in South Africa. 13 But the purged CPSA was in the throes of accelerating disintegration.

Immediately after the expulsion' in an interview published in The Star of September 9, Sachs denounced the Wolton-Bach leadership, questioned their legitimacy, and declared his intention to ignore the expulsion order. Bunting, who opposed the use of the 'bourgeois' press, chose to present his case directly to the membership of the party in October through the device of a privately-printed letter in English and two African languages. He, too, declared his intention to remain within the party--relying upon a revolt of the membership of the party to overturn the decree of Wolton and Bach.

The waves of dissension shortly spread outward to the communist-front organizations of AFTU, Ikaka la Basebenzi, and the Friends of the Soviet Union. Gana Makabeni, a long-time friend and admirer of Bunting, continued to pursue an independent course, and more particularly, to work with Sachs through his Garment Workers' Union. He, too, was expelled by the Wolton-Bach leadership and the AFTU lost its one well-organized union. Within Ikaka la Basebenzi Wolton and Bach purged all except those who were loyal to their leadership. The Friends of the Soviet Union splintered into a 'loyalist' faction and a rival League of Soviet Friends supported by Bunting, Glass, and other expelled communists. 14

In Cape Town and Durban, the two significant remaining branches outside Johannesburg, the local leadership emulated the actions of Wolton and Bach. The district political committee in Durban, plagued and persecuted by the government, merely endorsed the action of the central committee in UMsebenziof October 2. In the same issue of UMsebenzi it was announced that in Cape Town, however, the district political committee had expelled its own "right wing elements." Five white members, some of whom had been dissatisfied since the promulgation of the new slogan, were expelled for "fractional activities." Later in October La Gum a' the original supporter of the new slogan, was finally ousted from the party for following the demands of his trade union duties over those of the party. 15

In both Cape Town and Johannesburg the expulsions were followed by the organization of Trotskyist groups which provided a new challenge for the Wolton-Bach leadership. In Johannesburg the white Trotskyists did not organize formally, but a group of Africans under Thibedi reorganized themselves into a momentarily significant, but short-lived, Communist League of Africa (Opposition) which attracted African defectors from the CPSA. In Cape Town some of the expelled white communists helped to form the Lenin Club which subsequently produced two small Trotskyist organizations which plagued the communists for many years. 16

From his increasingly strong base in the growing Garment Workers, Union Sachs remained a potential disrupting force' particularly since he continued to proclaim his loyalty to the Soviet Union along with his opposition to the Wolton-Bach leadership. Andrews and Tyler made no attempt to challenge the Wolton-Bach leadership, but their respected presence in the SATLC intensified the difficulties of any future attempts by the CPSA to work with the SATLC. The absence of Bunting from the party deprived the communists of one of their greatest assets among non-whites. Above all, the mere fact of the expulsions, charges, and counter-charges within the small ranks of South African Marxists sowed confusion, distrust, and resentment in the already harsh soil cultivated by the CPSA.

Yet the tremors which shook the party and its satellite organizations and the threats of new disasters and storms did not dislodge Wolton and Bach from the leadership of the CPSA. Backed by the authority of the ECCI, Wolton and Bach single mindedly continued to act as if their glossy blueprint for a sophisticated and orthodox 'Bolshevik' model for South Africa was about to be realized. The smallest hints of support were interpreted as the upsurge of the impending revolutionary wave. In the pages of UMsebenzi the CPSA and its satellites appeared to be accelerating from one success to another.

Outside the pages of UMsebenzi, however, the hastily-constructed CPSA 'machine, was very much a jerry-built vehicle. In late 1932 the AFTU numbered only 200. The communist-front organizations were hollow shells of hard-core party members. Party membership was "not more than 300." The majority of the members were white--and probably many of them were members of the Jewish Workers, Club. 17 The most respected white leaders had been purged' and many of the experienced non-whites had also been purged or had fallen away from the party. The party had merely skeleton organizations in Johannesburg' Cape Town, and Durban. 'Bolshevization, was achieved, but only at the heavy cost of sectarianism.

The impotence of the CPSA in 1932 was highlighted by its inability to utilize the dislocations of the depression to rally support to its cause. Yet the situation in 1932 was only an exaggerated repetition of the consistent failure of the CPSA and its left-wing international socialist predecessors. The history of the ISL and the CPSA through 1932 illuminates some of the difficulties of Marxist-Leninist organizations in a race-conscious environment.

From its start the labor and socialist movement in South Africa was restricted primarily to a small segment of the English-speaking skilled workers, clerks' and professional men. The strength of the movement was concentrated in a few areas around the largest cities in South Africa, and around Johannesburg in particular. Politically the movement was significant only as the junior partner in any potential coalition. The left wing of the labor and socialist movement, in turn, was always a minority of the larger movement. It did attract a number of prominent socialists and trade unions, but their importance could not compensate for the tiny size of the left-wing socialist forces in South Africa. To the several hundred left-wing international socialists of the ISL, and its successor, the CPSA, fell the task of creating a viable and expanding organization to spread the Marxist-Leninist ideology to the population of South Africa which grew from almost six million in 1911 to nine and a half million in 1936.

Although the South African economy was almost a caricature of a Marxist-Leninist model of capitalism, the ISL and the CPSA were not able to harvest the d is content of the new proletariat for their cause. Initially many among the English-speaking workers, and some among the Afrikaner workers, seemed sympathetic to the militant socialist approach of the ISL and the CPSA, particularly in the 1922 strike, but the emphasis of the CPSA upon the non-white workers diverted the white workers from its banners. The carefully protectionist policy of the SALP-Nationalist government after 1924 finally alleviated the grievances of the white workers. The loss of militancy among the English-speaking white workers deprived the CPSA of potential support among the one element of the working class that had some familiarity with its language and approach. The inability of the CPSA to make any converts among the Afrikaner workers denied it entry to the poorer and larger section of the white population among whom economic discontent was the greatest. The record of the ISL and the CPSA among the non-whites was little better. The anti-industrialist strand of Marxism should have struck a responsive chord among the newly-proletarianized African. Yet the great majority literally could not comprehend the approach of the ISL and the CPSA. Only in the late 1920's did the CPSA begin to find a small, but significant response among the Africans around the cities of the Transvaal. Many of those who affiliated with the CPSA, however, were not able to adapt to the discipline and regularity necessary for a successful party. Of those who did remain most became confused and disillusioned by the internecine quarrels within the CPSA which they witnessed in the 1928-32 period. The CPSA lost its base among the whites, and it was also unable to hold its recruits among the non-whites.

Despite repeated setbacks the ISL, and the CPSA after it, always retained a tiny band of loyal followers. At first they were the militant white trade unionists from whose ranks the ISL had arisen. When this group fell away from the CPSA, its main support then came from the small number of whites who saw Marxist socialism as the means by which the established racial and economic patterns of South Africa could be overturned. In the late 1920's this core was joined by the first few Africans who became convinced of the truth of the non-racial socialist vision offered by the Bunting leadership of the CPSA. When the vision, sincerity, and the lack of results of this group, particularly the whites, proved unsatisfactory to Moscow in the changed situation of the post-1928 period, they were expelled or they resigned . A new group of whites, the members of the Jewish Workers, Club, then became the mainstay of the CPSA. New to South Africa and immersed in the intricacies of Marxism-Leninism rather than in South African affairs, the recruits from the Jewish Workers, Club were the ,Bolsheviks, which the new leadership needed for support of the line dictated by Moscow.

The loyal followers of the ISL and the CPSA all shared positions on the fringe of South African society. The first group, white workers, remained outside the main concern of the white government until the advent of the SALP-Nationalist government; by that time they had ceased to regard the approach of the CPSA as relevant. The second group of white supporters, like the Christian missionaries and the white liberals who envisaged a non-racial society for South Africa, also were on the outer fringe of both white and non-white politics. Yet the communist missionaries were more isolated than the Christians as far fewer either understood or accepted their plan for immediate action in order to achieve a non-racial, and socialist society. The African supporters of the CPSA were similarly isolated from both their tribal societies and such African politics as existed. The communists of the Jewish Workers, Club were perhaps the most isolated; they were living primarily in a 'Bolshevik' ghetto which merely happened to be physically in South Africa.

The isolation and seeming eccentricity of the strong supporters of the ISL and the CPSA compounded the difficulties of the CPSA in expanding significantly within South Africa. Yet the same factors acted to strengthen the belief of the followers of the ISL and the CPSA that their lonely efforts were in keeping with the imminent and inevitable advance of socialism which they continued to see manifest in the development of the Soviet Union and the Cl. Even many of the whites and Africans who left the party in 1928-32 continued to believe in the ultimate correctness of their faith despite their fate at the hands of the Wolton-Bach leadership. In their non-racial approach to South African politics the ISL and CPSA could produce few concrete results. Nevertheless, their Marxist faith and their commitment to a non-racial socialist society never wavered.

The lack of success of the ISL and the CPSA had its roots in the nature of South African society and the inability of the South African Marxist socialists to compensate for it. At the same time the very nature of Marxist socialism, particularly in the context of the Cl, hindered the efforts of the ISL and the CPSA.

The primary political problem of white South Africa was the conflict between the Afrikaners and the English-speaking South Africans. The ISL and the CPSA, composed predominantly of English-speakers, were regarded with suspicion by Afrikaners. Their philosophies were particularly alien to Afrikaner experience and tradition. Yet neither organization, however, made any attempt to overcome this obstacle through a sustained special approach to the newly-urbanized Afrikaner workers. With the increasing 'Afrikanerization' of the white working force the possibilities for the growth of the ISL and the CPSA among the white workers diminished.

Yet it was the overriding problems of race which most confounded the efforts of the ISL and the CPSA to expand within white South Africa. The ISL and CPSA consciously adopted programs which placed increasing emphasis upon the necessity of a rapid advance of the non-whites towards an integrated socialist society. The mere adoption of the program alienated the ISL and the CPSA not only from the traditionally-prejudiced Afrikaners, but also from the protectionist English-speaking workers, as well as from the overwhelming majority of the remaining white South Africans.

The complexities of non-white South Africa itself added greatly to the difficulties of the ISL and the CPSA. As a section of the white labor and socialist movement the ISL and the CPSA encountered some of the same suspicion and animosity which the non-whites directed at all white trade unionists, most of whom were fervent segregationists. The divisions within the non-white section of the population posed additional problems. In language, culture, education' and economic level the Coloureds were the closest to the white workers' yet they were Afrikaans-speaking and were concentrated in Cape Province where neither the ISL nor the CPSA was particularly strong. Furthermore, the Coloureds were offered hopes of further limited concessions at the expense of other non-white groups by the established political parties. Thus, they were wary of supporting a radical group such as the ISL or the CPSA which attempted to appeal to Africans. In terms of education and economic level the Indians were also closer to the whites than the Africans. Yet the Indians were concentrated in Natal where the ISL and the CPSA hardly existed. Furthermore, the Indians, in contrast to other non-whites, looked for their political inspiration to the politics of India. In approaching the Africans who comprised the overwhelming majority of the non-white workers, particularly on the Witwatersrand, the ISL and the CPSA encountered other difficulties. The strength of the migrant labor system, particularly in the key mining industry, infinitely multiplied the problems of building a strong permanent organization among the African workers concentrated in the Transvaal. The Africans spoke a variety of languages and were the least formally educated of the non-white groups. While some of the poorly-educated Africans did respond to the message of the ISL and the CPSA few became permanent members. Most of the educated Africans who were best able to understand the Marxist socialism of the ISL and the CPSA were linked with the moderate accomodationist political groups which generally distrusted the ISL and the CPSA.

The difficulty of approaching the Afrikaner, the prejudices of white South Africa, the heterogeneity of the non-whites, the conservatism of non-white politicians, and the lack of a common language between the militant English-speaking whites of the ISL and the CPSA and the non-white workers combined to create formidable barriers for the ISL and the CPSA.

Instead of helping the ISL and the CPSA to overcome their difficulties, the socialist and Marxist approaches of both organizations compounded their problems in South Africa. Ideological disputes, a narrowness of experience, and interference from overseas burdened the South African left-wing international socialists and communists.

The numerous bitter divisions of the international socialist movements in Europe and America were refracted into the tiny South African movement. Ideological and tactical quarrels hindered unity before the First World War and the movement split over the question of participation in the First World War. Even within the left-wing anti-war international socialist groups quarrels persisted over industrial unionism' and particularly, over the utility of electoral activity, until the formation of the CPSA in 1921. The membership of the CPSA, in turn, disputed over the proper Marxist approach to the South African situation.

Specific elements of Marxist ideology as interpreted by the South Africans blunted their perceptions of their South African environment. By regarding South Africa in increasingly orthodox Marxist terms the ISL and the CPSA until 1928 were insufficiently sensitive to the nationalism both of the Afrikaners and of the non-whites. Occasional attempts were made to formulate special approaches to the nationalisms of both groups, but the attempts remained stillborn. The ISL and the CPSA also tended to treat South Africa as a modern capitalist industrial state' rather than as a developing industrial state in a peculiar colonial position. Consequently' some of the modern industrial aspects of the South African economy were considered more important than in fact they were at the time. Above all the ideology gave little help in dealing with problems of race' either in the form of racism as manifested by the whites' or in the form of the increasing racial consciousness among the Africans.

In the multi-racial, culturally-segmented, and semi-colonial environment of South Africa the European background of most of the members of the ISL and the CPSA was confining. Experienced generally within the British left-wing socialist traditions, most of the membership of both groups was often preoccupied with events overseas. While identification with left-wing international socialists and communists overseas did sustain the ISL and the CPSA in their isolation in South Africa, it made it more difficult for both groups to adapt their approaches to the peculiarities of the South African situation. The militant European political language which the ISL and the CPSA spoke and the methods which they advocated ill equipped them to proselytize successfully except in small white circles in South Africa.

The affiliation of the CPSA with the Cl did not immediately aid or harm the efforts of the CPSA in South Africa. Yet the act of affiliation with the Cl in 1921 introduced new dimensions into the affairs of the CPSA. The CPSA placed itself formally under the discipline of the Moscow-centered Cl. South African problems were placed within the context of the national and colonial questions and the Negro question as defined by the Cl. The affairs of the CPSA came under the scrutiny not only of the Cl' but also other sections of the international communist movement in Soviet Russia, the United States, and Britain. Only with the convergence of pressures within the international communist movement in the late 1920's for attention to the world Negro problem, for a redefinition of the national and colonial problem, and for the 'Bolshevization' of all sections of the Cl did the Cl intervene in the affairs of the CPSA.

The new program of the CI for the CPSA did draw the attention of the South Africans to the national' colonial' and agrarian aspects of the South African situation which they had previously neglected. Yet the prescriptions which were offered by the Cl were relatively undistilled cliches drawn largely from the Leninist-Stalinist analyses of the Russian nationalities problem and the colonial problem; they gave no workable tactics and strategy for the South African situation. Most disastrously, the imposition of the new program at the insistence of the Cl destroyed the first successes of the party among the Africans' introduced factionalism and dissension into the party, and finally resulted in the expulsion from its ranks of its most experienced and devoted leaders.

The interference of the Cl highlighted the problems of the dual environment in which the CPSA, and its predecessor, the ISL' operated. From its foundation the ISL stood primarily upon its commitment to the principles of international socialism. Through this prism it viewed the South African situation and decided to cast its socialism in a non-racial form. Thus, the ISL became the first white political party to advocate a non-racial South Africa and to include non-whites in its ranks. Its policy assured that the ISL would remain an isolated left-wing international socialist sect in white South Africa. At the same time the remaining ambiguities of the ISL policy toward non-whites helped to hinder any advance of the ISL among the non-whites. Yet once the CPSA, the successor to the ISL' resolved the ambiguities in its policy and decided that Marxism demanded that the emphasis of the party's work should be among non-whites, there were signs that the CPSA was beginning to evolve tactics which would have given it a toehold for the first time in South African non-white politics.

It was at this point that the Cl intervened. The new program threatened to destroy the tenuous roots of the CPSA in its South African environment; thus it was resisted by the Bunting leadership which believed that it was best qualified to formulate Cl policy for South Africa. When it was clear that the Cl would insist upon its program the Bunting leadership attempted a reconciliation of its South African approach with the line dictated by Moscow. Within the 'Bolshevized' Cl the temporizing of the Bunting leadership was seen as insubordination. Acting through Wolton and Bach who were able to take advantage of the fact that few in the CPSA dared to challenge the ultimate authority of the Cl, Moscow purged the CPSA into apparent conformity with the distinctive 'Bolshevik' model which it had decreed for it. The process by which the CPSA was 'Bolshevized, showed that those who followed the demands of Moscow over the demands of the South African environment were successful within the CPSA. 1 Ultimately the CPSA proved more responsive to the demands of its international socialist environment, even in the exaggerated 'Bolshevik, form decreed by the Cl.

The experience of the CPSA within the international communist movement also offers some insight into the workings of the international communist movement in the first dozen years of its existence. South Africa was not in Europe, the Middle East' or China' the prime areas of Soviet and Cl concern in the early 1920's. Neither was the CPSA a large party to attract the interest of the Cl. Thus, the CPSA was left to its own devices and until 1928 it conducted itself as merely a peculiar continuation of one of the pre-war left-wing international socialist sects on the periphery of South African politics. Only when 'Bolshevik' practices were extended to the Cl, and more particularly, when colonialism and the Negro question became important concerns of the Cl did South Africa become important to the Cl. The Cl then analyzed South Africa in terms of the other problems with insufficient attention to the unique features of South Africa. The resulting program for South Africa was removed both from the previous practice of the CPSA and from the possibilities of the CPSA in the South African situation. The peripheral position of the CPSA within the international communist movement meant that it preserved its autonomy longer than many other sections of the Cl; yet it also meant that when the Cl did turn to the problems of the CPSA its prescription was particularly irrelevant to the precarious position achieved by the CPSA.

The process by which the Cl imposed its decision upon the CPSA illustrated its ability to organize the international communist movement in order to enforce its program even upon a peripheral section of the Cl. In 1928 the previously uncoordinated interests of the RILU, the CPGB, and the YCI were synchronized to orchestrate the new interest of Moscow in South Africa as part of the Negro problem and the colonial problem. Once the new program was formulated sections of the international communist movement were clearly given supporting roles to back up the efforts of the Cl to bring the CPSA into line.

The performance of the international communist movement in the South African situation testified both to its heavy-handed thoroughness and to its lack of comprehension of the realities of the South African situation. The new program of the CPSA dramatically spotlighted an instance where the Cl imposed a 'made-in-Moscow' program tailored to the ideology and priorities of the Soviet Union upon a section of the Cl. The results of the new program graphically illustrated the high cost of subservience to the demands of Moscow.

The Cl, however' remained dissatisfied with the performance of the CPSA. The clear disintegration of the party' in the face of the frantic efforts of the Wolton-Bach leadership, brought Eugene Dennis of the CPUSA to South Africa in mid-1932 to supervise directly the CPSA on behalf of the Cl . Under his leadership the tiny ranks of the CPSA were further indoctrinated in the proper 'Bolshevik' approach to the South African situation' but the party still remained a sect in isolation on the fringe of South African politics. With the departure of Dennis in late 1932' and the sudden exit of Wolton in mid-1933' some of the intense pressures for 'Bolshevik' activity were removed and the CPSA made the first small steps to a partial readjustment with its South African environment. Yet bitter ideological and tactical quarrels within the ranks continued to impair the operation of the CPSA. 2

Only in the late 1930's did the CPSA begin to emerge from its isolation in spite of itself. Amidst rising concern at the threat of fascism abroad and in South Africa, the shift of Cl strategy to advocacy of the popular front opened new more acceptable means for the CPSA to build links with elements of the white population of South Africa. Among non-whites, the greater political consciousness in the wake of the Representation of Natives' Act of 1936 (which removed the Africans from the common roll in Cape Province in return for three 'Native' representatives in parliament' a dubious Union-wide representation in a Natives' Representative Council, and promises of more land for the tribal 'reserves') created a climate in which popular front alliances with the communists in pursuit of common short-term goals were acceptable. 'Bolshevik' habits' however, died hard. It was necessary for the Cl to send another representative (George Hardy of the CPGB) to the CPSA in order to attempt to convince the CPSA of the correctness of the new united front tactics.3 Some of the subsequent united front organizations which were formed to appeal to the anti-fascist sentiments in the white community failed to escape from crude party domination. within the party itself' particularly in the key Johannesburg branch, poisonous factionalism persisted.

Nevertheless, by the end of the 1930's the party had begun to change its organization, its ideology' and the basis of its support.

By a vote of the central committee the headquarters of the central committee were shifted from faction-ridden Johannesburg to Cape Town. Although the centralized structure of the party remained the same on paper, considerable local autonomy became the practice.

The party began to emphasize its reformist, South African nature, rather than its revolutionary internationalist nature. Interference by the Cl appears to have ended and the CPSA turned to a more independent estimation of the South African situation. The controversial slogan of the "independent native South African republic" was quietly dropped and the emphasis of the party's program for non-whites returned to the full extension of political and economic rights which had characterized it in the 1920's. Questions of ideology became relatively unimportant; the CPSA concentrated upon an 'activist' approach to whites and non-whites on a program of socialist reforms.

While the CPSA remained small it was no longer restricted to a small core of whites preoccupied with 'Bolshevik' dogma. The CPSA began to attract to its ranks a number of professional people and intellectuals who were concerned about the threat of fascism overseas and at home, as well as a number of whites for whom the CPSA' as the only non-racial political party at the time, seemed to offer a political approach for the improvement of the conditions of the non-whites. In the absence of a strong visible socialist streak at the time in the SALP the CPSA undoubtedly attracted support from those whites seeking a 'socialist' party in South Africa. As a result of the efforts of individual communists in the trade union movement the party began to get a small membership and following for the first time among the Afrikaner workers. Similarly' the efforts of a few new Indian communist trade unionists in Durban brought sustained support for the party among Indians and Africans in Durban for the first time. In Cape Town the party also built up limited support among Coloureds in trade unions organized by its members.

Most striking was the shift of the attitude of the CPSA toward the established nationalist organizations of the non-whites. Whereas the 1928 directive from the Cl had precluded cooperation with nationalist organizations except through a direct appeal to the rank and file' the CPSA in the late 1930's attempted critical alliances with the leadership of the existing nationalist organizations (in addition to continuing efforts to work directly with the rank and file). The policy of qualified cooperation with the nationalist organizations was reaffirmed continually throughout the 1940's.

The sharp shifts of line at the time of the Hitler-Stalin Pact in 1939 and again in 1941 with the attack of Germany upon the Soviet Union created some difficulties for the CPSA, but during the Second World War it expanded rapidly upon the base of its own popular front policy for South Africa. It remained the only political party at the time which embraced the cause of the non-whites. In the postwar atmosphere of the cold war overseas and heightened racial tensions within South Africa the CPSA lost a number of whites who had been attracted to it, but it continued to expand among the non-whites and to receive greater acceptance by many non-white political organizations. The membership of the party became predominantly nonwhite, but among the leadership whites predominated. The party continued to attract a small, but significant, group of devoted and talented whites and non-whites from almost all sections of the South African population. Despite continuing difficulties, the CPSA was established in South Africa.

Yet the CPSA never achieved a membership of more than several thousand. It was continually plagued by the ghosts of its 'Bolshevik, past in the form of the Trotskyists, the independent left-wing agitation of "Solly" Sachs' and the activities among Africans of Senator Hyman Basner (a former communist who parted from the CPSA in the late 1930's on the basis of disagreements on the Hitler-Stalin Pact). Rising national and racial consciousness among the non-whites particularly among the Africans' further hampered the rapid expansion of the CPSA. The CPSA remained on the periphery of South African politics.

Nevertheless' its policies and activities were an anathema to the Nationalist government which assumed power after its unexpected victory in the elections of May 1948. Under the terms of the Suppression of Communism Act which it passed in 1950 the CPSA was to be outlawed and its members strictly penalized. In the face of the stringent terms of the new legislation the CPSA dissolved itself in June 1950. The decision of the CPSA to dissolve itself' and not to go underground' fittingly symbolized the end of the legal and open existence of a Marxist-Leninist political organization in South Africa. 4

In the changed situation of the 1950s the terms of all South African politics shifted under the pressures of the relentless application of apartheid. The communists reorganized themselves in 1953 into a new underground party, the South African Communist Party. Its members continued to participate in non-white organizations opposed to apartheid. In the increasingly fertile soil of government repression the now clandestine communists were able to play an influential role in non-white politics for the first time. More than three decades after the formation of the CPSA the communists began to surmount the obstacles of the harsh South African environment, the restrictions of their Marxist ideology, and the burdens of their international communist affiliations.

In the course of the research for this dissertation I was able to correspond and talk with a number of former participants in the South African left-wing international socialist movement and the CPSA. The correspondence and conversations were most fruitful in confirming written sources and giving the spirit of the politics of the South African left wing in the period until 1932. I have preferred, however' to rely almost exclusively upon written sources. Only when a few details were added which were unavailable from written sources have I relied upon personal correspondence and personal interviews; these few letters and interviews are cited in the bibliography under "Other Letters and "Other Sources."

I was particularly fortunate to obtain access to a number of unpublished documents relating both to the CPSA and to the ICU which helped me to maintain my reliance upon written sources. The papers of C. F. Glass provided a number of documents of the left-wing international socialist movement in Cape Town and inner party documents of the first three years of the CPSA. The collection of Professor Edward Roux provided the crucial correspondence and documents pertaining to the history of the CPSA in the period 1927-30 during the debates over the new slogan of the "independent native South African republic." From scattered private sources in South Africa, and from the papers of Winifred Holtby on file at the Public Library, Hull, England, l was able to gather a most incomplete, but most useful, collection of internal ICU documents and correspondence which helped to illuminate the relationship of the important ICU to the CPSA. In the listings of these materials under the heading "Unpublished Materials', it may be presumed that the items listed belong to the above collections which are not, with the exception of the papers of Winifred Holtby, available for public inspection.

The most invaluable source of information has been, however, the published press of the communist movement, both in South Africa and overseas. The newspaper of the ISL and the CPSA, The Intemational, and its successors, The South African Worker and UMsebenzi' have been perused from 1915 to 1932 with the exception of brief periods in 1925 and 1926 for which it was impossible to find copies of the newspaper. Similarly, the newspaper of the Cl, International Press Correspondence, the English language journal of the Cl, Communist Intemational, its Russian-language equivalent, Kommunisticheskii Internatsional, and the various publications of the CPGB have been inspected. On specific topics communist publications in the United States and Pravda were consulted, as well as the ,bourgeois, newspapers of South Africa and such copies of Workers, Herald and New Africa, the newspapers of Kadalie's ICU, as could be located. The communist periodicals consulted, along with the non-communist periodicals consulted, are listed under the heading "Periodicals"; all periodicals which were published outside of South Africa are so noted. Under the heading "Articles" is the list of single articles in additional periodicals which were consulted only for these specific articles.

Under the headings of "Public Documents" and "Books and Pamphlets" are found the official government and party documents, books and pamphlets which were useful both for specific information and for general background to the various aspects of the left-wing international socialist and communist movement in South Africa before 1932.

Amter, Israel. Mirovoe Osvoboditel,noe Dvizhenie Negrov (The World Negro Liberation Movement). Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1925. Andrews, W. H. Class Struggles in South Africa. Cape Town: Stewart Printing Co., 1940.

, The Workers' Revolution in Russia. Johannesburg: ISL Press, 1918.
Armstrong, H. C. Grey Steel (J. C. Smuts): A Study in Arrogance. Middlesex: Penguin Books,1939.
Barlow, Arthur G. Almost in Confidence. Cape Town: Juta & Co., Ltd .,1952.
Benson, Mary. The African Patriots. London: Faber and Faber,1963.
Bealey' Frank and Pelling' Henry. Labour and Politics, 1900-1906, A History of the Labour Representation Committee. London: Macmillan and Co.

1958.
Boersner, Demetrio. The Bolsheviks and the National and Colonial Question (1917-1928). Geneva: Librarie E. Droz,1957.
Boy dell, Thomas. 'My Luck Was In': With Spotlights on General Smuts.
Cape Town: Stewart Printing Co., 1948.
, 'My Luck's Still In': With More Spotlights on General Smuts. Cape Town: Stewart Printing Co.,1948.
Brissenden, Paul F. The IWW. 2nd ed. New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1957.
Brittain, Vera. Testament of Friendship. London: Macmillan and Co.,1940. Brittain, Vera and Handley-Taylor, Geoffrey (eta.) Selected Letters of Winifred Holtby and Vera Brittain (1920-1935l. London: A. Brown and Sons,Ltd.,1960.

'Brutus'. Never Again, The Psychology and Lesson of the Rand Revolt' 1922. Johannesburg: Central News Agency, n.d.
Bunting, Sidney P. Imperialism and South Africa. Johannesburg: Communist Party of South Africa,1928.
, The Red Revolt. Johannesburg: Communist Party of South Africa,1922.
Cal pin, G. H. Indians in South Africa. Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter,
1949.
, There Are No South Africans. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd. 1941.

Carter, Gwendolen. The Politics of Inequality: South Africa Since 1948. New York: Frederick A. Praeger,1958.
Cole, Monica. South Africa. London: Methuen and Co., Ltd.,1961.
Cope, R. K. Comrade Bill: The Life and Times of W. H. Andrews, Workers' Leader. Cape Town: Stewart Printing Co., n.d.
Creswell, Margaret. An Epoch of the Political History of South Africa in the Life of Frederic Hugh Page Creswell. Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, n.d.
Cronon, Edmund D. Black Moses. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1955.

Degras, Jane (ed.). The Communist International, 1919-1943, Documents. London: Oxford University Press,1956.
de Kiewiet, Cornelius W. A History of South Africa, Social and Economic. Oxford: Clarendon Press,1941.
de Kock, M. H. The Economic Development of South Africa. London: P. S. King & Son, Ltd., 1936.
Doxey, G. V. The Industrial Colour Bar in South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press,1961.
Draper, Theodore. American Communism and Soviet Russia. New York: Viking Press, 1960.

, The Roots of American Communism. New York: Viking Press, 1957.
Ebbels, R. N. The Australian Labor Movement. Sydney: Australasian Book Society, 1960.
Egbert, D. E. and Persons, Stow. Socialism and American Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press,1952.
Fain sod, Merle. Intemational Socialism and the World War. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press,1935.
Feit, Edward. South Africa, the Dynamics of the African Nationai Congress. London: Oxford University Press' 1962.

· Town: Real Printing and Publishing Co.' 1959.
Gitlin, Marcia. The Vision Amazing. Johannesburg: Menorah Book Club,
1950.
Gitsham, Ernest, and Trembath, James. A First Account of Labour Organ-
isation in South Africa. Durban: E.P. & Commercial Printing Co., Ltd.' 1926.
Gumede, James. A Fighting Policy for South Africa. Cape Town?: Committee to Send a South African Delegation to the International Negro Congress, 1930.
Hancock' W. K. Smuts: The Sanguine Years, 1870-1919. London: Cambridge University Press,1962.

, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 2 vols. New York: Oxford University Press, 1937, 1939, 1942.
Hardy, George. Those Stormy Years. London: Lawrence & Wishart,1956.
Harrison, Wilfred. Memoirs of a Socialist in South Africa, 1903-1947. Cape Town: By the Author,1947.
Houghton, D. Hobart. The South African Economy. Cape Town: Oxford University Press,1964.
Hughes, Emrys. Keir Hardie. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1956.
Jabavu, D. D. T. The Black Problem, Papers and Addresses on Various Native Problems. 2nd ed. Lovedale: The Book Department, 1921.

, Native Disabilities in South Africa. Lovedale: The Lovedale Press, 1932.
Jones, D. Ivon. Communism in South Africa. Johannesburg: ISL Press, 1921. Josh I, P. S. The Struggle for Equality. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, Ltd., 1951. , Verdict on South Africa (The Tyranny of Colour). Bombay: Thacker & Co., Ltd.,1945.
Kent ridge, Morris. l Recall. Memoirs. Johannesburg: Free Press, Ltd.,1959.
Kruger, D. W. The Age of Generals: A Short Political History of the Union of South Africa, 1910-1948. Johannesburg: Dagbreek Book Store (Pty.) Ltd., 1961.
Kuper, Hilda. Indian People in Natal. Pietermaritzburg: Natal University Press, 1960.
Laqueur, Walter Z. The Soviet Union and the Middle East. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959.
MacCrone, l . D. Race Attitudes in South Afnca: Historical, Expenmental and Psychological Studies. New York: Oxford University Press (on behalf of the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg),1937.

Macmillan, William Miller. Africa Emergent: A Survey of Social, Political, and Economic Trends in British Africa. London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1938.
, Bantu, Boer and Briton: The Making of the South African Native Problem. London: Faber and Gwyer, Ltd.,1929.
, Complex South Africa: An Economic Footnote to History. London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1930.
Mann, Tom. Tom Mann's Memoirs. London: Labour Publishing Co.' 1923.
Marais, J. S. The Cape Coloured People. London: Longmans, Green and

Co., 1939.
Marquard, Leo. The Black Man's Burden, by John Burger (pseud.). London:
VictorGollancz, Ltd.,1943.
, The Native in South Africa. 2nd ed. revised by Julius Lewin.
Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1944.
, The Peoples and Policies of South Africa. London: Oxford University Press. 1952.
, The Story of South Africa. London: Faber and Faber, Ltd.,1950. Nolan, William A. Communism v. the Negro. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1951.

Overacher, Louise. The Australian Paffy System. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952.
Overstreet, Gene D., and Windmiller, Marshall. Communism in India.
Berkeley: University of California Press,1959.
Padmore, George. Pan-Africanism or Communism? The Coming Struggle
for Africa. London: Dennis Dobson,1956.
, What Is the Intemational Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers. Hamburg?: I nternational Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers, 1930?

Patterson, Sheila. Colour and Culture in South Africa: a Study of the Status of the Cape Coloured People within the Social Structure of the Union of South Africa. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.,1953.
. The Last Trek: A Study of the Boer People and the Afrikaner Nation. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.,1957.
Pelling, Henry. The British Communist Party. A Historical Profile. London: Adam and Charles Black,1958.
. Origins of the Labour Party, 1880-1900. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1954.

. A Short History of the Labour Party. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1962.
Phillips, Ray E. The Bantu in the City, a Study of Cultural Adjustment on the Witwatersrand. Lovedale: The Lovedale Press,1948.
Plaatje, Solomon Tshekisho. Native Life in South Africa, Before and-Since the European War and the Boer Rebellion. 2nd ed. London: P. S. King & Son, Ltd., 1916.
Potekhin, l. l. Formirovanie Natsional'noi Obshchnosti luzhnoafrikanskikh Bantu (The Formation of the National Community of the South African Bantu). Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1955.

Record, Wilson. The Negro and the Communist Party. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,1951.
Ringrose, H. G. Trade Unions in Natal. Cape Town: Oxford University Press
(for University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg), 1951.
Roux, Edward. S. P. Bunting: A Political Biography. Cape Town: African Bookman,1944.
. Time Longer Than Rope: A History of the Struggle of the Black Man for Freedom in South Africa. 2nd ed. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964.

Sachs, Bernard. Multitude of Dreams. Johannesburg: Kayor Publishing House, 1949.
. The Road from Sharpeville. London: Dennis Dobson, 1961.
Sachs, E. S. The Choice Before South Africa. London: Turnstile Press' 1952.
. Rebel Daughters. London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1957.
Sampson, Anthony. The Treason Cage. The Opposition on Trial in South Africa. London: Heinemann,1958.
Saron, Gustav, and Holtz, Lewis (eta.) The Jews in South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1955.

Smuts, Jan. The Syndicalist Conspiracyin South Africa. Cape Town: Cape Times Limited, 1914.
Story of a Crime. Johannesburg: Transvaal Strike Legal Defense Committee, 1924.
Sundkler, Bengt G. M. Bantu Prophets in South Africa. London: Lutterworth Press,1948.
Talbot-Williams, R. White Trade Unionism or a Call to the Non-European Workers of South Africa. Johannesburg: Transvaal and Free State Executive, APO, 1918.
Thompson, Leonard M . The Unification of South Africa, 1902- 1910. Oxford: Oxford University Press,1960.

Tinley, James M. The Native Labor Problem of South Africa. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,1942.
Urquhart, William. The Outbreak on the Witwatersrand, March, 1922. Johannesburg: Hortors, Ltd.,1922.
van der Horst, Sheila. Native Labour in South Africa. London: Oxford University Press, 1942.
Walker, Eric A. A History of Southem Africa. 3rd ed. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1957.
Walker, Ivan L. and Weinbren, Ben. 2000 Casualties. A History of the Trade Unions and the Labour Movement in the Union of South Africa. Johannesburg: South African Trade Union Council,1961.

Whiting, Allen S. Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954.
Wolton, Douglas. To the Electors of Cape Flats Division. Cape Town: By the Author, 1929.
. Whither South Africa? London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1947.

Crawford, Archibald. "Socialist Party Progress in South Africa," International Socialist Review. Kill, No. 1 (July 1912), pp. 48-50.
Flynn, Elizabeth G. "The Life of Eugene Dennis, Political Affairs. Xl, No. 3 (March 1961), pp. 4-8.

Haggar, C. H. "Organised Labour as a Political Force'" State. Ill (June1910)' pp. 933-945.
"Der Kongo und Delagoa Streik (The Congo and the Delagoa Strike), Kommunismus. l, No. 45 (December 3,1920), pp. 1637-1641.
Levenberg' B. "Yidisher Arbeter Klub (Barikht fun Veyterdike Arbet)" (The Jewish Workers' Club [Report of Further Work]), Proletarishe Shtime. l, No. 1 (May 1932), pp. 23-25.
Minor, Robert. "The First Negro Workers' Congress," Workers' Monthly. V (December 1925), pp. 68-73.

Mrg. B. "Ikaka Laba Sebenzi--Der Pantser fun Arbeter Klas (Internatsionale Royte Hilfl" (Ikaka Laba Sebenzi--The Shield of the Working Class [International Red Aid]), Proletarishe Shtime. l, No. 1 (May 1932), pp. 21 -22. ',Die Proletarische Bewegung in Britisch-Sudafrika und tag Problem der Eingeborenen Arbeiter" (The Proletarian Movement in British South Africa and the Problem of the Native Worker), Kommunismus. I, No. 45 (December 3, 1920), pp. 1641-1643.

Rochlin, S. "Our Duty,: Correspondence of the Young Intemational. l, No. 6(July10,1921),p. 2.
Roux, Edward. "Reaching the Native Youth, A South African Problem," The Intemational of Youth. IV, No. 1 (1924), pp. 26, 30.
Sachs, E. S. "Harry Snitcher, the 'Revolutionary Bolshevik' and E. S. Sachs, the 'Reformist Menshevik'," The Garment Worker, IV, No. 6 (November-December 1943), pp. 8-10.
"Selby Msimang," Drum. IV (June 1954).
Shepperson, George. "Ethiopianism and African Nationalism," Phylon. XIV, No. 1 (1953), pp. 9-18.

African Communist (London)
The Bolshevik
Bulletin of the IV Congress of the Communist Intemational (Moscow)
The Call
The Call (London)
Cape Times
The Communist (London)
Communist Intemational (Leningrad, London, New York)
Communist Review (London)
Daily Worker (Chicago)
Daily Worker (London)
Forward
Freedom
The Guardian
Inkululeko
The Intemational
Intemational Press Correspondence (Vienna, London)
Kommunisticheskii Intematsional (Moscow)
Krasnii Intematsional Profsoiuzov (Moscow)
Labour Monthly (London)
Moscou (Moscow)
Natal Mercury
Negro Worker (Hamburg)
New Africa
Novii Vostok (Moscow)
Pravda (Moscow)
Rand Daily Mail
Round Table (London)
The South African Worker
The Star
UMsebenzi
War on War Gazette
Workers, Herald
Workers' Weekly (London)

A. Government Documents
Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Vol. XXIII (Accounts and Papers, Vol. Vlll)' Cd. 2682' 1926' "Communist Papers.
Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Vol. XLIX (Reports, Vol. XXXIX), cd. 7112,1914, "Report of Commission on Witwatersrand Disturbances."
Transvaal. Transvaal Indigency Commission, 1906-1908, Minutes of Evidence, T. G. No. 11/08.
Union of South Africa. House of Assembly Debates, Vol. XIV,1930.

Union of South Africa, Official Year Book, No. 7-1924. Pretoria: Government Printing and Stationery Office, 1925.
Union of South Africa, Report of the Martial Law Inquiry Judicial Commission, U. G. No. 35/1922.
B.Materials Issued by South African Political Parties and Trade Union Organizations
[Communist Party of South Africa]. 'n Brief a an Wit Myn-werker s (A letter to the White Mine Workers). Johannesburg: ISL Press,1924.
Communist Party of South Africa, Election Manifesto. Johannesburg: ISL Press, 1924.

. A Vital Issue. Johannesburg: ISL Press?. 1924.
. What is This Communist Party. Johannesburg: Communist Party of South Africa, 1928.
Constitutional Socialist League. A Concrete Practical Socialist Plan in the Form of a Parliamentary Bill. Cape Town: Constitutional Socialist League' 1919.
. Draft Bill to Coordinate Supply and Demand and Usher in a New Order of Society on the Basis of a Socialist Commonwealth. Cape Town: Constitutional Socialist League' 1919?.

. Manifesto. Cape Town: Constitutional Socialist League, 1920
Industrial and Commercial Workers, Union of Africa. lCU Reply to Racial Declaration of South African Trade Union Congress. Johannesburg: Industrial and Commercial Workers, Union of Africa, 1923.
. Official Report of Proceedings, Third Annual Conference. Cape Town: Industrial and Commercial Workers, Union of Africa' 1923.
International Socialist League. Socialist Manifesto on Education. Johannesburg: ISL Press' 1916.

The South African LabourParty Exposed. Johannesburg: ISL Press' 1920.
The Labour Paffy's Duty in the War. Benoni: Eastern Record' 1915.
Signatories of ,The Labour Party's Duty in the War'. Noblesse Oblige. Johannesburg: Signatories of 'The Labour Party's Duty in the War',1915. South African Association of Employees' Organisations, Report of the First Congress. Johannesburg' 1925.
. Report of the National Executive Committee Meehng. March 30,1926.

South African Labour Party. Constitution and Plafform. Johannesburg: South African Labour Party, 1914.
South African Trades and Labour Council. Report of First Annual Conference. Durban, April 4, 6,1931.
South African Trade Union Congress. Annual Report. 1930.
. Report of the National Executive Commiffee Meeting. August 10, 1926.
. Rep off of the National Executive Committee Meeting. November29,1927.
. Report of the National Executive Commiffee Meeting. November25,1930.

. Report of the National Executive Commiffee Meeting with Executives of Affiliated Unions. January 15,1928.
. Report of the Second Congress. Johannesburg,1926.
War on War League. Have You Answered the Call?. Cape Town: War on War League, n.d.
C. Materials Issued by Overseas Communist Organizations and Affiliates The Communist Intemational
The Communist Intemational Between the Fifth and the Sixth World Congresses, 1924-8. London: Communist Party of Great Britain,1928.

Ein JahrArbeit und Kampf' Tatigkeitsbericht der Exekutive der Kommunis-
tischen Internationale, 1925-26 (A Year of Work and Struggle, The Report of the Activities of the Executive of the Communist International,1925-26). Hamburg: Verlag Carl Hoym Nacht,1926.
Piatii Vsemirnii Kongress Kommunisticheskogo Intematsionala -Stenograficheskii Otchet (Fifth World Congress of the Communist International --Stenographic Report). 2 parts. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1925.

Communist Party of Great Britain
Resolutions of the 11 th Congress of the Communist Party of Great Britain. London: Communist Party of Great Britain, 1929?.
Communist Party of the United States
The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies. New York: Workers' Publishing Co., 1929.
Intemational Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers
First Intemational Conference of Negro Workers--Report of Proceedings and Decisions. No. 1. Hamburg: International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers, 1930.

Red International of Labor Unions
IV Kongress Profintema, Stenograficheskii Otchet (Fourth Congress of the Profintern, Stenographic Report). Moscow: Izdanie Profinterna, 1928.
IV Sessiia Tsentral'nogo Sovieta Krasnogo Intematsionala Profsoiuzov, 9-15 Marta, 1926 g., Otchet (Fourth Session of the Central Executive of the Red International of Labor Unions, 9-15 March, 1926, Report). Moscow: Izdanie Profinterna,1926.
Desiat' Let Profintema v Resoliutsiiakh, Dokumentakh, i Tsifrakh (Ten Years of the Profintern in Resolutions, Documents, and Figures). Moscow: Izdatel'stvoVTSSPS,1930 .

Report of the Fourth Congress of the RILU. London: National Minority Movement, 1928.
Resolutions and Decisions--Third World Congress of the Red International of Labour Unions. Chicago: Trade Union Educational League, n.d.
Ill Kongress Krasnogo Intematsionala Profsoiuzov, Otchet. (lll Congress of the Red International of Trade Unions, Report). Moscow: Izdanie Profinterna, 1925.
Young Communist International.
Protokoll tea 5. Weltkongresses der KJI (Report of the 5th World Congress of the YCI). Berlin: Verlag der Jugendinternationale,1929.

A.lntemal Communist Documents and Correspondence
"Address of S. P. Bunting to the Sixth Congress of the Communist International, Moscow, July 23, 1928" (Typewritten).
"Address of S. P. Bunting to the Sixth Congress of the
Communist International, Moscow, August 20, 1928" (Typewritten).
"Amendments," Document Submitted to the First Congress of the Communist Party of South Africa, Cape Town' July 30-August 1, 1921 (Typewritten).

Bunting, Sidney P. "The ,Colonial' Labour Front," 1922 (Typewritten) .
"Circular, to the Sections of the Anglo-American Colonial Group of the Communist International," Circular Sent to the Communist Party of South Africa from the Secretariat, ECCI, Moscow, Ausgabe 1140, June 3, 1922. "Draft of a Letter from the Secretary' General Executive, CPSA, to the ECCI," 1929 (Typewritten).
"Draft Rules," Document Submitted to the First Congress of the Communist Party of South Africa, Cape Town, July 30-August 1,1921 (Typewritten).

Glass, C. F. "Relations with the S.A. Labour Party," Document Submitted to the Third Congress of the Communist Party of South Africa, Johannesburg, December 29-31,1924 (Typewritten).
Letter from Bunting to Roux, December 15, 1926.Letter from Bunting to Roux, September 11,1928.
Letter from Bunting to Roux, January 9,1929.
Letter from Bunting to Secretary, CPSA, July 21, 1929.
Letter from Bunting to Secretary, Cape Town Branch,CPSA, September 22, 1930.
Letter from Danchin and Kalk to Bunting, December 22,1928. Letter from C. F. Glass to The Intemational, March 3, 1921.

Letter from National Minority Movement (Signed by Harry Pollitt) to Secretary, SATUC (Andrews)' January 6,1928.
Letter from Roux to Bunting, December 29, 1927. Letter from Roux to Bunting' December 5, 1928.
Letter from Roux to Central Executive, CPSA' April 5,1928. Letter from Roux to Wolton, September 5,1928. Letter from Wolton to Roux' February 14,1928. Minute Book of the Communist Propaganda Group, Cape Town,1921. "Minutes of Meeting of South African Delegation to Brussels Conference with Secretariat of League Against Imperialism"' 1927 (Mimeographed).

Notes of R. Bunting at the Sixth Congress of the Communist International, 1928 (Handwritten).
Notes of S. P. Bunting at the Sixth Congress of the Communist International, 1928 (Handwritten).
· Official Report of the Communist Party Congress," Issued by the Central
Executive Committee, Communist Party of South Africa, Johannesburg,
1921 (Typewritten).
"Proposals for the Plafform of the Party," Document Submitted to the
Second Congress of the Communist Party of South Africa, April 28-29' 1923

(Typewritten) .
Reesema, "Report on South Africa," Statement Submitted to Anglo-American Secretariat, Communist International, Moscow, December 22, 1928 (Typewritten).
"Report of the Central Executive," Document Submitted to the Second Congress of the Communist Party of South Africa, Johannesburg, April 28-29,1923 (Typewritten).
"Report of the Unity Committee," Document Submitted to the First Congress of the Communist Party of South Africa, Cape Town, July 30-August 1,1921 (Typewritten) .

"Scheme for Work in South Africa--Meeting of Comrade Roux with International Secretariat, League Against Imperialism, June 28, 1929 (Typewritten).
"Supplementary Report of the Central Executive from Ist April to 30 November, 1924," Document Submitted to the Third Congress of the Communist Party of South Africa, Johannesburg, December 29-31,1924 (Typewritten). B.lnternal ICU Documents and Correspondence Pertaining to the ICU.
"Circular Letter No. 2-26," Issued by ICU Headquarters,

Johannesburg, April 27, 1926 (Mimeographed).
"Circular Letter No. 9-26'" Issued by ICU Headquarters, Johannesburg, July 30,1926 (Mimeographed).
"Circular Letter," Issued by ICU Headquarters, Johannesburg, October 21, 1926 (Mimeographed).
"Circular Letter," Issued by ICU Headquarters,
Johannesburg, October 21, 1926 (Mimeographed).
"General Secretary's Report of Inspection of Branches,"
Adopted by the Board of Arbitration, lCU' March 6,1926 (Mimeographed). "The ICU Special Congress (Kimberley)"' Issued by the ICU Head Office, Johannesburg, December 20 ' 1927 (Typewritten) .

Letter from Creech-Jones to Kadalie, September 23, 1926.
Letter from Headquarters, ICU, to Members, National Council, ICU, October
21, 1926.
Letter from Ethelreda Lewis to Winifred Holtby, July 27, 1926. Letter from Kadalie to Creech-Jones, October 6,1926. Letter from Kadalie to Creech-Jones, October 3,1928 Letter from Kadalie to Winifred Holtby, September 12, 1928. C.Theses and Manuscripts
Hessian, Bernard. "An Investigation into the Causes of Labour Agitation on the Witwatersrand, January to June, 1922"' Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Department of History, University of Witwatersrand,1957.

Kadalie, Clements. "Memoirs" (Typewritten).
Thomas, D. G. "A History of the Labour Party in South Africa up to 1924,"
Unpublished B.A. Honors Thesis, Department of Politics, University of
Witwatersrand, 1963.
D.Other Letters
Letter from Harry Haywood to Johns, July 27,1961.